


A REPORT OF THE PIPS
PROGRAM ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Anatomy of Green-on-Blue Attacks



Pak Institute For Peace Studies

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Anatomy of Green-on-Blue Attacks

Ehsan Mehmood Khan

During exercises and operational planning, the Americans assign Blue color to their own forces (including the allies) and green color to the host nation. Red color signifies the enemy. Thus, attacks by Afghan security forces personnel on NATO soldiers are described as green-on-blue by the Pentagon / NATO Headquarters

The Taliban pose extensive and multifaceted threat to the security of foreign coalition forces in Afghanistan. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have come up as a newfound threat. Nonetheless, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Police (AP) are deemed by the US and NATO to be an opportunity in four ways. First, they often serve as a front line of security operations both for defensive and offensive operations against the Taliban. Secondly, they provide an Afghan face to the security machination in Afghanistan. Thirdly, with predominant non-Pashtun character and composition, they can work as a bully against an ethnic Pashtun-tinted movement. Fourthly, they would be responsible to maintain law and order and security in Afghanistan beyond 2014 when bulk of NATO forces would have been withdrawn leaving behind a part thereof in fortified bases. These opportunities were, probably, foreseen and set as objectives by NATO years back at the time of conception of this idea to raise and train ANSF after the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

However, some inherent challenges exist within these opportunities, which have gradually started surfacing and which were probably not forethought by the concerned quarters. Afghan security forces have always remained a major preoccupation, a sort of operational headache, for NATO since their establishment but the kind of challenges they have started to offer are really disturbing. First, the administrative bulk of the newly established force calls for allocation of significant resources by NATO forces as the Afghan government, so far, cannot bear huge expenditures and would not be able to do so till 2024. Currently, combined strength of ANA & AP stands at 352,000. According to NATO estimates, Kabul would require over \$4.1 billion a year to maintain this force. But the Afghan government lacks funds even if the number of personnel was reduced to 228,500 by 2017.¹

Secondly, the system of Afghan security forces has to have concrete linkage with the social makeup and political system of the country. With some pluses and minuses, Afghanistan has remained a country in present shape since its establishment in October 1747. Since then, none could ever dare to cut it into pieces. However, it remained somewhat like a loose confederation of tribes (rather than administrative divisions) and has never been ruled from the centre in a conventionally (and universally) known fashion even during the strongest of the regimes. A weak centre can never maintain a national army. Traditionally the tribes have been maintaining their own armies, the tribal militias, to ward off any threat from the other tribes. The tribal chieftains not only headed their tribes on socio-political plane but were also the warlords in their area. Socio-political environment of Afghanistan has not changed. The tribal sway and protectorates continue to exist despite the Western democratic scheme at the level of the Centre. Tribal militias also exist. Since the Centre cannot encroach much into the affairs of the tribes, hence, sway of a security force commanded from the Centre is also seen as a threat by the tribes. In addition, because of obvious reasons, Afghan security forces are dominated by non-Pashtun fragments of population, and thus cannot be fully confided in by the Pashtun segment of society. Furthermore, the efficacy of Afghan security forces in Pashtun-inhabited areas remains limited and questionable, even while it might “astonish” the NATO hierarchy when they compare the situation with the countries of Western social order.

While NATO saw Afghan security forces as an opportunity before 2014, the plan had been to totally count on them beyond 2014. However, with present state of affairs, the dream does not seem to come true and thus it has come up as Challenge Number-1

Thirdly, Afghan security forces suffer from the pitfall of inadequate evolutionary process. NATO must understand (and one should believe they do) that it takes decades to raise an armed force. Yet more, it needs decades and at times centuries of experience backlog to establish a professional military machine, something that the existing Afghan security structure lacks.² This reflects that the NATO’s program to raise ANSF has been ambitious beyond realities of the time, place and wherewithal. While NATO can claim to have established a force structure with large number of personnel on its inventory, still, it lacks discipline and temperament of a name-worthy security workforce, which will take time to develop. Commenting on these issues, Siraj Ulmulk recently wrote in the News International:


In any case, establishment of the Afghan National Army by the government of Afghanistan is merely a non-serious effort to appease the Americans. The ANA stops young people on the street to offer them recruitment. Boys as young as 14 years are seen awkwardly attired in army uniforms. After enrolment in the army, a soldier could be on leave for weeks (or even months) at a time, but will continue to receive the pay cheque regularly. It is just numbers the Afghan government is interested in.³

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The Green-on-Blue Attacks

With increasing number of green-on-blue attacks, Afghan security forces have developed into a threat to reckon with for security of NATO personnel. Albeit, Threat Number-2 for NATO in character, it has perhaps transformed into Threat Number-1 in nature given that green-on-blue is swelling larger than red-on-blue and lies within. According to NATO, 37 of its soldiers have died in 27 attacks by Afghan soldiers during 2012 and 35 in 21 such attacks during 2011.⁴ Afghan soldiers, intelligence officials and civilians killed by the Afghan soldiers are in addition to these figures. The green-on-blue attacks inflicted less than 1% of the total casualties on coalition forces in 2008, 2% in 2009, 3% in 2010, 6% in 2011 and 13% in 2012 (till August 23).⁵

The Long War Journal's data has covered green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan from January 1, 2008 to the present. As of August 23, 2012, there have been a total of 52 attacks. Province wise details are shown in Figure-1.⁶ It is of note that green-on-blue attacks occurred in 18 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan – more than half of the provinces.



The total number of Coalition casualties (fatalities) from green-on-blue attacks for the period January 1, 2008 to the present is 103. Province wise details are shown in Figure-2.⁷ Total number of Coalition wounded is 84. Data up to August 26, 2012 has

killed 45 coalition troops, making up about 14 percent of the overall death toll in the war for 2012.¹² On the whole, 314 NATO soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan till August 30 during 2012.¹³ Thus, fatalities resulting from the green-on-blue attacks are 14.33 percent. So, isn't it Challenge Number-1 for NATO and even transforming into Threat Number-1. Time alone would tell the tale of the coming months and years. The situation has deteriorated to an extent that the US has stopped training of some Afghan forces. The move only puts about 1,000 Afghan trainees into limbo, a small fraction of the country's security forces. But it shows how these attacks have the potential to derail the U.S.-Afghan handover of security so essential to the international drawdown strategy.¹⁴

Threat Analysis

To an extent, the number of casualties suffered by a force is proportional to the intensity and magnitude of operations conducted by it. With lower intensity of operations in the first nine years of employment in Afghanistan, 1,000 American soldiers were killed. "The second 1,000," noted James Dao and Andrew W. Lehren, "came just 27 months later, a testament to the intensity of fighting prompted by President Obama's decision to send 33,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in 2010, a policy known as the surge."¹⁵ According to the Times analysis, three out of four were white, 9 out of 10 were enlisted service members, and one out of two died in either Kandahar Province or Helmand Province in Taliban-dominated southern Afghanistan. Their average age was 26.¹⁶ Thus, American youth is serving as a means to attain the geo-political ends even though their families are told that they are out to ensure security of the American Homeland. Anyway, strategic ends on both sides apart, it is youth-for-youth, dead-for-dead and wounded-for-wounded contest underway in Afghanistan at tactical level, wherein the green segment has, now, started complementing the efforts of the red, and is acting as an auxiliary effort in support of the main effort launched by the Taliban.

With the passage of time, the war itself becomes the reason for war. This is somewhat true for Afghanistan too. The Euro-American forces had never been so cautious and defensive in Afghanistan as they are today after surge in green-on-blue. While the Taliban are a bomb-in-the-backyard, the Afghan soldiers and policemen are akin to a primed grenade under the bed of the NATO soldiers with the pin pulled out four second ago.

It does not need a missile-manufacturing formula to know as to what induces the Afghan security forces personnel to attack their NATO "brethren" while they are dwelling on the financial support of the latter. More so, NATO forces are ostensibly a winning side too, as claimed and proclaimed by them. Decades back, David Galula espoused that the population support is contingent upon their realization as to who will win.¹⁷ Certainly, if we take this as a yardstick or a population support formula, Afghan security personnel should have and would have supported NATO forces without ado. But the fact remains that population support spectrum is wider than

Galula's narrow consideration. Population also contemplates as to who is ours, who is to stay and who supports our interest anyway! By all four gauges, Afghan civilians and security forces personnel are likely to support the Taliban.

Firstly, who is to win; the Taliban and not NATO seem to be the winning side. Despite all out and multidimensional efforts, the Taliban are on strategic offensive in Afghanistan, and hit the soft belly of the coalition forces wherever they wish to besides engaging hard targets like soldiers-on-patrol, well protected military convoys, armored vehicles, helicopters, fortress and airbases.



Figure-3: A US soldier killed sixteen civilians (including 9 children) on 11 March 2012. Two grief-stricken Afghan men look at the body of a child badly burned in the same incident

Secondly, who is ours; by any measure, the Taliban are “our” side for Afghan populace including the Afghan security forces. Irrespective of the present security makeup of the country and their ethnic identities, they have lived together for centuries and rather millennia, and hence cannot right away revoke the age-old kinships. In case of Afghan security forces, it is perhaps an implicit feeling turned explicit. Behold a moment! Ask the Afghans; the civilians killed in the Taliban attacks on NATO are considered by the most a collateral damage. On the other hand, even the US-placed Afghan President does not accept a civilian casualty at the hands of NATO soldiers and has often rebuffed in loudest possible words. Take the example of a terror act by US Staff Sergeant Robert Bales wherein, on March 11, 2012, he left his base in Panjwayi district of Kandahar province and opened fire against civilians,

killing 17, including three women and nine children (refer to Figure-3 for a relevant image).¹⁸ The Western press labeled it the Kandahar Massacre and the sergeant was taken into custody on the charges of premeditated murder. Mr. Hamid Karzai, the Afghan President, vocally labeled the incident as it 'an assassination, an intentional killing of innocent civilians' that cannot be forgiven.¹⁹ He also demanded NATO troops to immediately pull out of rural areas.²⁰ Besides, he has occasionally threatened to join the Taliban.²¹ Reflect a moment! If the president of a country, who is oft-labeled an American “puppet” by his antagonists, has such outlook, opinion and reaction apropos the coalition forces, one can feel the sentiments of a commoner in Afghanistan including the Afghan security forces personnel who are constitutionally serving under the Afghan government headed by Mr. Hamid Karzai.

One can realize the feelings of the common Afghan from the words of a villager whose brother had been killed in the Kandahar Massacre, who said, “I don't want any compensation. I don't want money, I don't want a trip to Mecca, I don't want a house. I want nothing. But what I absolutely want is the punishment of the Americans. This is my demand, my demand, my demand and my demand,” said one villager, whose brother was killed in the nighttime slaughter.”²²

Don't such episodes touch the hearts of commoners in Afghanistan, including their security forces personnel? If yes, doesn't Sergeant Robert Bales qualify to be the General Charles Krulak's



Figure-4: Image showing the US soldiers urinating on the bodies of the Taliban in Afghanistan

strategic sergeant, as he left strategic impact on psycho-social environment of Afghanistan?²³ Likewise, the incidents like bombing of mosques and madrassas, desecration of the Holy Qur'an, indiscriminate killing by the US soldiers during night raids, and urination by the US soldiers on the bodies of Taliban (Figure-4)²⁴ do nothing but further fuel the hatred amongst Afghan populace (including the Afghan security forces personnel) against the foreign forces.

Thirdly, who is to stay; at any rate, Taliban and not the Western forces are to stay. The latter may stay for decades or even a century but will finally have to go back to

the parent countries. To this end, Taliban maintain, “You have the watches, we have the time. We were born here. We will die here. We aren’t going anywhere.”²⁵

Fourthly, who supports our interests anyway; NATO could have delivered well in this sphere but in reality, they are well short of the desired line of expectation. Hundreds of billions have been spent inside Afghanistan but most of it has either gone into maintenance of the NATO forces or allied legions of civilians. Much of the exchequer that was spared for Afghanistan itself gushed into the stream of institutional corruption therein. The life of the common Afghan, if changed, has changed for the worst. Thus, it may come to surprise for none, including the Pentagon and NATO high command, if the greens and the reds join hands against the blues tomorrow.

Oddly indeed, the Pentagon officials are still not ready to consider that with Afghan security officials in action against the coalition forces, the events are gradually assuming an Afghan-character rather than remaining Taliban-specific. Everything that kills or wounds is blamed on Taliban even if they have nothing to do with it. This rather elevates their stature. For instance, on the issue of surge in the green-on-blue attacks, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told the reporters on August 20, 2012, “We’ve said for a very long time, perhaps for as long as a year or more, that the pressure that we’re bringing to bear on the Taliban is forcing them to look to new tactics. Again, I can’t say that these [green-on-blue] incidents originate with the Taliban. Some of them may, some of them may not.”²⁶ He went on to say, “They will not have safe harbor as long as American forces are in Afghanistan, and they are lashing out in certain ways. They are adapting, and we’re prepared for whatever they may bring to the fight.”²⁷ Is it not rather ironic? Are the Afghan soldiers and policemen assaulting and harassing the US / NATO soldiers not living in the safe harbors provided by the NATO in form of the official dwellings and duties? Indeed yes, but may not be publicly acceptable to the Pentagon / NATO officials for politico-strategic and psychological reasons. To note, commenting on two green-on-blue attacks, Brigadier-General Gunter Katz, the chief NATO force spokesman, told reporters on August 11, 2012, “Let me clearly say that those two incidents clearly do not reflect the overall situation here in Afghanistan.”²⁸ If this does not reflect that overall situation, the question is as to how could two-third of NATO casualties in the month of August 2012 result from green-on-blue attacks?

More to the point, NATO military officials earlier attributed only about 10 percent of green-on-blue attacks to Taliban infiltration or impersonation of Afghan security units. Lately, General Allen said that in addition to that infiltration figure, another roughly 15 percent of the attacks could be caused by Taliban coercion of soldiers or police officers, either directly or through family members.²⁹ 10 + 15 comes to 25 percent. If this is taken as a yardstick, NATO is still living with traumatized mathematics. This denotes that at least 75 percent of the Afghan soldiers and policemen attacking the coalition forces have no links with the Taliban, and are doing so on personal stimulus and nationalistic motivation. Pentagon and NATO need to

recognize and rather acknowledge that they are not encountering a simple red-on-blue (Taliban) threat but indeed a complete citizenry, which includes the people ostensibly on “their” side. Imagine, if the red and the green join forces together against the blue (NATO), what would be the complexion and countenance of the Western narrative that they were in Afghanistan to help the populace against the forces of extremism? The narrative is already losing its color and complexion with greens assailing the blue without much support or spur from the red. Figure-5 contains the image of dead body of a US marine carried by his comrade. He was one of the three US marines killed by an Afghan security worker on August 11/12, on a military base in Southern Afghanistan.³⁰

Even though Pentagon and NATO officials are still not sure as regards the motives for this surge, it is considered that there cannot be a single *raison d'être* for such episodes. At strategic level, physical conditions cannot be separated from psycho-emotive responses and rationale, social structure, economic makeup and political framework in which the greens are



Figure-5: Dead body of one of the US marines killed by an Afghan soldier

operating. In heart of the heart, Afghan soldiers know that, for whatever reasons, their country stands occupied at the hands of the foreigners hailing from countries located over a myriad mile. They also feel that they have been embroiled in an Afghan-versus-Afghan combat on behalf someone else. *Inter alia*, there are six key factors that may be found at the bottom of green-on-blue attack series, as shown in Figure-6. These include: Afghan Nationalism at large; excesses by the NATO forces; antipathy towards aliens; interface with the Taliban; personal motivations; and lack of training and discipline.³¹

NATO officials have so far given confusing and somewhat contradictory messages. Some of them say that stress is the reason for outbreak of these incidents. If this was the core reasons, why would have the Afghan soldiers attacked the coalition (mainly American) soldiers only? Why would they not attack their fellow Afghan soldiers or civilians? Others say that these are isolated incidents that take place from internal altercation and disagreement between the soldiers. The argument is still the same; why green-on-blue? Quite interestingly, General Allen upholds that it was because of fasting (and the ensuing stress) by the Afghan soldiers and policemen during the holy month of Ramadan that they attacked the NATO soldiers.³² But the fact is that Ramadan comes every year! The attacks are in the news since 2008, and the Afghan

soldiers are not undergoing fasting for four years. The office of the Afghan President has come up with even novel explanation – infiltration of foreign spies – something that the NATO officials have not paid any heed to.³³ Even, with regard to the size and structure of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), there are mixed messages. Declared ANSF growth target is 352,000 forces.³⁴

Proposals are coming out of some US desks to cut down the size of the

force to 230,000 after 2014, something on which General Abdul Rahim Wardak, the then Afghan Defense Minister, expressed concerns.³⁵ Hence, it is uncertainly not only with regard to the character of the force but even the composition.




Figure-6: Factors fuelling green-on-blue attacks

The Greens versus Haqqanis

Let us examine the green-on-blue threat from another angle. On the one hand, the US and NATO officials maintain that if it was not for the Haqqanis (located in FATA of Pakistan, according to them), conflict scene of Afghanistan would have been different. Certainly, a sane mind would ask a question as to how do the Haqqanis infiltrate in Afghanistan, trek hundreds of kilometers, conduct a raid or attack, and travel back unchecked, unbridled and unhindered despite massive presence of the NATO and Afghan forces throughout Afghanistan? This question has so far remained unanswered.

This is, indeed, the pinnacle of mistrust between the green and blue fragments of a force otherwise thought to be performing the same task towards the same strategic end

NATO maintains that Haqqani operations account for one-tenth of the attacks on ISAF troops, and perhaps 15 percent of casualties.³⁶ If this is taken as the mathematics of war in Afghanistan, it denotes that green-on-blue is emerging as a bigger threat than Haqqani Network of the Afghan Taliban. Green-on-blue makes up for 14.33 percent of the coalition casualties during 2012 but it is more serious a threat in that it

nurtures right under the nose of the NATO forces. Thus, more than Haqqanis, NATO needs to concentrate on green-on-blue, the threat within.

Conclusion

Surge in green-on-blue attacks is certainly consequential. It has far-reaching effects insofar as NATO's strategy and strategic ends in Afghanistan are concerned. The state of affairs is not very healthy for NATO as it nears completion of 11 years in Afghanistan. The situation is so precarious that armed NATO soldiers have been deputed to monitor the Afghan soldiers so as to protect the Westerners. The analysts think that these 'Guardian Angels' won't fix a flawed Afghan war policy.³⁷ This is, indeed, the pinnacle of mistrust between the green and blue fragments of a force otherwise thought to be performing the same task towards the same strategic end. Thus, under the circumstances, the dream of Afghan forces assuming complete security responsibility in the country beyond 2014 without physical American support seems improbable. If they do it with "some" American support from the American fortresses and bases, which might remain under use by the US forces, their legitimacy would be questioned by common Afghans as well as the Taliban, and it would remain as the Taliban versus the US conflict in the main.

To encapsulate, it seems in the best interest of the US to leave the Afghan issue to the Afghans rather than exporting and imposing a solution to them. The comments of Jon Cleveland, probably a Canadian or British national, on one of the news items of Daily Mail best abridge the solution to the issue, "Is it any wonder why these people despise us and the Americans.....We are not just occupying their country like a certain nation did to many countries in 1939-1945 [Germany], there are [NATO] soldiers committing atrocities also....Time we left these people in peace to sort out their own problems."³⁸ In the wake of several deaths of its soldiers in Afghanistan, New Zealand (like France and South Korea) has already started accelerating the departure of its 140 soldiers.³⁹ Isn't time for the US too to expedite exodus of its forces?

**(The views expressed herein, including the references, are entirely based on the personal opinion of the author, and do not in any way, represent the views or policy outlook of Pak Institute for Peace Studies).*

Notes:

¹ Imtiaz Gul, "US running out of options in Afghanistan," *The Friday Times*, Lahore, August 24-30, 2012, Vol. XXIV, No. 28.

² Some newly created or liberated countries do have first-rate professional armed machines but their military forces, in reality, precede their countries in existence and experience.

³ Siraj Ulmulk, "It's frustration, not defection," *The News International*, August 20, 2012.

⁴ "Afghan policeman fires on NATO allies," *The News International*, Islamabad, August 14, 2012.

⁵ Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, "Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data," *The Long War Journal*, August 23, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29 (accessed August 26, 2012).

⁶ Ibid; adapted from data covered by *the Long War Journal*. Map by this author.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Taimoor Shah, "Differing Theories in Killing of 17 in Taliban Stronghold," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2012.

⁹ "Killing of 2 US soldiers by Afghan soldier appears to be accidental, officials say," *Fox News*, August 27, 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/08/27/afghan-soldier-kills-2-coalition-service-members-nato-says/> (accessed August 28, 2012).

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¹² Dylan Welch and Judith Ireland, "Five Australian soldiers killed in Afghanistan," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 30, 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/five-australian-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan-20120830-251log.html> (accessed August 30, 2012).

¹³ <http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed August 30, 2012).

¹⁴ "US stops training some Afghan forces after attacks," *The Marietta Times*, September 3, 2012.

¹⁵ James Dao and Andrew W. Lehren, "In Toll of 2,000, New Portrait of Afghan War," *The New York Times*, August 21, 2012.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 55.

¹⁸ "Afghanistan - Mid-Year Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," *United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, July 2012: 36.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Amir Shah and Sebastian Abbot, "Afghan President Karzai tells NATO to pull back," *The Washington Times*, March 15, 2012.

²¹ Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough, ed, *Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers- China and India* (Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 296.

²² "Karzai says he's at 'end of the rope' with US over Afghanistan massacre," NBC News, March 16, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/16/10722610-karzai-says-hes-at-end-of-the-rope-with-us-over-afghanistan-massacre (accessed August 30, 2012).

²³ General Charles Krulak introduced the term "strategic corporal." For details, see General Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block Warfare," *Marines Magazine* (January 1999).

²⁴ When the news on upload of video on YouTube broke, Afghan President Hamid Karzai condemned the video, describing the men's actions as "inhuman" and calling for an investigation. Rage spread across Afghan populace and it stirred up anti-US sentiment across Afghanistan. Certainly, Afghan security forces did not remain immune to the rage and wrath. <http://news.kuwaittimes.net/2012/01/12/taleban-say-marine-abuse-tape-wont-hurt-afghanistan-talks-us-defense-secretary-orders-investigation-of-video/> (accessed August 28, 2012).

²⁵ Sami Yousafzai, and Ron Moreau, "The Taliban in their own words," *Newsweek*, September 26, 2009.

²⁶ Tyrone C. Marshall Jr. Army Sgt. 1st Class, "Insider Attacks Mask Full Afghan Story, Little Says," *American Forces Press Service*, US Department of Defense, August 20, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117561> (accessed August 26, 2012).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “Three more U.S. soldiers killed by Afghans in grim day for NATO,” Updated News, August 12, 2012, <http://updatednews.ca/2012/08/12/three-more-u-s-soldiers-killed-by-afghans-in-grim-day-for-nato/> (accessed August 28, 2012).

²⁹ Thom Shanker, “General Notes Taliban Coercion in Some Attacks on Troops,” *The New York Times*, August 23, 2012.

³⁰ “Three more U.S. soldiers killed by Afghans in grim day for NATO,” Updated News, August 12, 2012, <http://updatednews.ca/2012/08/12/three-more-u-s-soldiers-killed-by-afghans-in-grim-day-for-nato/> (accessed August 28, 2012).

³¹ View of this writer.

³² Geoff Dyer, “US general blames fasting for attacks,” *Financial Times*, August 23, 2012, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5dfaadf2-ed40-11e1-83d1-00144feab49a.html#axzz252mEstqz> (accessed August 30, 2012).

³³ Graham Bowley, “Afghanistan, Contradicting NATO, Blames Foreign Spies for Insider Attacks,” *The New York Times*, August 22, 2012.

³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development,” *Media Backgrounder*, Public Diplomacy Division - Press & Media Section Media Operations Centre (MOC), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf, May 2012 (accessed August 29, 2012).

³⁵ Yaroslav Trofimov, “Afghan General Sounds Alarm,” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 8, 2012.

³⁶ Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “New Boldness From Militants Poses Risk to U.S.-Pakistan Ties,” *The New York Times*, July 30, 2012.

³⁷ James Carroll, “‘Guardian Angels’ won’t fix a flawed Afghan war policy,” *The Boston Globe*, August 27, 2012, http://articles.boston.com/2012-08-27/opinion/33400323_1_nato-soldiers-members-of-afghan-security-coalition-troops (accessed August 29, 2012).

³⁸ Comments by Jon Cleveland, probably a Canadian or British national, below Beth Stebner and Thomas Durante, op.cit.

³⁹ Tom Engelhardt, “How quickly will the US leave Afghanistan?” *Aljazeera*, August 30, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/201282873530364972.html> (accessed August 30, 2012).



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