Understanding North Punjab in the Context of Pakistani

1. Introduction and Background

A census report by the Institute for Public Policy Research in London counted that 7.53 percent of Britain’s population in 2001 was born overseas. Among the top non-UK birthplaces of Britain's population, Pakistan was ranked third after Republic of Ireland and India. British Pakistanis mainly hail from three parts of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir: Mirpur, which has produced more than 42 percent of their over one million population in Britain, and North and Central Punjab. Many British Pakistanis also belong to Peshawar, Karachi and interior Sindh.

The large-scale immigration leads to various socio-cultural, religious-political and economic transformations in both the immigrants' native areas and the host society. To understand their behaviors and interaction with the host societies, it is important to map some prevalent socio-cultural and ideological tendencies in their areas of origin, particularly the families they belong to. This exercise becomes even more pertinent where the immigrants have maintained strong links with their native towns and also feel reluctant to be fully assimilated into their host societies for one reason or another.

The primary goal of this study is to measure the key religious, ideological and political trends among Pakistani immigrants hailing from North Punjab, and some adjacent parts of Central Punjab. The research study was conducted in different parts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Chakwal, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin districts of Punjab. Although the title of the report only mentions North Punjab, the scope of the study also includes Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin districts, which are not part of North Punjab but have been included in the study because a large number of British Pakistanis hail from there, particularly from those parts of Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin districts which are close to North Punjab's Jhelum district. The same belt extends to Gujranwala as well, with the number of British Pakistanis decreasing from North to Central Punjab.

Methodology

The study is largely a product of extensive research spanning four months of in-depth field interviews and close-ended surveys. In order to pursue the study in a systematic manner, a mixed method approach was employed. All four qualitative data collection methods—including open-ended interviews, structured surveys, observations during field work and analysis of official texts and documents—have been utilized. The research process commenced with a review of the available literature, PIPS news archives and online sources on the subject. Having reviewed the available literature in the form of books, newspapers, journal articles and online sources, a structured survey form and a questionnaire for open-ended interviews were drafted.
Survey Description

PIPS researchers, who have been involved in similar studies in the past, held extensive discussions to formulate the survey form and the questionnaire. The survey focused on the following key areas: personal information (respondents’ age, marital status, education, address in Pakistan and Britain and media interests, etc.); views on religion and ideology (importance of religion in personal life, favorite religious scholar, views on Sufism, madrassas, suicide attacks, etc.); political views (favorite political party, participation in British and Pakistani politics, worldview and opinion on the war on terror, etc.); and views on cultural and economic issues, etc.

- A Profile of North Punjab

The region under study stretches from the Potohar Plateau to the plains of Gujranwala. Administratively, the Potohar Plateau is classified as North Punjab, which comprises four districts in an arid zone of the province, namely, Rawalpindi, Chakwal, Jhelum and Attock. Commonly called the Potohar Plateau, North Punjab lies to the south of northern mountains and is flanked in the west by River Indus and in the east by River Jhelum.

The history of North Punjab dates back to the Hindu mythological period of the Mahabharata. The epic represents the Salt Range as the refuge of the five Pandava brothers during the period of their exile. Similarly, the mention of Katas Raj temple, located in the Salt Range 18 miles south of Chakwal city, is found in the Mahabharata written in 300 BC.

Modern historians have designated Jhelum district of North Punjab as the site of the famous battle between Alexander the Great and Hindu king Poras. After this battle, we have little information with regard to the condition of the district until the Muslim conquests brought back literature and history to Upper India. The Janjuas and Jats, who now inhabit the Salt Range and its northern plateau, respectively, appear to have been among the earliest inhabitants.

The Ghakkars seem to represent an early wave of conquest from the east, and they still inhabit the whole eastern slope of the district; while the Awans, who now cluster in the western plain, are apparently later invaders from the opposite quarter. The Ghakkars were the dominant race at the time of the first Mughal conquests, and long continued to retain their independence.

During the flourishing period of the Mughal dynasty, the Ghakkar chieftains were prosperous and loyal vassals of the house of Babar; but after the collapse of the Delhi Empire Jhelum fell, like its neighbors, under the sway of the Sikhs. In 1765, Gujjar Singh defeated the last independent Ghakkar prince, and subjugated the wild mountaineers. His son inherited the territory and ruled it until 1810, when he was defeated by Ranjit Singh’s army. In 1849, the district passed, with the rest of the Sikh territories, into the hands of the British.

The British, after annexation of Punjab from Sikhs, established administration at the district level. During the British era in the Subcontinent, North Punjab was a religiously diverse area where Sikh, Hindu and Muslim had lived in peace for centuries.
Social Structure

With the exception of Rawalpindi, the districts of North Punjab have the largest rural populations in Pakistan. Hence tribes and castes become very strong in the local context. The population mostly consists of the following tribes, clans and castes: Awans, Janjuas, Gujjars, Jats, Bhuttas, Mair Minhas Rajputs, Kahuts, Mughal Kassars, Janjua Rajputs, Gujjars, Gondals, Syeds, Arains and Sheikhs.

Education

Decades of sending their sons to European countries in search of better jobs and serving as recruitment ground for the armed forces of Pakistan has led to a boost in the literacy rate of North Punjab. In fact, North Punjab is regarded as the most literate region of Pakistan. Rawalpindi, Chakwal and Jhelum districts are among five districts of Punjab with the highest literacy rate. Charts 2 and 3 provide a comparison of literacy rates between North Punjab (the area that produced the largest number of immigrants to the UK and European countries) and South Punjab (the area that produced the largest number of economic immigrants to the Persian Gulf states).

(Source: A report prepared by Punjab Education Department in 2003)
Political Landscape

The four North Punjab districts: Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum and Chakwal, with a total population of 6.66 million, comprise 14 National Assembly constituencies and had remained the traditional stronghold of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) from 1988 to 1997. Since the split of the Nawaz Sharif-led PML and the formation of the PML-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) in 2002, the electoral contests in these districts largely remain between the Nawaz-led PML-N, the PML-Q and Pakistan People’s Party-Parliamentarians (PPPP). Following is a breakdown of the winning political parties on the 14 seats in the National Assembly from North Punjab in the 2008 elections.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>No of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League-N</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League-Q</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PML-N is also the largest political party in Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujrat districts in terms of representation in the National Assembly. The following table depicts the breakdown of the winning political parties on the 11 National Assembly seats from these districts in the 2008 elections.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>No of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League-N</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League-Q</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this performance in the elections, party representation in the National Assembly from the area of this study is given in Chart 4.
Not surprisingly, religious-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan have never been able to claim more than 1,000 votes in the entire electoral history of North Punjab. However, in Gujranwala district of Central Punjab, Qazi Hameedullah Khan of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an umbrella organization of religious political parties formed in 2002, was able to win from the National Assembly constituency NA-96 in the 2002 elections. But that was the time when for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the MMA and other religious outfits were able to gain political strength due to increasing anti-American sentiments following the Afghan and Iraq wars. However, in the 2008 election Qazi Hameedullah lost, securing only 2,600 votes. In the rest of the Central Punjab districts under discussion, religious parties have always been marginalized on account of popularity of mainstream political forces.

Religious Landscape

Sunni-Barelvis presumably form the largest part of the population of North Punjab followed by Deobandis and Shias. Gujrat, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala maintain a similar pattern of sectarian distribution of the general population. Since there is no official record maintained on the sectarian affiliations of the population, the sectarian classification of North Punjab is based on the observations of local field researchers and the community leaders engaged and interviewed for the study. The number of mosques and religious seminaries endorsing particular sects are also helpful in understanding the sectarian distribution of the region’s population. For instance, investigations revealed that there were 2,827 mosques in Chakwal district, of which 2,056 belonged to Sunni-Barelvis, 507 to Deobandis, 162 to Shias, while 28 mosques were affiliated with the Ahl-e-Hadith sect. The number of mosques subscribing to the Barelvi sect indicated the dominance of this particular sect in terms of numbers in the Chakwal district.

Like any other part of Pakistan, the Sufi tradition is very strong in North Punjab and in the three districts of Central Punjab where this study focused. Prominent spiritual personalities with significant following include Pir Mehr Ali Shah, Barri Imam, Shah Abdul Lateef, Sayyed Muhammad Shah, Hafiz Abdullah Dood Shah, Bawa ji Ghulam, Bawa Afzal, Hazrat Shah Safeer, Shah Chan Charagh, Bikhar Shareef, Bhengali Shareef, Tahl Shahana, Eidgah Shareef, Mian Muhammad Bakhsh, Shah Daula Wali, Kanwan

Economic Landscape

Apart from agriculture, the local economy is largely dependent on three major sources; a significant number of locals settled in Britain and other European countries; a large number of local men enlisted in the armed forces of Pakistan; and local industries that provide employment opportunities to tens of thousands of people in the region. In Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin agriculture also provides livelihood to a large number of people.

Large-scale migration of natives of the area to other countries has brought high levels of economical stability, good educational opportunities and better healthcare facilities to the region. This economic boost has attracted a huge numbers of people from impoverished parts of Pakistan, especially from Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Communication Avenues

The area under study maintains a vibrant presence in the cyber world. Various web portals present considerable information about different districts under study. Similarly, the print media is also very robust here. In addition to widespread circulation of national newspapers, a number of local newspapers are also published from each district. The total number of local newspapers and magazines published from Rawalpindi, Chakwal, Jhelum, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin exceeds 60.

2. Salient Geographical and Demographic Features

2.1. Composition and Geographical Distribution of Immigrants in Britain

There are around two million Muslim immigrants in Britain, the Pakistani-origin community forming the largest part of that. After Mirpur district in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the origin of a significant number of British-Pakistanis settled in Britain is spread over the rural and urban areas of the six districts of north and central Punjab which are the focus of this study.

Pakistani immigrants from these areas, as from other parts of Pakistan, and from Mirpur in Azad Kashmir, started to arrive in Britain in the 1950s. The prime pull factor was the sheer demand for workforce in Britain at the time, which prompted the country to attract people mostly from the newly independent Commonwealth countries. Even before the 1950s major shift of Pakistani workers, individuals from the Indian Subcontinent working in ships had settled in Britain in the early 1920s.

A larger number of Pakistanis arrived in Britain in the 1960s. Those who followed them preferred to lodge with other Pakistanis, preferably relatives or friends, to get community support in the new country. By the 1970s, many Pakistanis working in Britain had started thinking that it would be difficult to return home due to a number of factors including better living standards in Britain, the need to maintain their new businesses and works, their children being enrolled in British schools and the political instability in Pakistan.
The field survey designed to seek responses of British Pakistanis and their relatives from the areas under study asked about the former’s length of stay in Britain. Around 65 percent of the respondents said that the period of stay of their family members or relatives was 20 years or less; while relatives of the remaining 35 percent said that the length of stay in Britain was 21 years or more. (See Table 1)

Table 1: British Pakistanis’ Length of Stay in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Stay</th>
<th>Frequency of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10 years</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 10 and 20 years</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 years and above</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now when the second and third generations of British Pakistanis have come of age, the basic features of their population and settlements have changed considerably. The composition of their main native towns in the six selected districts of Punjab and their corresponding places of settlement in Britain, as discerned from the field survey and interviews with a range of sources, are given in Table 2.

Table 2: Geographical Correspondence between Immigrants’ Native and Host Towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native Towns in Six Pakistani Districts</th>
<th>Host Cities in Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rawalpindi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islampura Jabbar, Gujjar Khan</td>
<td>Bradford, Dewsbury, Birmingham, Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhata, Thathi 10, Gujjar Khan</td>
<td>Birmingham, Nottingham, Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babul village, Gujjar Khan</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rattala village, Gujjar Khan</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujjar Khan City</td>
<td>Birmingham, Manchester, Bartley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok Sayyedan, Rawalpindi</td>
<td>Waltham St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bewal, Gujjar Khan</td>
<td>London, Bartley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namble Danna, Murree</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbasiyan, Murree</td>
<td>Bradford, Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawat, Kallar Sayyedan</td>
<td>Birmingham, Bradford, Blackburn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Jhelum</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermala village, Akwanabad, Sanghoi, Bhaga Sayyedan,</td>
<td>Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok Ambh, Pindorin</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pehl Bannay Khan, Pehl Mirza Khan, Sohawa</td>
<td>Bradford, Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangla, Dhok Chamala, Deena</td>
<td>Manchester, Birmingham, Nottingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Gujrat</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalamusa</td>
<td>Birmingham, London, Yorkshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara-e-Alamgir</td>
<td>Bradford, London, Glasgow, Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharian</td>
<td>Manchester, Bradford, London, Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat City</td>
<td>Manchester, Bartley, Bradford, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chak Kalu, Kotla Arab Ali Khan</td>
<td>London, Birmingham, Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Chakwal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakwal City</td>
<td>London, Dewsbury, Birmingham, Sheffield, Nottingham, Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan Khund, Tala Gang</td>
<td>Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahula, Urwal, Chua Sayyedan, Chakor, Chakral, Dhudiyal</td>
<td>Nottingham, Manchester, London, Bradford, Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Mandi Bahauddin</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassuwal, Malikwal, Bohat, Thathi Murid, Phalia, Mong, Chak Jannu Kallan, Chak 33 Khasa, Chak Basaway, Aidal, Miana Gondal</td>
<td>London, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham, Bradford, Dewsbury, Nottingham, Liverpool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Gujranwala</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodhra, Wazirabad</td>
<td>Bradford, London, Manchester, Nottingham, Middlebrow, Leeds, Nottingham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2. Clan and Biradri Relations among Divided Families

The British Pakistanis have maintained a strong link with their native towns. The interviews conducted for this study with the local people from across North Punjab and parts of Central Punjab suggested that joint family system and clan or caste-based relations were very strong in these areas, and also among families divided between Pakistan and Britain. These relations work as a permanent centripetal force attracting the immigrants to their origin, particularly the first and second generations of immigrants. On the other hand, the clan and biradri links have not only led to the emergence of a cohesive community of immigrants in Britain but has also ‘discouraged’ their interaction and assimilation into the host society.21 This has strengthened in a way the development of parallel communities of Pakistani immigrants in the host society.

The immigrant families also prefer to invite to Britain and sponsor the people on the basis of biradri and blood relations.22 The tradition of intra-family and intra-biradri marriages further supports such relations. In some cases, however, a sort of competition also exists between immigrants belonging to the same clan and biradri to get better economic and social status in the native and host societies. They strive to be prominent figures of their biradri, in a way to represent it at various social and political platforms.23 Their financial position thus becomes the key to achieve this purpose.

Besides constant financial support for and marriages within their families and relatives, the strong biradri and clan relations are also manifested by the frequency of immigrants’ visits to their native towns. As many as 96 of family members and relatives of the immigrants revealed that they visited their native towns at least once a year. (See Table 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visits</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice a year</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very rare/after one to three years</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total respondents</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Links of British Pakistanis with Immigrant Community of Mirpur

Around 62 percent respondents of the survey said their family members and relatives settled in Britain had good relations with immigrants from Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir; the remaining either did not know about the nature of relations (26 percent), or said their family members had no links with the immigrant community from Mirpur (12 percent). Most of the respondents from the last category belonged to Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin districts. The interviews with the local sources also strengthened the perception that immigrants from these two districts had least links with the immigrant community from Mirpur. However, the reason for that was not sufficiently elaborated by any of them.
Some speculated that Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin were much farther from Mirpur, being located in Central Punjab and had a different way of life as well. Interaction of the two districts with the Mirpur community in Pakistan is also not frequent or well established.

Those who stated that their relatives had good relations with the Mirpur immigrant community in Britain described a shared native nationality, i.e., Pakistani, as the reason. Some immigrant families from Jhelum also marry into and have family relations with the Mirpuri community. However, the shared towns, regions, and clan/biradri were found to be equally, or even more, important in development of links between British nationals with a Pakistan or Kashmiri origin.

2.3. Immigration Trends: Ethnographical and Geographical

People from all social strata, based on economic background, education, professions and age, etc., and administrative domains (rural and urban) represent North Punjab’s immigrant community in Britain. The number of immigrants from rural and urban parts of Jhelum and Rawalpindi, or the Potohari belt close to Mirpur, is higher than that from other parts. Parts of Gujrat close to Jhelum, such as Sara-e-Alamgir, Kharian and even Lalamusa, have a significant number of immigrants settled in Britain. After that, Chakwal, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala represent the descending order with regard to the number of immigrants from these areas.

The number of immigrants from rural areas is higher, who mostly have an agricultural background. Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin and parts of Gujrat are typical agricultural areas where land ownership patterns are different from Jhelum, Rawalpindi and Chakwal districts. In case of the former there are small farmers with just a few acres of agricultural holding as well as feudal land owners and Chaudhrys, who have hundreds of acres of land. Urban parts of Gujranwala and Gujrat are rich in industry but the field observations suggested this sector does not provide much employment opportunities any more due to the protracted economic crisis and electricity shortages in Pakistan.

On the other hand, Jhelum, Chakwal, Rawalpindi and parts of Gujrat closer to the Potohari belt have remained military recruitment areas. Economic activities in the form of industry are limited. People own little agricultural land, which is arid and hardly suffices to meet their living expenses. Based on perceptions of the local sources interviewed for this study and survey respondents, it can be assessed that about 10 to 15 percent people from these areas are living abroad, including in Britain.

People from these areas sell their assets such as agricultural lands, property and jewelry, to go abroad. Some often borrow money to fund their trip abroad. Those who want to go to European countries have to manage much higher finances—ranging from US$ 5,000 to US$ 15,000 depending upon their choice of the country and means (legal or illegal)—as compared to those desiring to go to Middle Eastern countries. However, as discerned from field interviews, the possibility of going to Britain illegally is minimal, and that also through other European countries.

Presently, the family members of British Pakistanis and the students who get admission to British educational institutions constitute a large portion of long-stay immigrants to Britain from North Punjab and other areas. Qualified and highly skilled professionals also adopt the legal course. The less affluent and the uneducated nonetheless rely on illegal agents to land in European countries, particularly in
In a visible trend, however, most of the youths, educated or uneducated, aspire to go abroad, mainly to European countries. But the actual ratio of Pakistanis going to Europe or the United States is now far less than that of the people going to Middle Eastern and other countries. Two main factors for this are the very strict visa policies and the scale of money needed to go to the former countries. Some relatives of British Pakistanis said that after the war on terror and the global economic downturn, the trend to immigrate to Britain has declined. Some local journalists, who were interviewed for this study, also subscribed to that opinion. The representative of Dawn Group of Publications in Mandi Bahauddin argued that previously they found many reports and news about travel agents illegally sending people abroad but nowadays such reports were rare. However, a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Mandi Bahauddin said that more people were trying to go abroad as he received around 10 applications every day, requesting issuance of character certificates which are required to be submitted along with visa applications. He considered that the number of visa applicants was higher compared to the past. At the same time, he believed that only a few of the applicants would have been able to get visa.

Human traffickers and agents facilitating illegal travel abroad are mainly based in Gujrat, Rawalpindi and Mandi Bahauddin districts. The majority of the people going abroad illegally, particularly to European countries, belong to Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin. That means that the thrust of the people immigrating to Britain is on legal means—including student and family members of British Pakistanis—and is more visible in the districts of Jhelum, Chakwal and Rawalpindi. If they need some consultancy regarding the visa process they prefer to go to Rawalpindi and Islamabad for that purpose. The second and third generations of Pakistani immigrants in Britain from Mirpur and Jhelum are being brought up there. They follow the legal procedure to invite their relatives or friends to Britain. Educated people and government officials apply for different scholarships to go to Britain.

It was also found during field research conducted for this study that some consultants/agents befoul the people in the name of study visas. In Mandi Bahauddin, for example, there are some student visa consultancy firms which tell the people they can get admission to colleges and universities in Britain and other European countries even if they have middle class education; one grade less than matriculation or GCSE. According to a representative of travel agents in Jhelum, there is a misconception among people about travel agents and human traffickers. A travel agent has to provide guarantees of millions of rupees to the government and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to get licenses. He said it was highly unlikely he would put his business on stake by getting involved in illegal practices. Human traffickers retain a chain of agents in different countries and move the people illegally from country to country through sea or land routes.

The federal government’s Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment also sends Pakistanis to different countries such as Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan, etc. The main destinations for business visits are mainly China and Taiwan, etc. Some people suspect that officials of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) also play a role in illegal immigrations by providing protection and cover to human traffickers/agents.
The trends of going abroad legally and illegally also often depend largely on the legal and social status of immigrants inviting or encouraging their relatives or friends to emigrate.

- **Key Pull and Push Factors**

Out of the 154 respondents of the survey, including British Pakistanis and their family members, 83 (54 percent) said better economic opportunities including work, job and business in Britain had attracted their relatives. As many as 19 percent said their relatives had emigrated to get better education. While 14 and 13 percent respondents identified marriages and family visits, respectively, as the major pull factors. (See charts 5 and 6)

![Chart 5: Key Pull Factors: Percentage of Responses](image)

Interviews with a range of people from the native towns of British Pakistanis however revealed that whatever the purpose of their visits, the immigrants have some fundamental economic objectives in their minds. Wealth is considered an indicator of social status, power and ‘wisdom’ in Pakistan. The majority of British Pakistanis’ families back in their native areas have wealth which encourages others to follow their example and go abroad.36

On the other hand, poor socio-economic conditions in Pakistan and lack of economic opportunities were described as some of the major factors pushing people to leave Pakistan. Many family members of British Pakistanis described the economic opportunities and wages in Pakistan and Britain in a comparative context; they lamented the poverty, unemployment and lower wages in Pakistan. A sizeable majority, 81 percent, said their family members had left Pakistan due to poverty and unemployment. A civil society representative in Rawalpindi argued that if issues of inflation and low wages were addressed, the number of Pakistanis going abroad would dwindle significantly.37 Some others described absence of industry, particularly in Chakwal and Jhelum areas, and protracted industrial crisis in Gujranwala and Gujarat as the major push factors.
According to a representative of the business community in Gujrat district, youngsters do not see a promising future for themselves in Pakistan and want to go abroad at all costs. They perceive Europe, including Britain, as a land where their dreams could come true. The role of the media and the Internet, among others, is very critical in creating such perceptions.

Land disputes and local rivalries also play a role in forcing people to migrate from some parts of north and central Punjab. In many cases in Mandi Bahauddin and Gujrat, old enmities, clashes and cases of legal prosecution forced the influential families and farmers, particularly from the Jat biradri, to send their youths abroad. Many others do so to compete with their rivals in the area because they think going abroad opens for them doors to affluence, which they need in order to have influence and power, and for legal wrangling in courts. Even those who do not have rivalries or enmity with anyone join the race to send their family members, mostly youths, abroad. In some cases, this competition also arises out of jealousy.

3. Socio-cultural Features

3.1. Native Towns: A Review of Local Perceptions of Immigrants

The field survey included some questions which were meant to explore the prevalent trends in the social and cultural lives of British Pakistanis and their families. As many as 81, or 53 percent, of the survey respondents said they celebrated Urs, cultural and religious festivals held in remembrance of one Sufi saint or another. This demonstrates that the Sufi tradition of Islam is well entrenched in these regions of Punjab and also among families of British Pakistanis. Meanwhile, responding to another question, as many as 136 respondents said they listened to music; only 18 percent said they did not. With regard to getting information, news and entertainment, most of them relied on TV; compared to 56 percent newspaper readers. As many as 97 percent said they watched television. (See Chart 8)
Among the 150 respondents who said they watched television, 72 percent did not confine themselves to watching a particular TV channel or type of channels, such as news and entertainment; they watched more than one channels. As many as 11 percent of the respondents said their favorites were entertainment channels, 15 percent liked Geo News, one of the main TV news channel in the country, while only 2 percent favored the state-run Pakistan Television (PTV). (See Chart 8-A)

Out of the 86 respondents who said they read newspapers, 36 percent liked Urdu daily Jang and 17 percent Urdu daily Nawa-e-Waqq, while only 1 percent, one respondent indeed, liked Time magazine. (See Chart 8-B)
Some other survey questions sought opinions of the respondents about how the British Pakistanis impact the culture and society of their native towns, and how did the government and society treat them when they return for brief visits or permanently. As many as 71 percent of the respondents said that the local culture of their native towns was not influenced or threatened by the visits and stay of British Pakistanis, whereas 29 percent asserted British Pakistanis posed some threats. Less than half of the respondents, 48 percent to be precise, were of the view that British Pakistanis were treated well in Pakistan at the state and society level; 52 percent said the government and society did not treat them well. (See Chart 9)

Nonetheless, British Pakistanis were viewed by the local people interviewed for this study as impacting the culture of their native towns both positively and negatively. Some others argued that they had no such impact. However, one thing that almost all the respondents agreed to was that British Pakistanis had a special place in their family, and among their relatives and community in their native areas. Secondly, most of the people saw culture through religious shades.

Maulana Muhammad Hanif, a cleric in Gujranwala, argued that immigrants spread secular, or non-religious, culture, in their native areas in Pakistan when they return from the UK and other European
Contrary to this, according to Maulana Rafique Salafi, the expatriates from the Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia have a very positive impact on the local culture and society. Those who think British Pakistanis have a negative impact on their native societies criticize British Pakistanis male youths for having different styles of beard, hair, and wearing earrings, bracelets and dress, etc. They consider all those things to be symbols of a luxurious and apathetic way of life in a society where most of the children and youths feel depressed and unhappy. Some of them think British Pakistanis are arrogant and consider themselves superior to others; that by criticizing each and everything in their native areas in Pakistan they give the impression that they have come to a dirty place. Many of the proponents of this view say British Pakistanis try to introduce ‘British culture’—which, according to them, is not acceptable in Pakistan on religious, traditional social grounds in their native towns. "The other children and youths try to copy them and this creates economic, religious and cultural problems."

Those who consider British Pakistanis have a positive impact on their native towns' cultural and social life argue that they have a better mindset and approach towards life. Proponents of this view believe that there is a lot to learn from Britain and when immigrants come back to their native towns they try to live a better life. “We feel the impact of their positive behaviors on our social life.” They are civilized, respect rules and laws, and try to pay taxes. They create awareness about the need for education and social services. Some other local people however argue that sometimes they are disillusioned when the reality of the local environment does not match their ideals. British Pakistanis think there should not be deception, lies, and corruption. Instead they aspire for peace, justice, harmony, discipline, etc. But they are helpless to a great extent. Indeed they, particularly those who come back to settle in Pakistan permanently, want to replicate what they had done or seen in Britain.

A third category of the people interviewed for the study says British Pakistanis have no significant impact on socio-cultural realities of their native towns. They have their own arguments. First, that British Pakistanis come back for a few days or weeks. Those who stay longer or permanently find it easier to live like the locals do. Secondly, the impact is subjective and varies from person to person. It depends on education, training and family background of British Pakistanis. Also the impact cannot be analyzed as being positive or negative in absolute terms. This is how cultures get mixed and new cultures evolve. The print and electronic media and the Internet also play an important role in this regard. Around three decades ago, the cultural impact of immigrants was much more significant. According to Shahid Khan, a leader of the PML-N in Rawalpindi, people in urban areas of Pakistan, such as Rawalpindi and Islamabad, are well aware of the emerging social and cultural trends in different countries. Immigrants do not have to tell or show them anything new.

### 3.2. Socio-cultural Conflicts in Host Society

- **Cultural Alienation and Identity Crisis**

As discussed earlier in the report, most of British Pakistanis who emigrated to Britain from North Punjab and parts of Central Punjab belonged to rural areas or small urban centers. Their traditional ways of life did not even match those in the big cities or urban areas of Pakistan. According to many of the people...
interviewed for this study, the first generation of immigrants arriving in Britain would have felt that they were in entirely new and advanced socio-cultural settings. They and their succeeding generations have been struggling since then to adjust in their host society without breaking ties with their tradition and their native lands’ socio-cultural and religious norms and values. Besides the structural factors, it was discerned from discussions with family members and relatives of British Pakistanis that the issues of British Pakistanis’ cultural alienation and identity construction have remained subject to some instantaneous triggers over time as well, particularly the incidents of 9/11 and 7/7, the war on terror, so-called ‘Islamophobia’ and role of the media in these respects.

The second and third generations of British Pakistanis are in particular struggling to resolve their identity conflict, which mainly emanates from distinct socio-cultural realities of their ancestral/native and host societies. They are also confused on how to counter ‘negative perceptions’ of themselves, particularly with regard to Islam, extremism and terrorism. According to a recent opinion poll commissioned by Exploring Islam Foundation, Muslim youths believe that the whole ‘identity crisis business’—the view that confusion among new generation of Muslim immigrants about their cultural identity tends to push them towards extremism—has been exaggerated to fit a stereotype image of Muslims. The role of political classes and the media are hence very significant in determining the level of success of multicultural and assimilation policies.

Khaleda Khan, mother of two British Pakistanis living in London, says that living in Britain as a Muslim and Pakistani is not an easy task these days. “My son feels unsafe when he goes to mosque.” She did not, however, describe the reason for this ‘insecurity’, but the person who interviewed her for this study believes that she was referring to strict monitoring and surveillance of British Muslims by the UK government.

As religious values are placed above the social, cultural, ethnic and other traits by most British Pakistanis, the role of clerics and Muslim schools cannot be ignored in encouraging children and teenagers to isolate themselves from the social mainstream. According to Dr Denis MacEoin, the author of *Music, Chess and other Sins: Segregation, Integration and Muslim Schools in Britain*, although some Muslim schools teach social cohesion, others regard it as a deadly sin. Some schools impart the skills necessary for a fulfilling life alongside non-Muslim friends and co-workers, others try to recreate a Pakistani or Bangladeshi lifestyle and to make it exclusive. Music, chess and cricket are just three things banned in some Muslim schools in Britain. Others are drama, dance, sport, Shakespeare, and, in some cases, any aspect of the Western culture.

There are some other understandable factors for British Pakistanis’ alienation and failure to assimilate in the mainstream British society. Britain’s urban communities are changing at a more rapid pace than ever, but acute economic and social challenges prevent Muslims in Britain from availing the opportunities. The problems of widening economic and social inequalities also have implications for wider issues of alienation, disenfranchisement, isolation and dislocation that have an impact on how young men, irrespective of their religion, might become vulnerable to the forces of political radicalism and violence.

Another factor regarding this is that most British Pakistanis arrange marriages of their children in their native towns in Pakistan which in a way discourages the youths’ integration into the host society and
also creates conflicts in their minds as there are numerous examples of such marriages not succeeding. When children of British Pakistanis, particularly girls, reach adulthood their parents rush back to their native towns in order to seek a suitable match for them. In many cases, however, such marriages cannot be called successful due to socio-cultural gaps.\textsuperscript{66}

However, despite some difficulties that they have started to face, particularly after 9/11, on account of sharing the religion of Islamist terrorists, most British Pakistanis feel that they have been successful in maintaining their religious and cultural values in Britain to a great extent. As many as 64 percent of the survey respondents said British Pakistanis did not feel any threat to their religion and culture in Britain; whereas 35 percent said there were some threats. (See Chart 10)

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Do you think immigrants' religious and cultural values are under threat in Britain?}
\end{table}

- \textit{Generation Gap}

The old British Pakistani generations think their children do not conform fully to their ancestors' socio-cultural and religious ways of life. Some are happy that their children are adapting to new realities of the ever changing modern world but others are not. New generations nevertheless are more or less ignorant of the culture of their ancestors' native towns. When they visit Pakistan, many of them find it difficult to understand or adjust to things they have never experienced before.\textsuperscript{67} Unlike their ancestors, they do not consider that they have roots in their parents' areas of origin.

The new generations confront two key social paradigms in Britain, i.e., the British social setup, and pressure, and at least a desire from their parents to conform to their ancestral religio-cultural norms and values. Some of them see the progress and development among all layers of British society, including locals and immigrants, in a comparative context and trace their own backwardness to the traditional social and religious narratives of their forefathers. \textsuperscript{68} This creates a sort of conflict or generation gap between the old and new generations.

- \textit{Issues of Discrimination}

A general perception among the family members of British Pakistanis is that the latter have started to face more problems after the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks; about two-third of the survey respondents
confirmed this perception while a third denied it. Meanwhile, a considerable majority, 83 percent, said British Pakistanis had never faced any act of racial discrimination towards them in Britain. As many as 16 percent, however, reported incidents of racial discrimination. When asked if their family members or relatives were satisfied with the British government’s efforts to counter racism, more than half of the respondents (53 percent) did not offer any reply, 32 percent replied in the affirmative and 15 percent in the negative. (See Chart 11)

Chart 11: Responses about discrimination against Pakistani Diaspora in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you/your relatives faced.</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you/your relatives ever.</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                               | 16% | 83%| 1%      |

Media campaigns against terrorism also have their impact on public perceptions of Muslims, particularly Pakistani immigrants, in Britain, and encourage the non-Muslim British citizens to distance themselves from Muslims and Pakistanis. The behavior the British people has indeed changed to varying extent towards Pakistani immigrants.

Describing the nature of the problems British Pakistani had been facing in Britain especially after the 7/7 attacks, some respondents said that they were viewed with suspicion. Some had to face enquiries but were cleared after no ground was found of their support or involvement in any extremist or terrorist plot. They have to face strict security checks at airports, which some family members of British Pakistanis call discriminatory. The terrorism and counter-terrorism phrases and the political and media debate have definitely added to social isolation of British Pakistanis. The number of Muslims stopped and questioned at airports and other points of entry to the UK has doubled in the last four years, raising serious concerns about racial profiling.

3.3. Economic and Education Status

The education and economic and social status of British Pakistanis from the six districts of Punjab under study is diverse. They include laborers, businessmen or self-employed or salaried individuals (low-grade to highly skilled professionals), and students. Most of the respondents and the people interviewed for this study however claimed their relatives or family members were laborers and low-grade workers in Britain. Professionals such as doctors, engineers and IT experts, etc. were fewer in number but earned a lot. A substantial change is also visible in the lifestyles of families of British Pakistanis in their native towns. Their life standards are better than in the past and compared to other families living in the same localities. It is a generalization, however, to suggest that British Pakistanis and their families have a lot of money. Indeed the situation varies from individual to individual.
A range of views were found in the field interviews with regard to education of children of British Pakistanis in their native areas. Some said their education was improving, others however said that it was not. Those who advocated the first view asserted that the first generation of the immigrants was not well educated. But once they had the financial means, they ensured good education for their children. They managed to enroll their children in good private schools. Many British Pakistani families’ children in Pakistan study in the Cambridge education system—for their O and A levels—after which their parents or elders try to invite them abroad for higher education. Former District Nazim Chakwal Sardar Ghulam Abbas also argued that children of British Pakistanis from Chakwal and children of their family members were studying in good schools, colleges and universities.

On the other hand, Uzma Khawaja, general manager for National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), said that she had recently visited government and private schools in Jhelum as part of an education campaign. She was surprised to see that few students were enrolled in private schools—about 5 percent of them from families of immigrants in different countries—and the majority was either studying in government schools or was not enrolled in schools at all. She asserted that people were not willing to spend much on education.

In Gujrat district also, students’ dropout rate at the secondary and higher secondary education levels was high, particularly in government schools and colleges. One reason was stated to be youths’ obsession to go abroad.

The economic and education status of British Pakistanis is also diverse in Britain. Although in general they lag far behind other British citizens, including those from other Asian communities, there are also many examples of British Pakistanis who are very well placed in the host society.

Although exact data is not available in this regard, discussions with British Pakistanis and their relatives suggested that the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, and the war on terror had affected employment opportunities for Pakistani Diaspora in Britain. Those living illegally in Britain find it difficult to find any work. They mostly work in shops, restaurants and homes and are often paid less than minimum wage. Their employers exploit their illegal status.

Most children of British Pakistanis in Britain fail to go to colleges and universities. GCSE is considered basic education in Britain and 78 percent British Pakistani boys and 63 percent girls cannot even complete this first level of education. Asfandiar Khan, a businessman and political activist in Jhelum, said he saw fewer children of Pakistani immigrants in schools and colleges than in shops and factories during his visits to Britain. He does not believe that immigrants’ children are getting any better education in Britain than children in their native areas in Pakistan.

• **Immigrants’ Role in Socio-economic Uplift of Native Towns**

Around 62 percent of the respondents said that British Pakistanis were playing their due role in socio-economic uplift of their host and native countries, whereas 38 percent did not consider that they were playing such a role. (See Chart 12)
Chart 12: Perceptions of Immigrants’ Socio-economic Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do immigrants play some role in development of their host…</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do immigrants play some role in socioeconomical uplift of…</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The various perceptions of the role of British Pakistanis in socio-economic uplift of their families and native towns, discerned from field interviews, are described in the following paragraphs.

**Areas of Investment and Spending**

1. Most of the investment and spending of British Pakistanis in their native towns is on constructing personal properties, homes, big plazas and markets. A representative of a local NGO in Gujrat said that the construction boom in Gujrat and Jhelum was due to remittances from abroad. He asserted that there is more demand for construction material and labor in the areas which have a higher ratio of people abroad.82 This has a positive impact on other related businesses and industries such as ceramics, sanitation, plastic, electric and other home appliances.83 Purchasing activity in local markets circulates money.84 In rural areas also most of the big houses and buildings belong to immigrants and their families. They also make a major contribution in development of housing societies in urban areas either by investing their money with builders or purchasing plots and houses.85

2. A major chunk of earnings of British Pakistanis is spent on maintaining their status and lavish life. They spend a lot on marriages, including on wedding functions and parties.

3. British Pakistanis provide monthly expenses of their families including parents, spouse and siblings in their native areas. In many cases the entire income of British Pakistanis is spent on supporting their parents and families.86 Those who have their children with them in Britain regularly support their parents in Pakistan.

4. Some people interviewed for this study said British Pakistanis had established some businesses in their native towns in collaboration with their family members and other local partners. The businesses included fuel stations, schools or colleges and cottage industry. Many also kept their savings in bank accounts in their native towns.87

5. British Pakistanis also donate funds as charity and Zakat. They send donations for victims of floods and other natural disasters in Pakistan. However, after alleged ‘misuse’ of their funds after the 2005 earthquake, they have become more cautious in who they give donation and charity to in order to ensure that the money is used effectively.88 To help the victims of the 2010 floods, they raised and sent money to their relatives in their native towns. They trust the army more for judicious use of their donations.89
6. British Pakistanis were found to be very interested in financing the education sector in their native towns. If any of their old school teachers requested them to fund a school or college they readily did so if they had the resources. This trend is more prevalent in rural areas. But former Deputy District Nazim of Rawalpindi Afzal Khokhar claimed he knows some British Pakistanis who had established on their own or had contributed to the establishment of schools and colleges in Rawalpindi, a big urban centre.

Some people interviewed for this study quoted examples where British Pakistanis had contributed money for socio-economic development of their native towns. For instance, in rural areas of Lalamusa in Gujrat some British Pakistanis had contributed finances for construction of roads. Al-Mudassar Education Centre and Al-Mudassar Centre for the Disabled in Kharian get funding from immigrants in France and Britain. Hafiz Shabbir, a prayer leader in Madni Masjid in Sara-e-Alamgir, had visited Britain, raised funds from immigrants and established a madrassa in Sara-e-Alamgir. A British Pakistani, Anwar Pervez, is funding schools in Gujjar Khan. Farhat Abbas claimed that his relatives in Britain run an NGO in their native town, Chakwal, and have established a college there where more than 60 teachers are employed. According to Rizwan Ali Khan, Educational Coordinator of the NCHD, British Pakistanis had provided electricity transformers and electricity generators in the nearby villages of Chakwal.

But most of the people interviewed in the native towns of British Pakistanis lamented that there were a lot of problems for the latter to come and invest their money in Pakistan, including bureaucratic hurdles. British Pakistanis do not invest in establishing industrial units because it is a complicated process in Pakistan and difficult to manage without strong political and administrative connections or support. In addition, there are issues of insecurity, violence and law and order. They do not want to put their lives and investments at risk amid increasing incidents of robberies and kidnapping for ransom. Shortage of gas and electricity also repels them. At the same time, there is no institute or mechanism in Pakistan to motivate and facilitate the immigrants to invest in Pakistan.

4. Religious Trends

There is a general perception among people that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam. Being Muslim, an average Pakistani takes religion seriously and wants to see it in the public domain. Nevertheless, most of them do not practice religion in their daily life. To measure the religious trends of the population in focus, the survey respondents were asked about some aspects of their religious life. An overwhelming majority, 96 percent, said religion was an important part of their life. About 53 percent respondents said they were practicing Muslims and offered their prayers regularly; whereas 32 percent said they did not. Significantly, 49 percent of the survey respondents believed that Shariah, or Islamic jurisprudence, should be the only source of law; however, a considerable portion of the survey population, 29 percent, asserted that Shariah should not be the only source of law. At the same time over half of the respondents (58 percent), said they were disciple of some Pir, religious faith leader or saint. (See Chart 13)

Sectarianism—Muslims’ subscription to various religious sects—is one of the major factors for growing radical tendencies in Pakistan where people devotedly follow the interpretation and beliefs of their own sects and are unwilling to consider alternative views. But as mentioned earlier, the areas under study are presumably dominated by the Sunni-Barelvi sect, followed by the Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith and Shias.
But the Deobandi school of thought is gradually gaining ground and increasing its strength in the area.\textsuperscript{101}

Nonetheless, the perceptions of the people interviewed for this study suggest that the tradition of Sufism is on the wane in these areas. People openly express their love with and faith in the Sufis and saints of the past who, according to them, served Islam and preached love. But at the same time many people are skeptical of the present breed of ‘Pirs’ and fake Sufis, who neither hold the good character of their predecessors nor serve Islam in any manner. Some others however think that with people moving away from this ‘peace loving and tolerant’ tradition in Islam, society has become more conservative and rigid over the past few decades.\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Aspect} & \textbf{Yes} & \textbf{No} & \textbf{No reply} \\
\hline
Are you a disciple of some Pir (Religious faith leader)? & 42.2\% & 57.8\% & \\
\hline
Should Shariah be a compulsory source of law? & 49\% & 29\% & 22\% \\
\hline
Do you offer prayers regularly? & 53\% & 32\% & 15\% \\
\hline
Is religion an important part of your life? & 96\% & 4\% & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Aspects of Religious Life of Respondents}
\end{table}

4.1. **Comparison of Trends in Native and Host Societies**

Most British Pakistanis and their family members said they enjoy almost the same religious freedom in Britain as they did in Pakistan. All the sects celebrate religious events in Britain as well. Eight major Pakistani religious parties have their network in Britain and operate a number of affiliated organizations, charities and religious schools. These parties have links with international Islamic groups and charities, which share a common agenda. Deobandi politico-religious parties are very active in Britain and British Pakistanis are a major source of funding for their political, sectarian, Jihadi and charity/welfare activities. Pakistani Salafi movements are also growing rapidly in Britain and have established links with other international groups in Britain, such as Muslim Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{103}

The presence of all schools of thought and groups in Britain is the cause of spread of different ideologies in Pakistani Diaspora. Anjum Saleem, a British Pakistani from Jhelum, said that although the young generations of British Pakistanis were less inclined towards religion but some of them had adopted extreme religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{104}
According to another point of view that emerged during the interviews, the people who had been living a less religious life in Pakistan became more religious and practicing Muslims after they went to Britain, although the environment of their host society was liberal.\textsuperscript{105} Perceptions of most of the people interviewed in the six native districts of British Pakistanis suggested that British Pakistanis were more religious than their family members and relatives in Pakistan.

Some people believe that Muslims in the UK are practicing their religion in a better manner which is why Islam is spreading there, while some others consider the 7/7 and 9/11 attacks to be a conspiracy by Jews with the objective of maligning Islam.\textsuperscript{106} Dr. Asmat Malik, a social activist and political leader from Jhelum commented that religious inclinations of Muslims have increased in the West and that they are better Muslims than the people of Pakistan, as 80 percent Muslims, including the old and the young, are inclined towards Islam.\textsuperscript{107}

5. Political and Ideological Outlook

With regard to ideological and political views and beliefs British Pakistanis can be placed into two categories. One is active part of the political process in Britain and has made significant contribution to the state institutions, whereas the other has kept itself politically isolated. The political psychology of the latter category links their identity to the religious-political groups, religious clergy and political parties active in their native towns in Pakistan.

5.1. Political Awareness and Roles

- Links with Native Politics

As many as 51 percent of the respondents of the survey said that their relatives settled in Britain were actively participating in politics in their native towns. The remaining 49 percent said their family members did not have any links with politics in their native areas. (See Chart 14)
British Pakistanis from rural and urban parts of Gujrat, Rawalpindi and Jhelum were found to be more active in their native towns’ politics compared to those from Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin and Chakwal.

Their support for political parties comes in the forms of funds and political campaigns in their native towns. Their money becomes available mostly on or around election day. Representatives of political parties call them and visit them abroad to get their support, which is mainly financial. Some of them even come to their native areas in Pakistan ahead of elections to campaign for the candidates they support.

Many of the political activists interviewed for this study said that family members and relatives of British Pakistanis and immigrants to other countries had strong political lobbies. Chaudhry Arshad, a PML-Q member of the Punjab Assembly from Kharian and brother of a British Pakistani, said that when representatives of political parties go to immigrants’ families to ask for votes, they are told that they would first seek the opinion of their family members abroad and then respond.

Political parties try to maintain good relations with British Pakistanis because they can influence their families and relatives in their native lands to vote for those parties’ candidates. The voters are usually disposed to vote according to their British Pakistanis relatives’ advice because of the latter’s financial support for them.

Support on the basis of a common biradri (clan or caste) is a powerful element in Pakistani politics. British Pakistanis also have to take this factor into consideration while supporting candidates in elections. It was learned during field work for this study that the majority of British Pakistanis belongs to rural areas in North Punjab, hence they are more influenced by the caste and clan considerations. In urban areas this trend is not as strong.

British Pakistanis cannot win elections as independent candidates. However, with money they can get ticket of one of the leading political party or can use this money to enhance their profile in their area and in the ranks of a main political party. This offers them in return votes from supporters of the party.

Based on perceptions of family members and relatives of British Pakistanis, it can be discerned that the latter mainly support two factions of Pakistan Muslim League—the PML-N and PML-Q—and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). (See Chart 15)
• **Participation in British Politics**

Contrary to British Pakistanis’ involvement in politics in their native towns, only 8 percent of the respondents said that their family members or relatives were participating in politics in their host country. *(See Chart 16)* This is also in contrast to the findings of a study on British Pakistanis from Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir, which found that 56 percent people of the Mirpuri community in Britain were associated with some political party in Britain.\(^{114}\)

But there are some British Pakistanis belonging to north and central Punjab who are actively engaged in British politics. For instance, parents of Sayeeda Warsi, the current chairperson of the Conservative Party and a minister without portfolio in David Cameron’s cabinet, had migrated from Bewal, Gujjar Khan to Britain.\(^{115}\) Ancestors of British Pakistani Sajjad Karim, who is a member of the European Parliament, belong to Karari Wala village of Mandi Bahauddin.\(^{116}\)
With regard to British Pakistanis’ active participation in British politics and their political vision as voters, the 2010 elections in the UK manifested two significant trends. First, British foreign policy appealed more to British Pakistani voters rather than domestic issues, and, secondly, more British Pakistanis got elected to British parliament.

The pre-election feedback from British Pakistanis and other members of the Muslim community in the UK was that foreign policy remained of pivotal importance, with issues such as Palestine and Afghanistan heading the list. On the domestic front, ‘Islamophobia’ headed a long list of issues that also included economy, health, education and taxation. What was also of great interest this time round was that there was an unprecedented numbers of Muslim women and Muslim young people, who were following, campaigning and generally engaged in the election process.117

A number of British Pakistanis contested the 2010 elections in the UK, representing different political parties. Seven of them, including two women, were elected members of parliament. Five of these seven won elections on the ticket of Labour Party while the rest won on Conservative Party tickets. For the first time, two British Pakistani women made their way to the British parliament.118 In the last parliament, there were four Muslim MPs, three of them of Pakistani origin.119

5.2. A Peep into Ideological and Political Viewpoints

The family members and relatives of British Pakistanis from North Punjab were asked a number of questions to seek their political and ideological views on a range of national and global issues. These views do not necessarily represent the political and ideological positions of British Pakistanis but are helpful in assessing the mindset of their family members and relatives in their native towns.

- **Jihad, Terrorism and Taliban**

Respondents’ viewpoints suggest they strongly condemn violence, terrorism and actors of violence in Pakistan such as Taliban. 93 percent of the respondents said nothing justified taking of human lives through terrorist activities, whereas 2 percent said there could be some justification for that. Similarly, 90 percent of the respondents believed that suicide bombings and attacks could not be justified in the name of Islam, while 6 percent held the opposite view. Ninety percent of the respondents also did not see Taliban as serving the cause of Islam; whereas only 5 percent said that the Taliban were serving Islam. (See Chart 17)
Chart 17: Respondents' Views on Jihad, Terrorism and Taliban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are suicide bombings justified in Islam?</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are Pakistani Taliban serving Islam in any way?</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing justifies taking human lives through terrorist activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is fighting in Kashmir jihad?</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is fighting in Afghanistan jihad?</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, when asked if fighting in Kashmir was jihad, 48 percent of the respondents replied in the affirmative, while 23 percent called fighting in Afghanistan jihad. 45 percent and 68 percent of the respondents, respectively, did not believe that fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan was jihad.

A study on radicalization conducted by Pak Institute for Peace Studies in 2009 had asked the same question regarding fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan from 1,568 respondents across Pakistan. Findings of the PIPS study reveal almost similar trends. As many as 73 percent of the respondents in the 2009 PIPS study were of the view that fighting in Afghanistan was not jihad; 18 percent considered it jihad, while 9 percent did not respond to the question. As many as 56 percent of the respondents in the 2009 study had called fighting in Kashmir jihad and 21 percent had said that it was not jihad. More public support for ‘jihad’ in Kashmir is probably because of the historical link of Pakistan with the Kashmir conflict. Most of the people in Pakistan also see Kashmir as a continuation of the nation’s struggle for independence.

- **Worldview and War on Terror**

The majority of the respondents (75 percent) said that Pakistan should not support the United States in the war on terror. As many as 20 percent supported Pakistan’s alliance with the US while 12 percent chose not to answer the question. When asked about the Pakistani government’s use of force against militants in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, 75 percent of the respondents supported such tactics; 18 percent opposed military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and 7 percent did not respond.
This reflects a general perception in Pakistan against the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan and in FATA in Pakistan, and also public sentiments against the US. This notion was further strengthened when the highest number of respondents, 40 (26 percent), said that the US was the biggest threat to Pakistan’s security and integrity. (See Table 4) This perception is not confined to the US alone but many British Pakistanis see the US and Britain as very close allies in the ongoing war on terror.122

Table 4: What is the Biggest Threat to Pakistan’s Security and Survival?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Al Qaeda</th>
<th>Anti-democratic discourses</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Taliban</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of responses</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Radicalization Trends

A report on Wilton Park Conference 1021, “Tackling Violent Extremism: The Arc between Pakistan and the UK Diaspora” held on March 25-27, 2010, talks of ambitions of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda to recruit young British Pakistanis, to encourage them to travel to Pakistan and to return to the UK to carry out attacks. Although it is a serious challenge facing the British government, it must be disturbing for the Pakistani community to hear the British government say that 75 percent of terrorist plots against the UK emanate from Pakistan. No report has elaborated this statistic further.

6.1. Trends in Host Society

Radicalized sentiments emerged in the minds of some British Muslims due to the circumstances that had prevailed during the past few years at the international level and the perceived duality of policies of the western powers as well as the reaction of Muslim leaders against fellow Muslims. This had a particularly adverse impact on young boys and girls who in their frustration could adopt ways and take actions that not only turn out to be a snare for them but also invite blame for the whole Muslim community. Internet
and other mediums and channels that are available today to deliver radical ideologies were not there before. Many confused youths, who are against their traditional local Muslim scholars and leaders who have failed to satisfy their religious quests, land themselves in trouble while searching for solutions to their problems online. Many a times they are guided in an insensitive manner. Hence it is crucial to keep tabs on the sources linked to Al Qaeda, Hizbut Tahrir and other organizations with similar agendas.

6.2. Trends in Native Towns

Religious extremism and terrorism are gradually engulfing Pakistani society and the Potohar region and its adjacent areas including Gujrat, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala are no exception. Poverty, illiteracy and political marginalization may not be the triggers of violent and non-violent radicalization in the region under study as it is politically well-integrated and socio-economically more developed than many other parts of the country. But the physical presence and increasing activities of militant outfits, radical madrassas, heavy concentration of Afghan refugees, especially in Chakwal and Rawalpindi districts, and pervasive confusion over the discourse of jihad and war on terror may contribute in the future to radicalizing individuals and pockets of population in parts of central and north Punjab.

As mentioned earlier, a significant number of respondents denounced Pakistani Taliban and condemned suicide attacks but paradoxically a large number of participants in the survey did not approve of Pakistan’s support for the US-led war on terror. Around 50 percent of the respondents also supported armed jihad in Kashmir. (See section 5.2) Meanwhile, patterns of militants’ recruitment in Pakistan indicate that such mindsets are more susceptible to recruitment for ‘Jihadi’ operations in the country and abroad. Another alarming factor is the weakening of the tolerant Sufi tradition in the area. Sufism has always acted as a bulwark against extremist ideologies in Pakistan. For this very reason, terrorists are increasingly intensifying attacks on shrines of Sufis across Pakistan. Attacks on the shrines of Rehman Baba in Peshawar (March 2009), Hazrat Ali Hajveri in Lahore (July 2010), Hazrat Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi (October 2010), and Hazrat Baba Fareed in Pakpattan (October 2010) are some of the recent examples in this regard.

6.3. Conclusion

Based on the findings of the field work and observation of the field researchers, a dominant majority of the survey respondents and the people interviewed for this study seemed to be very moderate in their religious outlook. In political and ideological perspectives, however, their views were more or less in synch with the general public’s perceptions prevalent across Pakistan.

The factors of radicalization are the same in both the native and host societies but a critical factor present in the host society is that the second and third generations of the immigrants to Europe, including Britain, are suffering from an identity crisis and a generation gap. They have a sense of structural or socio-psychological discrimination and are attaching themselves to global Islam at an increasing pace. Saudi Arabia’s role in Britain is also highlighted as a critical factor by the media. For decades, Islam has been slowly shifting into an ever more conservative mould, influenced by the huge amounts of cash channeled by the Saudi religious establishment to mosques around Europe.
Although, British citizens of Pakistani origin, their immediate family members and relatives profess great admiration for British society in particular and the West in general, but like any other areas of Pakistan, anti-West and anti-US sentiments are on the rise in the areas studied for the research. Various organizations and platforms consisting of British Pakistanis must be utilized in order to publicize the positive role Britain has played and is still playing in the socio-economic uplift of the areas that have produced a large number of immigrants to Britain.
Notes:

1 The PIPS is grateful to Mujtaba Muhammad Rathor, who managed fieldwork for this study and wrote parts of the report along with Safdar Sial and Khuram Iqbal. Special thanks to Amin Farooqi, Raja Nau Bahar, Zahid Khan, Usman Sarwar, A. Sattar Nadeem and Khalid Gardezi for assisting PIPS field researchers in conducting interviews and survey in their respective cities.
3 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 More than 86 percent of the population of Chakwal lives in rural areas.
12 Figures obtained from www2.ecp.gov.pk/vsite/ElectionResult/Default.aspx, the official website of the Election Commission of Pakistan.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
16 Sayeeda Warsi (Chairperson of Britain’s Conservative Party), interview published in daily The Nation, June 18, 2010.
17 More than 42 percent of British Pakistanis are natives of this district. (Source: Safdar Sial, “Exploring the Mindset of the British-Pakistani Community: The Socio-cultural and Religious Context.”
18 Nasrullah (Correspondent daily Nawa-e-Waqt (Urdu), interview by Amin Farooqi in Kharian (Gujrat), September 2010.
19 Farhat Abbas (cousin of a Birmingham-based British Pakistani), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem in Chakwal, August 2010.
21 Khawaja Asif Javed (a political activist of PPP), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
22 Muhammad Ashraf (a businessman), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
23 Khawaja Muhammad Anwar (a civil society activist), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
24 Waseem Shahid (a community leader), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
25 Dr Zaheer Ahmed (a journalist), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; DPO Chakwal Sabir Ahmed, interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; Pir Abdul Sattar (journalist), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Chakwal, August 2010.
26 Zahid Saeed (Commissioner Rawalpindi), interview by Khalid Gardezi, September 2010.
27 Zahid Shakeel (Correspondent Dawn News and daily Dawn), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; Pir Abdul Sattar (journalist), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Chakwal, August 2010.
28 Saifullah Virk (Deputy Superintendent Police, Mandi Bahauddin), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
29 Dr Zaheer Ahmed (a journalist), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; DPO Chakwal Sabir Ahmed, interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; Pir Abdul Sattar (journalist), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Chakwal, August 2010.
30 Shahid Nawaz Warrachi (Sub-Divisional Officer Police), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
31 S. Nawaz Warrachi has also worked in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).
32 Rana Gul Bahar (a local journalist), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010.
33 Haji Jawad Ali (a travel agent), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
34 Muhammad Ashraf Ghauri (City President, PPP Mandi Bahauddin), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010.
35 Faiz Piracha (a journalist associated with jang Group), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, September 2010.
35 Farhan Hashim (Bureau Chief of Nawa-e-Waqt Group of Publications in Gujranwala), interview by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
36 Muhammad Ilyas (an NGO worker), interview by Amir Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010.
37 Ejaz Ahmed (representative of Citizen Council, an NGO based in Rawalpindi), interview by Khalid Gardezi, September 2010.
38 Shaikh Muhammad Ikram (a businessman), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e- Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
39 Syed Ahmed Ali (a community leader), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, October 2010.
40 Dr Muhammad Shoaib (former City Nazim, Gujjar Khan), interview by Khalid Gardezi, October 2010.
41 Rana Gul Bahar, interview by Zahid Khan.
42 Zahid Shakeel, interview by Zahid Khan.
43 Rana Rasheed (Tehsil Municipal Officer, Sara-e- Alamgir), interview by Amin Farooqi, August 2010.
44 Dr Muhammad Shoaib, interview by Khalid Gardezi.
45 Interview in Gujranwala by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
46 Ibid.
47 Ghulam Murtaza (advocate), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010; Dr Saeed Ehsanullah (a political activist of Jamaat-e-Islami), interview by Amin Farooqi in Kharian (Gujrat), September 2010.
48 Muhammad Ismail (former Nazim, Union Council Thathi, Gujjar Khan), interview by Khalid Gardezi, October 2010.
49 Chaudhry Azaz Taj (a leader of PML-N), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e- Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
50 Umar Farooq (a businessman), interview by Amin Farooqi in Lalamusa (Gujrat), August 2010.
51 Pir Sahib (a local religious leader), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Deena (Jhelum), October 2010.
52 Nigar Khalid (a journalist and analyst), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, October 2010.
53 Chaudhry Muhammad Nazir (Director, Water and Sanitation Authority), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
54 Mirza Mashiatour Rehman (former Naib Nazim, Union Council 117, Sara-e- Alamgir), interview by Amin Farooqi, October 2010.
55 Mushtaq Ahmed Badal (President, Citizen Committee, Gujranwala Cantt.), interview by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
56 Muhammad Azam (a political leader, PML-Chattha group), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
57 Mian Azhar Hassan Dar (General Secretary, People’s Lawyers Forum), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
58 Farhan Hashim (a local journalist), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
59 Rana Muneebur Rehman (former Nazim, Union Council, Gujranwala), interview by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
60 Engineer Muhammad Ashraf Butt (a leader of PML-Q), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
61 Interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, September 2010.
63 Interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
64 Denis MacEoin, “We must stop Muslim schools teaching that integration is a sin,” The Telegraph, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/4700709/We-must-stop-Muslim-schools-teaching-that-integration-is-a-sin.html, accessed on 13 November 2010.
66 Mirza Mashiatour Rehman, interview by Amin Farooqi.
67 Farhat Abbas, interview by A. Sattar Nadeem.
68 Malik Jameel (a British-Pakistani expatriate and Member National Assembly Pakistan), interview by Amin Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010. Malik Jameel has lived in Britain for about 23 years, mainly in Manchester.
69 Nasrullah, interview by Amin Farooqi.
70 Rashid Shafiq (nephew of a British-Pakistani living in Manchester), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
71 Muhammad Ali (brother of a British-Pakistani living in Leeds), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
74 Nasrullah, interview by Amin Farooqi.
75 Interview by A. Sattar Nadeem in Chakwal, August 2010.
76 Interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
77 Ghulam Shabbir (Administrator, Jamia Siddiqia Anwarul Quran, a religious seminary in Kharian), interview by Mujtaba Rathore in Kharian (Gujrat), September 2010.
78 Muhammad Fareed (cousin of a British Pakistani Muhammad Naeem living in London), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
79 Shabbir Ahmed Butt (former chairman, Municipal Committee, Gujrat), interview by Amin Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010.
81 Interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
82 Muhammad Ilyas, interview by Amir Farooqi.
83 Sohail Yusuf (Vice President, Gujranwala Chamber of Commerce and Industry), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
84 Muhammad Ilyas, interview by Amir Farooqi.
85 Zahid Saeed, interview by Khalid Gardezi.
86 Abdul Wahid Khan (a PPP activist), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e-Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
87 Shazia Nayyar (Member, District Council Jhelum), interview by Raja Nau Bahar, October 2010.
88 Nasrullah, interview by Amin Farooqi.
89 Malik Nadeem Ajmal (a political activist), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e-Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
90 Afzal Khokhar (former Deputy District Nazim, Rawalpindi), interview by Khalid Gardezi, September 2010.
91 Umar Farooq, interview by Amin Farooqi.
92 Ghulam Shabbir, interview by Mujtaba Rathore.
93 Amin Farooqi (a senior journalist), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Gujrat, August 2010.
94 Raja Sabir Hussain (political activist, PML-Q), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Gujjar Khan, October 2010.
95 Farhat Abbas, interview by A. Sattar Nadeem.
96 Interview by A. Sattar Nadeem in Chakwal, August 2010.
97 Mushtaq Ahmed Badal, interview by Usman Sarwar.
98 Abid Hafeez (President, Tehreek-e-Insaf, Gujranwala), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
99 Sohail Yusuf, interview by Usman Sarwar.
100 Khwaja Asif Javed (a political activist, PPP), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
101 Raja Nau Bahar (Jhelum Correspondent of Express TV), interview by Mujtaba Rathore, August 2010.
102 Ikram Siddique (Vice President, Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat), interview by Mujtaba Rathore in Jhelum, October 2010.
104 Interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
105 Interview with Ghulam Shabir (Administrator, Jamia Hanafia Siddiqia Tajveedul Quran, Kharian), interview by Amin Farooqi in Kharian, September 2010.
106 Mehmudul Hasan (a British-Pakistani, graduate from Jamia Salafia, Mandi Bahauddin), interview by Zahid Khan, August 2010.
107 Interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
108 Zahid Saeed, interview by Khalid Gardezi.
109 Chaudhry Arshad (PML-Q's Member Provincial Assembly (Punjab) from Kharian), interview by Amin Farooqi in Kharian, September 2010.
110 Malik Shaukat Ali (member, social forum of MQM, Gujranwala), interview by Amin Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010.
111 Muhammad Azam, interview by Usman Sarwar.
112 Zahid Shakeel, interview by Zahid Khan.
113 Zafar Mehmoob Dar (Chief Organizer, Tehreek-e-Insaf, Jhelum), interview by Raja Nau Bahar, September 2010.
115 Muhammad Arif Chaudhry (representative of Jhelum Trade Union), interview by Raja Nau Bahar, September 2010.
Haji Imtiaz (former Tehsil Nazim, Mandi Bahauddin), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010. Haji Imtiaz claimed to be a cousin of Sajjad Karim.


Ibid.

Chaudhry Sultan, interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e-Alamgir (Gujrat), October 2010.
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