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Paper  
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# Mapping the Madrasa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Madaris

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## Introduction

The role of Pakistani madrassas features prominently in the debate on terrorism. They are perceived as a crucial medium for promoting extreme religious, sectarian, social and political views. They are projected as no longer focused on producing the next generation of religious scholars but dominating the education system as a whole.<sup>1</sup> Many analysts view that although not all madrassas have direct links with terrorism,<sup>2</sup> approximately 10-15 percent do.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, madrassas' role in shaping radical views among the masses, and specifically among their students is a serious concern for many analysts and policymakers.<sup>4</sup> Their affiliations with political, sectarian and militant organizations are a cause of concern. Such affiliations may drive their administrations and students toward an increased political role of these madrassas.

It is important to look at the political attitudes of madrasa teachers – who are instrumental in shaping students' views – and to explore whether it is similar to or differs from that of the general political attitudes in Pakistan. The study is an attempt in that direction.

The study also addresses a range of other issues related to the efforts aimed at curbing extremism in the post 9/11 scenario. Based on a survey of 251 madrassas across the country belonging to five madrasa education boards – the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabia of the Deobandi school of thought, the Tanzeemul Madaris Pakistan of the Bareilvi school of thought, the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Shia of the Shia school of thought, the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Salfia of the Ahle Hadith school of thought, and the Rabitalul Madaris Al-Islamia run by the Jamaat-e-Islami. The study attempts to document the opinion of representatives of a sector which houses and imparts religious education to more than a million girls and boys. The main objective of this study is to highlight and incorporate the opinion of the madrasa sector in the ongoing debate on how to rein in the growing religious intolerance and violence in Pakistan and abroad.

The questions put to seminary teachers were designed to elicit their response on a variety of issues that affect public perceptions directly or indirectly. Primarily, the purpose of the survey was to determine the political attitudes of the clergy that controls madrassas. Do they agree with the general understanding of terrorism and extremism? How do they view Pakistan's policies on the war on terror and military operations in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan? What changes would they like to see in the way the country's foreign relations are being conducted? Has the democratic change in the country paid any dividends? What is the clergy's understanding of international relations, especially with regard to American and European Union policies vis-à-vis the Muslim world? Do they link the disputes in Palestine, Kashmir and Afghanistan with the war on terror? Most of the respondents were quite forthcoming and vocal in giving their opinion. The responses to these questions varied from sect to sect, area to area and with respect to the respondents' political affiliations. A near unanimity of views was noted in responses by respondents from the same sect.

The significance of this study, therefore, lies in the fact that it helps understand the viewpoint of the madrasa sector on Pakistan's domestic politics as well as on the country's international relations. It shows how these viewpoints and opinions relate to the outside world. The trends gauged from the findings are likely to help determine whether madrassas' political attitudes are aligned with the mainstream political behavior and also how and whom do such attitudes influence.

### Survey Design and Methodology

The data were collected in three phases – over a period of 13 months, between September 2007 and October 2008. The survey originally planned to cover 700 madrassas but after a pilot survey carried out in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar encountered reluctance among the madrassas' administration to respond. Of the 70 madrassas visited for the pilot survey, only 30 agreed to participate in the survey. Most of the madrassas initially viewed the survey as an attempt by 'the West' or the government to collect 'sensitive' information about madrassas, although, most of them did not explain what they meant by 'sensitive'. However, many changed their minds and agreed to participate after going through the questionnaire. The survey was subsequently restricted to 251 madrassas, on account of field constraints, without disturbing the initially planned sectarian or geographical proportion.

The 251 madrassas spread across the four provinces, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Northern Areas, Kashmir, and the capital territory of Islamabad. The sample also took into account the relative numerical strength of madrassas of these sects. The sample included madrassas associated with each of the five major seminary boards. Deobandi and Bareilvi madrassas had a heavy representation – 46 and 27 percent respectively – whereas the Ahle Hadith and Shia madrassas made up 12 and 9 percent of the sample group respectively. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which has a few madrassas in Pakistan, accounted only for six percent. The survey did not include madrassas run by the government.

The survey included both structured and unstructured interviews. A questionnaire was designed based on the pilot survey done by the field researchers<sup>5</sup>. The purpose of the pilot survey was to determine the issues of concern for madrasa administrators and formulate a questionnaire accordingly. The pilot survey helped identify the political and cultural trends in madrassas and informed the survey design as well as its methodology.

On the basis of the pilot survey, a 21-point questionnaire was prepared. Some of the questions were open-ended to allow the respondents maximum space to express their opinion. Most of the questions, however, were specific and required direct responses. After the pilot survey, queries that might have dissuaded the respondents from cooperating with the survey team were excluded. No questions were asked about the financial state or sources of madrassas. Supplementary questions were also asked, though observations by the team members during their field visits were taken into consideration while finalizing the survey findings.

To collect the data, a 10-member research team was formed from different areas with a view that local researchers could access the selected madrassas relatively easily because of their understanding of local traditions and circumstances. Most of the questionnaires were delivered and collected by the field researchers themselves.

Table 1: Sample Distribution

Board	No.	Percentage
Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabia	115	46%
Tanzeemul Madaris Pakistan	69	27%
Wafaqul Madaris Al-Shia	23	9%
Wafaqul Madaris Al-Salfia	30	12%
Rabitaul Madaris Al-Islamia	14	6%
Total	251	

Field researchers' impressions, snippets of information gathered during meetings with the administrators and discussions with the students and teachers in many madrassas were also used to supplement and corroborate the responses obtained through the questionnaire. The responses were tabulated and analyzed.

### Respondents' Characteristics

Pakistan's educational system reflects a deeply divided society. There are six forms of education in Pakistan based essentially on class divisions. Madrassas are the lowest rung among the categories<sup>6</sup> and provide education to children who are mainly neglected by the national educational system.<sup>7</sup> Along with the economic and social classes, Ahmed Sheikh also considers disparity in access, area of residence (rural and urban) and gender as factors in this regard.<sup>8</sup> Seminary teachers represent a different segment of the society. They are typically graduates from madrassas of their own schools of thought and spend their whole life in madrassas. However, there are a few exceptions among the teaching staff at JI madrassas which includes graduates - mostly in Islamic, Arabic and oriental studies - from formal educational institutions.

Madrassa teachers are typically native males. It is very uncommon to find foreign teachers in madrassas. There are, of course, some teachers who have received their education/training in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, usually through scholarships offered by the host countries. Female teachers are hired in girls' seminaries but the number is far lower compared to males. It is very common for teachers to be graduates from the same madrassa they teach in, as is the case in Jamia Binori in Karachi. For some madrassas, graduation is the minimum qualification for teachers. Others require a Master's degree. Teachers, who are aged between 24 and 60, earn a meager monthly salary of around (Pak) Rs 5,000 (approximately 600 US dollars). Like the students, teachers are provided free board and lodge by the madrassa. Generally, a madrassa has between 30 and 50 teachers. Larger ones have more, for instance, Jamia Binori has 145 teachers.

## Relationship between Madrasa and Society

Despite the fact that madrassas are politically sensitized, the interaction of their teachers, students and administrators with the society is nominal. The teacher, in particular, faces many implicit restrictions from the society. His participation in social activities is limited to certain ceremonies related to birth, marriage and death. His daily interaction with the people is confined to the mosque during prayer times. People expect a madrasa teacher to behave as a scholar who must keep some distance from society. His participation in sports and festivals is not appreciated. All these checks effectively confine him to the small social sphere of madrasa, mosque and house. Participation in religious congregations becomes the main outlet for madrasa teachers, as there they associate with religious parties whose leanings range from political to sectarian, missionary and militant. The teachers study literature and publications reflecting the beliefs and opinions of their own schools of thought.<sup>9</sup> All these factors contribute to the formation of the thinking style and the general mentality of the madrasa teacher.

## Findings

### a. Affiliation

Contrary to common perception, the survey found that 172 (62%) of the 251 madrassas surveyed have political affiliations – 59 percent are affiliated with religio-political parties, three percent with other mainstream parties and 18 percent with sectarian or jihadi parties. Eighteen percent did not express such association.

Table 2: Affiliation

Responses	No. <sup>10</sup>	Percentage
Religious political parties	163	59%
Sectarian/Jihadi groups	50	18%
Mainstream political parties	9	3%
Other groups	4	1%
Not affiliated	48	18%

The majority's political affiliation indicates that madrassas are eager to play a prominent political role. The administration of 60 percent of these madrassas believes that playing their role in politics is a religious obligation. Some nine percent prefer to be affiliated with a political party to protect their interests. Most of these interests revolve around administrative issues concerning government departments. However, 21 percent cite their desire to be a part of their community as the reason for their association with a political party. Ten percent did not give any reason for the affiliation.

The survey shows that Deobandi and JI madrassas are more inclined towards politics as 82 percent of Deobandi and 100 percent of JI madrassas have political affiliations. It is easy to understand the reason in case of JI madrassas – they are under the patronage of a political party – but for the Deobandi madrassas it can be a matter of their tradition, as political struggle was the main objective behind the formation of Darul Uloom Deoband, whose founders had taken part in the freedom movement of 1857. After their movement was defeated they concluded that they could not overcome the British Raj in India with military might and that the biggest challenges facing the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent was a lack of education and social reform.<sup>11</sup> The focus of the Darul Uloom was on education but it also concentrated on religious reformation, Muslim’s civil rights and politics.<sup>12</sup> Deobandi religious scholars played their role in the Subcontinent’s politics during the British Raj. Madrassas remained the custodians of the political trends of their respective schools of thought and carried on the same tradition after the creation of Pakistan. The Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam, whose leadership mainly consists of madrasa teachers, is the continuity of the same legacy.


Like the Deobandis, the Barelvis also have a tradition of political activism – they had supported Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s pro-Pakistan movement, much to the chagrin of the Deobandis. But they have apparently not maintained their focus on the political tradition. The survey found that 27 percent of the Barelvi madrassas have political affiliations, not only with religio-political parties but also with the mainstream ones. All three percent of the madrassas affiliated with mainstream political parties belong to the Barelvi school of thought. Seventy percent of Ahle Hadith and 48 percent of Shia madrassas have political affiliations, mostly to safeguard the interests of their schools of thought. Only 20 percent said they deemed association with politics as a religious obligation.

Field researchers found that the madrassas’ administration was reluctant to disclose their sectarian and militant affiliations. Even though some of the madrassas are well-known for such affiliation, their administration denied links with sectarian and militant groups. Eighteen percent, however, acknowledged affiliations with sectarian outfits and only a few acknowledged their links with militant jihadi groups.

#### *b. War on Terror*

Most of the responding madrassas condemned terrorism as an evil. But the condemnations came with qualifications. Fifty-seven percent of the madrassas view the war on terrorism as directed exclusively against Islam and Muslims. They see the global campaign against terror as a ploy to kill Muslims and undermine Islam. Some 31 percent of the respondents expressed this view unequivocally. Only 13 percent of the respondents agreed that Pakistan should be a part of the international campaign against terrorism while 77 percent disagreed with such a role for the country. But all of them disagreed with the conventional notion of terrorism. They held that Pakistan should support the anti-terror campaign only when it is not directed against Muslims or Islamic countries. Some described the United States as the “biggest terrorist” itself. Only seven percent supported the military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas, while 81 percent opposed them. Twelve percent talked about the definition of terrorism, but did not give a clear opinion.

Chart 1: Is the war on terror an issue?




Respondents from 16 of the 23 Shia madrassas thought that killing of Muslims by Muslims – sectarianism – is the real terrorism. At the same time, 70 percent of Shia madrassas said that Pakistan should not be a part of the global campaign against terrorism.

Table 3: Should Pakistan be a part of global campaign against terrorism?

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	32	13%
No	195	77%
No Response	24	10%
Total	252	

Chart 2: Should Pakistan be a part of global campaign against terrorism?



Almost half the 69 Bareilvi madrassas hold that terrorism is a product of the United States' Cold War policies against the Soviet Union. However, 35 Bareilvi madrassas say that terrorism has become a serious issue now and 17 say that Pakistan should cooperate with the international community in the war on terror.

Eleven of the 14 JI madrassas think that the war on terror is not an issue and hold that it is aimed at targeting Islam and Muslims in general. All of the JI madrassas hold that Pakistan should not join the global campaign against terrorism and oppose the military operations in the tribal areas against Taliban. Similar views were expressed by Ahle Hadith madrassas - only five out of the 30 surveyed consider the war on terror a serious issue.

Among Deobandi madrassas, nearly 20 percent believe the war on terror is an issue but most of them suggest that Pakistan should deal with the issue on its own, and not take 'dictation' from the West. As many as 103 out of the 115 Deobandi madrassas opposed the military operations in the tribal areas. Three Deobandi madrassas, from Sindh, supported the military operations.

Table 4: Favor for military operations against Taliban in tribal areas

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	18	7%
No	204	81%
No Response	29	12%
Total	251	

#### *c. Support for Taliban*

None of the madrassas said that they offered practical support to the Taliban movement, but 43 percent expressed moral support for Afghan Taliban, who they said were fighting against occupation forces. Only 19 percent agreed with the Taliban ideology. Support for Pakistani Taliban and militant groups was as high as 29 percent. Forty-nine percent of the respondents said that they did not support any militant organization, whereas 25 percent did not offer an opinion. Support for militant groups was higher among Deobandi madrassas as 57 percent admitted moral and ideological support for them but most of them were reluctant to admit any direct link with or practical support for them. None of the Shia madrassas said they supported militant groups and only seven of the 30 Ahle Hadith madrassas admitted their support for militant groups.

Table 5: Support for Afghan Taliban

Responses	No. <sup>13</sup>	Percentage
Agree with ideology	53	19%
Moral support for armed movement	121	43%
Practical support	--	--
No response	109	39%

#### d. Suicide Attacks and Violent Protests

More than 90 percent of the respondents said there was no justification for committing suicide attacks inside Pakistan. Only two percent supported such attacks, but only in a scenario where the state denounced Islam and killed its own citizens. Most of them stated that suicide attacks in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan were justified. The result is similar to *fatwas* (religious decrees) issued by clerics during the last three years in which they declared suicide attacks *haram* (forbidden) in a Muslim society but justified in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, they were not certain if the presence of foreign jihadists in the tribal areas and their use of the territory of their host country, Pakistan, for waging 'jihad' in a neighboring country was justified.<sup>14</sup>

Table 6: Are suicide attacks justified inside Pakistan?

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	6	2%
No	226	90%
No response	19	8%
Total	251	

The survey shows that 52 percent of the madrassas believe that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is the main reason for suicide attacks in Pakistan and 20 percent think it is because of Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism. Twelve percent of the respondents see poverty, unemployment and social injustice behind the phenomenon and eight percent think religion is a motivating force for suicide attacks.

Table 7: Factors behind suicide attacks in Pakistan

Responses	No.	Percentage
Pakistan's role in war against terrorism	51	20%
Foreign troops' presence in Afghanistan	131	52%
Religious motivation	20	8%
Poverty and social injustice	29	12%
Reaction to military operation	20	8%
Total	251	

Ninety-two percent of the madrassas oppose violent protests in the country over any issue, including the blasphemous caricatures of Prophet Muhammad published in western countries. Similar views were expressed in a PIPS public opinion poll on the issues of the blasphemous caricatures. It showed that 97 percent of the respondents were in favor of peaceful demonstrations and 95 percent opposed violent protests.<sup>15</sup>


#### *e. Madrassas' Role in Promoting Extremism*

Madrassas deem themselves to be protectors of Islam, or at least their own brand of Islam. They disagree with the notion that they are encouraging extremism in any form. Asked whether madrassas are a source of extremism, more than 79 percent replied in negative. They emphasized making a distinction between militant seminaries and 'normal' madrassas. Eight percent of the respondents believe that some madrassas play a role in promoting extremism but also point out that such seminaries were close to the government of Pakistan and even received support from the West. Even those madrassas that identified extremism as a real problem refused to acknowledge that madrassas play a role in promoting it. On the contrary, they accused the United States, Israel and other western countries of terrorism and promoting extremist ideologies. Shia madrassas see terrorism at two levels, intra-sect militancy and global terrorism.

Table 8: Madrassas' role in promoting extremism

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	21	8%
No	198	79%
No response	32	13%
Total	251	

Chart 3: Madrassas’ role in promoting extremism



The survey’s findings show two facets of the madrasa mindset. One, they consider themselves and their profession as superior to worldly pursuits and, two, they suffer from a siege mentality and think of themselves as targets of conspiracies by the West and its allies in Pakistan.

*f. Support for Democracy*

The majority of the madrassas surveyed favors a democratic process in the country, with 73 percent respondents agreeing that democracy is the solution to many issues in the country. But this support for democracy comes with caveats. Most of the madrassas think that they can bring Islamic reform in the country through democracy. Some also cited achievements of religio-political parties in terms of Shariah legislation in the country. They did not support the secular values of the system and stressed the need of its Islamization. Not even a single madrasa supports a 2006 law introduced by the Musharraf government to protect women’s rights. Most of them – 72 percent – considered the law as an attempt to westernize Pakistani society. The rest saw other reasons, such as foreign pressure, behind the introduction of the 2006 Women’s Protection Act.

Table 9: Support for democracy

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	183	73%
No	35	14%
No response	33	13%
Total	251	

However, 14 percent madrassas do not support democracy. Six percent support military rule and eight percent disagree with both and want the Muslim Caliphate revived.

*g. Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Worldview*

Nearly 73 percent of madrassas call Pakistan's foreign policy an utter failure. They blame the US and other western countries' influence and lack of independent policies for that. Some of the respondents held that since Pakistan was a nuclear power, it should formulate a policy along the same lines as the United States and other nuclear powers. Most of them saw Islamabad as a pawn of the West, adding that it cannot devise its policies without a go-ahead from western powers.

Those who called Pakistan's foreign policy a success – a mere 11 percent – thought so because of Pakistan's good relations with countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bangladesh. Seventy-five percent of the respondents emphasized the unity of the Muslim *Ummah* and said that that was the only solution of the problems facing the Muslim world and Pakistan. Fifty-seven percent respondents believe that western policies towards the Muslim world are based on taking over its resources. Twenty-nine percent respondents said that western policies were against Islam and intended to westernize the *Ummah*.


*h. Solution for Conflicts*

The survey also sought the opinion of the madrassas on the solution of the two major regional conflicts, Afghanistan and Kashmir. PIPS teams found that the madrassas were keen to express their views on the subjects and suggested more than one solution. Nearly 90 percent favored a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. Out of them, 69 percent supported a solution according to United Nations' resolutions and 23 percent favored a resolution through bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, or trilateral negotiation, also including Kashmiris. Every respondent condemned the Indian forces' atrocities in held Kashmir and criticized the role played by the international community, but only nine percent believed that jihad is a solution to the dispute.

Table 10: How should Kashmir issue be resolved?

Responses	No.	Percentage
According to UN resolutions	172	69%
Through jihad	22	9%
Through talks with India and/or Kashmiris	57	23%
Total	251	

Chart 4: How should Kashmir issue be resolved?



Similarly, only six percent supported a solution to the situation in Afghanistan through jihad but a majority (82%) linked it with foreign troops leaving Afghanistan. Around 12 percent emphasized evolving traditional resolution mechanisms – jirgas and talks with Taliban.

### Conclusion

Madrassas and the general public hold common views on many issues including violent protests, suicide attacks and democracy in Pakistan. Like madrasa teachers, many people condone suicide attacks carried out by the jihadis. Similarly, Taliban fighting in Afghanistan is mainly viewed in the same perspective by the general public as by the madrasa teachers. But the survey noted a major difference of opinion on the issue of extremism. According to a December 2008 Gallup poll, 60 percent of Pakistanis believe that religious extremism is a serious problem in the country,<sup>16</sup> but only 31 percent madrassas hold that view. The December poll suggested that 60 percent of the people support government's crackdown on Pakistan-based extremists but the madrassas' majority suggests looking for political solutions. Considerable differences were noted between the stance of madrasa students and teachers regarding the conflicts in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The students supported a militant policy towards India regarding Kashmir,<sup>17</sup> but 90 percent of the teachers favored a peaceful resolution.

Most importantly, political views of madrassas are not confined to religious issues alone. On certain issues, their views are in line with public perceptions. Madrassas should not be treated as equivalents of schools or merely as educational institutions for religious studies. They essentially serve as places of political and cultural indoctrination and therefore deserve to be dealt with politically. Given their proclivity to indulge in political discourse and foreign policy issues, the government can arrange training and lectures for orientation on Pakistan's foreign policy and international relations in general.

## Notes:

- <sup>1</sup> P.W Singer, "Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of Education not jihad," Analysis paper 41, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, November 2001.
- <sup>2</sup> Peter Bergen & Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Scapegoat", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The study examined 79 terrorists responsible for five of the worst anti-Western terrorist attacks and found that only in rare cases were madrassa graduates involved.
- <sup>3</sup> P.W Singer, op. cit.
- <sup>4</sup> "Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism," International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 73, January, 16, 2004. The report emphasizes madrassas' role in promoting extremist views.
- <sup>5</sup> The author is thankful to Najam Mushtaq and PIPS survey teams led by Shahzada Saleem and Mujtaba Rathore. The teams included Muhammad Fareed (Rawalpindi/Islamabad), Mufti Sanaullah (Balochistan), Moeen Noori (Sindh), Aminullah Swati (Swat), Bakhtiar Ahmed and Shehryar Ahmed (Hazara region).
- <sup>6</sup> Tariq Rahman, "Worlds Apart: An opinion survey," *The News*, May 12, 2000.
- <sup>7</sup> There are a few exceptions: some madrassas have upgraded their system – Darul Uloom Bhera Sharif, Sargodha, Jamiatul Rasheed and Darul Uloom Korangi, Karachi have the all facilities available at modern educational institutions. At the same time, madrassas and religious parties have set up their English-medium schools to attract middle and lower-middle class children. In general, however, madrassas are the major source of education for the poor.
- <sup>8</sup> Amneh Shaikh, "Warring ideologies: The use of education policy to control religious fundamentalism in Pakistan," Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, Policy and Governance Discussion Paper 06-10.
- <sup>9</sup> A range of religious publications, by religious parties and radical and militant groups, is available in the market. These groups publish their own daily and weekly newspapers. Madrassa teachers are cut off from mainstream media. For a detailed discussion see Muhammad Amir Rana, "Radical Print Media in Pakistan, An Overview," *PIPS Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Islamabad, Issue 1, Number 1, 2008.
- <sup>10</sup> The total exceeds from the number of surveyed madrassas because some of the madrassas are affiliated with political parties as well as sectarian/jihadi organizations.
- <sup>11</sup> Qari Muhammad Tayyab, Darul Uloom Deoband, Monthly *Al-Jamia*, Rawalpindi, April 2001.
- <sup>12</sup> Abu Atta, Mufti, "Darul Uloom Deoband Kay Anasar-e-Tarkeebi," Monthly *Al-Jamia*, Rawalpindi, April 2001.
- <sup>13</sup> The total exceeds from the number of surveyed madrassas because some of the madrassas agree with the ideology of Afghan Taliban as well as morally support their armed movement.
- <sup>14</sup> "Ideology: Clergy holds War on Terror Responsible for Terrorism," [http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=ra&id=ido\\_list\\_1](http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=ra&id=ido_list_1), retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.
- <sup>15</sup> Opinion poll on blasphemous caricatures of Prophet Muhammad, <http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=survey&id=02>, retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.
- <sup>16</sup> Julie Ray, "Pakistanis Support Tougher Stance on Terrorism," <http://www.gallup.com/poll/113455/Pakistanis-Support-Tougher-Stance-Terrorism.aspx>, retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.
- <sup>17</sup> Tariq Rahman, "Politics of Knowledge: Language, Education and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan," 2003, <http://www.tariqrahman.net/>, retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.

KNOWLEDGE FOR PEACE