


# PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT

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# Digital Database on Conflict and Security

Pak Institute for Peace Studies' (PIPS) digital database is the first comprehensive account of incidents of violence and terrorism in Pakistan. PIPS has been maintaining its database on issues related to conflict and security since 2006 that includes the diversified info tracks containing details of terrorist and insurgent attacks, inter-tribal infightings and inter-tribal sectarian clashes, sectarian related terrorism, ethno-political violence, cross-border attacks and clashes, operational attacks by the security forces and their clashes with militants, kidnappings, and search and arrest operations by the law enforcement agencies.

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<b>Contents</b>			
List of Acronyms	2	6.1 Sectarian-related Terrorist Attacks	25
Methodology and Variables	3	6.2 Sectarian Clashes	27
Glossary	4	7 Attacks on NATO Supplies	29
1. Introduction	5	8 Attacks on Educational Institutions	29
2. Overview	6	9 Border Tensions	29
2.1 Comparison	6	9.1 Pak-Afghan Border	30
3. Major Actors of Instability in 2012	9	9.2 Pak-India Border	30
3.1 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	9	9.3 Pak-Iran Border	30
3.2 Local Taliban	11	10 Drone Attacks	31
3.3 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	11	11 State Response	31
3.4 Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan	12	11.1 Operational Front	31
3.5 Punjabi Taliban	12	11.1.1 Military Operations	31
3.6 Lashkar-e-Islam	12	11.1.2 Search Operations	32
3.7 Balochistan Liberation Army	12	11.1.3 Terrorists Arrested	33
3.8 Baloch Republican Army	13	11.2 Political and Administrative Front	33
3.9 Lashkar-e-Balochistan	13	11.2.1 FATA Reforms	33
3.10 Balochistan Liberation Front	13	11.2.2 Establishment of NACTA	33
3.11 United Baloch Army	13	11.2.3 Fair Trial Bill 2012	34
3.12 Baloch Musallah Difa'a Tanzeem	13	11.2.4 National Strategy for Counter-IED	34
3.13 Sindhu Desh Liberation Army	13	11.2.5 Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2012	34
3.14 Actors of Ethno-political Violence	13	12 Challenges	34
3.15 'Unidentified' Militants	13	12.1 Critical Areas	34
4 Security Landscape in 2012	14	12.1.1 Balochistan	34
4.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & FATA	14	12.1.2 FATA	34
4.1.1 Attacks on Security Forces / Law Enforcement Agencies	15	12.1.3 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	34
4.1.2 Attacks on Pro-government Tribesmen & Civilians	16	12.1.4 Karachi	35
4.1.3 Attacks on Political Leaders and Workers	16	12.2 Critical Internal Threats	35
4.1.4 Inter-militant Clashes	17	12.2.1 Sectarian Violence	35
4.2 Balochistan	17	12.2.2 Nexus between Terrorists and Criminals	35
4.2.1 Attacks on Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies	18	12.2.3 Monitoring Mechanism for Proscribed Organizations	35
4.2.2 Attacks on Non-Baloch Settlers and Civilians	18	12.2.4 Changing Tactics and Targets by Terrorists	36
4.2.3 Attacks on Government Installations and Functionaries	19	12.2.5 Illegal Weapons	36
4.2.4 Attacks on Political Leaders and Workers	19	12.3 Critical Policy Initiatives	36
4.3 Sindh	19	12.3.1 Counter-terrorism Policy	36
4.3.1 Ethno-political Violence	20	12.3.2 Prosecution and Witness Protection Program	36
4.4 Punjab	21	12.3.3 Better Policing	37
4.5 Gilgit Baltistan	22	12.3.4 Peace Talks with Taliban	37
4.6 Islamabad	22	12.3.5 Rehabilitation of Detainees	37
4.7 Azad Jammu and Kashmir	23	13 Recommendations	38
5 Suicide Attacks	23	a. Internal Security	38
6 Sectarian Violence	23	b. Critical Areas and Initiatives	38
		c. Border Security	39
		Notes	40
		Appendices & Annexures	43

## List of Acronyms

<b>AJK:</b> Azad Jammu and Kashmir	<b>FIA:</b> Federal Investigative Agency	<b>NDMA:</b> National Disaster Management Authority
<b>ANA:</b> Afghan National Army	<b>Fr:</b> Firing	<b>NI:</b> Nationalist Insurgents' Attack
<b>ANP:</b> Awami National Party	<b>FR:</b> Frontier Region	<b>NP:</b> National Party
<b>Arm:</b> Army	<b>HDP:</b> Hazara Democratic Party	<b>Oper:</b> Operational Attack
<b>ASWJ:</b> Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamat	<b>HG:</b> Hand Grenade	<b>PATA:</b> Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
<b>ATC:</b> Anti Terrorism Courts	<b>HRCF:</b> Human Rights Commission of Pakistan	<b>P-ml:</b> Paramilitary Forces
<b>ATF:</b> Anti-Terrorism Force	<b>ICRC:</b> International Committee of Red Cross	<b>PML-N:</b> Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
<b>BC:</b> Balochistan Constabulary	<b>IDP:</b> Internally Displaced Persons	<b>Pol:</b> Police
<b>BH:</b> Beheading	<b>IED:</b> Improvised Explosive Device	<b>PPP:</b> Pakistan People's Party
<b>BLA:</b> Balochistan Liberation Army	<b>ISAF:</b> International Security Assistance Force	<b>RA:</b> Rocket Attack
<b>BLF:</b> Balochistan Liberation Front	<b>ISI:</b> Inter Services Intelligence	<b>RCB:</b> Remote-controlled Bomb
<b>BNP-M:</b> Balochistan National Party-Mengal Group	<b>ISO:</b> Imamia Student Organization	<b>Rng:</b> Rangers
<b>BT:</b> Bomb Blast	<b>Ji:</b> Jamaat-e-Islami	<b>SA:</b> Suicide Attack
<b>CIA:</b> Central Intelligence Agency	<b>JUI-F:</b> Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam-Fazl	<b>Sab:</b> Sabotage
<b>CID:</b> Criminal Investigation Department	<b>Kid:</b> Kidnapping	<b>Sect:</b> Sectarian
<b>Civ:</b> Civilians	<b>KP:</b> Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	<b>SM:</b> Sipah-e-Muhammad
<b>COAS:</b> Chief of Army Staff	<b>LeJ:</b> Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	<b>SP:</b> Superintendent of Police
<b>CSF:</b> Coalition Support Funds	<b>LI:</b> Lashkar-e-Islam	<b>SSP:</b> Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
<b>DG:</b> Director General	<b>LM:</b> Landmine Blast	<b>ST:</b> Sunni Tehrik
<b>DSP:</b> Deputy Superintendent Police	<b>LoC:</b> Line of Control	<b>TA:</b> Terrorist Attack
<b>ETIM:</b> East Turkistan Islamic Party	<b>Lvs:</b> Levies Force	<b>TK:</b> Target Killing
<b>FATA:</b> Federally Administered Tribal Areas	<b>Mil:</b> Militant	<b>TNSM:</b> Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
<b>FC:</b> Frontier Corps	<b>MQM:</b> Muttahida Qaumi Movement	<b>TTP:</b> Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
<b>FCR:</b> Frontier Crimes Regulation	<b>NATO:</b> North Atlantic Treaty Organization	<b>UBA:</b> United Baloch Army
<b>FDMA:</b> FATA Disaster Management Authority		<b>UN:</b> United Nations

## Methodology and Variables

The PIPS conflict/security database and archives are the basic sources relied upon for this report. The archives and the database are the outcome of a meticulous monitoring process on every relevant incident in the country on a daily basis. A regular follow up is conducted in liaison with PIPS correspondents in the regions in order to keep track of daily developments on such incidents. PIPS compiles data from sources including newspapers, magazines, journals, field sources and screening of official record. More than 30 English and Urdu dailies, magazines, and journals, and various television news channels are monitored to update the database and archives. Regional daily newspapers and weeklies from Peshawar, Quetta, Gilgit and Karachi are also monitored for details of incidents reported in the local media. Correspondents in provincial capitals are the primary source for PIPS to verify the media reports. In case of a major incident, PIPS teams consult the local administration and journalists for further details. In cases where PIPS finds it difficult to verify facts of a particular incident, it gives preference to the official statements in that regard. PIPS security reports utilize eight major variables with their respective set of sub-variables for analysis of the security situation in Pakistan. The security landscape is mapped through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative methods are used, based on PIPS Conflict and Security Database, to measure the scale and level of violence. Meanwhile, the qualitative approach dilates upon changes and developments on the militants' front, state responses to these developments and projections of future scenarios. The following eight major variables with their sub-sets of variable are used in the PIPS Security Reports:

1. **Attacks:** This major variable has a sub-set of five sub-variables i.e. (i) terrorist attacks including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks; (ii) incidents of ethno-political violence; (iii) cross-border attacks; (iv) drone attacks; and (v) operational attacks by security forces against militants. Since Pakistan's security landscape is very complicated with a diverse array of insecurity indicators in different parts of the country, the type of violence in one geographical unit is often different in its nature and dynamics from security landscape in other parts of the country. For this purpose the mentioned sub-set of variables is carefully monitored and analyzed in the security report with a view to suggest specific counter-strategy for each type of attack in these areas.
2. **Clash:** Another variable used is of clashes which include four sub-variables, i.e., (i) inter-tribal; (ii) sectarian; (iii) clashes between security forces and militants; and (iv) militants' infightings. The number of such clashes and their geographic location is taken as an indicator of parallel trends unfolding simultaneously with major trends and patterns of security in different areas of the country.
3. **State Responses:** It has two sub-variables: (i) security measures, and (ii) political and administrative responses. The first takes into account the security forces' operational attacks and clashes with militants, search and hunt operations and terrorists' arrests, etc. The second variable entails the government's political and administrative measures to maintain law and order and reduce insecurity and violence.
4. **Casualties:** Casualties include both the number of people killed and injured. Casualties among civilians, militants and security forces are treated as another indicator to measure the levels and trends of security in the country.
5. **Attack Tactics:** This head takes a comprehensive account of various tactics used by different actors including suicide attacks, missile attacks, hand grenade attacks, kidnappings, rocket attacks, beheadings, landmine blasts, firing, sabotage, target killings, and bomb and improvised explosive devices blasts.
6. **Development on Militants' Front:** This variable analyzes statements, activities, internal divisions and other activities of militants to determine their strength and the dynamics of their strategies.
7. **Opportunities and Challenges** include political measures and military responses to different security issues along with highlighting constraints and challenges encountered by the state.
8. **Claimant of Responsibility:** It provides insight into militants' targets, tactics, areas of operation, and agendas.

## Glossary

**Military Operation:** Large-scale operations launched by military and paramilitary forces against Islamist militants and separatist insurgents in KP, FATA and Balochistan to preserve law and order and the writ of the state.

**Operational Attack:** Pre-emptive attacks launched by military and paramilitary troops to purge an area of militants.

**Clashes between Security Forces and Militants:** Armed clashes between security forces and militants, triggered by militants' attack on security check posts/ convoys and confrontation during search operations.

**Terrorist Attacks** include militant, nationalist, insurgent and sectarian attacks. Indiscriminate use of violence by militant outfits such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) etc., manifested through suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video shops, etc.

**Nationalist Insurgent Attacks:** Attacks by separatists/nationalist insurgents mainly in Balochistan.

**Sectarian Attacks:** Indiscriminate use of violence rooted in differences among various Islamic schools of thought over interpretation of religious commands. Incidents involving indiscriminate use of violence perpetrated by banned

sectarian outfits such as LeJ, Tehrik-e-Jafria, Imamia Student Organization (ISO), Sipah-e-Muhammad, etc., against rival schools of religious thought.

**Ethno-political Violence:** The threat or use of violence, often against the civilian population, to achieve political or social ends, to intimidate opponents, or to publicize grievances.

**Inter-tribal Clash:** Clashes or feuds reported between tribes, mainly in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, rural areas of Punjab and parts of interior Sindh.

**Search and Hunt Operation:** Launched by law enforcement agencies on intelligence to capture militants or to purge a particular locality of suspected militants and their hideouts.

**Seatrain Clashes:** Violent clashes between armed factions of banned sectarian outfits or between followers of rival sects such as Sunni-Shia, Deobandi-Barelvi strife. Sectarian clashes also include tribal feuds between followers of Sunni and Shia schools of thought as in Kurram Agency, where the Sunni Turi tribesmen frequently clash with members of the Shia Bangash tribe.

**Overall Number of Attacks:** The sum of militant and counter-militant attacks by the security forces, besides drone attacks, incidents of ethno-political violence, and attacks with sectarian motives or by nationalist insurgents.

## 1. Introduction

2012 was a year of mixed responses to critical security threats by both the state and society in Pakistan. A downward trend in the number of overall incidents of violence and casualties, which had started in 2010 continued in 2011 and 2012. There emerged some clarity on the institutional level in dealing with the menace of terrorism, but the assassination of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa senior minister Bashir Ahmed Bilour and the unsuccessful bid on the life of Malala Yousafzai, a young peace activist from Swat, dampened the optimism.

In order to keep the optimism intact, some institutional responses would be indispensable to deal with terrorism and addressing the rising extremism in society. The fact that the security establishment, which had been reluctant to acknowledge the growing influence of extremists in the country, had formally recognized it as a threat must be built upon. The army chief's speech on Independence Day was encouraging as he stressed clarity on the issue of extremism and terrorism. The judiciary, which was under criticism for acquitting detained terrorists, showed the resolve to prioritize the issue. The Chief Justice of Pakistan on a number of occasions emphasized collaborative efforts to eradicate extremism from society.

Pakistan's National Assembly passed a fair trial bill, which authorized the state to intercept private communications in order to find incriminating evidence against the terrorists. Although invasion of privacy and denial of freedoms have and should elicit strong reservations, it is promising that the use of technology and reliance for conviction on things other than torture and confessions beaten out of criminals are being considered. This could be a definite step towards strengthening prosecution of terrorists, but must go hand in hand with measures such as effective witness protection mechanisms and focusing on scientific investigation and gathering forensic evidence.

The federal cabinet also approved the draft National Counter-Terrorism Authority Bill 2012. A properly constituted and mandated authority could contribute to evolving meaningful counter-extremism initiatives.

These are the positive responses, but in the absence of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, these initiatives may not bring the desired results. Many ideological, political and operational ambiguities still persist, which influence the threat perception of the security apparatus. Coordination and trust are still lacking among the various intelligence and law enforcement departments, and lack of processing the data and analysis of information that is already in the system remain largely neglected areas.

Public opinion on how to deal with terrorists in the tribal areas is still divided, and opinion leaders and experts also do not appear convinced about the implications of, or prospects for, a military operation. But without going into the operational complexities of an offensive in North Waziristan, it is worth noting that the military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan Agency had proved productive and significantly decreased the threat from terrorism to internal security. A 24 percent decline in terrorist attacks in the country was recorded following these operations. The operational and technical aspects of a possible offensive will get proper attention in the coming days, but facts must not be lost sight of in policy- and



opinion-making debates. These should help develop informed public opinion, which is badly needed to counter critical threats. On the other hand, unity among terrorist groups is a source of their strength. They also gain strength from fragmentation and confusion over the war on terror among the security, political and civil society leaderships in Pakistan.

Ahead of the general elections, political parties do not appear to be willing to take a clear stance. They are happy to stay on the sidelines despite a dire need for a national security policy that security experts have been crying themselves hoarse about for years.

In this perspective, many challenges have the potential to increasingly hurt internal security in the coming days. The rise in sectarian violence, heightened ethno-political tensions in Karachi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and its affiliates and the Balochistan imbroglio will remain serious security challenges in 2013. Against the backdrop of the upcoming general elections in particular, these security challenges could have an impact on the political parties' ability to run their electoral campaigns smoothly and free from the specter of violence.

The security challenges will not go away by themselves simply because there are some stand-alone responses here and there. They need to be connected with a comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy. That would not be possible without political consensus. 2013 will be a year when the political leadership in Pakistan will have no alternative but to come out clearly to state their vision and resolve in dealing with the challenges or risk becoming irrelevant.

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) hopes that the seventh edition of its annual security report would help the policymakers, academics, media and civil society understand the gravity of the situation with a view to move toward sustainable solutions. The report contains comprehensive data on violent incidents, comparative analysis of the security situation, the changing targets and tactics of militants, government strategies and the nature of its response to the security challenges.

The entire team at PIPS deserves much praise and acknowledgment for bringing out this report. It would not have been possible without the hard work and dedication of Mujtaba Rathore, Safdar Sial, Farhan Yousaf, Maryam Naseer and Shagufta Hayat in monitoring and recording security developments in the country throughout the year. Credit is due also to Najam U Din, for editing this report and giving his valuable input. A special thanks to Shahzad Ahmed, the IT manager, who managed the digital database in an excellent manner and provided comprehensive maps to help understand the trends and dimensions of conflicts.

**Muhammad Amir Rana**

January 4, 2013



## 2. Overview

Militant, nationalist insurgent and violent sectarian groups carried out a total of 1,577 terrorist attacks across Pakistan in 2012, claiming the lives of 2,050 people and causing injuries to another 3,822. Over 61 percent (971) of these attacks were carried out by the so-called religiously motivated militant groups, mainly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which caused the killing of 1,076 people and injuries to another 2,227. The Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents carried out 404 attacks, killing 437 people and injuring 823 others. Meanwhile, 202 sectarian-related terrorist attacks, perpetrated by banned sectarian groups, and the TTP and groups affiliated with it claimed the lives of 537 people and caused injuries to 772 people.

Although the terrorists used diverse attack tactics to hit their targets across Pakistan, a considerable number of these attacks—587, or 37 percent—were incidents of targeted killings. As many as 177 incidents of politically motivated targeted killing were reported in 2012, which are not included in this figure. As many as 33 suicide attacks were also reported in 2012. Other significant attack tactics used by the terrorists in 2012 included improvised explosive devices (375 attacks), remote-controlled bomb blasts (139), rocket attacks (127), landmine blasts (88), bomb explosions (85), hand grenade blasts (75), incidents of kidnapping (39), acts of sabotage (20), and beheadings (9).

The highest number of terrorist attacks (474) for any one region in 2012 was reported from Balochistan, which has been a flashpoint of a nationalist insurgency and sectarian violence for several years. The Taliban-infested and militancy-hit Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were the second and third most volatile regions of the country in 2012 where 456 and 388 terrorist attacks were reported, respectively. Meanwhile, 187 terrorist attacks were reported in Karachi and 28 in other parts of Sindh, 26 in Gilgit Baltistan, 17 in Punjab, and one in the federal capital Islamabad. For the second year in a row, no terrorist attack was recorded in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

The highest number of casualties in terrorist attacks in 2012 was reported from FATA and Balochistan; 631 people were killed in each of the two regions. As many as 1,095 people were also injured in these attacks in FATA and 1,032 in Balochistan. In Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa, such attacks claimed the lives of 401 people and caused injuries to another 1,081. A significant number of casualties in terrorist attacks was also reported from Karachi (272 dead and 352 injured). Terrorist attacks claimed the lives of 17 people in interior Sindh and of 22 in Gilgit Baltistan. (See Table 1)


**Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2012**

Province/Area	Frequency	Killed	Injured
KP	456	401	1,081
Balochistan	474	631	1,032
FATA	388	631	1,095
Punjab	17	75	184
Karachi	187	272	352
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	28	17	45
Gilgit Baltistan	26	22	33
Azad Kashmir	0	0	0
Islamabad	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,577</b>	<b>2,050</b>	<b>3,822</b>

### 2.1 Comparison

If casualties in terrorist attacks, operations by the security forces and their clashes with militants, ethno-political violence, drone attacks, inter-tribal and inter-militants clashes, sectarian clashes, religious/communal violence, cross-border attacks and clashes, criminal gangs' clashes with one another and with the security forces are counted, the overall figure in 2012 was 5,047 people killed and 5,688 injured in 2,217 attacks and clashes of various kinds.

**Chart 1: Comparison of Overall Incidents of Violence & Casualties (2009-12)**



A downward trend in the number of overall incidents of violence and casualties in Pakistan—as described at Table 2—which had started in 2010 continued in 2011 and 2012. (See Chart 1) A total of 2,217 violent incidents including 1,577 terrorist attacks described earlier were reported in 2012, compared to 2,895 in 2011 and 3,393 in 2010, a decrease of 23 percent and 35 percent, respectively. The overall casualties in violent incidents also went down, from 7,107 fatalities in 2011 to 5,047 in 2012, a decrease of 29 percent. The number of people injured in the overall incidents of violence including attacks and clashes declined from 6,736 in 2011 to 5,688 in 2012, a decrease of about 16 percent. (See Table 2)

**Table 2: Nature of Overall Incidents of Violence**

Attacks/Clashes	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Terrorist attacks	1,577	2,050	3,822
Clashes between security forces and militants	115	705	490
Operational attacks by security forces	109	960	469
Drone attacks	45	336	67
Border clashes/attacks	79	326	227
Political and ethnic violence	183	288	182
Inter-tribal clashes	13	74	28
Sectarian clashes	11	26	128
Inter-militant clashes	61	217	158
Criminal gangs clashes	13	36	54
Clashes between security forces and criminal gangs	8	25	60
Religious/communal violence	3	4	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,217</b>	<b>5,047</b>	<b>5,688</b>

In comparison with 2011, the overall number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2012 fell by about 20 percent, the fatalities in such attacks by 14 percent and the number of injured by 13 percent. (See Table 3)

Karachi and interior Sindh were the only regions where the incidence of terrorist attacks increased in 2012, by 222 percent and 33 percent, respectively,

compared to the previous year. The number of casualties in terrorist attacks also increased significantly in Karachi and interior Sindh in 2012, as compared to 2011.

The number of terrorist attacks fell considerably in Islamabad (by 75 percent), FATA (42 percent), Punjab (43 percent) and Balochistan (26 percent) but the number of people killed in terrorist attacks increased in Gilgit Baltistan by 144 percent, and in FATA by 3 percent. In Balochistan where although the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks decreased by 11 percent, the number of the injured increased by 21 percent. An 11 percent decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was accompanied by a 51 percent decrease in fatalities in such attacks and a 36 percent decrease in the number of the injured.

**Table 3: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks & Casualties (2011 vs. 2012)<sup>1</sup>**

Province / Region	Number of Attacks (%Change)	Killed (% Change)	Injured (% Change)
KP	11% ↓	51% ↓	36% ↓
Balochistan	26% ↓	11% ↓	21% ↑
FATA	42% ↓	3% ↑	8% ↓
Punjab	43% ↓	35% ↓	39% ↓
Karachi	222% ↑	136% ↑	57% ↑
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	33% ↑	240% ↑	41% ↑
Gilgit Baltistan	Unchanged	144% ↑	37% ↑
Islamabad	75% ↓	75% ↓	100% ↓
<b>Total</b>	<b>20% ↓</b>	<b>14% ↓</b>	<b>13% ↓</b>

Sectarian violence increased markedly in 2012 compared to the previous year. The number of incidents of sectarian violence, including sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes, increased by 53 percent, from 139 in 2011 to 213 in 2012. More than 85 percent of all reported incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan were concentrated in four cities/regions: Karachi, Quetta, Gilgit and Kurram Agency.

The number of suicide attacks across the country fell by 27 percent, with 33 suicide attacks in 2012 compared to 45 in 2011. As many as 54 percent of all suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2012 were concentrated

in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These were mainly carried out by the TTP. In 2011 also, 60 percent of all suicide attacks reported across Pakistan were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

US drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas registered a 40 percent decrease in 2012 compared to the previous year and fatalities in these attacks also fell by 40 percent. Out of 45 drone attacks in 2012, as many as 38 reportedly struck militants and their hideouts in North Waziristan Agency. Six drone strikes were reported in South Waziristan and one in Orakzai Agency.

The number of cross-border attacks and clashes decreased in 2012 but the casualties in these attacks increased. As in 2011, most of the cross-border attacks and clashes (70 percent) were reported from Pakistan's western border with Afghanistan including attacks reportedly carried out by militants of TTP's Swat chapter hiding in Afghanistan's Kunar and Nuristan provinces. On the whole, 79 border attacks and clashes were reported from Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran, which were 6 percent less than such incidents in 2011. There were 326 fatalities in such attacks in 2012; the figure was 25 percent higher than the killings in such incidents in 2011.

The incidents of ethno-political violence in Pakistan declined in 2012 but the number of political parties which were either tied to or targeted in politically motivated targeted killings increased. Out of a total of 183 incidents of ethno-political violence reported across the country in 2012, compared to 265 in 2011, as many as 176 (96 percent) were concentrated in Karachi alone. At least 16 political parties and their affiliated groups were believed to be involved in ethno-political violence in Karachi in the year under review.

The decrease in casualties in 2012 in overall incidents of violence essentially translated into a decrease in casualties among militants, civilians and security forces personnel. Compared to 2011, the number of militants killed decreased by 34 percent and of the injured by 17 percent. Similarly, the number of civilians killed in 2012 declined by 25 percent and of those injured by 7 percent. Fatalities among security forces personnel also decreased by 16 percent and injuries by about 38 percent compared to 2011. Distribution of casualties in the overall reported incidents of violence in 2012 is given in Table 4.

**Table 4: Casualties in Pakistan in 2012**

Affected Group	Killed	Injured
FC	188	291
Militants	2,302	929
Civilian	2,058	3,821
Police	228	306
Paramilitaries	29	18
Army	190	261
Levies	42	42
Rangers	10	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,047</b>	<b>5,688</b>

#### **'No-casualty' Attacks**

Out of 1,577 terrorist attacks reported countrywide in the year under review, in 501 no fatality or injury was recorded. As many as 101 of these 'no-casualty' attacks targeted security forces and their check posts, 55 were against civilians, and 40 against tribesmen, political leaders/workers and government officials. The rest of the attacks were targeted against public and private property, electricity pylons, railway tracks/trains, educational institutions, gas pipelines and NATO supply vehicles, among others.

### **3. Major Actors of Instability in 2012**

#### **3.1 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan**

The major actor of instability in the country in 2012 was TTP. This alliance of numerous militant groups and commanders proved lethal with 350 terrorist attacks across the country, which claimed the lives of 498 civilians and 633 security forces personnel. The group was also involved in 68 small- and medium-scale armed clashes with security forces in FATA and the KP province.

The TTP has diversified its operational tactics from guerrilla-style operations to suicide attacks and targeted killings. It has also expanded the range of targets, from security forces to political and sectarian killings.

In 2012, TTP claimed responsibility for 31 suicide attacks out of 33 such attacks reported in the country during the year. The group also expanded targeted killings of the top political leadership and peace activists in the country. The assassination of Bashir Ahmed Bilour, Awami National Party (ANP) leader

and Senior Minister of the KP province, and the attempted assassination of Malala Yousafzai were just two instances evidencing the TTP's aggressive move against the moderates in the country.

**Table 5: Terrorist Attacks Claimed by Terrorist Groups**

Organization	Balochistan	FATA	KP	Punjab	Sindh	Islamabad	Pakistan
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	2	197	109	5	36	1	350
Local Taliban	-	167	362	-	-	-	529
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	67	-	1	1	59	-	128
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	10	-	-	-	42	-	44
Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)	-	116	8	-	-	-	124
Ansarul Islam (AI)	-	5	-	-	-	-	5
Punjabi Taliban	-	-	-	8	-	-	8
Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB)	15	-	-	-	-	-	15
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	121	-	-	-	-	-	121
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	17	-	-	-	-	-	17
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	131	-	-	-	-	-	131
Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LB)	43	-	-	2	1	-	46
United	15	-	-	-	-	-	15

Organization	Balochistan	FATA	KP	Punjab	Sindh	Islamabad	Pakistan
Baloch Army (UBA)							
Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA)	-	-	-	-	27	-	27

The militant group's capacity to launch major guerilla operations remained intact as it managed two terrorist attacks of such kind at the Kamra and Peshawar airbases in 2012. Although it was assumed after the killing of Ilyas Kashmiri, a self-styled expert in multi-layered terrorist attacks, Qari Hussain, who was known as *ustadul fidayeen* (master of suicide bombers), Badar Mansoor, chief of Al Qaeda's operational network in Pakistan, and Abu Laith al-Libi, strategic mastermind of Al Qaeda in the country, that the terrorists were losing their destructive edge. However, it seems that those were mere indications that they would need time to recover from those losses.

At the same time, a change in the nature of attacks reflected that the terrorists were under some pressure or lacked human resources. Their reliance on targeted killings grew. There was a clear decline in the number of suicide attacks in the first half of 2012. These factors offered reason to believe that the space for terrorists in Pakistan's tribal areas was shrinking amid the ongoing military campaign and US drone strikes against them. The Taliban appear to have quickly realized that the erosion of high-value resources could lead to the annihilation of their movement. They combined their scattered forces and formed a *shura-i-murakeba* to resolve their internal disputes.

The strikes on the airbase in Kamra and Peshawar showed that the assumption about their power being ground down was incorrect. Indeed these major assaults were perhaps aimed at impressing upon the people and the military that the TTP still had the capability to launch substantial operations against high-profile installations.

The mastermind in these attacks was believed to be Adnan Rasheed, a former employee of Pakistan Air Force (PAF), who was sentenced to death for his role

in an attempt to assassinate military ruler Gen Pervez Musharraf. He was among those who had escaped from a jail in Bannu in a prison break in April 2012.

It is possible that Rasheed was part of the planning team for the attacks, as he could have been aware of security details at the airbase and could have sympathizers inside the base.

Besides Rasheed, the TTP and its affiliates still have human resource, who can pose major security threats—such as Farman Ali Shinwari, successor to Badar Mansoor as Al Qaeda’s operational chief in Pakistan, Ustad Farooq, head of the so-called Punjabi Taliban, Abdul Shakoor al-Turkistani, a powerful Al Qaeda leader, Saiful Adil, who operates from Iran, Mullah Fazlullah, now based in Kunar province of Afghanistan, and Hakeemullah Mehsud, head of the TTP.

Although the terrorists failed to show the level of destructive skill in the Kamra and Peshawar airport attacks that they did manifested under Kashmiri’s supervision at the Mehran base, the military headquarters and the Lahore police academy attacks, the unfolding pattern suggests that they would continue to try.

Although the TTP is afflicted by an internal crisis but its strength lies in its nexus with external and internal terrorist groups. The TTP serves as a bridge between Al Qaeda and its international affiliates and local terrorist groups ranging from the Punjabi Taliban to LeJ. These groups not only share similar ideological and political ambitions and borrow tactics and techniques from each other, but also mirror other terrorist outfits’ approaches by merging or otherwise converging, transforming or altering their organizational composition. Typically, the influence of the TTP has impacted smaller groups who had been struggling to survive or had material deficiencies and required external help to survive. Al Qaeda has been more than willing to help out, through both ideological and operational support.

### 3.2 Local Taliban

The meaning of the term ‘local Taliban’ varies from one area to another but mainly denotes groups that are loosely connected with the TTP or formed with similar objectives. Most of these groups are operating in KP, mainly in Charsadda, Swabi, Nowshera and in the

periphery of Peshawar. Many criminal elements are also using this tag in these areas, but most of these groups are small and their operations limited only to their respective vicinities. The phenomenon of local Taliban can be compared with the Punjabi Taliban on an inspirational level, but both have no comparison in operational capabilities and linkages with external terrorist groups.

Although these groups are not well organized and have limited resources, but in 2012 they proved to be major actors of instability in KP as they conducted 362 attacks in the province, which killed 81 civilians. Local Taliban were also responsible for loss to public and private property, and their favorite tactic was improvised explosive devices (IEDs). (For details see PIPS Digital Database on Conflict and Security)

Non-TTP militant groups in North and South Waziristan are also called ‘Local Taliban’, such as Mullah Nazir and Qari Gul Bahadur groups, but the two categories of militants groups have few shared linkages.

**Table 6: Armed Clashes between Terrorists and Security Forces**

Organization	FATA	KP	Sindh	Pakistan
TTP	45	20	3	68
Local Taliban	6	14	-	20
Lashkar-e-Islam	25	-	-	25

### 3.3 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was believed to be involved in 128 terrorist attacks across the country in 2012, largely in Karachi and Quetta; these attacks ranged from sectarian to assaults on the security forces. (See Table 7) The sectarian terrorist groups, which had absorbed the Al Qaeda and Taliban ideological tendencies, increasingly returned to their primary sectarian agendas.

Although the LeJ has lost central command and splinted into many groups, and though their targets and tactics vary from area to area and from one faction to another but all the splinters have similar sectarian objectives. The Balochistan chapter of LeJ, led by Usman Kurd, which targets the Hazara Shia community in Quetta, has little interaction with a group led by Asif Chotu, who controls the affairs of LeJ from Karachi to Punjab.<sup>2</sup> Apart from these two

major factions, seven other LeJ groups are active in Karachi and Punjab. These groups are; Attaur Rehman alias Naeem Bukhari, Qasim Rasheed,<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Babar, Ghaffar, Muaviya, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq groups.

**Table 7: Fatalities in Terrorist Attacks**

Group Responsible	Civilian Killed	Security Forces Killed
TTP	KP: 170 FATA: 302 Sindh: 24 Balochistan: 2	KP: 68 FATA: 175 Sindh: 17 Balochistan: 5 Punjab: 11
Local Taliban	KP: 81 FATA: 71	KP: 42 FATA: 40
LI	KP: 9 FATA: 89	FATA: 33
LeJ	Sindh: 82 Balochistan: 178 Punjab: 21	Sindh: 10 Balochistan: 116
SMP	Sindh: 77 Balochistan: 26	Sindh: 4
Punjabi Taliban	Punjab: 2	Punjab: 14
TTB	3	
BLA	119	48
BRA	55	45
LB	Balochistan: 29 Punjab: 05	Balochistan: 11 Punjab: 1
BLF	13	25
UBA	26	1
SDLA	Sindh: 11	-

### 3.4 Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan

Banned Shia militant group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) is active in Karachi, where it is involved in targeted killings of religious leaders of the rival Sunni sect. Three factions of SMP, lead by Baqar Zaidi,<sup>4</sup> Mohsin Mehdi and the Balti group, are active in Karachi and Quetta. These groups have no direct link with the Punjab-based SMP, which has been

dysfunctional since an effective police operation against the group in the late 1990s.<sup>5</sup>

In 2012, the SMP was believed to be involved in the killing 103 religious scholars (*See Table 7*) and activists associated with the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (now operating as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat). All these killings took place in Karachi and Quetta.

### 3.5 Punjabi Taliban

Punjabi Taliban claimed responsibility for eight terrorist attacks in 2012. More than an operational force, it acted as a facilitator for the TTP and LeJ. In 2012, seven major groups of Punjabi Taliban were active in Punjab and Karachi. These were:

1. Qari Shakeel Group in South Punjab
2. Qari Yasin Group in South Punjab. The group was believed to be involved in Kamra attack.
3. Rabbani group active in Central and North Punjab, mainly in Rawalpindi, Lahore and Gujrat districts.<sup>6</sup>
4. Al-Mukhtar group, a terrorist cell of Badar Mansoor group in Karachi, which attacked a gambling den in the port city in 2012.<sup>7</sup>
5. Qari Shahid group, comprising former students of Karachi University, found involved in four terrorist attacks in 2012.<sup>8</sup>
6. Khurooj group, operating from Waziristan, active in Karachi and involved in bank robberies.<sup>9</sup>
7. Jundullah in Karachi.
8. Lashkar Jaish-e-Islami in Karachi and Khuzdar.

### 3.6 Lashkar-e-Islam

Headed by Mangal Bagh, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) is active in Khyber Agency, where it is involved in attacking shrines, security forces and leaders of rival sects. The LI is considered a major irritant in securing Khyber Agency and the area surrounding Peshawar.

### 3.7 Balochistan Liberation Army

BLA is headed by Harbyar Marri, who currently resides in London, and was a major actor of instability in Balochistan in 2012 as the group launched 131 terrorist attacks in which 119 civilians and 48 security forces personnel lost their lives. (*See Table 7*) Quetta, Bolan, Kech, Khuzdar and Kohlu districts in Balochistan are the major areas of operation of this group.

**Table 8: Killings in Armed Clashes with Security Forces**

Group Responsible	Civilians Killed	Militants Killed	Security Forces Killed
TTP	KP: 0 FATA: 22	KP: 98 FATA: 425 Sindh: 3	KP: 05 FATA: 26 Sindh: 1
Local Taliban	KP: 14 FATA: 13	KP: 24 FATA: 69	KP: 5 FATA: 5
LI	FATA: 22	FATA: 73	FATA: 1

BLA is also active in Karachi and bordering parts of South Punjab, where it is believed to be involved in criminal activities such as abduction, extortion and armed robbery.<sup>10</sup>

### 3.8 Baloch Republican Army

Baloch Republican Army (BRA) mainly comprises Bugti tribesmen, led by Brahamdag Bugti. The group carried out 121 terrorist attacks in 2012 in Dera Bugti, Naseerabad, Dera Murad Jamali, Barkhan and Loralai districts.

### 3.9 Lashkar-e-Balochistan

Lashkar-e-Balochistan led by Javed Mengal is an emerging group, which is concentrated in Kuzdar, Panjgur, Gwadar and Turbat areas of Balochistan but it has also expanded terrorist operations in Punjab and Karachi. (See Table 7) The group's involvement was suspected in terrorist attacks on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi<sup>11</sup> and a blast at the Lahore Railway Station in August 2012.

### 3.10 Balochistan Liberation Front

BLF, led by Dr Allah Nazar Baloch, operates across Balochistan but is primarily focused in the southern coastal Makran belt.<sup>12</sup> BLF killed 25 security forces personnel and 13 civilians in 2012. (See Table 7)

### 3.11 United Baloch Army

UBA, led by Mureed Baloch, is a splinter group of BLF,<sup>13</sup> which is known for attacking settlers from

Punjab and KP. It launched 14 major terrorist attacks in Balochistan in 2012.

### 3.12 Baloch Musallah Difa'a Tanzeem

BMDT, led by Shafiq Mengal, is a pro-government militant group, which operates around Quetta and Khuzdar.<sup>14</sup> It is blamed for the killing and disappearance of Baloch nationalists.

### 3.13 Sindhu Desh Liberation Army

The SDLA, led by Darya Khan Marri, is an underground Sindhi separatist organization, which is considered an offshoot of Sindhi nationalist political parties Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) and Jeay Sindh Tehrik (JST). The group was involved in attacks on railway tracks, banks and inter-provincial transportation system in interior Sindh. It was believed to be involved in 27 such terrorist attacks in 2012. The government has banned SDLA for its involvement in terrorist activities.

### 3.14 Actors of Ethno-political Violence

The complex nature of the ethno-political landscape of Karachi could be identified as the main reason behind the unrest in this port city. In 2012, ethno-political tensions remained high and not only caused instability in the city but also adversely affected national economy.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.15 'Unidentified' Militants

Militants and nationalist insurgents, whose group identities and organizational affiliation were not defined or who did not claim responsibility for terror attacks, also launched terrorist attacks across the country, which claimed the lives of 110 civilians and 50 security forces personnel. These militants might have definite group affiliations but media reports of terrorist attacks did not cover those and in many cases law enforcement agencies remained clueless about those affiliations. In Balochistan, unidentified insurgents carried out 59 attacks, which killed 38 civilians and 13 security forces personnel. The phenomenon of unidentified militants was high in Karachi, where they carried out 46 terrorist attacks, in which 49 civilians and 30 security forces personnel were killed. Apart from terrorist attacks, seven clashes



between unidentified militant groups were also reported from Karachi. In KP, 15 and in Gilgit Baltistan eight such incidents were reported.

#### 4. Security Landscape in 2012

Frequent insurgent attacks in Balochistan, assaults by TTP and affiliated militant groups across the country, mostly in KP and FATA, sectarian-related terrorist attacks in Karachi, Balochistan, Gilgit, FATA and KP and incidents of political and ethnic strife in Karachi portrayed the volatile security landscape of Pakistan. Operational attacks by the security forces in various areas and their clashes with militants and drone strikes by the US in FATA eliminated scores of militants in 2012. Meanwhile, inter-militant and inter-tribal clashes and cross-border attacks were also important features of the country's security landscape in 2012.

##### 4.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was the second most volatile region of Pakistan in 2012 where 456 terrorist attacks (compared to 512 attacks in 2011)—including 18 suicide attacks—claimed the lives of 401 people, among them 314 civilians, 76 policemen, seven FC and four army personnel and injuries to 1,081 other people, including 850 civilians, 182 policemen, 25 FC and 24 army troops.

Peshawar was the worst affected area of KP where 140 militant attacks killed 170 people and injured another 540. Charsadda was the second worst-affected district in KP with 52 attacks. Bannu, Nowshera, Swabi, Hangu, Mardan and Kohat were the other districts of KP that faced more than 20 militant attacks during the year. (See Table 9)

A downward trend was witnessed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2012 compared to the previous year as terrorist attacks decreased by 11 percent, the resulting deaths by 51 percent and the number of the people injured by 36 percent.

Besides terrorist attacks, cross-border attacks, search operations by the security forces and their clashes with militants as well as three inter-militant clashes were reported in the province. In all, 611 people were killed and 1,180 others injured in 509 incident of violence in KP.

**Table 9: Terrorist Attacks in KP in 2012**

District	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Abbottabad	1	0	0
Bannu	37	22	35
Buner	1	5	7
Charsadda	52	13	59
Chitral	1		
D.I. Khan	16	25	127
Hangu	24	11	21
Karak	3	0	0
Kohat	21	31	32
Kohistan	2	18	2
Lakki Marwat	15	6	8
Lower Dir	10	20	18
Malakand	3	4	3
Mansehra	5	27	7
Mardan	22	3	27
Nowshera	34	16	121
Peshawar	140	170	540
Shangla	1	1	4
Swabi	35	4	28
Swat	11	10	16
Tank	18	6	11
Upper Dir	4	9	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>401</b>	<b>1,081</b>

The security landscape of FATA in 2012 was marked by terrorist attacks on security forces, pro-government tribesmen and educational institutions, operational attacks by law enforcement agencies and their clashes with militants as well as drone strikes, cross-border attacks and inter-militant clashes. A visible decline in terrorist attacks, a decrease of 42.5 percent, was observed in FATA in 2012 compared to militants' assaults in 2011. However, the region remained the most volatile in the country in terms of casualties in these attacks and other incidents of violence.

As many as 388 terrorist attacks were reported in FATA in 2012 that left 631 people—including 398 civilians, 88 army and 85 FC soldiers, 30 Levies personnel and 21 paramilitaries—dead and 1,095 others injured. Of the injured, 802 were civilians, 136 army soldiers, 107 FC troops, 25 Levies personnel and 19 personnel of other

law enforcement agencies. (See Table 10) Khyber Agency remained the most volatile part of FATA where 127 attacks claimed the lives of 201 people while Mohmand Agency was the second most affected area that witnessed 66 attacks. All other agencies of FATA also remained in the grip of militancy in 2012. As many as 2,893 people were killed and 2,371 others injured in 701 incident of violence in FATA during the year.

**Table 10: Terrorist Attacks in FATA in 2012**

District	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Bajaur Agency	27	78	82
Frontier Regions	19	36	29
Khyber Agency	127	201	436
Kurram Agency	54	122	300
Mohmand Agency	66	23	44
North Waziristan Agency	42	69	70
Orakzai Agency	30	56	62
South Waziristan Agency	23	46	72

#### **4.1.1 Attacks on Security Forces / Law Enforcement Agencies**

Security forces, their convoys and check posts were the prime targets of militants in KP and FATA in 2012. Out of 844 attacks, law enforcement agencies were targeted in 284 attacks (a total of 34 percent), including 12 suicide attacks. As many as 299 security personnel were killed and 476 others injured in these attacks. FC and army convoys and camps were repeatedly attacked by militants to dissuade the forces from pursuing the ongoing operation in FATA. On January 5, the TTP killed 15 captive Frontier Constabulary personnel in North Waziristan.

The militants had abducted these FC personnel on December 23, 2011 in an attack on their post in Tank district of KP. In the second attack of this kind, the TTP killed 10 abducted security forces personnel on January 9, and handed over their bodies in Orakzai Agency; the personnel had been missing since a militants' attack on their check post on December 21, 2011. Militants kidnapped 23 Levies personnel in attacks on three security forces check posts in Koi Hassan Khel area in FR region Peshawar on December 26. Twenty-two of them were killed while one of them managed to escape.

Around 100 TTP militants attacked a security check post with heavy weapons in Baba Zayarat area in South Waziristan on August 29, killing nine security personnel and injuring eight others. In another major attack, the TTP attacked the Nawab Shaheed Post near the Afghan border and killed eight paramilitaries. Bajaur Levies head Subedar-Major Javed Khan and Quarter Master Subedar Fazal Rabi were killed along with 27 other people in a suicide attack in Bajaur Agency.

The militants stepped up their attacks against police patrol vehicles and convoys by employing various tactics, including suicide attacks, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A suicide bomber blew himself up near a police van in Qissa Khwani Bazaar in Peshawar district, killing six people including SP (investigation) Hilal Haider and injured 37 others.<sup>16</sup> Another superintendent of police (SP) in Peshawar, Kalam Khan, was killed when a suicide bomber targeted his official vehicle on Ring Road, Peshawar. Kotwali Police Station in Peshawar city was targeted by a suicide bomber that left four policemen dead and six others injured. One of the most gifted experts of Peshawar Bomb Disposal Unit, Hukam Khan, who had defused around 200 bombs in 2012 alone, was killed while neutralizing explosives planted near Frontier Road between Peshawar and Khyber Agency.

In the biggest jail-break in the country's history, over 100 militants stormed Central Prison Bannu at midnight and freed 384 prisoners. Adnan Rasheed, a former Pakistan Air Force officer, who had been sentenced to death for trying to assassinate former president Pervez Musharraf was also among the escaped prisoners.<sup>17</sup> In another assault on police in Bannu district, five suicide bombers attacked Kakki Police Station with guns and hand grenades.

Two suicide bombers blew themselves up, two other were killed in exchange of fire with the police, and one managed to escape. Nine people were killed, including three police personnel, an army soldier and five other people, who were coming from a nearby mosque, were killed in the exchange of fire. Terrorists disguised as policemen attacked the district police office in D.I. Khan with suicide jackets and hand grenades. Two police constables and two pedestrians were killed and 10 others injured, three suicide bombers also blew themselves up while one was shot dead by the police before he could set off his explosives.

#### **4.1.2 Attacks on Pro-government Tribesmen & Civilians**

In order to weaken the counter-militancy responses from the community, militants targeted peace committee members, pro-government tribesmen, government-supported tribal Lashkars and civilians in KP and FATA throughout the year. The civilians were the target of militants in 138 attacks whereas the pro-government tribesmen were targeted in 94 attacks in KP and FATA during the year. Some exceptionally brutal attacks included a suicide bomber ramming his explosives-laden car into the office of Aman Lashkar in Darra Adamkhel Bazaar on October 15, killing 17 people and injuring 20 others. As many as 13 people were killed and 20 others injured when an explosives-laden pick-up blew up in a market in Salaarzi's Pasht Bazaar area in Bajaur Agency; the market was owned by former member of the National Assembly Shahabuddin Khan who was chief of Salarzi Qaumi Lashkar. Pro-government Taliban commander Mullah Nazir was targeted when a suicide bomber blew himself up in Rustam Bazaar in South Waziristan Agency, killing six persons and injuring 14 others, including Mullah Nazir. The injured pro-government militant had carried out an armed campaign against Uzbek and other militant groups in collaboration with the security forces in 2007.

At least 20 people were killed and 42 others injured when a powerful bomb exploded in a bus carrying government employees from Peshawar to Charsadda. A suicide attack targeting the chief of an anti-Taliban lashkar and Qaumi Watan Party leader Fateh Khan in Daggar area in Buner district left five people including Khan, dead and seven others injured. A double-cabin truck rigged with explosives parked at a workshop near a mosque in Mattani Bazaar, Peshawar went off in the busy market, killing 12 people and injuring 16 others.

The TTP attacked teenaged peace campaigner and National Peace Award winner Malala Yousufzai on October 9 as she was returning home from her school in Mingora town of Swat valley. The TTP said that they had attacked the girl for her pro-peace, anti-Taliban and 'secular' agenda. Malala survived the attack and was being treated in a hospital in Britain as the year came to an end. Eight employees of Gomal Zam Dam project, including three Chinese engineers, were abducted by militants from Murtaza Goth area, some 30 kilometers west of district Tank. The TTP threatened to kill the eight abducted men if the

government failed to meet their demands. They remained in captivity at the end of 2012.

#### **4.1.3 Attacks on Political Leaders and Workers**

The TTP continued targeting the leaders and workers of various political parties in KP and FATA in 2012. A total of 29 terrorist attacks were reported against political leaders and workers that left 28 people—23 civilians and 5 policemen—dead and 76 others injured. Awami National Party was the major target of TTP, besides Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), PPP Aftab Sherpao group and Jamaat-e-Islami.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Senior Minister Bashir Ahmed Bilour and at least eight other people were killed and 18 injured in a suicide bomb explosion in Qissa Khwani Bazaar in December. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack on the ANP leader whose outspokenness had made him a lot of enemies among the militants. A TTP spokesperson said that the TTP had set up a new 'revenge wing' that had carried out the attack and warned that ANP and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement were the prime targets of that group. As the general elections drew near, the security situation for political parties and workers became exceedingly dangerous in KP as the TTP had time and again threatened the political parties, particularly the ANP, with terrorist attacks.

Two suicide attempts on the lives of renowned leaders Aftab Sherpao and Qazi Hussain Ahmad were made in KP and FATA, respectively. Pakistan Peoples' Party-Sherpao leader Aftab Sherpao and his son narrowly escaped the suicide blast on the outskirts of Shabqadar town, in Charsadda. Two people including one policeman died in the attack.<sup>18</sup> A TTP leader, Omer Khalid, claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that they had targeted Sherpao because of his cooperation with the government for an operation against militants in the tribal areas. Former chief of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) Qazi Hussain Ahmad escaped unhurt in a suicide attack when a woman suicide bomber wearing a veil (burqa) blew herself up close to the convoy of the former chief of Jamaat-e-Islami in Haleemzai tehsil in Mohmand Agency. Three workers of JI were injured in the attack.<sup>19</sup>

Five people were killed and 26 suffered injuries in a bomb blast near the venue of a public meeting organized by ANP in Nowshera district. ANP president for Tank district Khan Gul Bittani was

gunned down in Gara Badha area, joint secretary of ANP Shabqadar Shahjehan Durrani was shot and killed in Shabqadar Bazaar and three ANP activists were gunned down in Par Hoti area of Mardan. A JUI leader Haji Azeem Khan was shot dead in Nawerkhel area in Lakki Marwat while Maulana Mir Wali, a local JUI-F leader, was gunned down in Nowshera. Afzal Khan, a PML-N leader was shot dead in Swat.

#### 4.1.4 Inter-militant Clashes

Clashes between different groups of militants were another hallmark of the volatile security landscape in FATA. Khyber Agency was affected the most by these inter-militant clashes and at least 48 such clashes took place there out of the total 66 reported in FATA in 2012. Khyber-based militant groups Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansarul Islam, TTP and the tribal Lashkar of Zakakhel tribe (Toheed-e-Islam) were fighting with each other and used suicide bombers and explosives-laden vehicles in their fight. A leader of Ansarul Islam, Haji Akhunzada, and four other people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up outside his house in Peshawar. Lashkar-e-Islam, a rival group, claimed responsibility for the attack.

The others clashes were reported between the Haqqani Network and the TTP in North Waziristan, between the TTP Tariq Afridi Group and Momin Group (Aman Lashkar) in Akhorwal area in Frontier Region Kohat, between TTP Tariq Afridi Group and pro-government Kukikhel Aman Lashkar in Tirah Valley, between TTP and Mullah Nazir Group and between Mullah Nazir Group and Ghulam Jan Group in Rustam Bazaar area in South Waziristan, between TTP and a faction of Jamiat Isaatul Quran Wal Sunnah in Shongari area of Ghalanai in Mohmand Agency and between Mullah Toofan Group and Gul Zaman Group of militants in Mamozai in Orakzai Agency; both groups belonged to the TTP.

## 4.2 Balochistan

Balochistan was the most violence-ravaged region of the country in 2012 where 474 attacks by militants took place, compared to 640 witnessed the previous year, a decrease of 26 percent. At least 631 people were killed in these attacks, including 452 civilians, 88 FC personnel, 64 policemen, nine Levies troops, nine army soldiers, eight paramilitaries, and one Rangers personnel, whereas 1,032 people were injured, among

them were 834 civilians, 114 FC personnel, 61 policemen, 15 Levies personnel and eight army soldiers. Quetta remained the worst affected area in the province where 172 attacks, an increase of 28 percent compared to 124 attacks in the previous year, left 264 people dead and 549 injured. Dera Bugti was the second most affected area in the province with 62 recorded attacks in 2012 in which 61 people were killed and 84 others wounded. (See Table 11)

The frequent insurgent attacks and sectarian violence and some militant strikes were the important features of the volatile security landscape of the province in 2012. Out of 474 reported terrorist attacks, 373 were perpetrated by nationalist insurgents, 62 by sectarian groups and 39 by other militant groups including Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB). In addition, there were some clashes between the security forces and militants as well as cross-border attacks reported from the province during the year.

**Table 11: Attacks in Balochistan in 2012**

District	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Awaran	8	5	0
Barkhan	11	1	5
Bolan	26	53	55
Chagai	2	2	0
Dera Bugti	62	61	84
Gwadar	10	21	15
Jaffarabad	11	5	5
Kalat	14	6	15
Kech	25	66	27
Kharan	4	1	2
Khuzdar	26	28	10
Kohlu	14	7	10
Lasbela	7	4	40
Loralai	4	2	3
Mastung	23	46	99
Naseerabad	12	8	21
Nushki	6	2	0
Panjgur	17	12	18

District	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Pishin	2	1	0
Qila Abdullah	2	2	0
Quetta	172	264	549
Sibbi	7	17	53
Washuk	4	4	1
Zhob	4	7	7
Ziarat	1	6	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>474</b>	<b>631</b>	<b>1,032</b>

#### 4.2.1 Attacks on Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies

Baloch insurgents and other militant groups increased attacks against security forces and law enforcement agencies across Balochistan in 2012. Around 30 percent of the total reported terrorist attacks in Balochistan were targeted against the security forces. The militants carried out 141 attacks against security forces personnel, patrolling convoys and check posts in the year and killed 165 security personnel including 86 FC soldiers, 53 policemen, 8 paramilitaries and Levies personnel each, nine army soldiers and one Rangers personnel, while injuring 186 others, including 113 FC soldiers, 51 policemen, 14 Levies and 8 army personnel.

Some of the deadly attacks against the security forces included militants' ambush of an FC convoy with rockets and automatic weapons in Nawano area of Turbat in Kech district, killings 14 FC personnel. A terrorist attack against the security forces claimed by insurgent group Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Mach area of Bolan killed 22 people including 15 FC troops and injured another 13 troops. A Pakistan Army van escorting children home from school was attacked in a remote-controlled bombing in Quetta, killing five persons including three army personnel and injuring 28 persons including three army personnel. The militants targeted a Balochistan Constabulary truck in a remote-controlled explosion in Sami area of Turbat in district Kech and killed five policemen and injured 11 others. Militants attacked a check post of Pakistan Coast Guards in Gwadar, resulting in the death of eight paramilitary personnel. Five FC soldiers were killed and four others injured when a

suicide bomber blew up his explosives-laden car at a check post in Qambrani Road area of Quetta.

The militants repeatedly targeted policemen in Quetta during the year. Four police personnel were killed when gunmen opened fire on their vehicle when they were on patrol in the Sariab Road area. The policeman who killed the spokesman of banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and his friend was gunned down by LeJ in Quetta; he had been on leave after receiving threats from the organization. A police officer SP CID Shahnawaz was killed by banned militant group LeJ. The Balochistan police chief said that Shahnawaz had been investigating important cases which might have led to his killing. Another police Inspector, Jalal Shah, was shot dead; he had previously survived a bomb attack. Superintendent of Police (investigation) Jamil Kakar was shot dead near his residence in Killi Gul Muhammad area in Quetta; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility for the attack.

#### 4.2.2 Attacks on Non-Baloch Settlers and Civilians

Non-Baloch settlers, civilians and pro-government tribesmen remained targets of Baloch insurgents during the year. The most fatal attacks were assaults on vehicles carrying non-Baloch people. Eighteen people who belonged to Sindh, Punjab and KP and wanted to go to Iran were gunned down when militants attacked three vans in Dasht Hasholi area of Kech district. Eight coalminers belonging to Swat and Dir areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were kidnapped from Sourang Mach coalmines in Bolan district and later killed. Five people were killed and 13 injured when two buses with Punjabi settlers in Gokarat area and one in Bala Nari in district Bolan and a truck were attacked by the militants. Ten construction workers lost their lives when unidentified men opened fire on them in Mastung area of Dasht. The militants attacked a bus in Pothan area near the Pak-Iran border and killed 11 persons. The bus passengers belonged to Punjab and were trying to cross into Iran without valid travel documents. Eleven people were killed and 26 were injured when an explosive device attached to a motorcycle exploded near a restaurant on Nishtar Road in Sibi district. Armed men opened fire on a laundry shop at Sariab Road, Quetta and killed eight people. Mir Saeed Qalandrani, a pro-government tribal elder, and his five friends were killed when they were returning home after attending a Jirga in Khuzdar, BLA claimed responsibility for the attack.

### 4.2.3 Attacks on Government Installations and Functionaries

Government installations and infrastructure especially gas pipelines, railway tracks and electricity pylons were regularly targeted by the insurgents in Balochistan. Gas pipelines were the most frequently hit target with 27 reported attacks while railway track were the second most commonly hit target with 16 attacks; six attacks on electricity pylons were also witnessed in the province. Eight attacks on other government offices were also reported. Baloch insurgents shot and killed 15 government officials in the province. High profile attacks on government functionaries included the targeted killing of Asif Baloch, a younger brother of provincial finance minister Mir Asim Kurd in Panjgur. He was a deputy superintendent in the Customs Department. A medical officer of Mastung District Hospital, Dr Abdul Hamid Shahwani, was gunned down in Killi Lika area, and his bodyguard was injured, Panjgur Airport's Manager Yasir Arafat, who hailed from Lahore in Punjab, was shot and killed in Panjgur. A polio vaccinator was shot dead when militants attacked a polio vaccination team in Rindgarh area of Quetta. Civil Hospital employee Dr Dawood Aziz Jan was shot and killed in Khuzdar. Two officials of Khuzdar district administration were shot and killed, as was a food tehsildar Haji Abdul Qadir Esazai in Basima area in Washuk district. Prominent psychiatrist and senior professor of Bolan Medical College Dr Ghulam Rasool was kidnapped from Brewery Road area. Dr Khalil Dale, an International Committee of the Red Cross official, was kidnapped from Chaman Housing Scheme area in Quetta in January 2012 and killed four month later on April 28. Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan claimed responsibility for the attack.

### 4.2.4 Attacks on Political Leaders and Workers

The militants carried out 15 attacks in Balochistan in which political leaders and workers were targeted, killings 19 people and injuring another 60. In one such attack, the militants shot at the car of Mir Qadir Zehri, a leader of PML-N in Hub area, killing him and his two guards. The militants targeted a public meeting of ANP in Kuchlak area of Quetta that resulted in the death of eight people including vice president of Pashtun Students Federation (PSF) Malik Muhammad Qasim, and injured 24 others including ANP provincial president Aurangzeb Kasi and his

wife. The militants also targeted MNA Ahmadan Bugti, from PML-Quaid, and his son Shaukat Khan in a remote-controlled explosion in Dera Bugti that left 17 people injured including Ahmadan and his son.

## 4.3 Sindh

Sindh, particularly Karachi, remained in the grip of terrorist attacks and incidents of ethno-political violence throughout 2012, further aggravating the worsening law and order situation and economic activity in this commercial nerve centre of the country. Out of the total 215 reported terrorist attacks in Sindh in 2012, as many as 187 were carried out in Karachi, causing 272 fatalities and injuries to 352 persons. The 215 terrorist attacks, including attacks by militants, Sindhi nationalists and sectarian groups, claimed the lives of 289 people and resulted in injuries to another 397 persons in the province. (See Table 12)

**Table 12: Terrorist Attacks in Sindh**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Karachi	187	272	352
Badin	1	0	0
Dadu	1	0	0
Ghotki	2	0	0
Hyderabad	4	3	8
Jacobabad	1	3	15
Jamshoro	2	0	0
Kashmore	2	3	1
Khairpur	2	0	0
Larkana	2	0	0
Naushehro Feroze	1	0	0
Nawabshah	3	8	20
Qambar Shahdadkot	2	0	1
Sanghar	1	0	0
Shikarpur	1	0	0
Sukkur	1	0	0
Tando Muhammad Khan	1	0	0
Thatta	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>397</b>

Out of the 215 reported terrorist attacks in Sindh, 98 were sectarian-related, mainly incidents of targeted killing, carried out by rival sectarian groups including Sunni groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), and two factions of Shia group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan. These attacks killed 167 people and injured 110 others. As many as 88 terrorist attacks were perpetrated by different banned militant groups including TTP which claimed the lives of 109 people, besides causing injuries to another 235. Meanwhile, 29 of the total terrorist attacks in the province were carried out, mainly in interior Sindh, by nationalist insurgents including Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA) and BLA, which claimed 13 lives and injured 52 people.

More than 71 percent (153) of the total terrorist attacks in Sindh were incidents of targeted killing. Terrorists used IEDs in 30 attacks, hand grenades in 14 attacks and bomb blasts in 10 attacks. Two suicide blasts, two remote-controlled bomb explosions, two incidents of kidnapping, and as many landmine blasts were also reported in the province.

Security forces and law enforcement agencies, members/activists of Shia and Sunni community, public and private property and installations including railway trains and tracks, civilians, NGO/civil society workers, government officials, and places of worship were the main targets of terrorist attacks in Sindh in 2012. Among the fatalities in these attacks were 223 civilians and 66 personnel of police, FC, and Rangers, while 355 civilians and 42 personnel of security forces were injured.

**Table 13: Casualties in Terrorist Attacks & Political Violence in Sindh**

Region	Casualties in Terrorist Attacks		Casualties in Political Violence	
	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
Karachi	242	269	266	142
Interior Sindh	19	45	13	38
Total	261	314	279	180
<b>Total Killed</b>		<b>540</b>		
<b>Total Injured</b>		<b>494</b>		

Meanwhile, 183 incidents of ethno-political violence were also reported in Sindh in 2012. Of these, 176 took place in Karachi and five in interior Sindh, killing 288 people, mostly members and activists of political parties, and injuring another 182. With the exception of 13 people killed and 35 injured in interior Sindh, all other casualties in incidents of ethno-political violence reported from the province were concentrated in Karachi.

#### 4.3.1 Ethno-political Violence

Politically motivated targeted killings and clashes were a prominent feature of insecurity and violence in Karachi in 2012. As many as 176 incidents of ethno-political violence across Pakistan occurred in Karachi, which claimed the lives of 275 people and injured another 144. Five such incidents were reported from interior Sindh, killing 13 people and injuring another 35. One incident was also reported from Quetta and one from Islamabad. (See Table 14)

**Table 14: Incidents of Ethno-Political Violence<sup>20</sup>**

Districts	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Karachi	176	275	144
Hyderabad	3	4	21
Khairpur	2	9	14
Quetta	1	0	0
Islamabad	1	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>182</b>

With the exception of one act of sabotage and a hand grenade blast, all other incidents of ethno-political violence in 2012 were incidents of targeted killing and armed clashes between rival political groups.

The ethno-political violence in Karachi became more complex in 2012. Despite a decrease in the number of incidents and the resulting casualties, 2012 witnessed an increase in the number of political parties which were either part of or were targeted in politically motivated targeted killings, largely reported from Karachi.


The incidents of ethno-political violence or armed clashes during the year under review were recorded between activists or groups affiliated with the following parties: Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and ANP; MQM and Jamaat-e-Islami; MQM



and Sindh Progressive Party; MQM and Pakistan People's Party (PPP); MQM and Sunni Tehrik (ST); MQM and Muhajir Qaumi Movement-Haqiqi (MQM-H); PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-Functional (PML-F); ANP and Katchi Rabita Committee.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, members and political activists of PML-N, Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM), Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI) and Awami Tehrik, Sindh, were also murdered in targeted killings in Karachi in 2012.

The flashpoints of ethno-political violence in Karachi in 2012 included Nazimabad, Orangi Town, Landhi, Ghazi Goth, Malir, Gulshan-e-Maymar, Dastageer Colony, North Karachi, PIB Colony, Surjani Town, Liaqatabad Town, Karachi West, Manghopir, Kharadar, Baldia Town, New Karachi, Clifton, Gulistan-e-Jauhar, Khudadad Colony, Lyari, and Federal B Area. (See Chart 2)

**Chart 2: Members/Activists of Parties Killed in Ethno-political Violence**



#### 4.4 Punjab

As many as 17 terrorist attacks took place in Punjab during 2012, a decrease of 43 percent compared to 2011, claiming the lives of 75 people—51 civilians, 17 policemen and seven army soldiers, and injuring another 184 people including 171 civilians, nine policemen and four army soldiers. (See Table 15) Out of these attacks, 17 were sectarian in nature, two attacks reported in Lahore were claimed by Baloch insurgent group Lashkar-e-Balochistan while the rest of the attacks were perpetrated by TTP and its affiliated Punjabi groups.

The highest number of attacks in Punjab was reported from Lahore that left 18 people dead and 85 others injured. Three terrorist attacks, including a suicide bombing, occurred in Rawalpindi district, killings 24 people and injured 41 others. Gujrat and Multan districts faced two attacks each. A total of 30 incidents of violence including the above mentioned terrorist attacks, eight border attacks, three sectarian clashes and one operational attack by the security forces in Dera Ghazi Khan and a clash with militants in Kamra marked the security landscape of the province in 2012.

**Table 15: Terrorist Attacks in Punjab in 2012**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Attock	1	0	0
Gujrat	2	12	4
Lahore	6	18	85
Multan	2	0	0
Muzaffargarh	1	0	0
Rahim Yar Khan	1	21	50
Rajapur	1	0	4
Rawalpindi	3	24	41
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>184</b>

Intensifying the attacks on security forces in Punjab, militants attacked a private hostel for policemen in Ichhra area of Lahore where recruits from the KP province were residing as they attended a training course. Nine policemen were killed and three injured in the attack. A TTP spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack and said it was revenge for the police torture of detained militants in prisons of KP. In the

second attack, an army camp near a bridge on the river Chenab in district Gujrat was attacked by the gunmen in which seven army personnel and a policeman were killed and four others injured. Four policemen were shot dead at a picket in Gujrat on March 13<sup>22</sup> and a police picket was attacked by militants in Lahore in which two policemen were killed and two others injured.

Targeting high security zones, Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab's militants attacked Minhas Air Base of PAF at Kamra with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. The security forces repulsed the attack and killed all nine attackers while two personnel of PAF also died in the attack. A TTP spokesman claimed responsibility and said the militant group had dedicated the attack to Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.<sup>23</sup>

Three sectarian attacks took place in Punjab in 2012. These included a bomb explosion along the route of a *Chehlum* procession in Khanpur, Rahim Yar Khan, which caused the death of 21 people and injuries to another 50. A suicide bomber detonated his explosives when he was intercepted by security personnel as he tried to join a Muharram procession in Dhoke Syedan, Rawalpindi, killings 23 people and injuring 40 others.

#### 4.5 Gilgit Baltistan

Gilgit Baltistan remained in the grip of sectarian violence in 2012 despite a lot of efforts by parliamentarians to bring peace to the region. In all, 29 incidents of violence were reported in Gilgit that left 34 people dead and 88 injured during the year. Targeted killing of subscribers of Shia and Sunni sects continued and 20 sectarian attacks, 12 attacks against the Sunni sect and eight against the Shia sect, were reported in Gilgit that left 18 people dead and 26 injured. In six other reported terrorist attacks, one FC soldier was killed and another injured in firing by unidentified gunmen, a policeman was shot dead and another injured and a local leader of JUI-F was shot and killed in Gilgit. Three low-intensity bombs also exploded in Gilgit.

Besides target killings, sectarian clashes between the Shia and Sunni sects also jeopardized the security situation of Gilgit Baltistan in 2012. A clash erupted in the city after a hand grenade attack on a Sunni group that had been observing a strike to press the government for the release of its leader on April 3.

After the grenade attack, firing started at various localities in the city that left five people dead and 50 others injured. In retaliation, a mob intercepted a convoy of buses headed for Gilgit in Chilas at Karakoram Highway, killed nine Shia passengers and torched four buses. Seven more persons were killed in continuing violence in Gilgit city the following day. A deadly sectarian-related terrorist attack on Gilgit-bound passenger buses in Babusar Top area in district Mansehra of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa fuelled sectarian riots in Gilgit Baltistan.<sup>24</sup> Renewed hope for sectarian harmony and peace in Gilgit Baltistan emerged in 2012 through the efforts of the region's government and two important accords were signed in May 2012. First, Gilgit Baltistan Mosque Board and a parliamentary peace committee signed a 15-point code of conduct to ensure sectarian peace and harmony and use of worship places for constructive purposes in the region. According to the code of conduct, the *khateeb* or his deputy at the central Ahl-e-Sunnat mosque would not use the pulpit for propaganda or making inflammatory speeches during Friday prayers or on the occasions of Eid, etc., to avoid sectarian friction. Similarly, the *khateeb*s of the Shia mosque also agreed not to make any speech that could hurt the feelings of members of the Sunni community.<sup>25</sup> Another big achievement was the adoption of Masajid Regulation Act 2012 by the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly. The law applied to the whole region and aimed to promote religious harmony and maintenance of durable peace in the area, which had been wrecked by sectarian killings and hatred for decades.<sup>26</sup>

**Table 16: Terrorist Attacks in Gilgit Baltistan in 2012**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Diamer	1	9	0
Gilgit	25	13	33
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>33</b>

#### 4.6 Islamabad

The security situation in Islamabad relatively improved in 2012 as only one militant attack was reported, compared to four such attacks in 2011. A retired Military Intelligence officer Brig (retd) Tahir Masood was kidnapped from Defence Housing Authority (DHA) in Islamabad on October 11. His driver was shot dead by the militants. The abducted officer remained in militants' custody as the year came to an end.<sup>27</sup> Meanwhile, a plot to kill senior journalist Hamid Mir was foiled as explosives and a detonator

were found attached to his car in Islamabad. A TTP spokesperson claimed responsibility for planting the explosives.<sup>28</sup>

The federal capital received serious threats from TTP and other militant groups of fierce attacks at sensitive installations. Law enforcement agencies launched a few operations in Margalla Hills to rot out any militant hideouts after receiving intelligence that the militants could launch a missile attack on Islamabad from the hills. The security forces also arrested two militants from Shahzad Town, a TTP militant, Hashmat Ullah, from Sabzi Mandi area, a suspected suicide bomber from the same area and two suspected militants from the nearby area of Islamabad airport.

#### 4.7 Azad Jammu and Kashmir

The Pakistan-administered Kashmir was the only area that remained safe from any militant strike during 2012. However, the area witnessed 10 cross-border attacks on the Line of Control in Poonch and Chakothi sectors that killed one person and injured five others.

### 5. Suicide Attacks

With a decrease of 27 percent over the previous year, militants persisted with suicide attacks as a tactic to hit their targets. A total of 33 suicide attacks were reported across Pakistan in 2012, compared to 45 in 2011 and 68 in 2010. The militants also used suicide bombers to hit rival militants; two suicide attacks against Lashkar-e-Islam claimed by the TTP were reported in Khyber Agency that left eight militants dead and six others injured. As many as 239 people – 195 civilians, 36 security forces personnel and eight militants – were killed and 413 others, including 321 civilians, 86 security forces personnel and six militants were injured in these attacks.

Around 45 percent of all reported suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2012 targeted security forces personnel and check posts. Other targets of suicide bombers included the Shia sect (three attacks), political leaders (three attacks), pro-government tribesmen (seven attacks), local residents (two attacks), Lashkar-e-Islam (two attacks) and foreign diplomats (one attack). Over half of the suicide bombings, 18 attacks, took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 10 in FATA, two each in Balochistan and Sindh (Karachi) and one in Punjab in 2012. (See Table 17)

**Table 17: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2012**

Region	Frequency	Killed	Injured
KP	18	88	205
FATA	10	103	117
Balochistan	2	18	24
Sindh	2	7	27
Punjab	1	23	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>413</b>

Senior Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bashir Ahmed Bilour, Peshawar Superintendent of Police (Investigation) Hilal Haider, chief of an anti-Taliban lashkar and Qaumi Watan Party leader Fateh Khan, Bajaur Levies head Subedar-Major Javed Khan and Quarter Master Subedar Fazal Rabi were the important personalities killed in suicide attacks during the year under review. Targeting of the motorcade of Pakistan Peoples' Party-Sherpao chief Aftab Sherpao, an attack on pro-government militant commander Mullah Nazir's car in Wana (South Waziristan Agency) and a burqa-clad woman suicide bomber blowing up explosives strapped to her body close to the convoy of former Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad were suicide bombings that unsuccessfully attempted to kill these men.

"Fidayeen" attack similar to the 2010 military headquarters attack in Islamabad and the 2011 Mehran naval air base attack in Karachi continued in 2012 and three attacks of this kind were reported in the country. In the first attack, militants attacked PAF's Minhas base at Kamra in district Attock with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons.<sup>29</sup> In the second attack, militants attacked the PAF base inside Peshawar's Bacha Khan International Airport with rockets and heavy weapons and tried to enter the base.<sup>30</sup> In the third attack, two suicide bombers entered a Special Branch office in the old building of the City Police Station and fired at the guards and took six policemen hostage.<sup>31</sup> All the attacks were successfully foiled by the security forces and all the attackers killed.

### 6. Sectarian Violence


The overall incidents of sectarian violence increased significantly in 2012 compared to the previous year, with the main incidents and the consequent casualties concentrated in four cities/regions of

Karachi, Quetta, Gilgit and Kurram Agency. The number of incidents of sectarian violence, including sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes, increased by 53 percent from 139 in 2011 to 213 in 2012. As many as 563 persons were killed in these incidents—a 42 percent increase in fatalities compared to 2011—and another 853 injured—44 percent more than in 2011.

The downward trend in incidence of sectarian violence and casualties that had been witnessed in 2011, as compared to 2010, could not be sustained in 2012. (See Chart 3) The increase in sectarian violence in 2012 was largely visible in sectarian-related terrorist attacks, most of them incidents of targeted killing. However, incidence of sectarian clashes decreased in 2012 compared to the past three years.

In 2012, over 85 percent of the overall reported incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan, including sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes, occurred in Karachi, Quetta, Gilgit and Kurram Agency. More than 68 percent of the total fatalities and 60 percent of the injured in sectarian violence in Pakistan were also concentrated in these four cities/regions. (See Chart 4) Other sectarian flashpoints in 2012 with three or more sectarian attacks/clashes in the year were Mastung in Balochistan and Dera Ismail Khan.


**Chart 3: Trends of Sectarian Violence (2009-2012)**



A comparison of the geographical spread of incidents of sectarian violence from 2010 to 2012 suggests that Karachi, Quetta, Gilgit and Kurram Agency have become regular hotspots of sectarian violence, whereas sporadic incidents were also reported in each

of these years from different areas of country, particularly central and south Punjab, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Khyber and Orakzai agencies in FATA, and Mastung in Balochistan.

**Chart 4: Sectarian Flashpoints in 2012**



The provincial and regional distribution of sectarian violence also shows the number of sectarian-related attacks, clashes and consequent casualties increasing significantly in Sindh and Balochistan in 2012, compared to 2011, mainly due to a rise in sectarian violence in Karachi and Quetta, the capital cities of the two provinces, respectively. Sectarian violence also rose considerably in Mastung, Balochistan, in 2012.

The province of Sindh, mainly Karachi, witnessed a 137 percent increase in sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes, and 128 percent increase in the resulting fatalities in 2012 compared to 2011; the number of people injured in sectarian violence also increased by 27 percent in 2012.

In Balochistan, the number of sectarian attacks and clashes increased by 195 percent in 2012, compared to 2011, and the number of fatalities and the injured in these attacks by around 62 percent and 239 percent, respectively. Members of the Hazara Shia community were frequently killed in targeted attacks in Balochistan throughout 2012. Punjab and FATA were two regions in 2012 where incidents of sectarian violence and casualties in those attacks decreased in comparison with the situation in 2011.

The number of sectarian attacks and clashes also decreased in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit Baltistan in 2012, compared to the previous year, but the number of casualties in such incidents increased.

A significant feature of sectarian violence in 2012 was a large number of sectarian-related targeted killings, mainly in Karachi and Quetta. Around 85 percent of the overall reported sectarian-related attacks and clashes in 2012 were incidents of targeted killing. The other tactics used by sectarian groups and militants to attack sectarian targets included suicide attacks (3 incidents), bomb blasts (7), hand grenade blasts (6), IED blasts (4), remote-controlled bomb blasts (7), landmine blast (1) and rocket attack (1).

Sunni sectarian groups including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, ASWJ—new name for the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan—Sunni Tehrik (ST), Jaishul Islam and Jundullah, and Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan were involved in most incidents of sectarian violence in different parts of Pakistan in 2012. TTP also claimed responsibility for many attacks targeting members of the Shia community, mainly in Karachi, Kurram Agency and Rawalpindi. The TTP-Ghazi group claimed responsibility for sectarian-related terrorist attacks in Parachinar in Kurram Agency and the TTP-Darra Adamkhel chapter claimed attacks on the Shia community in Orakzai Agency (FATA) and in Mansehra in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP also claimed responsibility for some such attacks in Quetta.

Although the nexus between the militant sectarian Sunni groups and the TTP was already well-established but it was for the first time that in 2012 the TTP claimed responsibility for several attacks on the Shia community in different parts of Pakistan.

Out of the 33 suicide attacks reported across Pakistan in 2012, at least three were sectarian in nature and claimed the lives of 79 people—78 of them civilians and one policeman—and injured another 75 persons including 67 civilians and eight policemen. All three sectarian-related suicide attacks targeted the Shia community. The TTP claimed responsibility for two of the three attacks, one in Kurram Agency and the other in Rawalpindi. The third one, in Quetta, was claimed by the banned LeJ. In the first attack, a suicide bomber detonated explosives strapped to his body in a busy market near a Shia mosque in Parachinar, the main city of Kurram Agency, on February 17. At least 43 people were killed and 15 injured in the attack. A TTP spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>32</sup> In the second attack, on June 28, a suicide bomber slammed his explosives-laden vehicle into a bus carrying Shia pilgrims, who were returning from Iran, in Hazarganji

area of Quetta, killing 13 people and causing injuries to another 20. An LeJ spokesman claimed responsibility and said the suicide bomber, identified as Ziaur Rehman Farooqi, was an LeJ activist. He said the bombing was carried out to avenge attacks on Jamia Miftahul Uloom (a seminary) and Farooqia Masjid (Tablighi Markaz) in Quetta.<sup>33</sup> In the third sectarian-related suicide attack, a suicide bomber in Rawalpindi detonated the explosives on him when security personnel stopped him at the entrance of a *Muharram* procession on November 21. At least 23 people were killed and 40 injured in the blast. A TTP spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>34</sup>

### 6.1 Sectarian-related Terrorist Attacks

A total of 202 sectarian-related terrorist attacks were reported from across Pakistan in 2012, an increase of 82 percent compared to 2011 and a spike of 77 percent and 94 percent, respectively, when compared to such attacks in 2010 and 2009. More than 85 percent of all reported sectarian-related terrorist attacks in 2012 were incidents of targeted killings. These attacks claimed the lives of 537 people—an increase of 71 percent compared to 2011—and caused injuries to another 772 people, 68 percent more than those in 2011. Karachi was the worst-affected city in terms of the number of sectarian-related terrorist attacks and casualties, where 96 attacks killed 64 people and injured another 106. The second highest number of such attacks (52) was reported from Quetta, which claimed the lives of 132 persons and injured another 199. FATA was the third most affected region where 10 sectarian-related attacks, nine in Kurram Agency and one in Orakzai Agency, killed 77 people and injured 148 others. In Punjab, three reported attacks killed 45 people and caused injuries to another 90. A significant number of sectarian-related terrorist attacks (20) was also reported from Gilgit Baltistan, 19 in Gilgit and one in Diamer, that killed in total 18 people and injured 26 others.

**Table 18: Sectarian-related Terrorist Attacks in 2012**

Province /region	District	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Sindh	Karachi	96	164	106
	Hyderabad	1	3	3
	Qambar Shahdad Kot	1	0	1

Province /region	District	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
	<b>Sindh Total</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>110</b>
Balochistan	Quetta	52	132	199
	Mastung	5	32	85
	Khuzdar	1	1	0
	Bolan	2	5	1
	Pishin	1	1	0
	Zhob	1	1	0
	<b>Balochistan Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>285</b>
Punjab	Rahimyar Khan	1	21	50
	Lahore	1	1	0
	Rawalpindi	1	23	40
	<b>Punjab Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>90</b>
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)	D.I. Khan	3	17	111
	Peshawar	1	1	0
	Hangu	2	2	2
	Mansehra	1	19	0
	Kohat	1	1	0
	Kohistan	1	18	0
	<b>KPK Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>113</b>
FATA Agencies	Orakzai	1	13	0
	Kurram	9	64	148
	<b>FATA Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>148</b>
Gilgit-Baltistan	Gilgit	19	9	26
	Diamer	1	9	0
	<b>Gilgit Baltistan Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Pakistan Total</b>		<b>202</b>	<b>537</b>	<b>772</b>

Around 60 percent of the total 202 sectarian-related terrorist attacks reported across Pakistan in 2012 were targeted against the Shia community, its worship places and processions. Around 30 percent of such attacks targeted the Sunni community across Pakistan. The remaining 10 percent targeted security forces and law enforcement officials, leaders and workers of political parties and other members of various sects because of their sectarian identity. The highest number of casualties for any sectarian group in these attacks was also recorded among the Shia community. As many as 395 members of the Shia community were killed—73 percent of the total fatalities in sectarian-

related attacks in Pakistan in 2012—and another 582 were injured—around 75 percent of the people injured in such attacks across the country. Most of these casualties were concentrated in Quetta, among the Shia Hazara community, and in Karachi. The fatalities among the Sunni community represented about 20 percent of the overall number of the people killed in sectarian-related terrorist attacks.

The targets of the sectarian-related terrorist attacks were, however, very diverse, ranging from general adherents of a particular sect to professionals, lawyers, educationists, worship places including mosques and *imambargahs*, religious seminaries and their students/teachers, members and activists of sectarian and religious organizations, religious gatherings and processions, vans carrying Shia passengers, political workers/activists and personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies.

Personnel and officers of security forces and law enforcement agencies subscribing to the Shia sect were targeted in Gilgit, Quetta and Karachi. Shia religious leaders, political activists and community members were frequently targeted in Karachi, and also in Qambar Shahdadkot in Sindh; in Quetta, Pishin and Mach in Balochistan; D.I. Khan and Kohistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and Gilgit. Lawyers, educationists and other professionals belonging to the Shia sect were assassinated in targeted killings in Karachi, Quetta and Gilgit. Members of Shia religious organizations also came under attack. Members of Majlis-e-Wahdatul Muslimeen and Jafaria Alliance were killed in targeted attacks in Karachi while a member of Millat-e-Jafaria was killed in Quetta. Meanwhile, a *Chehlum* procession of the Shia community was attacked in Khanpur, Rahimyar Khan district, in January and *Ashura* processions (Shia mourning processions observed on the 10<sup>th</sup> of *Muharram*) were attacked in Rawalpindi, Kurram Agency and D.I. Khan in November. Shia worship places (*imambargahs*) and prayer leaders were also targeted in Karachi and Kurram Agency. Shia members of local peace committees working against militant extremists were targeted in Kurram Agency and Hangu.

Vans and buses carrying Shia passengers and pilgrims were targeted increasingly in 2012 in Quetta, Mastung, Mansehra, Gilgit, and Kurram and Orakzai agencies. Taliban militants attacked a passenger bus going from Kurram to Peshawar on the Thall-Parachinar road on May 28.<sup>35</sup> LeJ militants hit a passenger bus carrying pilgrims to Iran via Taftan in Mastung in a remote-

controlled blast on June 11.<sup>36</sup> A bus of Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Sciences (BUIITEMS) carrying students of the Hazara Shia community was targeted in Quetta by LeJ militants on June 18 in a remote-controlled explosion.<sup>37</sup> A suicide bomber of LeJ attacked a bus carrying Shia pilgrims on June 28 in Quetta.<sup>38</sup> LeJ militants opened fire on a government vehicle in Kuchlak area of Quetta on July 4; members of the Hazara community were among the dead.<sup>39</sup> TTP-Darra Adamkhel chapter (Tariq Afridi group) targeted a van carrying mostly Shia passengers in a landmine explosion in Sipah area of Kurram Agency on July 18.<sup>40</sup> On August 16, militants of the same group ambushed four buses, pulled the passengers out, checked their identity cards to establish their sectarian identity and shot and killed 19 Shias in Babusar Top area of Naran in Mansehra district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A bus carrying young Shia activists of Imamia Student Organisation (ISO), who had boarded the bus at Karachi University and were heading to a central Yaum-e-Quds rally at Numaish Chowrangi, was targeted in an improvised explosive device (IED) blast on August 17 in Karachi.<sup>41</sup> Militants planted explosives in a car, parked it along the main highway in Mastung and detonated the explosives with remote control on December 30 when a three-bus convoy of Shia pilgrims reached there. As many 20 persons were killed and 25 others injured in the blast. A Jaishul Islam spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>42</sup>

Members of the Sunni community including religious leaders, activists of militant sectarian groups including ASWJ and Sunni Tehrik, members and leaders of Sunni religious organizations including JUI-F, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and Tablighi Jamaat were assassinated in targeted attacks believed to be carried out by Shia sectarian groups in various cities, including Gilgit, Karachi, Quetta, Hangu, Khuzdar and Hyderabad. Professionals such as lawyers belonging to the Sunni sect were targeted and killed in Karachi and Peshawar. Sunni mosques, religious seminaries and seminary teachers and students were also attacked in Karachi and Quetta.


Some of the important figures assassinated in sectarian-related targeted killings included JUP leader Maulvi Qasim (Karachi); Syed Imran Zaidi, vice principal of a college in Karachi; Shafqat Ali Harho, district president of Shia Ulema Council (Qambar Shahdadkot); religious scholar Maulana Aslam Sheikhupuri (Karachi); religious scholar and professor Dr. Shabihul Hassan

(Lahore); religious scholar and member of JUI-F Maulana Attaullah Lango and his son Imdadullah (Quetta); former deputy director of Intelligence Bureau (IB) Qamar Raza—(Quetta); Additional District and Sessions Judge Zulfiqar Naqvi (Quetta); Chairman of Islamic Research Centre Trust Mukhtar Azmi and his son (Karachi); Mohsin Ali Naqvi (Quetta), a senior official of Geological Survey of Pakistan; Deputy Secretary General of Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen Allama Aftab Haider Jafri and his colleague Shahid Ali Mirza (Karachi); Maulana Ismail (Karachi), administrator of Hadith Study at Jamia Ahsanul Uloom; and Maulana Jamil Qasim and Anwar Anjum (Karachi), both teachers of Idara Marooful Quran.

## 6.2 Sectarian Clashes

Contrary to the significant increase in sectarian-related terrorist attacks, the number of sectarian armed clashes and the consequent casualties decreased considerably in 2012 in comparison with the previous year. A comparison of sectarian clashes over the last four years reveals a gradual and considerable downward trend in the number of sectarian clashes and in the consequent casualties. (See Chart 5) Yet, despite the significant decline in sectarian clashes in the year under review, the overall level of sectarian violence and the casualties from it witnessed a surge in Pakistan in 2012 compared to 2011. This puts into perspective the extent of the increase in the number and intensity of sectarian-related terrorist attacks reported across Pakistan in 2012.

Chart 5: Trend of Sectarian Clashes (2009-2012)





As many as 26 people were killed and 128 wounded in 11 sectarian clashes reported from all over Pakistan in 2012, compared to 30 such clashes, 83 persons killed and 167 injured in 2011. Of the 11 clashes in 2012, three each were recorded in Karachi, Gilgit and Punjab, and one each in Khairpur (Sindh) and Islamabad. The highest number of casualties in sectarian clashes in 2012 occurred in Sindh and Gilgit Baltistan. (See Table 19) Most of the sectarian clashes across Pakistan in 2012 were reported between the Shia and Sunni religious sects. In all, 14 persons belonging to the Shia community were killed in these armed clashes and 10 injured across Pakistan, whereas two persons belonging to the Sunni community were killed and 53 injured.

**Table 19: Sectarian Clashes in 2012**

Province /area	District	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Gilgit Baltistan	Gilgit	3	12	55
	<b>Gilgit Baltistan Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>55</b>
Sindh	Karachi	3	3	8
	Khairpur	1	10	0
	<b>Sindh Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>
Punjab	Chakwal	1	0	10
	Chiniot	1	0	0
	Jaranwala, Faisalabad	1	0	53
	<b>Punjab Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>63</b>
Islamabad		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>128</b>

This significant fall in sectarian clashes in 2012 was mainly due to absence of any armed sectarian conflict in the tribal agencies of Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai during the year, unlike previous years. These tribal agencies had accounted for the bulk of sectarian clashes and casualties in Pakistan in the past few years. For instance, in Kurram Agency alone 179 people were killed in sectarian armed clashes in 2010 and 2011, around 69 percent of the overall fatalities in Pakistan in such clashes in those two years. The number of the people injured in Kurram in 2010 and 2011 also represented 54 percent of the total people injured in Pakistan during these two years.

Absence of armed sectarian clashes in Kurram in 2012 between rival tribes, mainly Mangal and Turi and

Mangal and Bangash, can be attributed, first, to a peace agreement<sup>43</sup> that was signed between the elders of Shia and Sunni tribes on October 9, 2011 and, secondly, to combined efforts of Sunni and Sunni tribesmen to counter the threats of militancy and terrorism from the Taliban militants, particularly from the TTP, who had been infiltrating into the agency from neighboring agencies of FATA.

As described earlier, although Sunni and Shia tribes remained at peace in Kurram Agency in 2012, yet militant sectarian groups continued attacking rival groups and tribesmen in different parts of the agency, contributing to its becoming one of the four regions worst affected by sectarian violence in 2012.

No incident of armed sectarian clash was reported in 2012 between rival sectarian groups Ansarul Islam and Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber and Sunni and Shia tribes in Orakzai and other agencies of FATA.

The number of sectarian clashes in Punjab and Karachi decreased significantly in 2012, compared to 2011. In Sindh, the number of such clashes decreased from six in 2011 to four in 2012, and the number of people killed in such clashes from 20 to 13, and of the injured from 35 to eight. Out of the four clashes in Sindh, three were reported from Karachi, between Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, and one in Khairpur.

In Punjab the number of sectarian clashes declined from nine in 2011 to three in 2012, with no fatality reported in these clashes; however 63 people were injured in Shia-Sunni armed clashes reported from Chakwal, Chiniot and Jaranwala in the province. In a single clash in Jaranwala, Faisalabad district, as many as 53 people, including three police constables, were injured when the Shia and Sunni sects clashed over the route of a religious rally on September 21.<sup>44</sup>

Three reported sectarian clashes claimed the lives of 12 people and injured another 55 in Gilgit in 2012. Two of these clashes occurred in April. In the first clash, Shia protesters clashed with members of the Sunni community on April 1 in Gilgit, leading to injuries to two people.<sup>45</sup> On April 3, when the ASWJ was observing a strike in Gilgit to press the government to release its leader, a hand grenade blast injured its workers.<sup>46</sup> This triggered an armed clash between activists of ASWJ and the Shia community, killing seven people and injuring another 45.

## 7. Attacks on NATO Supplies

NATO supplies through Pakistan to Afghanistan that were suspended in November 2011, after NATO airstrikes targeted two Pakistani military posts in Mohmand Agency, resumed on July 04, 2012, following Islamabad's agreement to end its seven-month blockade after the US said it was sorry for the American airstrikes that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

Although the TTP had threatened to attack the Afghanistan-bound NATO supply vehicles upon resumption,<sup>47</sup> those were not targeted as much as they had been in 2011. As many as 27 attacks were reported on NATO trailers, carrying goods and oil supplies for NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan in 2012, compared to 145 attacks in 2011. Out of the 27 attacks, 14 took place in Khyber Agency, and the rest in various districts of Balochistan. (See Table 20)

**Table 20: Attacks on NATO Supplies in 2012**

S.No	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
1	Khyber Agency	14	4	9
2	Mastung	5	0	4
3	Khuzdar	3	1	1
4	Quetta	2	0	2
5	Naseerabad	1	1	1
6	Bolan	2	0	4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>21</b>

## 8. Attacks on Educational Institutions

Continuing their anti-education campaign, extremist militants targeted 121 educational institutions in the country in 2012, compared to 142 attacks in 2011. As many as 80 attacks in 2012 occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, compared to 79 in 2011. However, the incidence of such attacks fell in FATA, from 56 in 2011 to 40 in 2012. In Balochistan, one such attack was reported in 2012, compared to two in the previous year. (See Table 21)

Government and private educational institutions, particularly girls' schools, were targeted in these attacks. A large number of these attacks were reported in Mohmand Agency of FATA where 24 schools were blown up by the militants and where the total number of schools blown up by the militants since the targeting of educational institutions began

reached 132. Swabi with attacks on 18 schools, Charsadda with attacks on 14 schools, Peshawar and Nowshera with 13 and 11 attacks, respectively, and Mardan with nine attacks on educational institutions were the other areas affected by these attacks in 2012.

**Table 21: Attacks on Educational Institutions in 2012**

No.	District	Frequency
KP	Swabi	18
	Charsadda	14
	Nowshera	11
	Peshawar	13
	Mardan	9
	Kohat	4
	Hangu	4
	Lakki Marwat	2
	D.I. Khan	2
	Bannu	1
	Swat	1
	Tank	1
FATA	Mohmand	24
	Khyber	9
	Bajaur	3
	South Waziristan	2
	Orakzai	1
	North Waziristan	1
Balochistan	Awaran	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>118</b>

## 9. Border Tensions

Cross-border attacks into Pakistan's territory, perpetrated by TTP militants based in Afghanistan, remained the cause of much friction between the two countries in 2012. As many as 55 border clashes between security forces and militants and cross-border attacks by NATO forces and Afghan National Army were reported along Durand Line that took the lives of 314 people, including 247 militants, 33 civilians and 34 security forces personnel, while 212 people were injured including 123 militants, 50 civilians and 39 security personnel. On Pakistan's eastern borders, there was an increase in border attacks along the Line of Control (LoC) and the border with India as 18 border attacks were reported that claimed two lives and injuries to 13 people. Six border attacks were reported

along the Pak-Iran border that took the lives of 10 people and injured another two. (See Tables 22 and 23)

**Table 22: Border Clashes in 2012**

Border	No of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Pak-Afghan border	55	314	212
Pak-India border	18	2	13
Pak-Iran border	6	10	2
Total	79	326	227

### 9.1 Pak-Afghan Border

Militants led by Mullah Fazlullah, the commander of TTP (Swat chapter), who had regrouped in the Afghan province of Kunar and Nuristan continued to launch sporadic attacks into Pakistani, targeting border security posts and villages. In 2012, the group launched 39 cross-border attacks inside Pakistan in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in which 34 security personnel and 33 civilians were killed and 89 others, including 50 civilians and 39 security personnel, injured while the security forces killed 247 militants and injured 123 others in these attacks. NATO and Afghan National Army reportedly violated Pakistan's border 16 times in the reporting year. Out of 55 attacks across the Pak-Afghan border, four took place in Balochistan, 14 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 37 in FATA.

**Table 23: Tensions along Borders**

Border	Agency/ Sector	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Pak-Afghan	Bajaur Agency	17	146	94
	Chagai	2	6	0
	Chitral	3	8	5
	Kurram Agency	2	2	3
	Lower Dir	3	14	13
	Mohmand Agency	6	35	36
	North Waziristan Agency	9	3	12
	Qila Saifullah	2	4	3
	South Waziristan Agency	2	5	1
	Upper Dir	8	91	45

Border	Agency/ Sector	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Pak-India	Hattian	1	0	0
	Narowal	2	0	0
	Poonch	9	1	5
	Sialkot	6	1	8
Pak-Iran	Chagai	2	2	0
	Gwadar	2	8	2
	Kech	1	0	0
	Kharan	1	0	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>227</b>

Pakistan and Afghanistan continued to blame each other over border violations. The Pakistan government repeatedly called upon the NATO forces and Afghan government to take action against the TTP militants hiding in Afghanistan. Afghanistan claimed that the Pakistani forces were engaged in cross-border shelling into Kunar province, however the Pakistani military rejected the allegation and said that they only targeted positions of militants, who crossed into Pakistan and attacked civilians and the security forces. There was also a war of words between the US and Afghanistan about Durand Line as the international border when the US State Department declared it internationally recognized border between Pakistan and Afghanistan whereas Afghanistan called it a disputed issue. Pakistan called Durand Line a closed and settled issue.

### 9.2 Pak-India Border

Incidents of cross-border firing/shelling by Indian border forces continued to be reported in 2012. Out of a total of 18 incidents, 10 were reported along the Line of Control (LoC) at Poonch and Chakhoti sectors and eight along the Sialkot border. Civilians as well as security forces were targeted in these attacks.

### 9.3 Pak-Iran Border

Six incidents of cross-border firing were reported on the Pak-Iran border in 2012, which claimed the lives of 10 people and caused injuries to two others. Iranian security forces opened fired on Pakistani nationals who had entered Iran with their cattle without legal documents.<sup>48</sup> Pakistani forces arrested three Iranian border guards after they allegedly crossed into

Pakistan and shot at a car killing a Pakistani national. The guards were acquitted by a court after the family of the deceased accepted compensation for the death.<sup>49</sup>

## 10. Drone Attacks

The US continued drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. As many as 45 drone strikes were reported in FATA in 2012, compared to 75 the previous year, a decrease of 41 percent. In these attacks, 336 people including 330 suspected militants and six civilians were killed and 64 suspected militants and three civilians were among the injured. (See Table 24)

**Table 24: Drone Attacks in 2012**

Areas	Frequency	Killed	Injured
North Waziristan Agency	38	264	47
Orakzai Agency	1	24	10
South Waziristan Agency	6	48	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>67</b>

As in previous years, the Pakistani government called these attacks a violation of its sovereignty, but the US persisted with the attacks. Notably, after the November 26, 2011 NATO airstrikes on Pakistani military posts in Mohmand, the US had suspended drone strikes in Pakistan but resumed them on January 11 in 2012.

Reports suggested that drone strikes in FATA in 2012 killed five senior Al Qaeda commanders, 13 activists of East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) including five commanders, two commanders of the TTP, eight commanders of local Taliban groups (Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir groups) and other foreign militants including Arabs and Uzbeks.

Key Al Qaeda and Taliban members killed in drone attacks in 2012 included senior Al Qaeda operatives Mohammad Ahmad al-Mansoor and Sheikh Khalid bin Abdul Rehman alias Abu Zaid Al-Kuwaiti,<sup>50</sup> who had replaced Abu Yahya al-Libi as Al Qaeda's operational chief in the region, Al Qaeda militant Abdur Rehman al-Yemeni, senior Al Qaeda member Abu Kasha Al-Iraqi and senior operations organizer for Al Qaeda Aslam Awan, a Pakistani national from Abbottabad.<sup>51</sup> Two TTP senior leaders, Commander Badar Mansoor who had close ties with foreign

militants and was fighting against the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan<sup>52</sup> and Commander Ahsan Aziz, who hailed from Kashmir, were also killed in drone strikes.

Five top commanders of ETIM, including Aimuthi Yakuf alias Abdul Jabbar, Yakoemithe alias Saleh, Twersin alias Zabihullah and Mukhtar,<sup>53</sup> and eight other foreigner militants from Turkmenistan were also killed in drone strikes. Most of the militants who were killed in drone attacks belonged to local Taliban groups, mainly Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, Maulvi Nazir Group and the Haqqani Network. A seminary of Mufti Shakirullah, who belonged to Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, was targeted in Balandkhel area of Orakzai Agency that left 24 suspected militants dead and 10 others injured.<sup>54</sup> Commander Malang, Kalam Khan, Commander Romanullah and two senior militants Shamsullah and Ameer Hamza affiliated with Maulvi Nazeer-led Taliban fighters were the other key militants killed in drone attacks in the year.

## 11. State Response

The government adopted a host of strategies to deal with the challenges emanating from political instability, institutional confrontation, economic volatility and precarious internal and external security. The security forces foiled 88 terrorist attacks in 2012, including seven would-be suicide attackers, indicating improved level of vigilance.

### 11.1 Operational Front

#### 11.1.1 Military Operations

The security forces launched 107 operational attacks in 2012 as part of military operations against militants in various agencies of FATA. The main emphasis remained on Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram tribal agencies of FATA, where 88 attacks were launched against the militants.

The military claimed to have made major progress in an operation in Kurram Agency after clearing the snow-covered Jogi mountain and severing a vital supply route for the militants through the mountains from North Waziristan.<sup>55</sup> Seven military attacks were launched in South Waziristan and four in North Waziristan in 2012. (See Table 25)

Table 25: Military Operations against Militants

Region	District	Number of Operations	Killed	Injured
FATA	Bajaur Agency	1	7	5
	Khyber Agency	23	179	81
	North Waziristan Agency	4	7	23
	Kurram Agency	15	150	64
	Orakzai Agency	50	531	203
	South Waziristan Agency	7	53	85
	FR Regions	1	5	0
KP	Bannu	1	2	1
	Peshawar	1	1	1
	Kohat	1	4	0
Punjab	Dera Ghazi Khan	1	1	0
Sindh	Karachi	1	2	0
Balochistan	Kech	1	3	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>107</b>	<b>945</b>	<b>463</b>

An important TTP commander, Maulvi Moeenuddin was killed along with 20 militants in an operational attack by the security forces in Orakzai Agency.<sup>56</sup> An Al Qaeda-linked militant and Azerbaijani national identified as Aslanov Zaur was killed in a clash between the security forces and the militants in Jogi area of Kurram Agency in February.<sup>57</sup> Another militant, Commander Sher Shah, was killed during a clash between the militants and security forces personnel in Dalanai area of Orakzai Agency.

#### 11.1.2 Search Operations

The security forces carried out 79 search operations across the country in 2012, including 27 in KP, 24 in FATA, 11 in Balochistan and four in Sindh. (See Table 26) The security forces recovered large quantities of explosives, suicide jackets, rocket launchers, IEDs and other deadly weapons.

Table 26: Search Operations in 2012

Region	District	No. of Search Operations
FATA	Khyber Agency	10
	Mohmand Agency	4
	Bajaur Agency	8
	North Waziristan Agency	2
KP	Lakki Marwat	1
	Shangla	1
	Swat	4
	Lower Dir	1
	Peshawar	5
	Lakki Marwat	3
	Kohat	1
	Hangu	2
	D.I. Khan	4
	Mardan	1
	Nowshera	1
	Bannu	3
Balochistan	Qila Abdullah	2
	Dera Bugti	3
	Quetta	2
	Chagai	1
	Naseerabad	1
	Pishin	1
	Jaffarabad	1
Sindh	Karachi	4
Punjab	Rahim Yar Khan	1
	Attock	3
	Bhakkar	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>71</b>

In 2012, 14 Taliban militants surrendered to the security forces in FATA and KP, while 66 nationalist insurgents surrendered to the authorities in Balochistan. (See Table 27)

Table 27: Taliban/Militants' Surrender in 2012

Region	Area	Militants Surrendered
Azad Kashmir	Bhimber	3
	Bagh	5
Frontier Regions		3
KP	Lakki	11

Region	Area	Militants Surrendered
	Marwat	
Balochistan	Dera Bugti	12
	Chagai	54
Total		88

### 11.1.3 Terrorists Arrested

In 2012, a total of 1,287 militants and members of radical organizations were arrested across the country. These include 856 suspected Taliban linked to the TTP and local Taliban factions and were apprehended mainly from KP, FATA and Karachi. Eighteen members of Al Qaeda were also arrested. (See Table 28)

**Table 28: Terrorists Arrested in 2012**

Organizational Affiliation	No. of Arrests
Al Qaeda	18
Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat	7
Banned militant outfit (excluding sectarian & tribal)	78
Lashkar-e-Islam	53
Local Taliban / TTP	856
Nationalist insurgents	55
Afghan Militants	38
Political leaders/workers	41
Unidentified Militants	74
Hizbut Tehrir	5
Balochistan Liberation Front	14
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan	4
BLA	4
BRA	2
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	38
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,287</b>

Despite the arrests, few terrorists have been put on trial. According to a security analyst,<sup>58</sup> suspects are often detained without trial or released because of lack of evidence and poor investigation methods.

## 11.2 Political and Administrative Front

### 11.2.1 FATA Reforms

On August 14, 2012, President Asif Ali Zardari announced promulgation of FATA Local Governance

Regulation 2012, establishing a system of local councils in the troubled tribal region. It was part of the government's FATA reform program. In 2011, the Political Parties Order, 2002, was extended to FATA and the Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 was amended in a bid to bring the law in conformity with basic human rights. However, the federal government also issued two regulations—Action (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations 2011 for FATA and PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas)—to give unprecedented powers to the armed forces operating against the militants in conflict zones.

Legislation is an undoubtedly important step towards reform in FATA but implementation and continuity of the reform program are equally critical issues.

### 11.2.2 Establishment of NACTA

The federal cabinet approved the legislative bill of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) on November 28, 2012.<sup>59</sup> The idea behind setting up the counter-terrorism body was to reinforce counter-terrorism efforts in the country. The proposed mandate of NACTA was to receive and gather information/intelligence and coordinate between relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessment with periodic reviews to be presented to the federal government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism, to coordinate and prepare comprehensive national counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies and review them on a periodic basis. It was also aimed at carrying out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and preparing and circulating documents and constituting committees of experts from the government and the private sector for deliberations in areas related to the functions of NACTA.<sup>60</sup>

According to media reports, some ministers were not happy with the idea of setting up the authority in the presence of a number of other agencies working to curb terrorism. They argued that there was a need for capacity-building of the people already working in intelligence and security agencies, instead of setting up another body.<sup>61</sup> To dispel any misgivings, the federal interior minister said that the body would act as a think tank.

If the purpose of NACTA is confined to being a counter-extremism think tank, that would go against its primary mandate of acting as a coordinating body

between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. PIPS has been highlighting the need for such a coordinating body for many years and considers that the initiative would be a good first step in coordinating and capitalizing on the surveillance and operational strategies against terrorists.

### **11.2.3 Fair Trial Bill 2012**

The National Assembly also passed a fair trial bill, which authorized the state to intercept private communications in order to apprehend terrorists. Although there were strong reservations that that might pose a threat to people's privacy, if used appropriately it could lead to improved prosecution of terrorists, who had been benefiting from weaknesses in the legal system.

### **11.2.4 National Strategy for Counter-IED**

Considering the rise in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the militants, the government planned to draft legislation for a National Strategy to Counter-IED.<sup>62</sup> The government decided to deploy specially trained Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) forces at 820 border posts along the Pak-Afghan border. According to media reports, FC had trained their personnel in basic Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) to undertake search and disposal operations, while specialized police units had been established to undertake EOD tasks which will be used not only at border points but also during raids on IED manufacturing sites inside Pakistan.<sup>63</sup>

In order to further strengthen the C-IED initiative the Interior Ministry planned to stop smuggling of ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer, to Afghanistan and impose restrictions on its sale. Ammonium nitrate, when mixed with fuels, makes a potent explosive.<sup>64</sup>

### **11.2.5 Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2012**

The federal cabinet approved the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2012, on September 4.<sup>65</sup> The bill addressed shortcomings relating to terrorism financing in the light of international standards and provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997.

## **12. Challenges**

In view of the security landscape in 2012, the following challenges of critical importance emerged:

### **12.1 Critical Areas**

#### **12.1.1 Balochistan**

The number of violent incidents in Balochistan fell by 26 percent in 2012 compared to the previous year, but it remained the most volatile region of the country, as the highest number of terrorist attacks (474) was reported from Balochistan. Besides attacks by nationalist insurgent, Balochistan also remained a hotbed of sectarian-related terrorist incidents, as well as continued enforced disappearances.

The continuing recovery of bullet-riddled bodies of abducted Baloch youth from various areas of the province remained a major issue in 2012, which alienated the Baloch and complicated prospects for reconciliation. The security agencies are accused of this and other illegal tactics. The Supreme Court holding hearings in Quetta into excesses in Balochistan was a positive development. The cases registered against some security forces officials on charges of involvement in enforced disappearances were also a good start.

#### **12.1.2 FATA**

FATA also remained a flashpoint of the Taliban insurgency and terrorism in 2012 although there were reports of differences cropping up in the Taliban ranks. Although Hakeemullah Mehsud appeared alongside Waliur Rehman in a 40-minute video<sup>66</sup> to dispel the impression of differences among the TTP ranks, but differences with Bajaur and Darra Adam Khel chapters had not been resolved yet. The TTP still had sanctuaries in South Waziristan Agency, which the security forces had declared cleared of militants in 2010.

#### **12.1.3 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

KP witnessed a slight decrease (11%) in the number of terrorist attacks in 2012 compared to 2011. Peshawar, Nowshera, Charsadda and Swabi districts remained flashpoints of terrorist activities of TTP and local Taliban groups. Analysts believe that the security



forces have a long way to go before the state's writ is fully restored and the militants ousted from there.

#### **12.1.4 Karachi**

In 2012, terrorist attacks increased by 222 percent in the city compared to the previous year. The TTP and its affiliates and multiple sectarian groups further exposed the vulnerability of the city. The armed/militant wings of major political parties and criminal gangs remained active to exploit urban violence in the city. Interventions by Pakistan Army and the Supreme Court helped to briefly disrupt cycles of violence but did not offer sustainable solutions to Karachi's violent politics.

The key to Karachi's stability is a representative power-sharing agreement among the major political parties that reflects the city's evolving demographics. However, the delay in conducting a transparent census, the failure to establish an uninterrupted platform for political negotiations and unprecedented weaponization and brutalization of society continue to fuel violence.

Karachi faces a hydra-headed threat. Rather than addressing various drivers of violence in a systematic and comprehensive manner, the authorities are operating in a muddle. Politicization of law enforcing departments in Sindh, illicit arms and growing financial stakes of the militants in the city are acting as catalysts for increasing violence in the city. According to media reports, 40 percent of Karachi's police have reportedly been recruited on political grounds rather than on merit. Many members are said to have a criminal record.<sup>67</sup>

### **12.2 Critical Internal Threats**

The internal security threats that had been there in the last couple of year either remained as critical or aggravated further at the end of 2012. Dynamics of some of the old threats continued to evolve.

#### **12.2.1 Sectarian Violence**

Sectarian violence increased significantly in 2012. Security experts were of the view that sectarian violence would continue to persist as a long-term challenge because there were now strong nexuses among sectarian groups, Taliban and Al Qaeda. One

factor, which needed to be addressed urgently and with vision, was the administrative side of the problem, or how local administrations dealt with issues involving different sectarian groups, such as disputes over mosques, routes for Ashura and Eid Milad-un-Nabi processions, allotments of plots for religious purposes, allocation of Auqaf property, etc.

These issues are apparently not considered to be contributing factors in the worsening sectarian divide in the country. And yet at the district and sub-district level, these very issues are a major source of concern and occasionally lead to violence. In Karachi in particular, sectarianism can be linked to the growth of madrassas and disputes over control of mosques.

#### **12.2.2 Nexus between Terrorists and Criminals**

As terrorists' infrastructure and ambitions grow, they are facing a serious financial crunch.<sup>68</sup> Although military operations and some state initiatives have contributed to blocking the flow of funds to them, they are continuously looking for new ways to generate money and with that aim they have expanded links with criminals. Terrorists are involved in abductions for ransom across Pakistan.<sup>69</sup> Some reports also suggest that terrorists are also aiding criminals in their activities. According to an international media report, a combination of hired criminals and local militants had grown in Pakistan, who snatched people from their homes, vehicles and workplaces for ransom.<sup>70</sup> These networks were active across the country but Karachi, Punjab and now the federal capital was also among the critical areas.<sup>71</sup>

#### **12.2.3 Monitoring Mechanism for Proscribed Organizations**

In 2012, the federal Interior Ministry added the name of Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat to its list of banned organizations<sup>72</sup> for its suspected involvement in terrorist activities and sectarian violence.<sup>73</sup> With this latest inclusion on the list, the total number of banned organizations in Pakistan in the past 11 years reached 45.<sup>74</sup>

Although the list of proscribed organizations continues to expand but militant organizations still flourish in the country. Quoting official sources, international news agency Reuters claimed that LeJ, one of the major actors of instability in the country,

had grown more robust and appeared to be operating across a much wider area in Pakistan than just a few years earlier.<sup>75</sup> Another media report that quoted intelligence sources claimed that organizations such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, LeJ and Jundullah were more powerful than in the 1980s and '90s. These outfits had been attracting more recruits after international players such as Al Qaeda joined the fray post-9/11.<sup>76</sup> Similar doubts were raised about the activities of Jamaatud Daawa (JuD) and Sunni Tehrik (ST)<sup>77</sup> in Punjab and Sindh but the federal government failed to evolve any monitoring mechanism for proscribed organizations in the country. Many proscribed militant groups resurfaced as charity organizations after the ban in order to boost their image and circumvent official curbs. Militant groups largely kept supply lines for their financing intact; many of them also found ways to cultivate and consolidate financial resources abroad.<sup>78</sup>

The situation in Punjab was the worst, where the provincial government was accused of appeasing the extremists and of making deals with banned outfits. Security experts voiced concern over violations of the fourth schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997<sup>79</sup> by the leadership of banned sectarian and terrorist organizations in Punjab. They believe that the release of LeJ leaders Malik Ishaq and Ghulam Rasool Shah had contributed to intensified Shia-Sunni tensions. The federal cabinet had decided to formally take up the matter with the Punjab government<sup>80</sup> but no concrete steps were taken against the groups.

#### **12.2.4 Changing Tactics and Targets by Terrorists**

In 2012, the terrorists intensified sectarian attacks and resorted to targeted killings more frequently. Law enforcement agencies noticed that the militants increasingly used peripheries of cities, mainly new settlements, as hideouts. Previously, they had considered it more convenient to hide in more populated areas. This new trend was noticed in Islamabad, Peshawar, Nowshera, Quetta and Karachi.<sup>81</sup>

#### **12.2.5 Illegal Weapons**

The terrorists used diverse attack tactics to hit their targets across Pakistan but their reliance on targeted killing increased in 2012. The issue was directly linked to easy access to illicit weapons and, according to an

estimate, 20 million illegal weapons were in circulation in Pakistan.<sup>82</sup> The sectarian terrorist groups and nationalist insurgents in Balochistan appeared to have recently adopted targeted killings as the foremost instrument of terrorism.<sup>83</sup>

According to a report, the illegal weapons trade thrived via a number of land and possibly even sea routes. The area where the boundaries of Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab provinces intersect is considered a haven for weapons smuggling.<sup>84</sup>

### **12.3 Critical Policy Initiatives**

#### **12.3.1 Counter-terrorism Policy**

Various state institutions are trying to respond to the security threats. As mentioned earlier, most of the initiatives had been taken on the legislative front and the security forces were trying to develop responses in many ways, including by increasing surveillance and the capacity to counter terrorist attacks had also improved but those responses were not being connected with any comprehensive counter-terrorism or national security policy. Many ideological, political and operational ambiguities still persisted, which undermined the threat perception of the security apparatus. Coordination and trust was absent among different intelligence and law enforcement departments, and the need for processing of data and analysis of information remained largely ignored. On the other hand, unity among terrorist groups was a source of their strength. They also gained strength from fragmentation and confusion over the war on terror among the security, political and civil society leadership in Pakistan.

PIPS had been emphasizing since 2006 that law enforcement agencies could only cope with the new challenges by putting in place improved investigation, intelligence-gathering and intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and by developing a rapid response system. Accurate threat perception is key to effective response to the sort of terrorism Pakistan faces. A clear approach based on a distinction between the challenges of tribal insurgency and urban terrorism is required at the policy level.

#### **12.3.2 Prosecution and Witness Protection Program**

A lack of professionalism in gathering evidence

continued to lead to terrorists going free. The Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) itself was amended by many ordinances, but since ordinances had a short lifespan, the same flawed ATA remained once the ordinances lapsed.<sup>85</sup> An effective witness protection program also remained missing. Without that, witnesses whose testimony was vital for the prosecution's case considered it prudent not to endanger themselves and their families by testifying against dreaded terrorists.

### **12.3.3 Better Policing**

Although the police need to be equipped with new technologies and resources but utilizing the resources available and allocated for the force is another critical issue. In Islamabad, police acquired two helicopters for aerial surveillance to effectively counter terrorism and heinous crime in 2012,<sup>86</sup> but there were serious doubts if they would be able to use them effectively. In the recent past, billions of rupees worth of scanners had been disposed off because of reluctance to use technology and on account of incompetence of the police. It has been the same case with Elite Police Force, which is trained for specific targets, mostly dealing with terrorists or hardened criminals, but its officials are made to perform functions that fail to utilize their specialized skills.<sup>87</sup>

### **12.3.4 Peace Talks with Taliban**

TTP offered a conditional ceasefire to the Pakistan state and political parties towards the end of the year.<sup>88</sup> The conditions, as reported, included Pakistan pulling out of the Afghan war and changing its constitution and foreign policy to bring it in conformity with what the Taliban considered dictates of the Quran and Sunnah. The militants also demanded Pakistan refocus on a war of "revenge" against India.

In its last annual security report, PIPS had endorsed the peace process with the Pakistani Taliban but cautioned the state to first decide what it wanted to achieve through talks. Was the desired objective to minimize terrorist attacks in the country, or dismantle terrorists' networks, regain lost ground or reintegrate the militants into society? It was also crucial what the state demanded of the militants, and what it offered in return. What was required was a comprehensive approach based on a lucid policy that was mindful of the lessons learned from previous peace deals.

At the same time, the state and the political leadership had to realize that the real strength of the militants of most groups had been their ability to sell their cause; and through their propaganda strategies they had tried to counterbalance the disparity between the capabilities of the security forces and of the militants.<sup>89</sup>

Apart from their well-defined ideological inspiration, the Taliban had got logistic support from international terrorist groups and used terrorism to achieve objectives which could be summarized as follows:

1. To destabilize the state's security apparatus so that people look towards the Taliban for protection.
2. To force the government not to interfere in Taliban-controlled areas so that they could continue their activities unhindered.
3. To force the government to bring structural changes in laws or the constitution, or to bring a new system according to the Taliban agenda.

Some Taliban groups have sectarian agendas, especially against Shias and followers of Sufism. They are also well connected with global terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, which have even more dangerous agendas of destabilizing or toppling the government and capturing territory.

### **12.3.5 Rehabilitation of Detainees**

In Pakistan, the terrorist detainees' rehabilitation program was built in the post-insurgency perspective of Swat. The military has been running the whole project and wants to extend it to other conflict areas. The Punjab government has also taken a similar initiative assigning a minimal role to the police. Apparently, the military-run program is proceeding successfully and their center based in Tank district for militants arrested during Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan Agency<sup>90</sup> is functional now. The focus of the program is on defusing anti-state tendencies. However, the militant landscape in Pakistan is rather complex and, amid the presence of other violent actors involved in international and regional terrorism, this narrative cannot prevent them from joining other groups. The complete denunciation of extremism should be the program's objective and a viable ideological anchor needs to be provided in the framework of nationalism and pluralism. At the same time, there is need to emphasize the post-release stage where rehabilitated detainees should be provided sufficient and prolonged 'after care'.

## 13. Recommendations

### a. Internal Security

1. There is an urgent need to review counter-terrorism strategies and evolve new approaches in view of the changing nature of threats. This is essential not only at the level of security agencies but also for policy makers, civil society, the media and other stakeholders.
2. Intelligence sharing and coordination among the various agencies tasked with counter-terrorism must be improved. National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) can be an effective tool for coordination.
3. PIPS endorsed the following recommendations offered in an Asia Society<sup>91</sup> report for better policing in Pakistan:
  - Oversight of the criminal justice system by parliament and provincial assemblies should be increased.
  - Greater emphasis should be placed on law and order and on the increased outlay of resources during annual budget allocations.
  - Closer networking is needed between the subsystems of the criminal justice system.<sup>92</sup>
  - Practitioners should be trained in conflict resolution and management so that these techniques can be employed before resorting to force.
4. There is a need to incorporate more changes in Anti-terrorism (amendment) Bill 2012, including addressing the procedural and definitional issues. There should be safeguards to prevent terrorists from collecting funds and using infamous systems like *hawala* to move money from one place to another. No new weapons licenses should be issued to such people and the licenses already issued should be cancelled. The government needs to regularize all commercial laws.
5. Legislation alone can never be an effective tool to deal with terrorism until the capacity of the legal system, including the Anti-terrorism Court (ATC), judges, lawyers and the prosecution department, is enhanced. Apart from transparency and appointment of capable judges to the ATCs, the Supreme Court and the high courts should monitor the functioning of ATCs in accordance with the Supreme Court's judgment in the 1999 Sheikh Liaquat Hussain case.

### b. Critical Areas and Initiatives

1. Rapid completion of development initiatives in FATA and KP is crucial. There is need to speed up the FATA reforms process and PIPS endorses International Crisis Group's recommendation that FCR must be replaced with the Pakistan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act.<sup>93</sup>
2. There is a desire among some sections of the clergy in Pakistan to play an active role in curbing violent tendencies. They can offer an alternative to the Taliban groups and strive for a change through peaceful means. This would not be an easy task and the option of use of force against Al Qaeda and inflexible elements among the Taliban should remain on the table and must form an unambiguous provision in any future peace agreement. A strategy based on accurate assessment of the militants' ideological and political strengths should be used to engage them. However, different approaches would be needed to engage different groups and a successful policy in one area may not work in another. A persistent, flexible and accommodative approach which can adjust to changing situations just might do the trick.
3. The firefighting approach of the state has become redundant and the current strategy being implemented in Balochistan needs comprehensive revisiting. In this regard, PIPS endorses the following recommendation by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan that the first step towards resolving the crises in Balochistan was to acknowledge their gravity and talk to the stakeholders with a view to finding solutions. It is indeed high time that rhetoric in that regard was translated into action and talks held with all groups, especially with the most disenchanted nationalists, in a manner that inspires confidence and sincerity of purpose.
4. Curbing violence in Karachi is not as much a problem of law enforcement as it is of political commitment. Apart from political initiatives, the government needs to develop a comprehensive security policy for Karachi. A coordinated effort through inter-agency cooperation along with intelligence sharing and better policing is direly needed in the city. That would involve systematic scrutiny at a minute, street-by-street level in particular localities. Stationed in such localities, police officials—far more than army or

paramilitary forces—are in a position to develop understanding of local communities, identify stakeholders, map crime trends, conduct effective investigations and help inform sophisticated policymaking. Better policing is the best long-term antidote to urban crime and chaos.

**c. Border Security**

In order to stem the tide of rising cross-border militant incursions from Afghanistan, it is crucial to find

solutions through the existing bilateral and trilateral frameworks of cooperation with Afghanistan and the US.

At the same time, the sides must devise a credible plan for regional stabilization and strategies to address common security challenges like effective control over cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs and related substances, gun running, terrorist-financing and terrorism in the region.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> ↑ and ↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from 2011 to 2012.
- <sup>2</sup> Daily *Ummat* (Urdu), Karachi, November 24, 2012.
- <sup>3</sup> Daily *Ummat*, Karachi, October 22, 2012.
- <sup>4</sup> The group is concentrated in Gulbahar, New Karachi, Malir, Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area of the port city. (Source: Daily *Ummat*, Karachi, September 4, 2012).
- <sup>5</sup> Daily *Ummat*, August 25, 2012.
- <sup>6</sup> Daily *Ummat*, October 4, 2012.
- <sup>7</sup> Ziaur Rehman, "Karachi's New Terrorist Groups," *The Friday Times*, Lahore, January, 6-12, 2012.
- <sup>8</sup> Zia, *ibid*.
- <sup>9</sup> Zia, *ibid*.
- <sup>10</sup> Daily *Ummat*, January 20, 2012.
- <sup>11</sup> Daily *Ummat*, Karachi, July 25, 2012.
- <sup>12</sup> *Dawn*, December 16, 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/12/16/the-game-players-2/>.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>15</sup> Ziaur Rehman (Karachi-based senior journalist and author of *Turmoil in Karachi*), interview by Farhan Yousuf.
- <sup>16</sup> Daily *Aaj*, Peshawar, November 06, 2012.
- <sup>17</sup> Daily *Aaj*, Peshawar, April 16, 2012.
- <sup>18</sup> Daily *Aaj*, Peshawar, March 3, 2012.
- <sup>19</sup> Daily *Aaj*, Peshawar, November 20, 2012.
- <sup>20</sup> These incidents do not include the targeted killings by criminal gangs and armed clashes between them.
- <sup>21</sup> Katchi Rabita Committee is reportedly a political wing of MQM in Lyari, a traditional political stronghold of the PPP. For details see Faiza Mirza, "Lyari: The tip of the iceberg or root of the problem?," *Dawn*, April 30, 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/04/30/lyari-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-or-root-of-the-problem-fm/>.
- <sup>22</sup> Daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Urdu), Rawalpindi, March 14, 2012.
- <sup>23</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, August 12, 2012.
- <sup>24</sup> Daily *K2*, Gilgit, August 17, 2012.
- <sup>25</sup> Daily *K2*, Gilgit, May 12, 2012.
- <sup>26</sup> Daily *K2*, Gilgit, May 26, 2012.
- <sup>27</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, October 12, 2012.
- <sup>28</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, November 26, 2012.
- <sup>29</sup> Daily *Express* (Urdu), Islamabad, August 17, 2012.
- <sup>30</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), Peshawar, December 16, 2012.
- <sup>31</sup> Daily *Aaj* (Urdu), Peshawar, July 17, 2012.
- <sup>32</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), Peshawar, February 18, 2012.
- <sup>33</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, June 29, 2012; Daily *Express* (Urdu), Islamabad, June 29, 2012.
- <sup>34</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, November 22, 2012; Daily *Jang* (Urdu), Rawalpindi, November 22, 2012.
- <sup>35</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), Peshawar, May 29, 2012.
- <sup>36</sup> Daily *Bakhabar* (Urdu), Quetta, June 12, 2012.
- <sup>37</sup> Daily *Express*, Islamabad, June 19, 2012.
- <sup>38</sup> Daily *Express*, Islamabad, June 29, 2012.
- <sup>39</sup> Daily *Dawn*, Islamabad, July 5, 2012; Daily *Express*, Islamabad, July 5, 2012.
- <sup>40</sup> Daily *Aaj*, Peshawar, July 19, 2012.
- <sup>41</sup> Faraz Khan and Samia Malik, "Karachi's Shias targeted in roadside bomb ahead of annual rally," Daily *Express Tribune*, August 18, 2012.
- <sup>42</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, December 31, 2012.
- <sup>43</sup> The agreement was signed after prolonged parleys through a representative jirga comprising 25 representatives from each side. (Source: "Kurram Sunnis, Shias sign renewed peace agreement," *Pakistan*

- Today, October 11, 2011, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/10/11/news/national/kurram-sunnishias-sign-renewed-peace-agreement/> (accessed December 20, 2012)).
- 44 *The News*, Islamabad, September 22, 2012.
- 45 *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt*, Islamabad, April 2, 2012.
- 46 *Dawn*, Islamabad, April 4, 2012.
- 47 *The News*, July 04, 2012.
- 48 *Dawn*, January 27, 2012.
- 49 *Express Tribune*, January 15, 2012 .
- 50 *The News*, December 09, 2012.
- 51 *Dawn*, January 21, 2012.
- 52 Mushtaq Yousafzai, "Taliban commander, three others killed in drone attack," *The News*, February 10, 2012.
- 53 *Daily Mashriq*, August 27, 2012.
- 54 *Daily Aaj*, Peshawar, October 12, 2012.
- 55 *Dawn*, February 09, 2012.
- 56 *Aaj*, Peshawar, February 02, 2012.
- 57 *Dawn*, February 05, 2012.
- 58 Manzar Zaidi (a defense analyst based in Islamabad), interview by Farhan Yousuf.
- 59 *Dawn*, November 29, 2012. <http://dawn.com/2012/11/29/some-ministers-oppose-move-to-set-up-nacta-cabinet-approves-bill-on-counter-terrorism-body/>
- 60 "NACTA Strategic Framework 2012-2015" by National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan.
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- 64 *Dawn*, January 7, 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/01/07/steps-being-taken-to-curb-smuggling-of-fertilise>.
- 65 *Daily Business Recorder*, Karachi, September 5, 2012, <http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/108-pakistan-top-news/77410-cabinet-approves-anti-terrorism-amendment-bill-2012-investigation-for-fair-trial-bill-2012-.html>.
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- 71 Munawer Azeem, "TTP generating funds from twin cities," *Dawn*, September 6, 2012.
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- Sabeel Organization, Gilgit; (30) Tanzeem Naujawan-e-Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit; and (31) Peoples Aman Committee (Lyari), Karachi and (32) Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ).
- <sup>73</sup> Imran Mukhtar, "Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat banned," March 1, 2012, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/11-Mar-2012/ahle-sunnat-wal-jamaat-banned>.
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- <sup>78</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Under the garb of charity," *Dawn*, December 2, 2012.
- <sup>79</sup> According to this provision of the law, individuals whose names are added to a list under the schedule cannot leave their vicinities without getting permission from the police and the local administration
- <sup>80</sup> *Dawn*, February 2, 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/02/02/centre-to-ask-punjab-govt-to-stay-away-from-banned-outfits/>.
- <sup>81</sup> *Dawn*, August 8, 2011.
- <sup>82</sup> Salman Siddiqui, "The Weapons Trial," *The Express Tribune*, May 17th, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/380032/the-weapons-trai-part-1-where-do-20m-illegal-arms-come-from/>.
- <sup>83</sup> Ikram Junaidi, "Illicit arms main cause of target killings," *Dawn*, February, 15, 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/02/15/illicit-arms-main-cause-of-target-killings-says-report/>.
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- <sup>85</sup> Manzar Zaidi, interview.
- <sup>86</sup> Shakeel Anjum, "Police commandoes being trained in aerial surveillance," *The News*, November 2, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-140548-Police-commandoes-being-trained-in-aerial-surveillance>.
- <sup>87</sup> *The News*, August 1, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-7-123970-Elite-Force-potentials-need-proper-utilisation>.
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- <sup>89</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Signs of frustration," *Dawn*, October 21, 2012.
- <sup>90</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, October 12, 2012.
- <sup>91</sup> Hassan Abbas, ed., "Stabilizing Pakistan through Police Reform," Asia Society Report by the Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reforms, July 2012.
- <sup>92</sup> Mohib Asad, "The criminal justice system," published in "Stabilizing Pakistan through Police Reform".
- <sup>93</sup> International Crisis Group, Policy Report No 237, "Pakistan: No end to humanitarian crisis," October 9, 2012.



## **Appendices**

### **1. Attacks on Media in 2012**

The year 2012 left the journalists of Pakistan and all those who cherished freedom of expression with new and more grave reasons to mourn. Physical threats alone to journalists were sobering indeed. Thirteen journalists were killed in the line of duty in the year under review, making Pakistan easily the most dangerous country for journalists in the whole of Asia. This was continuation of a clear trend for years. According to figures on journalists' casualties by international media watchdog Committee to Protect Journalists, Pakistan was also the single most dangerous country in the whole world for journalists in 2010 and 2011. The journalists killed in Pakistan in 2012 included Saqib Khan, Rehmatullah Abid, Mushtaq Khan, Abdul Haq Baloch, Abdul Qadir Hajizai, Razzaq Gul, Mukarram Khan Atif, Muhammad Amir, Aurangzeb Tunio, Tariq Kamal, Syed Tariq Hussain, Aslam Raja and Jamshed Kharal.

Impunity for perpetrators of journalists' killers continued in 2012 and no headway was made in investigating the cases or apprehending and prosecuting the killers of any of the journalists killed in 2012, nor in the case of any of over 80 journalists killed in the country since the year 2000.

The threats and pressures for journalists in the country came from state and non-state actors alike. Pakistani journalists were not immune from threats, intimidation, violence and targeted killings in cities big and small, but the most serious challenges were reserved for journalists from FATA and Balochistan. Working journalists had to abandon large parts of FATA for fear of their safety and reported on FATA from Peshawar or Islamabad. Journalists in Balochistan faced the most daunting threats for journalists anywhere in Pakistan. And again in terms of dangers to journalists, Khuzdar was to Balochistan what Balochistan was to Pakistan.

In September, Abdul Haq Baloch, became the third journalist to be killed in Balochistan in 2012. He was the secretary general of Khuzdar Press Club and was the 13th journalist to be killed in Khuzdar since 2000. In October, two sons of the Khuzdar Press Club President Nadeem Gurnari were shot. One of the boys died instantly, while Gurnari's second son died in the hospital a day later. There was little doubt that the profession of the boys' father had had an impact on their lives being cut short so abruptly. Two presidents and a general secretary of Khuzdar Press Club had already paid the price for their work with their lives.

With the upcoming general election in 2013 apprehended to be the most violent in the country's history, problems for journalists in Pakistan seemed certain to get much worse before they got better.

## Annexures

## Annex 1: Suicide Attacks in 2012

## Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Claim of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
14 Jan	D.I. Khan	Security forces/LEAs	Pol 3 Civ 2	Pol 3 Civ 6	TTP
19 Jan	Nowshera	Security check posts	0	Pol 3 Civ 3	TTP
30 Jan	Peshawar	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 5	Civ 7	LI
16 Feb	Upper Dir	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 2	Civ 6	TTP
24 Feb	Peshawar	Security forces/LEAs	Pol 4	Pol 6	TTP
03 Mar	Charsadda	Political leaders/workers	Pol 1 Civ 1	Pol 4 Civ 5	TTP
04 Mar	D.I. Khan	Security forces/LEAs	0	Pol 3	TTP
11 Mar	Peshawar	Civilians	Civ 18	Civ 34	TTP
15 Mar	Peshawar	Security forces/LEAs	Pol 1	Civ 3	TTP
12 Jun	Peshawar	Pro-government tribesmen	Pol 2	Pol 2 Civ 3	TTP
03 Sep	Peshawar	Foreign interests/ Diplomats	Civ 2	Pol 4 Civ 17	TTP
05 Oct	Hangu	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 2	TTP
13 Oct	Kohat/Darra Adamkhel	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 17	Civ 20	TTP
03 Nov	Buner/Daggar	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 5	Civ 7	TTP
07 Nov	Peshawar	Security forces/LEAs	Pol 4 Civ 2	Civ 37	TTP
04 Dec	Bannu	Security forces/LEAs	0	Pol 4 Civ 3 FC 1	TTP
10 Dec	Bannu	Security forces/LEAs	Civ 5 Arm 1 Pol 3	Pol 4	TTP
22 Dec	Peshawar	Political leaders/workers	Pol 1 Civ 8	Pol 4 Civ 14	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>18 Attacks</b>		<b>88 Killed</b>	<b>205 Injured</b>	

## FATA

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Claim of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
17 Feb	Kurram Agency	Shia religious scholars/community	Civ 43	Civ 15	TTP
02 Mar	Khyber Agency	Lashkar-e-Islam	Mil 5	Mil 6	TTP
23 Mar	Khyber Agency/Bara	Lashkar-e-Islam	Civ 2 Mil 3	Civ 7	TTP
14 Apr	South Waziristan Agency/Wana	Security check posts	-	P-ml 2	TTP
04 May	Bajaur Agency	Security forces/LEAs	Lvs 2 Civ 27	Civ 39	TTP
20 Jul	Kurram Agency	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 12	Civ 8	TTP
05 Nov	Mohmand Agency/Yake Ghund	Security forces/LEAs	0	Arm 2	TTP
19 Nov	Mohmand Agency/Haleemzai	Political leaders/workers	0	Civ 3	TTP
29 Nov	South Waziristan Agency/Wana	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 6	Civ 14	TTP
05 Dec	South Waziristan Agency/Wana	Security forces/LEAs	Arm 3	Arm 21	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>10 Attacks</b>		<b>103 Killed</b>	<b>117 Injured</b>	

## Balochistan

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Claim of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
28 Jun	Quetta/Hazar Ganji	Shia religious scholars/community	Pol 1 Civ 12	Pol 4 Civ 16	LeJ
17 Aug	Quetta	Security forces/LEAs	FC 5	FC 4	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 Attacks</b>		<b>18 Killed</b>	<b>24 Injured</b>	

## Sindh

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Claim of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
05 Apr	Karachi	Security forces/ LEAs	Pol 2 Civ 2	Civ 14	TTP
08 Nov	Karachi	Security forces/ LEAs	Rng 3	Civ 2 Pol 1 Rng 10	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 Attacks</b>		<b>7 Killed</b>	<b>27 Injured</b>	

**Punjab**

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Claim of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
21 Nov	Rawalpindi	Shia religious scholars/community	Civ 23	Pol 4 Civ 36	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 Attack</b>		<b>23 Killed</b>	<b>40 Injured</b>	

**Annex 2: Drone Strikes in 2012**

Date	Place	Killed	Injured	Detail
11 Jan	North Waziristan Agency	4	0	-
12 Jan	North Waziristan Agency	6	2	-
23 Jan	Datta Khel	5	0	-
23 Jan	North Waziristan Agency	0	0	-
8 Feb	Miranshah	10	0	Punjabi Taliban and Afghan Taliban of the Haqqani Network were killed in the attack.
9 Feb	Miranshah	4	2	An important commander Badar Mansoor was killed. He led his own group of Punjabi Taliban.
16 Feb	North Waziristan Agency	7	3	-
16 Feb	North Waziristan Agency	12	0	-
9 Mar	South Waziristan Agency	15	0	Most of the killed were believed to be local and foreign militants.
13 Mar	South Waziristan Agency	9	0	-
13 Mar	North Waziristan Agency	8	0	Shamsullah and Ameer Hamza, affiliated with Maulvi Nazeer-led Taliban fighters, were killed.
30 Mar	North Waziristan Agency	4	2	-
29 Apr	Miranshah	4	3	-
5 May	Miranshah	10	1	-
23 May	Miranshah	5	0	-
24 May	Mir Ali	10	3	Eight militants from Turkmenistan were among those killed.
26 May	Miranshah	4	0	-
27 May	Miranshah	5	0	-
28 May	Datta Khel	5	0	-
2 Jun	Wana	4	0	Militant commander Romanullah and a commander of Maulvi Nazir group were killed.
3 Jun	Birmal	12	3	Militant Commanders Malang and Kalam Khan were among those killed in the attack.
4 Jun	Mir Ali	15	0	-
13 Jun	Miranshah	4	0	-

Date	Place	Killed	Injured	Detail
14 Jun	Miranshah	4	2	-
26 Jun	Miranshah	6	2	-
1 Jul	Miranshah	8	0	Killed militants belong to Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group.
6 Jul	Datta Khel	20	4	20 militants of Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group were killed.
23 Jul	Miranshah	14	0	-
29 Jul	Mir Ali	7	0	7 militants were killed including Uzbeks and Gul Bahadur Group militants.
18 Aug	Shawal	6	2	According to a BBC Urdu report, Engineer Ahsan Aziz and his wife were identified among the dead. Ahsan, hailed from Kashmir was the son of a retired naval officer, Lieutenant. Commander Abdul Aziz, who is a member of Jamaat-e-Islami.
19 Aug	Shawal	10	4	-
21 Aug	North Waziristan Agency	6	4	-
24 Aug	North Waziristan Agency	18	6	18 suspected militants belonging to the TTP, Haqqani Network and Gul Bahadur group were killed in three consecutive strikes. These included five top commanders of ETIM named Aimithi Yakuf alias Abdal Jabbar, Yakoemithe alias Saleh, Twersin alias Zabihullah and Mukhtar.
1 Sep	Datta Khel	6	0	Six militants of Gul Bahadur Group killed, including three Arabs.
22 Sep	Datta Khel	4	2	-
24 Sep	Mir Ali	6	2	Senior Al Qaeda member Abu Kash al-Iraqi killed.
1 Oct	Mir Ali	3	0	-
10 Oct	Mir Ali	5	0	-
11 Oct	Orakzai Agency	24	10	-
24 Oct	Miranshah	5	3	-
29 Nov	Birmal	4	4	-
1 Dec	Wana	4	3	Four militants were killed including Al Qaeda militant Abdur Rehman al-Yemeni, and three other were injured.
6 Dec	Miranshah	5	0	Senior Al Qaeda operative, Sheikh Khalid bin Abdul Rehman alias Abu Zaid Al-Kuwaiti was killed in the attack.
9 Dec	North Waziristan Agency	4	0	Senior Al Qaeda figure Mohammad Ahmad al-Mansoor killed in the attack.
28 Dec	Datta Khel	5	0	-

Date	Place	Killed	Injured	Detail
Total	45 Attacks	336 Killed	67 Injured	

### Annex 3: Cross-border Attacks and Clashes on Pak-Afghan Border in 2012

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
10 Feb	Qila Saifullah	Civilians	Civ 3	0	ANA
01 Mar	North Waziristan Agency/Datta Khel	Civilians	0	Civ 6	NATO forces
14 Mar	Chagai	Civilians	Civ 1	0	NATO forces
26 Mar	North Waziristan Agency	Civilians	0	0	NATO forces
02 Apr	Mohmand Agency	Security check posts	Arm 5	Arm 4	TTP
16 Apr	Lower Dir	Security forces/ LEAs	0	0	Nil
24 Apr	Chitral	Security check posts	0	Mil 1 Arm 1	TTP
13 May	North Waziristan Agency/Miranshah	Security forces/ LEAs	0	0	NATO forces
21 May	Qila Saifullah	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 3	ANA
05 Jun	Mohmand Agency	Security check posts	Arm 1 Mil 20	Arm 3 Mil 25	TTP
05 Jun	North Waziristan Agency/Miranshah	Security check posts	0	0	ANA
14 Jun	Upper Dir	Security check posts	Mil 6	0	TTP
22 Jun	Upper Dir	Security forces/ LEAs	Arm 2 Mil 5	0 0	TTP
22 Jun	Mohmand Agency	Security check posts	Lvs 2	Lvs 2	TTP
24 Jun	Upper Dir	Security check posts	Mil 11 Arm 17	0 0	TTP
27 Jun	Upper Dir	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 7	0	TTP
28 Jun	Upper Dir/Barawal	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 8	0	TTP
29 Jun	Bajaur Agency/Mamund	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 1	TTP
01 Jul	Upper Dir/Barawal	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 3	TTP
02 Jul	Kurram Agency/ Upper Kurram	Tribesmen	Civ 2	Civ 1	ANA
08 Jul	Bajaur Agency/Mamund	Pro-government tribesmen	Mil 2	Mil 8	TTP
12 Jul	Bajaur Agency	Tribesmen	Civ 2 Mil 12	Civ 2 Mil 8 Arm 4	TTP
18 Jul	Chitral	Security check posts	Mil 7	Arm 3	TTP

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
25 Jul	Kurram Agency/ Upper Kurram	Security check posts	0	FC 2	ANA
28 Jul	Bajaur Agency/ Mamund	Civilians	0	Civ 1	TTP
09 Aug	Lower Dir	Security check posts	Mil 9	Mil 13	TTP
19 Aug	Chitral	Civilians	Civ 1	0	TTP
23 Aug	Lower Dir/ Samarbagh (Barwa)	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 5	0	TTP
24 Aug	Mohmand Agency	Security forces/ LEAs	0	0	TTP
24 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 6 Civ 2	Civ 5	TTP
25 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Pro-government tribesmen	Civ 4 Mil 28	Arm 4 Mil 10	TTP
26 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 20 Arm 1	Civ 2 Mil 7 Arm 4	TTP
27 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 15	Civ 1 Mil 5 Arm 1	TTP
28 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 11 Arm 3	Civ 4 Mil 3 Arm 2	TTP
29 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 6	Arm 3 Civ 2	TTP
30 Aug	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security check posts	Mil 18	Arm 2	TTP
01 Sep	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 3	0	TTP
01 Sep	Bajaur Agency/ Nawagai	Civilians	Civ 2	Civ 4	TTP
02 Sep	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 9	Arm 1 Civ 2 Mil 2	TTP
27 Sep	Upper Dir/ Barawal	Security check posts	Arm 1 Mil 13	Arm 1 Mil 11	TTP
01 Oct	Chagai	Civilians	Civ 5	None	NATO forces
05 Oct	Mohmand Agency	Security check posts	Arm 1 Mil 6	Arm 1	TTP
17 Oct	Bajaur Agency/ Mamund	Civilians	0	Civ 1	TTP
17 Oct	North Waziristan Agency/ Mir Ali	Civilians	0	Civ 3	TTP
18 Oct	Bajaur Agency/ Mamund	Civilians	0	Civ 1	TTP
31 Oct	Upper Dir	Security forces/ LEAs	Mil 20	Mil 30	TTP
07 Nov	North Waziristan Agency/	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 1	NATO forces

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
	Datta Khel				
11 Nov	South Waziristan Agency	Civilians	Civ 4	0	ANA
19 Nov	Bajaur Agency/ Nawagai	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 4	ANA
24 Nov	South Waziristan Agency / Angoor Adda	Security check posts	Civ 1	Civ 1	ANA
04 Dec	Mohmand Agency/Safi	Security check posts	0	Arm 1	TTP
07 Dec	North Waziristan Agency	Civilians	0	0	ANA
07 Dec	North Waziristan Agency/Ghulam Khan	Security forces/ LEAs	FC 1	0	TTP
08 Dec	North Waziristan Agency/Datta Khel	Civilians	Civ 1	Civ 2	NATO forces
27 Dec	North Waziristan Agency/Ghulam Khan	Civilians	0	0	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>55 Attacks</b>		<b>314 Killed</b>	<b>212 Injured</b>	

#### Annex 4: Attacks on Educational Institutions in 2012

##### Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
06 Jan	Charsadda	Government Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
10 Jan	Peshawar	Government Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
11 Jan	Swabi	Government Primary School for Girls	0	0	Local Taliban
21 Jan	Mardan	Government High School	0	0	Local Taliban
03 Feb	D.I Khan	Girls school	0	0	Local Taliban
05 Feb	Charsadda	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Feb	Swabi	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
28 Feb	Swabi	Boys Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
29 Feb	Charsadda	Three rooms of Wali Khan University	0	0	Local Taliban
29 Feb	Charsadda	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
01 Mar	Swabi	Private girls school	0	0	Local Taliban
09 Mar	Swabi	Girls College	0	0	Local Taliban
14 Mar	Nowshera	Govt. Boys School	0	0	Local Taliban
15 Mar	Lakki Marwat	Private school	0	0	Local Taliban
15 Mar	Lakki Marwat	Govt. Boys Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
16 Mar	Kohat	Govt. Boys Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban



Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
16 Mar	Swabi	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
17 Mar	Mardan	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	Civ 2	TTP
30 Mar	Charsadda	Govt. Girls School	0	0	Local Taliban
04 Apr	Nowshera	Govt. Girls School	0	0	Local Taliban
09 Apr	Nowshera	Govt. Boys Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
16 Apr	Peshawar	Govt. Girls Primary School	Civ 1	Civ 2	Local Taliban
17 Apr	Swabi	Private school	0	0	Local Taliban
22 Apr	Peshawar	Govt. Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
22 Apr	D.I Khan	Govt. Boys School	0	0	Local Taliban
27 Apr	Charsadda	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
30 Apr	Swabi	Government Girls Primary School and Middle Boys School	0	0	Local Taliban
04 May	Charsadda/ Shabqadar	Government Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
20 May	Swabi	Government Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
22 May	Nowshera	Government Community Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
31 May	Mardan	Government Primary School for Girls	0	0	Local Taliban
01 Jun	Charsadda/ Shabqadar	Government Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
05 Jun	Nowshera	Government Middle School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
10 Jun, 2012	Mardan	Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
13 Jun	Kohat	Government Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
22 Jun	Kohat	Government Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
30 Jun	Mardan	Government Girls Higher Secondary School	0	0	Local Taliban
02 Jul	Swabi	Govt. Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
10 Jul	Peshawar	Govt. Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
15 Jul	Peshawar	Govt. High School	0	0	Local Taliban
20 Jul	Peshawar	Under-construction school building	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Jul	Peshawar	Government Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
27 Jul	Swabi	Govt. Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
01 Aug	Peshawar	Govt. Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
02 Aug	Swabi	Govt. Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
15 Aug	Mardan/ Takht Bhai	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
15 Aug	Charsadda/	Private School "Doaba School System"	0	0	Local Taliban

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
	Shabqadar				
28 Aug	Swabi	Govt. Girls Higher Secondary School	0	0	Local Taliban
07 Sep	Swabi	Govt. Girl Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
12 Sep	Peshawar	Govt. Primary School for boys	0	0	Local Taliban
13 Sep	Swabi/Lahore	Private Quaid-e-Azam International Model School & Collage	0	0	Local Taliban
14 Sep	Mardan	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
17 Sep	Mardan	Govt Boys Middle School	0	0	TTP
19 Sep	Bannu	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
21 Sep	Charsadda/ Shabqadar	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	TTP
22 Sep	Peshawar	Govt. Boys School	0	0	Local Taliban
25 Sep	Charsadda	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
03 Oct	Nowshera	Govt. High School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
09 Oct	Peshawar	Govt. Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
09 Oct	Charsadda	Govt. Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
10 Oct	Nowshera	Govt. Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
19 Oct	Nowshera	Govt. Primary School for Girls	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Oct	Swabi	Boys Middle School	0	0	TTP
27 Oct	Mardan	Girls High School	0	Civ 1	TTP
28 Oct	Swabi	Govt. Boys Middle School	0	0	TTP
03 Nov	Swabi	Private college	0	0	Local Taliban
03 Nov	Swat	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	TTP
15 Nov	Tank	Govt. Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
16 Nov	Charsadda	Govt. Primary school	0	0	Local Taliban
19 Nov	Hangu	Govt. Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Nov	Nowshera	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Nov	Kohat	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	TTP
27 Nov	Hangu	Govt. Middle School for Boys	0	0	TTP
04 Dec	Hangu	Govt. Girls Middle School	0	0	TTP
15 Dec	Nowshera	Govt. Boys Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
16 Dec	Nowshera	Gov t. Boys High School	0	0	Local Taliban
21 Dec	Charsadda/ Shabqadar	Gov t. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
23 Dec	Hangu	Gov t. Boys Primary School	0	0	TTP

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
26 Dec	Peshawar	Gov t. Primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
27 Dec	Peshawar	Geology lab of Peshawar University	0	Civ 3	Local Taliban
	<b>Total</b>	<b>80 Schools</b>	<b>One Killed</b>	<b>8 Injured</b>	

FATA

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
03 Jan	Mohmand Agency	Govt. primary School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
07 Jan	North Waziristan Agency	Government Boys School	0	0	Local Taliban
10 Jan	Khyber Agency/ Landi Kotal	Government Middle School for Boys	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Jan	Khyber Agency/ Landi Kotal	A government primary School	P-ml 1	P-ml 1 Civ 1	TTP
05 Mar	Khyber Agency/ Landi Kotal	Govt. Boys Primary School	0	0	TTP
26 Mar	Mohmand Agency	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
06 Apr	Mohmand Agency/ Safi	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
14 Apr	Mohmand Agency	Two girls primary school	0	0	TTP
19 Apr	Bajaur Agency	Govt. Girls Middle School	0	0	Local Taliban
20 Apr	Khyber Agency	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	TTP
05 May	South Waziristan Agency/ Wana	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	TTP
05 May	Mohmand Agency/ Haleemzai	Gov t. Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
29 May	Mohmand Agency/ Safi	Gov t. Boy's Primary School	0	0	TTP
30 May	Mohmand Agency	Two Gov t. Primary Schools	0	0	TTP
29 Jun	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Gov t. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
29 Jun	Bajaur Agency/ Salarzai	Govt. Boys Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
10 Jul	Mohmand Agency/ Safi	Gov t. Middle School for Boys	0	0	TTP
20 Jul	Mohmand Agency/ Safi	Gov t. Boys Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
01 Aug	Mohmand Agency/ Safi	Gov t. Haji Abdur Rahim primary School	0	0	TTP
01 Aug	Mohmand Agency/ Safi	Gov t. Fida Muhammad primary School	0	0	TTP
09 Aug	Mohmand Agency/ Yake Ghund	Gov t. High School	0	0	TTP

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
20 Aug	South Waziristan Agency/ Toi Khullah	Gov t. Higher Secondary School for girls	0	0	TTP
05 Sep	Mohmand Agency/Safi	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	Civ 3	Local Taliban
05 Sep	Khyber Agency/Jamrud	Private School	0	0	LI
08 Sep	Mohmand Agency/Safi	Govt. Girls Primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
09 Sep	Orakzai Agency	Govt. Primary School for Girls	0	0	TTP
11 Sep	Mohmand Agency/Haleemzai	Govt. Primary School for Girls	0	0	TTP
12 Sep	Khyber Agency/Bara	Govt. primary School	0	0	LI
01 Oct	Mohmand Agency/Safi	Govt. primary School	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Oct	Mohmand Agency/Haleemzai	Primary school for boys	0	0	TTP
29 Oct	Mohmand Agency/Haleemzai	Private school	0	0	TTP
04 Nov	Mohmand Agency/Safi	Govt. boys primary school	0	0	Local Taliban
07 Nov	Mohmand Agency/Haleemzai	Govt. boys primary school	0	0	Local Taliban
07 Nov	Mohmand Agency/Pindiali	Govt. primary school for boys	0	0	Local Taliban
24 Nov	Mohmand Agency	Govt. primary school for girls	0	0	TTP
05 Dec	Mohmand Agency / Yake Ghund	Govt. primary school for boys	0	0	Local Taliban
06 Dec	Mohmand Agency / Yake Ghund	Govt. Middle school	0	0	Local Taliban
11 Dec	Khyber Agency/Bara	Govt. Girls primary school	0	0	TTP
15 Dec	Khyber Agency/Bara	Haji Jan Gul Girls School	0	0	LI
31 Dec	Khyber Agency/Jamrud	Primary school for girls in Bakarabad	1	0	LI
	<b>Total</b>	<b>40 Schools</b>	<b>2 Killed</b>	<b>5 Injured</b>	

#### Balochistan

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of Responsibility
18 Feb	Awaran	High School	0	0	BRA

**Annex 5: Attacks on NATO Supplies in 2012****FATA**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Suspect Org/Accept Responsibility</b>
09 Jan	Landi Kotal	0	0	TTP
24 Jul	Jamrud	Civ 1	Civ 1	TTP
06 Aug	Jamrud	Civ 1	0	TTP
07 Aug	Jamrud	0	0	Local Taliban
11 Aug	Jamrud	0	Civ 1	Lashkar-e-Islam
15 Sep	Landi Kotal	0	Civ 1	TTP
17 Sep	Jamrud	Civ 1	Civ 1	TTP
19 Sep	Jamrud	0	0	Lashkar-e-Islam
06 Oct	Jamrud	0	Civ 1	Lashkar-e-Islam
08 Oct	Jamrud	0	0	Lashkar-e-Islam
20 Nov	Jamrud	Civ 1	Civ 1	Lashkar-e-Islam
22 Nov	Jamrud	0	Civ 1	Lashkar-e-Islam
26 Nov	Landi Kotal	0	0	Lashkar-e-Islam
21 Dec	Jamrud	0	Civ 2	Local Taliban
<b>Total</b>	<b>14 Attacks</b>	<b>4 Killed</b>	<b>9 Injured</b>	

**Balochistan**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Claim of Responsibility</b>
04 Aug	Wadh	Civ 1	0	Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB)
05 Aug	Khuzdar	0	0	TTB
10 Aug	Dasht	0	Civ 2	TTB
03 Sep	Dhadar	0	Civ 3	TTB
07 Sep	Quetta	0	0	TTB
13 Sep	Dasht	0	0	TTB
25 Sep	Mastung	0	0	TTB
27 Sep	Wadh	0	Civ 1	TTB
05 Oct	Mastung	0	0	TTB
06 Oct	Mastung	0	Civ 2	TTB
16 Oct	Nasirabad	Civ 1	Civ 1	TTB
20 Dec	Quetta	0	Civ 2	TTB
28 Dec	Dhadar	0	Civ 1	TTB
<b>Total</b>	<b>13 Attacks</b>	<b>2 Killed</b>	<b>12 Injured</b>	

**Annex 6: Attacks on Shrines & Worship Places in 2012**

Date	Place	Target	Killed	Injured
03 Feb	Khyber Agency	Mosque	0	0
22 Apr	Rawalpindi	Madrassa	Civ 1	Civ 1
09 May	Nowshera	Shrine of Ajmal Khattak	0	Pol 2 Civ 10
20 May	Peshawar	Hindu temple	0	0
07 Jun	Quetta	Seminary Jamia Islamia Miftahul Uloom	Civ 16	Civ 46
21 Jun	Peshawar	Shrine of Panj Pir	Civ 3	Civ 31
28 Jun	Peshawar	Shrine of Mian Neka Shrine	0	0
26 Aug	Utman Khel (Ambar)	Mosque	0	Civ 1
12 Oct	Haleemzai	Jamia Masjid	0	0
28 Oct	Nowshera	Shrine of Kaka Sahib	Civ 4	Civ 34
03 Nov	Peshawar	Shrine of Panda Baba	0	0
18 Nov	Gulshan-e-Iqbal	Masjid-o-Imambargah Mohammad-e-Mustafa	Civ 3	Rng 5 Civ 20
21 Nov	Orangi Town	Masjid-o-Imambargah Haider-e-Karrar	Civ 2	Civ 7
21 Nov	Orangi Town	Masjid-o-Imambargah Haider-e-Karrar	0	Pol 2 Civ 7
24 Nov	Takht Bhai	Shrine of Maday Baba	0	0
01 Dec	Sohrab Goth	Madrassa Taleem-ul-Uloom Islamia Banori	0	0
26 Dec	Sohrab Goth	Mosque	0	Civ 4
Total	<b>17 Attacks</b>		<b>29 Killed</b>	<b>170 Injured</b>

**Annex 7: Breakdown of Terrorist Attacks in 2012****FATA**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	44	95	153
February	25	95	75
March	29	43	60
April	21	18	55
May	31	65	105
June	24	51	102
July	26	53	56
August	40	31	67
September	39	62	142
October	33	24	57

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
November	41	30	107
December	35	64	116
<b>Total</b>	<b>388</b>	<b>631</b>	<b>1095</b>

**KPK**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	42	27	91
February	37	64	113
March	48	39	92
April	36	14	38
May	30	10	76

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
June	33	43	98
July	34	12	40
August	33	40	34
September	27	31	77
October	44	45	101
November	49	41	198
December	43	35	123
<b>Total</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>401</b>	<b>1081</b>

**Balochistan**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	32	57	42
February	32	42	65
March	24	35	27
April	30	39	22
May	39	38	125
June	33	88	252
July	43	66	56
August	70	44	132
September	45	50	55
October	38	58	80
November	30	31	78
December	58	83	98
<b>Total</b>	<b>474</b>	<b>631</b>	<b>1032</b>

**Punjab**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	2	21	50
February	-	-	-
March	1	4	-
April	2	5	62
May	2	3	2
June	-	-	-
July	3	17	8
August	5	2	22
September	-	-	-

October	1	-	-
November	1	23	40
December	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>184</b>

**Karachi**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	8	9	9
February	10	16	9
March	4	4	3
April	10	15	18
May	8	11	12
June	12	11	21
July	18	14	48
August	15	30	28
September	14	29	32
October	27	41	3
November	25	43	70
December	36	49	99
<b>Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>352</b>

**Sindh**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	1	-	-
February	8	-	1
March	2	-	-
April	-	-	-
May	12	8	24
June	1	3	-
July	-	-	-
August	1	3	15
September	-	-	-
October	2	-	2
November	1	3	3
December	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>45</b>

**Gilgit Baltistan**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	4	3	2
February	2	1	3
March	2	1	3
April	2	9	10
May	-	-	-
June	-	-	-
July	-	-	-
August	7	4	7

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
September	1	-	2
October	-	-	-
November	2	1	1
December	6	3	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>33</b>

**Islamabad**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
October	1	1	-

**Annex 8: Incidents of Political Violence in 2012**

Region	Districts/agency	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Sindh	Karachi	176	275	144
	Hyderabad	3	4	21
	Khairpur	2	9	14
Balochistan	Quetta	1	0	0
Islamabad	Islamabad	1	0	3
<b>Total</b>		<b>183</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>182</b>

Region	Frequency	Killed	Injured
Sindh	181	288	179
Balochistan	1	0	0
Islamabad	1	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>182</b>

**Incidents of Ethno-political Violence in 2012**

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	11	13	4
February	5	5	2
March	18	26	37
April	22	27	7
May	24	38	59
June	19	29	18
July	17	29	0
August	19	26	18
September	12	30	12
October	15	32	20



November	8	15	0
December	13	18	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>182</b>

### Annex 9: Major Targets of Terrorists in 2012

Targets	No of attacks	Killed	Injured
Security forces/ LEAs	488	653	1234
Civilians	273	356	968
Shia religious scholars/community	123	395	582
Educational institutions	121	3	13
Pro-government tribesmen	102	243	243
Sunni religious leaders/community	70	113	87
Political leaders/workers	52	59	141
Non-Bloch settlers	32	93	47
Gas pipelines	31	0	0
Govt. officials	31	46	79
Power pylons	27	0	0
CD shops/others	17	3	73
Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	17	29	170
Govt. installation/hospitals/banks/property	38	0	10
Lashkar-e-Islam	2	10	13
Political administration	5	3	3
Hindu community	7	3	2
NGO / civil society members	23	15	8
Ahmadi community	1	1	0
Foreign interests/ diplomats	2	2	21
Railway tracks / trains	28	7	34
Private property	60	10	73
NATO supply vehicles	27	6	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,577</b>	<b>2,050</b>	<b>3,822</b>

## Annex 10: Terrorists' Tactics in 2012

Tactics	Frequency			
	2009	2010	2011	2012
Suicide attacks	87	68	45	33
Bomb blasts	341	54	26	85
Hand grenades	219	185	77	75
Improvised explosive device (IED)	355	344	478	375
Rocket attacks	422	227	224	127
Beheadings	49	34	12	9
Remote-controlled bombs	189	178	146	139
Kidnappings	74	73	82	39
Landmine explosion	111	132	132	88
Firing	650	712	672	587
Sabotage	89	106	72	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,586</b>	<b>2,113</b>	<b>1,966</b>	<b>1,577</b>

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
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