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Report **2017**

**PAKISTAN
SECURITY
REPORT**



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AJK:	Azad Jammu and Kashmir	HG:	Hand Grenade
AJIP:	Awami Jamhoori Ittehad Pakistan	HRCP:	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
ANP:	Awami National Party	IDP:	Internally Displaced Persons
Arm:	Army	IED:	Improvised Explosive Device
AQIS:	Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent	ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force
ASP:	Ansar ul Sharia	ISI:	Inter Services Intelligence
ASWJ:	Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat	ISIS:	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ATC:	Anti Terrorism Courts	ISO:	Imamia Student Organization
ATF:	Anti-Terrorism Force	ISPR:	Inter-Services Public Relations
BC:	Balochistan Constabulary	JI:	Jamaat-e-Islami
BH:	Beheading	JID:	Joint Intelligence Directorate
BLA:	Balochistan Liberation Army	JQM:	Jamote Qaumi Movement
BLF:	Balochistan Liberation Front	JM:	Jaish-e-Muhammad
BNP:	Balochistan National Party	JuA:	Jamaatul Ahrar
BNP-M:	Balochistan National Party-Mengal Group	JuD:	Jamaatud Dawa
BRA:	Baloch Republican Army	JUI-F:	Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl
BSF:	[Indian] Border Security Force	Kid:	Kidnapping
BT:	Bomb Blast	KP:	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency	LeJ:	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
CID:	Criminal Investigation Department	LeJ-A:	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami
CTDs:	Counter Terrorism Departments [of police]	LI:	Lashkar-e-Islam
Civ:	Civilians	LM:	Landmine Blast
CPEC:	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor	LoC:	Line of Control
CVE:	Counter-Violent Extremism	Lvs:	Levies Force
DGMOs:	Director Generals of Military Operations	Mil:	Militant
DSP:	Deputy Superintendent Police	MQM:	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
ETIM:	East Turkistan Islamic Party	MWM:	Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen
FATA:	Federally Administered Tribal Areas	MDM:	Muttahida Deeni Mahaz
FC:	Frontier Corps	NACTA:	National Counter-Terrorism Authority
FCR:	Frontier Crimes Regulation	NAP:	National Action Plan
FIA:	Federal Investigative Agency	NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Fr:	Firing	NI:	Nationalist Insurgents' Attack
FR:	Frontier Region	NIC:	National Implementation Committee [on FATA reforms]
		NP:	National Party

NPP: National People's Party
NSA: National Security Advisor
PkMAP: Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
P-mI: Paramilitary Forces
PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
Pol: Police
PPP: Pakistan People's Party
PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
QWP: Qaumi Watan Party
RA: Rocket Attack
RCB: Remote-controlled Bomb
Rng: Rangers
SA: Suicide Attack
Sab: Sabotage
Sect: Sectarian

SDLF/A: Sindhu Desh Liberation
Front/Army
SDRA: Sindhu Desh Revolution Army
SM: Sipah-e-Muhammad
SP: Superintendent of Police
SSP: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
ST: Sunni Tehreek
TA: Terrorist Attack
TNSM: Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Muhammadi
TTP: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UBA: United Baloch Army
UN: United Nations
WB: Working Boundary

METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES

The PIPS conflict/security database and archives are the basic sources relied upon for this report. The archives and the database are the outcome of a meticulous monitoring process on every relevant incident in the country on a daily basis. A regular follow up is conducted in liaison with PIPS correspondents in the regions in order to keep track of daily developments on such incidents. PIPS compiles data from sources including newspapers, magazines, journals, field sources and screening of official record. More than 30 English and Urdu dailies, magazines, and journals, and various television news channels are monitored to update the database and archives. Regional daily newspapers and weeklies from Peshawar, Quetta, Gilgit and Karachi are also monitored for details of incidents reported in the local media. Correspondents in provincial capitals are the primary source for PIPS to verify the media reports. In case of a major incident, PIPS teams consult the local administration and journalists for further details. In cases where PIPS finds it difficult to verify facts of a particular incident, it gives preference to the official statements in that regard.

PIPS security reports utilize eight major variables with their respective set of sub-variables for analysis of the security situation in Pakistan. The security landscape is mapped through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative methods are used, based on PIPS Conflict and Security Database, to measure the scale and level of violence. Meanwhile, the qualitative approach dilates upon changes and developments on the militants' front, state responses to these developments and projections of future scenarios. The following eight major variables with their sub-sets of variable are used in the PIPS Security Reports:

- 1. Attacks:** This major variable has a sub-set of five sub-variables i.e. (i) terrorist attacks including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks; (ii) incidents of ethno-political violence; (iii) cross-border attacks; (iv) drone attacks; and (v) operational attacks by security forces against militants. Since Pakistan's security landscape is very complicated with a diverse array of insecurity indicators in different parts of the country, the type of violence in one geographical unit is often different in its nature and dynamics from security landscape in other parts of the country. For this purpose the mentioned sub-set of variables is carefully monitored and analyzed in the security report with a view to suggest specific counter-strategy for each type of attack in these areas.
- 2. Clash:** Another variable used is of clashes which include four sub-variables, i.e., (i) inter-tribal; (ii) sectarian; (iii) clashes between security forces and militants; and (iv) militants' infightings. The number of such clashes and their geographic location is

taken as an indicator of parallel trends unfolding simultaneously with major trends and patterns of security in different areas of the country.

- 3. State Responses:** It has two sub-variables: (i) security measures, and (ii) political and administrative responses. The first takes into account the security forces' operational attacks and clashes with militants, search and hunt operations and terrorists' arrests, etc. The second variable entails the government's political and administrative measures to maintain law and order and reduce insecurity and violence.
- 4. Casualties:** Casualties include both the number of people killed and injured. Casualties among civilians, militants and security forces are treated as another indicator to measure the levels and trends of security in the country.
- 5. Attack Tactics:** This head takes a comprehensive account of various tactics used by different actors including suicide attacks, missile attacks, hand grenade attacks, kidnappings, rocket attacks, beheadings, landmine blasts, firing, sabotage, target killings, and bomb and improvised explosive devices blasts.
- 6. Development on Militants' Front:** This variable analyzes statements, activities, internal divisions and other activities of militants to determine their strength and the dynamics of their strategies.
- 7. Opportunities and Challenges** include political measures and military responses to different security issues along with highlighting constraints and challenges encountered by the state.
- 8. Claim of Responsibility:** It provides insight into militants' targets, tactics, areas of operation, and agendas.

GLOSSARY

Military Operation: Large-scale operations launched by military and paramilitary forces against Islamist militants and separatist insurgents in KP, FATA and Balochistan to preserve law and order and the writ of the state.

Operational Attack: Pre-emptive attacks launched by military and paramilitary troops to purge an area of militants.

Clashes between Security Forces and Militants: Armed clashes between security forces and militants, triggered by militants' attack on security check posts/ convoys and confrontation during search operations.

Terrorist Attacks: Include militant, nationalist, insurgent and sectarian attacks. Indiscriminate use of violence by militant outfits such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) etc., manifested through suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video shops, etc.

Nationalist Insurgent Attacks: Attacks by separatists/nationalist insurgents mainly in Balochistan and interior parts of Sindh.

Sectarian Attacks: Indiscriminate use of violence rooted in differences among various Islamic schools of thought over interpretation of religious commands. Incidents involving indiscriminate use of violence perpetrated by banned sectarian outfits such as LeJ, Tehreek-e-Jafria, Imamia Student Organization (ISO), Sipah-e-Muhammad, etc., against rival schools of religious thought.

Ethno-political Violence: The threat or use of violence, often against the civilian population, to achieve political or social ends, to intimidate opponents, or to publicize grievances.

Inter-tribal Clash: Clashes or feuds reported between tribes, mainly in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, rural areas of Punjab and parts of interior Sindh.

Search and Hunt Operation: Launched by law enforcement agencies on intelligence to capture militants or to purge a particular locality of suspected militants and their hideouts.

Sectarian Clashes: Violent clashes between armed factions of banned sectarian outfits or between followers of rival sects such as Sunni-Shia, Deobandi-Barelvi strife. Sectarian clashes also include tribal feuds between followers of Sunni and Shia schools of thought

as in Kurram Agency, where the Sunni Turi tribesmen frequently clash with members of the Shia Bangash tribe.

Overall Number of Attacks: The sum of militant and counter-militant attacks by the security forces, besides drone attacks, incidents of ethno-political violence, and attacks with sectarian motives or by nationalist insurgents.

Unsuccessful Attempts: These include attempts at terrorist attacks that were either foiled by security forces and bomb disposal squads, or explosives went off by accident before militants or suicide bombers reached their intended target.

FOREWORD

The internal security situation improved further in 2017 with a 16 percent decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, compared to previous year. However, the statistics and responses documented by Pak Institute for Peace Studies in the year suggest that many challenges remain to be addressed on the front of internal as well as border security. At the same time, some new challenges are rearing their heads like the emergence of self-radicalized individuals and small terrorist cells, growing incidence of religious extremism including on educational campuses, persisting cross-border attacks by Pakistani militants relocated to Afghanistan, and increasing footprints of Daesh in parts of the country and convergence of its fighters in Afghanistan near Pakistani border. These have made Pakistan's countering terrorism efforts even more challenging, which are also evolving in line with the changing regional scenario especially the pressure mounted by the US administration.

Certainly, all old and new internal and regional security challenges are orienting Pakistan towards reviewing afresh its security, strategic and geopolitical strategies. There are indications of transformation in security doctrine of the country. New regional alignment with China and Russia, and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have created new options for the country to diversify its geopolitical priorities. These developments also compelled the political and security leaderships to develop the National Security Policy (NSP). In December 2017, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi tasked the National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. (retd.) Nasser Janjua to present the NSP, which, as of now, has been documented and circulated to the relevant committees. It is expected that it may be launched in 2018. In an interview with PIPS, NSA Gen. Janjua provided the broad outline of the NSP. The multi-layered NSP, conceived in global, regional and national perspectives, will focus on safety, security and well being of Pakistani citizens. The interview is part of this issue, which also describes the importance of stable Afghanistan in Pakistan's national security doctrine.

The government has also tasked National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) to reformulate National Internal Security Policy (NISP). The first NISP was announced in 2014 but it remained a mere document and has not been implemented. The NSIP was conceived in a narrow perspective of countering terrorism and either overlooked or played down some important challenges. NACTA National Coordinator Ihsan Ghani in an interview with PIPS explained that the NISP consultation process would be inclusive and complete before June 2018.

However, there is also a need to review National Action Plan (NAP) as NSA Gen. (retd.) Nasser Janjua and NACTA's NC Ihsan Ghani supported this idea in their interviews with PIPS. The PIPS has done extensive consultations on NAP and linked challenges and suggested in 2017 to divide the NAP into two parts. First part should deal with counterterrorism challenges and the second with counter-extremism related issues. A revised NAP could also be made the part of NISP.

It is hoped that NSP and NISP will help to evolve effective responses to internal and regional security challenges. One main issue which continued troubling Pakistan in 2017 was the status and future of banned organizations, especially those conceived by the world as state proxies. The JuD has announced the formation of its political party Pakistan Milli Muslim League and many in security institutions described the development as the reintegration of the militant groups. However, it was not the part of any declared state policy and parliament was not taken into confidence over the issue. There is a dire need for a comprehensive reintegration and deradicalization program in the country, but it should be debated at proper forums including in parliament. The report has suggested some measures in this regard, however, NISP should address the issue as well.

However, in any NSP or NISP, the fundamental rights should not be comprised and effective implementation of rule of law and effective measures to stop misuse of authority is also needed to be ensured. A parliamentary committee on national security shall provide input in drafting NSP. The accountability of law enforcement agencies and transparency in the practices will improve the capacities. At the same time, there is need to clearly define the areas of operations of different law enforcement agencies and civilian law-enforcement agencies shall take the lead in any drive against militancy.

Another long-awaiting policy initiative in 2017 was Counter Extremism Policy, whose draft has been submitted to the Interior Ministry. Its key features are still not known but according to National Coordinator NACTA, it includes three major strands. One is the short-term, long-hanging, initiative like youth engagement. These are the activities that do not require funding or legislation. Then, there are medium-term initiatives, which required policies and funding and long-term issues that required legislation. The government has to announce the policy soon as extremism is becoming a complex challenge for the society. Dr. Farhan Zahid, Syed Arfeen, Ziaur Rehman and Najam U Din in their articles have explored the different dimensions of extremism and its link with militancy and human rights abuses.

The growing religious activism is another expression of extremism in the society, which also requires effective administrative responses. Azam Khan and Imran Mukhtar provided a detailed account of the November sit-in by a small religious group in Islamabad and how the police and government had failed to cope with the issue.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan has accomplished many things. It would have been concluded until now, but weak coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the issues of border security and counterterrorism is hindering the operation to reach its logical inclusion. Both countries need to evolve certain joint counterterrorism mechanism to address the common challenges.

PIPS hopes this 12th edition of its annual security report would help the policymakers, academics, media and civil society understand the gravity of the security situation in Pakistan with a view to moving towards sustainable solutions. Apart from the comprehensive data on violent incidents, comparative analysis of various security variables, the changing targets and tactics of militants and nature of state responses, the report also contains a comprehensive review of militant landscape, security issues related to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), assessment of NAP and CVE initiatives taken in 2017. The external contributions have helped in grasping different perspectives.

The credit for this report goes to the entire team at PIPS, especially deputy director PIPS Safdar Sial, who monitored security developments and narrated them for the report; Muhammad Ismail Khan, who consolidated the writings and reviewed them; Zarghona Alam and Raisa Mansoor, whose research support, especially in drawing annexures and timelines, greatly helped the analysis provided inside; and Shahzad Ahmed, who designed the various conflict maps.

Muhammad Amir Rana

Date January 2, 2018

CHAPTER 1

Overview of security in 2017: critical challenges and recommendations

Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial*

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1.1 Overview of security situation in 2017


Militant, nationalist/insurgent and violent sectarian groups carried out, in all, 370 terrorist attacks in 64 districts of Pakistan during the year 2017 – including 24 suicide and gun-and-suicide coordinated attacks. These attacks claimed the lives of 815 people, besides inflicting injuries on another 1,736. The reported terrorist attacks in 2017 marked a decline of 16 percent from the previous year, and the number of people killed in these attacks also fell by 10 percent; the number of those injured, however, increased by 7 percent, as compared to the year before.

As many as 213 of the total 370 reported attacks, or about 58 percent, were perpetrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), its splinter groups mainly Jamaatul Ahrar and other militant groups with similar objectives such as local Taliban groups in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Lashkar-e-Islam, and ISIS-affiliates and supporters. These attacks killed 604 people and injured 1,374 others. Representing 37 percent of the total, national insurgent groups carried out 138 attacks – mostly in Balochistan and a few in Sindh – which claimed 140 lives and wounded another 265 people. As many as 19 terrorist attacks were sectarian-related which killed 71 people and inflicted injuries on 97 others.

Those killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2017 included 563 civilians, 217 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies (46 FC men; 110 policemen

including Khassadar in FATA; 42 army troops; 16 Levies; and 3 unspecified paramilitaries) and 35 militants, who were either killed/exploded suicide bombers or those killed in retaliatory fire by security and law enforcement personnel following some attacks. Those injured in these attacks included 1,430 civilians, 305 security personnel and one militant.

Chart 1: Classification of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2017



As in past several years, security and law enforcement agencies were the foremost target of the terrorists in 2017. Over 43 percent (or 160) of the total terrorist attacks reported in 2017 hit personnel, convoys and check-posts of the security forces and law-enforcement agencies across Pakistan. Civilians were the apparent targets of 86 attacks (23 percent). Sixteen attacks targeted government officials, departments and offices etc., and another 13 attacks hit political leaders/workers and offices of

political parties. Pro-government tribal elders, or members of tribal peace committees, came under 12 attacks. Non-Baloch workers, settlers in Balochistan were targeted in 10 attacks. Nine attacks targeted media and journalists. Meanwhile 16 reported attacks targeted members of Shia community and 4 attacks, also one including one non-sectarian, hit members of Sunni community. Two lethal attacks also targeted worship places and shrines in 2017. Other sporadic targets hit by the terrorist in 2017 are given at Table 1.

Table 1: Targets hit in terrorist attacks in 2017

Targets	No. of Terrorist Attacks	Killed	Injured
Personnel, check posts and convoys of Security forces/law enforcement agencies	160	283	516
Educational institutions	7	1	11
Non-Bloch settlers/workers	10	40	32
Gas pipelines, power pylons, railways tracks/trains	12	0	6
Govt. officials, departments and offices, etc.	16	29	68
Tribal elders	1	3	0
Civilians	86	170	546
CD/other shops/private property	1	0	0
Shia religious	16	68	96

Targets	No. of Terrorist Attacks	Killed	Injured
scholars/community			
Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	2	113	281
Sunni religious leaders/community	4	4	4
Political leaders/workers	13	38	50
Christian community/Church	2	9	56
Ahmedi community	4	4	1
Foreign interests/diplomats/foreigners	1	2	0
Media/journalists	9	4	10
Health/polio workers	3	2	0
Pro-govt. tribesmen / peace committee members	12	23	16
Judges/lawyers/courts	3	13	41
Afghan Taliban/Others	2	2	0
CPEC projects/workers	3	3	2
Blasphemy accused	1	1	0
Former militants	2	3	0
Total	370	815	1,736

Besides 24 suicide blasts, militants employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types in launching 159 attacks. A considerable number of reported attacks in 2017 — 141, or about 38 percent — were incidents of targeted killing or shooting. Other attack tactics used by terrorists included grenade blasts (33), rocket attacks (8), mortar fire (2),

missile attacks (one) and sabotage (2 attacks).

Just as in past three years, the highest number of terrorist attacks for any one region of Pakistan was reported from Balochistan (165 attacks, or over 44 percent of the total attacks in Pakistan). Over 35 percent of the total number of people killed (288) and 31 percent of those injured (532) in terror attacks across Pakistan in 2017 concentrated in Balochistan alone. A bulk of these casualties in Balochistan (133 dead; 282 injured) resulted from 27 terrorist attacks carried out by Islamist militants including the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, ISIS-affiliates as well as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami. Different Baloch insurgent groups perpetrated 131 attacks claiming 138 lives and wounding 239 other people. Seven sectarian-related attacks, mainly targeting Hazara Shias, caused death to 17 people and injuries to another 11 persons.

The Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was the second most terrorism-affected region after Balochistan, with 83 reported attacks claiming 253 lives and wounding 491 others. Though these attacks were reported from across all 7 agencies of FATA, most of the terrorism-related casualties (154 dead; 341 injured), however, resulted from some major attacks that took place in Kurram Agency; Jamaatul Ahrar, TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and its global arm LeJ-Al-Alami perpetrated these attacks.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), as many as 71 attacks were recorded in 2017, in which 91 people lost their lives and 211 others were wounded.

As many 31 attacks took place in Sindh – 24 in Karachi and 7 in interior of Sindh – which killed a total of 119 people and injured 293 people. Most of the terrorism-related casualties in Sindh (91 dead; 250 injured) resulted from a single suicide blast reported from Sehwan Sharif, Jamshoro, at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar.

A total of 61 people were killed, including 54 in Lahore alone, and 194 others were injured in 14 reported terrorist attacks from Punjab. (See Table 1) Three terrorist attacks, each, were reported from Islamabad and Azad Jammu and Kashmir during the year. (See Table 2)

Table 2: Terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2017

Region	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
KP	71	91	211
Balochistan	165	288	532
FATA	83	253	491
Punjab	14	61	194
Karachi	24	25	16
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	7	94	277
Islamabad	3	2	5
AJK	3	1	10
Total	370	815	1,736

1.1.1 Comparison

On the whole, 713 incidents of violence of different types – as given at Table 3 – were reported from across Pakistan in 2017. These incidents mainly included 370 terrorist attacks cited earlier, 171 cross-border attacks from India, Afghanistan and Iran, 75 operational strikes carried out by security forces and their 68 armed clashes/encounters with militants, and 9 drone strikes. (See Table 3) A total of 1,611 people were killed and 2,212 injured in these violent incidents.


Table 3: Nature of overall incidents of violence

Nature of Incident	No. of Incidents	Killed	Injured
Terrorist attacks	370	815	1,736
Political and ethnic violence	4	10	4
Clashes & encounters between security forces & militants	68	251	31
Inter-tribal clashes/attacks	6	9	24
Border clashes/attacks	171	188	348
Operational attacks by security forces	75	296	47
Drone attacks	9	30	4
Sectarian clashes	1	3	9
Inter-militant clashes/attacks	2	2	0
Clashes between security forces & criminal gangs	1	3	0

Nature of Incident	No. of Incidents	Killed	Injured
Communal/faith-based violence	1	2	0
Mob violence	5	2	9
Total	713	1,611	2,212

The number of overall incidents of violence decreased from 749 in 2016 to 713 in 2017, by about 5 percent. The number of people killed in these violent incidents also decreased by about 15 percent, from 1,887 in 2016 to 1,611 in 2017. However, the number of people injured in all such incidents of violence increased by 13 percent from 1,956 in 2016 to 2,212 in 2017. (See Chart 2)

Chart 2: Comparison of overall incidents of violence & casualties (2014-17)



With the only exception of the year 2013 – when the number of terrorist attacks took an upward turn mainly due to an increased incidence of sectarian-related attacks in the country as well as a significant surge in terror acts in Karachi, a gradual decrease in the number of terrorist attacks and consequent fatalities in Pakistan can be visibly seen since 2009, or post-Swat military operation. (See Chart 3 and Table 4) The Rangers-led operation in Karachi (started 2013), military operations in North Waziristan and Khyber agencies, and police’s anti-militant actions across Pakistan including as part of the National Action Plan (NAP) and *Raddul Fasaad*, apparently helped sustain that declining trend 2013 onward, which continued in 2017 as well.

Chart 3: Comparison of terrorist attacks and fatalities in Pakistan (2009-2017)




Table 4: Comparison of terrorist attacks and fatalities in Pakistan (2009-17)*

Year	No. of Terrorist Attacks (% Change)	No. of Killed (% Change)
2009	Baseline year (2,586 attacks)	Baseline year (3,021 Fatalities)
2010	18%↓	4% ↓
2011	7%↓	18%↓
2012	20%↓	14%↓
2013	9%↑	19%↑
2014	30%↓	30%↓
2015	48%↓	38%↓
2016	28%↓	12%↓
2017	16%↓	10%↓

The overall decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2017 was however not as significant as it has been in the past few years. Nor was it marked by a decreased incidence of such attacks in all regions of Pakistan. Indeed the number of terrorist attacks posted a 100 percent and 9 percent increase, respectively, in Punjab and Balochistan provinces, as compared to the year before. However, despite an increase in attacks, the number of people killed and

* ↑ and ↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from previous year.

injured in Punjab and Balochistan declined from previous year. (See Table 5)

For interior Sindh and Islamabad, the number of attacks remained same as in previous year. The most significant increase in terrorism-related casualties for any region of the country was however recorded in interior Sindh.

The terrorist attacks significantly fell in Karachi and KP, by 49 percent and 44 percent, respectively, marking even higher declining trends in the number of people killed in these attacks. Though a drop of 16 percent was also recorded in attacks in FATA, the number of people killed in these attacks surged by 55 percent, when compared to the year before.

Table 5: Comparison of terrorist attacks & casualties (2016 vs. 2017)[†]

Province / Region	Number of Attacks (% Change)	Killed (% Change)	Injured (% Change)
KP	44%↓	52%↓	41%↓
Balochistan	9%↑	30%↓	24%↓
FATA	16%↓	55%↑	122%↑
Punjab	100%↑	24%↓	19%↓
Karachi	49%↓	58%↓	79%↓

[†] ↑ and ↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from 2016 to 2017.

Province / Region	Number of Attacks (% Change)	Killed (% Change)	Injured (% Change)
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	No change	3,033%↑ (from 3 to 94)	855%↑
Islamabad	No change	100%↑ (from 1 to 2)	25%↑
AJK	3 attacks (0 baseline data in 2016)	1 killed	10 injured
Total	16%↓	10%↓	7%↑

Compared to 17 in 2016, as many as 24 suicide attacks took place in Pakistan in 2017, indicating an increase of 41 percent. However the number of people killed in suicide attacks in 2017 fell by 25 percent, from 382 in 2016 to 286 in 2017; the number of those injured in such blasts also decreased from 856 to 723. Relatively more lethal of the reported suicide blasts in 2017, in terms of casualties, included attacks on a shrine in Sehwan Sharif, Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri in Mastung, anti-riots policemen in Lahore, and the shrine of Pir Rakhyal Shah in Jhal Magsi district. Out of the 24 suicide attacks in 2017, as many as 10 took place in Balochistan, 7 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 3 each in FATA and Punjab, and one in Sindh. The TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Islam and ISIS-affiliates were behind most of these suicide attacks.

Marking a decrease of 41 percent from previous year, as many as 20 sectarian-related attacks and clashes took place in

2017. The number of people killed in such attacks and clashes in 2017 also decreased by about 29 percent, from 104 in 2016 to 74 in 2017. As many as 106 people were also injured in sectarian-related attacks and clashes in 2017, a decrease of 34 percent from previous year. Over 80 percent of the total number of people killed in sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes across Pakistan, were concentrated in Kurram Agency in FATA, Quetta in Balochistan and DI Khan in KP. As many as 16 and 3 sectarian-related attacks, respectively, targeted members of Shia and Sunni communities/groups, while another was incident of sectarian clash between two rival groups, reportedly from Khairpur, Sindh.

Compared to 2016, a significant surge of 131 percent was witnessed during the year under review in cross-border attacks and clashes from Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran. A total of 171 cross-border attacks took place from the country's borders with India (131 attacks; compared to 51 in 2016), Afghanistan (28; compared to 18 in 2016) and Iran (12; compared to 5 in 2015). In general, the situation at Pakistan's border with India – along the LoC in Azad Kashmir and the Working Boundary – remained relatively more volatile in terms of the number of cross-border violations recorded during the year. However, comparatively more people were killed in

incidents of cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, though most of them militants; 117 people were killed in cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, compared to 69 and 2 killed, respectively, in similar attacks from India and Iran. Thus, on the whole, 188 Pakistani citizens were killed in these three types of cross-border attacks – an increase of 132 percent from previous year – and 348 others were also injured. Those 188 killed included 68 civilians, 25 army troops, 6 FC men, and 89 Afghanistan-based Pakistani Taliban militants, who were killed by security forces in retaliatory fire.

Down 21 percent from previous year, as many as 75 operational strikes were launched by security forces and law enforcement agencies against militants in the year 2017. These operations were conducted in 28 districts and regions of Pakistan; in previous year, such operations were recorded in 35 districts or regions. Out of the 75 operational strikes, 39 were conducted in Balochistan, 18 in FATA, 8 in KP, 7 in Punjab, and 3 in Karachi. These operational strikes killed a total of 296 people – compared to 492 in 2016 – including 281 militants, 14 personnel of security and law-enforcement agencies and one civilian. Around 47 people were also injured in these actions including 18 militants and 29 security personnel.

Apart from the anti-militant operations described earlier, security and law enforcement agencies also engaged in a

total of 68 armed clashes and encounters with militants, which represented a decrease of 35 percent from previous year, across 30 districts/regions of the country. These clashes and encounters claimed, in all, 251 lives in 2017 – including 243 militants and 8 security personnel – indicating a decrease of near 28 percent in fatalities in such incidents from 2016. As many as 31 others were also injured in these clashes including 24 security and law enforcement personnel, 3 civilians and 4 militants.

Compared to 3 in the year before, as many as 9 US-led drone strikes took place in 4 agencies of FATA; 5 in Kurram, 2 in North Waziristan, and one attack each in Orakzai and South Waziristan agencies. These attacks killed a total of 30 suspected militants and injured 4 others.

Incidents of ethnic and political violence in Pakistan fell significantly, from 12 in 2016 to 4 in 2017; the number of people killed in these incidents also decreased, by about 28 percent, to 10. Two incidents of ethno-political violence were reported from Punjab and one each from Karachi and Islamabad.

Meanwhile, 5 incidents of faith-based mob violence were also recorded in 2017 which claimed 2 lives – including of a student Mashal Khan on the campus of Abdul Wali Khan University in Mardan – and injured 9 others.

The number of people killed in overall incidents of violence in Pakistan decreased by about 15 percent, from 1,887 in 2016 to 1,611 in 2017. This decrease was marked by the death of 683 militants, compared to 921 in 2016, representing a decrease of about 26 percent. The number of civilians killed (657), in these violent incidents, however, increased by over 6 percent as compared to 2016. Fatalities among security forces personnel in 2017 (271) were 22 percent less from the previous year's fatalities among them (347). The distribution of casualties in the overall reported incidents of violence in 2017 is given in *Table 6*.

Table 6: Casualties in overall violent incidents in 2017

Category	Killed	Injured
FC	55	131
Militants	683	53
Civilian	657	1,762
Police	115	150
Army	77	95
Levies	16	7
Paramilitaries	3	2
Rangers	5	12
Total	1,611	2,212

1.2 Critical challenges and areas

1.2.1 Critical challenges

i. Complex militant landscape and reintegration challenge

The issue of militant groups is extremely

complex in the Pakistani context. Ambiguities persisted over the status of some banned militant groups in 2017, which also caused fissures between civil and military leaderships. Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) took path of its political expansion in the name of reintegration, which was not well received by international community. These groups are still causing diplomatic problems for Pakistan. It was mentioned in 2016 security report that many groups, which were tagged as 'proxies', took control of state narratives to emerge as a new far right that is not only interfering in 'strategic affairs' but also shrinking the space for mainstream politics. Apparently, JuD is projecting itself as an alternative model to challenge the Daesh and Al-Qaeda ideologies. Besides its multiple sociopolitical implications, which should be debated from different perspectives, the ideological encroachment of the JuD entails two critical aspects. First, a Salafi radical group has taken refuge in the idea, or identity, of Pakistan and feels an obligation to restructure the basic concept of nationalism in the country. It is ironic that a militant group has become the custodian of the national ideology, which was nurtured by the state institutions during the last 70 years. Secondly, there has been a collective intellectual failure in the development and provision of a vision of a modern Muslim state.¹

Apart from the issue of JuD's political mainstreaming, reported amnesty provided

to former Taliban leader Ehsanullah Ehsan made the reintegration debate more complex. Reportedly Asmatullah Muavia, another militant leader who got the amnesty two years before, convinced Ehsan to surrender on term of revealing Taliban secrets.² However, security agencies argued that the return of Ehsanullah Ehsan helped damage the TTP and Jamaatul Ahar (JuA). Overall, the move was considered counter-productive by many and reflected on the state's apparent appeasement approach towards the militants. On the other hand, it has not impacted on operational capabilities of the TTP or JuA. Both continue with attacks. Both also suffered in 2017 because of security operations against them both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Ambiguities on the status of such groups create embarrassing situation for security institutions. In 2017, as per a news report, NACTA issued warning that Indian RAW has given task and money to Jaish-e-Muhammad militants to killed Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and advised him to tighten his security.³ The same day, an English newspaper carried a report about Jaish's head Masood Azhar's nephew's killing in Indian-held Kashmir.⁴ Most importantly, such ambiguities are a major hurdle in the way of effective implementation of the NAP and a major irritant in the way of formulation of an effective Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) policy.

ii. A review of National Action Plan (NAP)

The National Action Plan was devised to correct counterterrorism practices and function as a set of guiding principles. But the government barely even invested in structural reforms, preferring a parallel monitoring institutionalisation instead. To make NAP functional and effective, a group of security experts in a consultative meeting organized by Pak Institute for Peace Studies in 2017 underscored that NAP should be reviewed afresh, dividing into two broader components, Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE).

- The first component, CT, shall deal with the hard approaches of countering militancy, having more immediate effect. These include reforming policing, coordination among security institutions, acting against armed groups, curbing hate speech, choking terror finance, protecting minorities, dismantling militants' communication networks, countering the cyber spaces, reforming criminal justice system, securing borders and most importantly reforming intelligence.

- The second component, CVE, shall deal with the soft approaches of countering militancy, producing results in the long-term. This component should include reforming madrassas, banning glorifying militants, reconciling politically with different militants especially in Balochistan,

rehabilitating and de-radicalizing of different brands of militants, reforming education, re-orientating culture, reshaping media strategy, countering sectarianism and reforming judiciary.

For each of the different points of NAP, a proper plan may be charted, laying down their indicators, goals, and responsible institutions. Parliament should provide an oversight role, the Prime Minister shall wrest ownership of the entire NAP, and the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) shall serve as the coordinating body on NAP.⁵

iii. Terrorist networks in Afghanistan and border insecurity

In 2017, the US administration took a tough position to press Pakistan to do more against the militants hitting Afghanistan, mainly Haqqanis, and check their cross-border movement. Pakistan has been expressing a similar concern about the Pakistani Taliban militants sheltered in Afghanistan and crossing over the border to launch attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan has demanded Afghan government to take action against the 76 terrorists including Mulah Fazullah, Umar Khurasani and others who had fled from tribal areas of Pakistan.⁶ The convergence of Daesh militants on the Afghan border mainly in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan also poses a threat to Pakistan. Apart from terrorist attacks

planned against Pakistan by the Pakistani militants in Afghanistan, out of the total 28 reported cross-border attacks from Afghanistan in 2017, 22 were launched by the Pakistani Taliban militants who have taken refuge in bordering areas of Afghanistan, including mainly the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Islam. Six cross-border attacks were conducted by the Afghan security forces including in Khyber and in Kurram agencies of FATA, and Chaman in Balochistan. Pakistan has made efforts on two levels to address the border insecurity with Afghanistan, which entail diplomatic engagement as well as border security measures with and/or without Afghanistan. Army chief Gen. Qamar Bajwa's visit to Kabul in October 2017 resulted in an agreement on a comprehensive bilateral engagement plan, called the 'Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Solidarity' envisioning "bilateral engagement in political, economic, military and intelligence domains through working groups".

On the other hand, Pakistan has started fencing the border with Afghanistan. According to media reports, 150 kilometers of the Pak-Afghan frontier had already been fenced, against a yearly target of 120 kilometers. The report also said that the work on fencing more than 800 kilometers of the border will be completed in the next two years, while "in the first phase, 432 kilometers of the border would be fenced at the most critical and crossable places." ⁷

These efforts will reduce stress on border security, but it will not eliminate the threat completely. There is a need to speed up the process with Afghanistan to develop comprehensive bilateral border security cooperation framework and efforts to eradicate the networks of terrorism on borders.

iv. The return of Pakistani fighters

The fall of Daesh in Iraq and Syria has raised concerns across the world about possible return of the foreign fighters to their native countries. Pakistan was among the countries, from where hundreds of militants had travelled to Iraq and Syria. Though official figures of these fighters are not available but the National Assembly Standing Committee on Interior was told last year that the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) has begun the process of compiling data on Pakistan-based individuals suspected to be involved with terrorist organizations abroad.⁸ The purpose of the exercise was to prevent or reduce the blowback on Pakistan once these suspected fighters returned to the country after the so-called Islamic State began losing ground in Iraq and Syria. However, there is little known about the government plans to deal with the returnee fighters. Security experts believe these returnees can pose short- to medium-term threat to internal security of the country.

v. The madrassa challenge

In 2017, the federal government came up with varying responses but one of the important developments was the finalization of the madrassa registration form, which NACTA and Interior Ministry undertook in consultation of Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaaris Pakistan; it has been sent to provinces for implementation.⁹ However, this initiative would not be enough to deal with the complex madrassa challenge. The government has assigned the task of madrassa reforms to the federal interior ministry, even though after the 18th Amendment, education has become a provincial subject. Yet another challenge is that provinces have either not come up with relevant legislation pertaining to education or have ignored madrassas in such legislations. It is for the provinces to take up the responsibility such as by evolving strategies for maintaining a database on madrassas, mainstreaming them and introducing curriculum reforms, etc.

vi. Extremism on campuses

In 2017, concerns about growing extremism on campuses increased in the backdrop of emergence of a new militant group Ansarul Shariah Pakistan, which comprised educated youth. The media hype around the issue gave the impression that universities have become a breeding ground for violent extremism. This was a

simplistic interpretation of a complex phenomenon. To counter the extremism on campuses, a suggestion was floated to control campuses through security institutions was launched. This certainly was a bad idea. It was an indication not only of the lack of empirical wisdom among those dealing with violent extremism — our most critical challenge — but also their approach to academic institutions.¹⁰ There is a need to evolve delicate response to reduce the influence of the extremist groups on campuses without compromising on academic freedoms, and universities should encourage the culture of accommodation and critical thinking.

vii. Sectarian divide

In 2017, a downward trend was recorded in sectarian violence in Pakistan for fourth year in a row. This is a positive development. The number of sectarian-related terrorist attacks fell by 41 percent, from 58 in 2015 to 34 in 2016, and plummeted 44 percent further in 2017. As also mentioned in previous year's security review, the fluctuations in sectarian violence are an old phenomenon in Pakistan. The sectarian violence will remain a threat so long as (i) sectarian terrorist groups remain active in Pakistan, (ii) external moral, political and financial support to sectarian groups in Pakistan and (iii) the discourse of hatred in the country remains sectarian including through sectarian streams of madrassas.

Especially, in the presence of Daesh in the region the threat of sectarian violence cannot be under estimated.

1.2.2 Critical policy initiatives

The following policy initiatives need attention of the government, as these are prerequisite for improving internal security environment alongside the implementation on the NAP.

i. FATA reforms

2017 was marked as the year to mainstream FATA, but it remained a dream and government delayed the process further. Though speculations were rife about possible merger of FATA with KP, the status was kept in limbo, after ruling parties' allies called for exploring other options. Meanwhile, in December, it emerged that the Prime Minister might have administrative reforms in FATA such as scrapping the existing Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR); a report even claimed that the National Implementation Committee (NIC) on FATA Reforms has endorsed the merger of FATA with KP and has also agreed to let FATA elect 23 members to the KP Assembly in the 2018 general elections. Yet, another report revealed that the federal government has converted the NIC on FATA Reforms into a cabinet body. The details of any such approval, however, did not come from the government.

ii. Strengthening Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) of police

The provincial CTDs of police are performing well, both in terms of launching anti-militant operations and gathering information. The CTDs of Sindh and Punjab police especially have done a commendable job in that regard. If the federal and provincial governments introduce little accountability and transparency reforms and improve their capacity, these departments can perform even better. So far, these CTDs have been operating on traditional police lines, meaning they also inherit all the institutional ills of the police.

iii. Joint Intelligence Directorate

According to the NACTA Act, data collection, information processing and its dissemination to the relevant authorities are its primary tasks. The same clause elaborates its key function of coordination among security agencies. Apparently, NACTA has established a Joint Intelligence Directorate, but it has not been activated yet. NACTA National Coordinator, Ihsan Ghani is hopeful that JID will be functional before June in 2018 as resources have been allocated for the body and staff recruitment will start in the beginning of the year.¹¹ The idea of JID is as old as the history of countering terrorism in Pakistan, but it has not materialized yet, because premier intelligence agencies hesitate to

operate under civilian supervision. Initially, a JID under the supervision of the Prime Minister's Secretariat was proposed, which appeared a workable idea. If the JID does not become functional in 2018, Prime Minister should take notice of it and separate it from NACTA and put JID under the parliamentary supervision.

iv. Reforming police

There is no denying the fact that police needs to be equipped with new technologies and resources, but utilizing the available resources also needs to be assessed. Likewise, the operational build-up of the police, its technical support, and capacity building are also areas needing attention. Their training programs should focus on technology-led policing, along with management, intelligence gathering, mobility and connectivity. The NAP should prioritize the de-politicization of police, so as to shape it into a professional force. Jail security and reforms should be part of the NAP. These are critical today, given that some terrorist groups have infiltrated in the ranks of police and jails officials.

v. De-Weaponization in the country and peace committees

Putting an end to the easily available heavy weapons is a major challenge for the security forces in their counter-militancy drive. Criminals in Karachi, sectarian terrorist groups and nationalist insurgents in Balochistan appear to have recently

adopted targeted killings as the foremost instrument of terrorism; easy access to lethal weapons has made their task easier. KP police asked peace committees (Aman Lashkars) to hand back arms because many members of these groups were using their position and arms to settle scores of personal enmity.¹² These committees were created to fight against the local militants. The peace committees have become so powerful in some areas that they start challenging the state writ while imposing Taliban style curbs, as it was reported from Wana in 2017.¹³

vi. Securing cyber spaces

Militant groups use cyberspaces for propagating their messages, recruiting new adherents, and generating funds, thereby making the virtual world a vulnerable place for the youth. This is the area, which needs effective responses both by the state and society. Daesh was using Russian messenger app Telegram to communicate.¹⁴ A media report revealed how banned militant outfits misuse social media spaces; 41 banned organizations had their Facebook pages.¹⁵

1.2.3 Critical areas

i. Balochistan

The security situation in Balochistan remained critical in 2017; not only Baloch nationalist insurgents but also sectarian and religiously-motivated groups remained

active in the province. Out of the 24 suicide attacks in 2017, as many as 10 took place in Balochistan. The highest number of incidents of sectarian violence for any one region of Pakistan was also recorded in Balochistan. Changing dynamics of unrest and insecurity in Balochistan indicate the province faces a much larger threat from brands of Islamist militants than from Baloch insurgents. The latter usually launch low-intensity attacks but groups like Daesh, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and its global arm LeJ Al-Alami, Jamaatul Ahrar and TTP have been carrying out major attacks in the province. In 2017, though, Baloch insurgents also launched some major targeted attacks against security forces, thus indicating the threat the security of Balochistan faced.

ii. FATA

FATA was the second-most terrorism-affected region, after Balochistan, both in terms of the number of terrorist attacks and consequent casualties in 2017. Though these attacks were reported from across all 7 agencies of FATA, most of the terrorism-related casualties, however, resulted from some major attacks that took place in Kurram Agency, including sectarian-related. Jamaatul Ahrar, TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and its global arm LeJ-Al-Alami mostly perpetrated these attacks.

1.3 Recommendations

– *National security policy*

The government has started consultations on National Security Policy under supervision of National Security Advisor to Prime Minister, Gen (retd) Nasir Khan Janjua and NACTA has been given the task to incorporate his recommendation regarding internal security challenges.¹⁶ Apart from the regional and national security and strategic challenges, there is need to envision the geo-economic, human security and non-traditional security challenges in the policy.

– *NAP implementation*

As mentioned earlier, there is a need to review the National Action Plan and to divide it into two components entailing counterterrorism and counter-extremism initiatives. However, it is also important to remove all the ambiguities regarding its implementation mechanism and appoint Federal Interior Minister as focal in-charge of the plan under parliamentary oversight.

– *Reintegration of militant groups and individuals*

The reintegration of the militants is a critical issue and needs to be dealt very carefully. In 2017, a group of security experts¹⁷ suggested a comprehensive framework for this purpose, and recommended that Parliament should constitute a high-

powered national-level truth and reconciliation commission, to review the policies that produced militancy and to mainstream those willing to shun violence.

Government can establish a commission to review the criteria of banned outfits and such commission may include parliamentarians, social scientists, and other experts. NACTA can serve as secretariat of this platform. Outfits once banned should be monitored under a framework by a body within NACTA.

– ***Deradicalization and rehabilitation of the detainees***

The policy group¹⁸ on reintegration of militant groups also recommended an institutionalized de-radicalization exercise and expansion of deradicalization centers in prisons across the country. Currently such centers are operating under the military in Swat and FATA but policy group recommended that the key authority to look after the centers should be with civilian law-enforcement agencies, preferably police. Professionals and moderate scholars should be engaged in the rehabilitation centers. Prison Departments, Police and its Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) can jointly launch de-radicalization programs for the terrorist detainees.

– ***Comprehensive databases***

There is a need for developing a **National**

Databank (NDB) synchronized with the police departments of the country, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), NACTA, FIA and State Bank of Pakistan. The Databank should have following features:

- A synchronized **National Red Book**, containing updated information about the wanted, suspected and arrested terrorists and their groups.
- The national databank could be divided into two categories, one for public consumption, which would include details about terrorists and their activities; and second, dedicated for the police and law enforcement agencies, containing details of bank accounts, financial transactions data, property and other assets of the suspected and active terrorists whose names had been placed under the Fourth Schedule.
- A **common website** can be developed under the supervision of NACTA and all police and relevant authorities could be bound to provide updates/information on weekly or monthly basis.
- There is a need that all provinces have their forensic labs¹⁹ linked with **National Forensic Laboratory** (NFL) in Islamabad.
- Capacitybuilding training programs for the Counter Terrorism Departments needed to be developed, and they must know the best practices around the world to avoid any mishandling of the sensitive issues.

– ***Legal framework***

- PIPS would also like to highlight the following recommendations for **better legal practices**, which still await proper attention of the relevant authorities:
- According to media reports, a NACTA body on Criminal Justice System has compiled its recommendations and sent to the Interior Ministry²⁰, but the fate of this report is not known yet. However, oversight of the criminal justice system by parliament and provincial assemblies should be increased; closer networking is needed among the subsystems of the criminal justice system.
 - The existing anti-terror laws should be reviewed after every three years.
 - Practitioners should be trained in conflict resolution and management so that these techniques can be employed before resorting to the use of force.
 - The **anti-terrorism courts** need to be strengthened, through working on infrastructure uplifting and capacity building.
 - Scrutiny of security officials: Nearly four months after the mysterious disappearance of a police commando from the capital, police have suggested that he may have been radicalised after they found extremist literature, including a book on the life of Osama Bin Laden from his room. Constable Ali Ahmed, who was part of the anti-terrorist squad (ATS) of the capital police and was living at the barracks at Police Lines, has been missing since the night of September 22.²¹

CHAPTER 2

Security landscape of Pakistan in 2017

Safdar Sial⁴

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⁴ Safdar Hussain, nom de plume Safdar Sial, is Joint Director at PIPS and Associate Editor of Conflict and Peace Studies journal. He has also co-authored "Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA" and "Radicalization in Pakistan".

2.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA

The ***Federally-Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)*** was the second-most terrorism-affected region, after Balochistan, both in terms of the number of terrorist attacks and consequent casualties. As many as 83 reported attacks from FATA claimed 253 lives – including 192 civilians, 57 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies and 4 militants – and wounded 491 others.

Though these attacks were reported from across all 7 agencies of FATA, most of the terrorism-related casualties (154 dead; 341 injured), however, resulted from some major attacks that took place in ***Kurram Agency***, including sectarian-related; Jamaatul Ahrar, TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and its global arm LeJ-Al-Alami mostly perpetrated these attacks.

Though a drop of 16 percent was recorded in terrorist attacks in FATA, as compared to previous year, the number of people killed in these attacks surged by 55 percent, and those of injured by 122 percent.

Militants employed diverse attack tactics to hit their targets in FATA, including 3 suicide bombings, 63 IEDs blasts, 12 incidents of firing, 2 mortar shell attacks and one missile fire.

As cited earlier, most terrorism-related casualties in FATA in 2017 concentrated in Kurram Agency (154 dead; 341 injured), where militants of the TTP, Jamaatul

Ahrar, LeJ, LeJ-Alami, and some unknown militants carried out 11 attacks. However, the highest number of terrorist attacks from within FATA was reported from Khyber Agency, where TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam and Jamaatul Ahrar launched 24 attacks claiming 24 lives and inflicting injuries on 19 others. The TTP conducted a total of 17 attacks in north and South Waziristan agencies, which killed in all 43 people and wounded 39 people. Mainly Jamaatul Ahrar as well as some other unknown militants perpetrated 13 attacks in Mohmand Agency, killing 15 tribesmen and wounding 20 others. The TTP and a local Taliban group were reportedly involved in 5 terrorist attacks reported from Orakzai Agency that killed 4 people and injured 17 others. (See Table 2)

Table 1: Terrorist attacks in FATA in 2017

Agency	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Bajaur Agency	13	13	55
Khyber Agency	24	24	19
Kurram Agency	11	154	341
Mohmand Agency	13	15	20
North Waziristan Agency	8	20	23
Orakzai Agency	5	4	17
South Waziristan Agency	9	23	16
Total	83	253	491

Apart from 83 terrorist attacks cited earlier, 18 operational strikes by the security forces and 4 armed clashes/encounters between security forces and militants were also recorded in FATA during the year. Furthermore, 27 cross-border attacks took place in parts of FATA from Afghanistan, mostly by Pakistani Taliban militants sheltered there. Nine US-led drone strikes also hit FATA. One inter-tribal clash and one incident of mob violence also took place in FATA during the year. On the whole, 143 incidents of violence of various types killed 537 people – 195 civilians, 80 security personnel, and 262 militants – and wounded 575 others in FATA.

In ***Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)***, as many as 71 terrorist attacks were recorded in 2017, marking a decrease of 44 percent from previous year. In all, 91 people lost their lives – 42 civilians, 32 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, as well as 17 militants – and 211 others were wounded in these attacks.

Out of these 71 attacks, as many as 3 were sectarian-related, all reported from DI Khan, which killed 5 people including 4 members of Shia community and one Sunni religious-political leader. The remaining 68 attacks were carried out by militants belonging to the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, local Taliban groups, Jamaatul Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami, and Khyber-Agency-based Lashkar-e-Islam etc.

These attacks killed 86 people and wounded 211 others.

Besides 7 suicide bombings, militants used firing in carrying out 36 attacks in KP, IEDs of various types in 19 attacks, hand grenades in 8 attacks and rockets in one attack. The fact that the militants employed more shootouts or targeted killings in KP, compared to more use of IEDs in FATA as cited earlier, also indicates that enhanced search and surveillance operations in the province diminished militants' logistical capacities, which in turn also resulted in a considerable decrease in terrorist violence there.

On the whole, it appeared as if the militants' destructive edge or capacity to launch high-casualty attacks in KP and FATA was constrained as most of the 10 suicide blasts reported from these two regions in 2017 were either of low intensity or missed the targets, thus, in all, causing 37 deaths, or less than 4 deaths at an average in one suicide attack. However, Kurram Agency was the only exception where militants were able to hit hard, mostly through planted explosives or IEDs.

Some relatively intense and high-scale terrorist attacks reported from the province in 2017 included a coordinated gun attack on the tehsil courts and secretariat in Charsadda; attack on the convoy of FC Major Jamal Sheran in Peshawar; and attack on the hostel of Peshawar's Agricultural Training Institute.

As in 2016, another significant feature of militancy in KP in 2017 was linked to targeted attacks on policemen.

Terrorist attacks were reported from 16 districts of KP in 2017. However, as many as 24, or about 34 percent of them took place in the provincial capital Peshawar alone. The second-most affected district was DI Khan, where 10 terrorist attacks happened in 2017. Furthermore, 7 terrorist attacks took place in Charsadda, 6 in Bannu, and 4 attacks each in Kohat and Lower Dir districts. In terms of casualties in terrorist attacks, Peshawar was affected the most (33 dead; 105 injured), followed by Charsadda (16 dead; 40 injured) and DI Khan (15 dead; 23 injured). (See Table 2)

Table 2: Terrorist attacks in KP in 2017

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Bannu	6	4	8
Buner	1	2	1
Charsadda	7	16	40
D.I Khan	10	15	23
Hangu	2	0	2
Haripur	1	1	0
Karak	1	0	3
Kohat	4	5	3
Lakki Marwat	1	1	1
Lower Dir	4	3	4
Malakand	1	0	0
Peshawar	24	33	105
Swabi	3	2	0

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Swat	1	0	5
Tank	3	1	8
Upper Dir	2	8	8
Total	71	91	211

In addition to 71 terrorist attacks, KP also witnessed 8 anti-militant operational strikes by security forces, 9 armed clashes/encounters between security/law enforcement personnel and militants, one inter-militant clash, and 2 incidents of mob violence including the one in which a student Mashal Khan was beaten to death by his university fellows in Mardan on accusation of blasphemy. On the whole, 91 incidents of violence of different types took place in the KP province which claimed the lives of 140 people – 43 civilians, 36 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, and 61 militants – and wounded 227 others.

When counted together, as many as 154 terrorist attacks took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA in 2017 – compared to 226 in 2016 – which killed 344 people and wounded 702 others. The militants mainly targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel (75 attacks), civilians (32 attacks), and pro-government tribesmen or members of peace committees (12 attacks) in KP and FATA. These and other sporadic targets hit by the terrorists in the two regions are described as following.

2. 1.1 Attacks on security forces/law enforcement agencies

As cited earlier, 75 terrorist attacks in KP and FATA – or over 48 percent of the total attacks reported from the two regions – hit security and law enforcement agencies. These attacks claimed 97 lives – 30 policemen, 21 army officials, 20 FC troops, 7 Levies, 2 unspecified paramilitaries, 6 civilians as well as 11 militants – and wounded 150 others including 117 security personnel.

Militants of the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, Khyber Agency-based Lashkar-e-Islam, local Taliban groups in parts of KP and FATA, as well as Lashkar-e-Jhangi Al-Alami were mainly involved in attacks on security forces and law enforcers.

As many as 33 of these attacks concentrated in KP – more than half being incidents of targeted killing of policemen – and the remaining 42 took place in FATA.

Security personnel faced highest number of attacks in Peshawar and adjacent Khyber Agency of FATA (a combined 24 attacks), followed by Mohmand Agency (7), South Waziristan (6), Kurram Agency (5), DI Khan (7), North Waziristan (5 attacks) and Bajaur (4 attacks). Such sporadic attacks were also recorded in Bannu, Charsadda, Kohat, Lower Dir, Malakand, Orakzai Agency, Swabi, Tank and Upper Dir.

Some of the main and high-profile attacks against security forces and law enforcers in KP and FATA in 2017 are narrated below in a chronological order of happening.

- February 16: In DI Khan, militants opened fire at a police van near Mission Morr (Turn), killing five people including 4 police officials including assistant sub-inspector Rehmatullah, constable Rashid.²²
- May 20: In Kohat district of KP, militants ambushed a police vehicle in the War Shand area killing 4 policemen. Jamaatul Ahrar claimed the attack, which police suspected saying a local TTP-linked group could be involved.²³
- June 15: A mobile van of police was on a routine patrol in Chamkani (Peshawar) when two militants riding a motorcycle opened fire on it. Three policemen were killed and one injured; one attacker was also killed when the injured policeman returned fire.²⁴
- July 1: Security forces were patrolling the Dars Jumaat locality in Khyber Agency when militants detonated an IED planted near a temporary helipad by remote control. Four people, including a soldier, were killed while another soldier received injuries.²⁵ Lashkar-e-Islam is active in the Dars Jumaat.
- July 10: An FC vehicle was targeted with a remote controlled IED blast

- when soldiers were bringing water from a nearby spring in Lower Kurram Agency. As a result, two FC men were killed and another succumbed to his injuries in hospital. A second attack occurred when FC troops rushed to the site of blast, injuring 4 more.²⁶
- July 17: The FC personnel were on routine patrolling in Hayatabad area of Peshawar when a suicide bomber hit his motorcycle with their vehicle. FC Major Jamal Sheran was killed in the blast. In all, 2 FC officials were killed, and 9 others were injured including 3 FC men and 2 women. Reportedly, 12kg explosives were used in the blast, claimed by the TTP.²⁷
 - August 9: Security personnel raided a house in Upper Dir on August 9, on a tip-off. The militants inside opened fire and one of them wearing a suicide jacket blew himself, resulting in the death of Major Ali Salman, Hawaldar Ghulam Nazir, Hawaldar Akhtar and Levies soldier Abdul Karim. Four other security personnel were injured. A militant was killed and another arrested during an exchange of fire.²⁸
 - September 17: Political Tehsildar Fawad Ali and officials of Levies Force were returning after defusing a bomb when their vehicle was targeted with a roadside remote-controlled IED blast. As a result, Fawad Ali, who got married 4 months ago, and 5 Levies lost their lives. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed the attack.²⁹
 - October: Five attacks happened in parts of FATA targeting security personnel and killing, in all, 6 army soldiers and 4 FC men. Two of these attacks happened in North Waziristan, and one each in Kurram, South Waziristan, and Bajaur agencies.
 - November 24: In a high-profile targeted attack, the second-in-command in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police, Additional Inspector General (AIG) Muhammad Ashraf Noor, was targeted by a suicide bomber who rammed his explosives-laden motorcycle into police vehicle near Zarghoni Masjid in Hayatabad area of Peshawar. The AIG died and 6 police personnel suffered injuries in the blast. Khyber Agency-based Lashkar-e-Islam militant group, a TTP-ally, claimed the attack.³⁰

2.1.2 Attacks on pro-government tribesmen and tribal elders

Compared to 26 such attacks in the year before, as many as 12 terrorist attacks in KP and FATA in 2017 targeted members of peace committees and anti-militant *lashkars* – also known as pro-government tribesmen or elders. These attacks claimed 23 lives and injured 16 others.

Most of these attacks (10) happened in FATA – 4 in Khyber, 3 in Mohmand, 2 in Bajaur and one in South Waziristan Agency – and two in KP; one each in Hangu and Peshawar. While Jamaatul

Ahrar launched the recorded attacks on tribal pro-government tribesmen in Mohmand and Bajaur agencies, Lashkar-e-Islam and TTP were involved in targeting them in Khyber Agency. The latter was also behind the only such attack recorded in South Waziristan. Local Taliban groups targeted members of peace committees in Hangu and Peshawar.

As many as 11 tribesmen were killed in Khyber Agency alone, in 4 such attacks reported from there, as cited earlier. On February 7, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militants ambushed a vehicle of Zakhakhel Aman [Peace] Committee members during routine patrol in Brag locality in Zakhakhel. Three peace committee members identified as Qadir Khan Afridi, Badar Nawab Afridi and Hukamran Khan Afridi were killed on the spot.³¹ On May 22, LI militants hit a vehicle carrying members of a local peace committee in Akakhel area killing 5 persons including the head of the peace committee Zar Wali Khan and a Levies official Abdul Manan. The vehicle was hit by a roadside remote controlled IED blast and was completely destroyed.³² A week later, on May 29, a roadside bomb blast targeted members of Zakhakhel peace lashkar killing one and wounding two others.³³ Next day, a vehicle of members of Tauheedul Islam peace lashkar was targeted with a roadside bomb blast in Nari Baba area of Tirah Valley. Two pro-government peace volunteers

died at the spot while another 2 were injured.³⁴

Three people were killed in Mohmand Agency in the attacks on pro-government tribal elders. On September 1, a local peace committee head Rehman along with four others was on his way home after offering Eid prayers (in Mohmand, Eid was celebrated one day earlier than in rest of Pakistan) in the Shati Meena area of Ambar when an IED went off. Faqeer Hussain, his father Shad Ali and son Maaz died on the spot. Rehman and Kaach Haji were wounded. Jamaatul Ahrar claimed the attack.³⁵ In another related attack reported from the agency, on December 2, the vehicle of a pro-government tribal elder Malik Amir Rehman was damaged in an IED blast in the Olai Shah area of Amber tehsil. Mr Rehman was not in the car at the time of the incident that did not cause any casualty.³⁶

In a lethal attack on tribal elders in South Waziristan Agency, on November 30, head of a peace committee Wali Jan Mehsud and 4 others were killed and two injured in a bomb blast reported from Spinkai area of the agency. The blast targeted the victims' vehicle completely destroying it. The Mehsud faction of the TTP, also known as Khan Said Sajna group claimed the attack.³⁷ The three reported such attacks in Bajaur did not cause any death but injured one tribal elder Malik Abdul Rauf and one Levies official.

In Peshawar, members of a government-supported peace Lashkar were targeted on May 29. Reportedly, four people including head of the Adezai Aman Lashkar Haji Irshad were killed when some unknown militants opened fire on their vehicle in Koh Daman area in the limits of Mattani police station.³⁸ In Hangu, militants shot injured a member of local dispute resolution council Zaheer Hussain.³⁹

2.1.3 Attacks on civilians

On the whole, 32 terrorist attacks in KP and FATA in 2017 apparently targeted civilians claiming 130 lives – compared to 40 fatalities in attacks on civilians in KP and FATA in 2016 – and inflicting injuries on another 357 people. Thirteen (13) of these attacks took place in FATA and 19 others in KP. These attacks spread over a total of 16 districts/agencies of KP and FATA.

The TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Islam, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami and local Taliban groups were reportedly involved in these attacks hitting civilians.

On January 21, at least 25 people were killed and 49 were wounded, 11 critically, in a blast at the Sabzi Mandi (vegetable market) in Kurram Agency's Parachinar area. The blast was caused by an IED hidden in a vegetable box. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami claimed that it, along with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter Shehryar Mehsud group carried out the

attack. On January 24 it was reported in daily *The News* that the death toll rose to 26 as one of the injured died at a hospital.⁴⁰

Two lethal bomb blasts took place in Turi market in Parachinar, on June 23, with an interval of about 15 minutes, initially killing about 67 people and wounding over 200. (Five more people among those injured died on June 25 in hospital. Daily *Dunya* reported on June 29 that death toll had reached 75). The first blast happened when people were busy in shopping, minutes after an Al Quds Day demonstration in support of Palestinian Muslims ended. The second blast took place when people gathered there to rescue the victims.⁴¹

A related attack in South Waziristan Agency also caused considerable casualties. Reportedly, 7 children aged between 6 to 12 years, all boys, were killed when a toy bomb they were playing with exploded; two others were wounded critically. The incident took place on June 25 in Speenmark village of the agency bordering on Afghanistan.⁴² In a related attack reported from North Waziristan Agency, on December 5, six people were killed and eight others wounded in a roadside bomb blast near Mirali. An explosive device was planted in a motorcycle which was parked in a market and exploded when a passenger van was passing by it.⁴³

2.1.4 Sectarian-related attacks

Having larger concentrations of Shia Muslims, the Kurram Agency also faced some major sectarian attacks in 2017, thus not only increasing the risk of insecurity but also heightening sectarian tensions. While the agency borders Afghanistan, it also has the background of sectarian violence. Three such attacks were also reported from DI Khan district of KP. In all, 6 sectarian-related attacks claimed 50 lives and wounded 79 others in KP and FATA. (Detail on these attacks can be seen in *Section 2.8 on Sectarian Violence*)

2.1.5 Attacks on govt. officials and offices/institutions

At least 6 attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA hit government functionaries and offices/institutions during 2017, killing 18 and wounding 45 people. Most of these casualties resulted from 2 attacks, one at the Mohmand Agency headquarters, and second on the hostel of Peshawar's Agricultural Training Institute in Peshawar. The latter was also the most lethal among all these 6 attacks.

At least 3 TTP terrorists dressed in burqas, fully armed and wearing suicide vests, stormed the hostel of Peshawar's Agricultural Training Institute on December 1. Nine people were killed, including 6 students, and 37 injured in the fighting before the security forces neutralized the terrorists.⁴⁴ In Mohmand

Agency, on February 15, five people including three Khassadar personnel were killed and three others were injured in a suicide attack at the agency headquarters. According to the ISPR, two suicide bombers riding a motor bike attacked the office of Political Agent, one of them blew himself at the entrance while the other was shot dead by the guards posted there.⁴⁵

One such attack was reported from Charsadda where a police constable Taj Muhammad was injured when a census team came under attack in the Sehray Harichand area. The attacker Fakhre Alam was killed in retaliatory fire; Alam was previously also found involved in attacks on polio vaccination teams.⁴⁶ Separately, an official of the Kurram Agency political administration Sarfraz Hussain and his guard were killed when their vehicle came under targeted fire. The banned sectarian organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility for the attack.⁴⁷ One similar attack each was recorded in Peshawar and Khyber Agency, which in all wounded 4 people.

2.1.6 Attacks on judges/ lawyers/ courts

A total of three attacks including two suicide blasts, targeted judges, courts and lawyers in Peshawar and Charsadda districts of KP. The TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar were involved.

On February 15, at least one person was killed and 18 others including five civil judges sustained injuries in a suicide attack in Hayatabad area of provincial capital Peshawar. The suicide bomber on motorcycle apparently targeted the van of judges near Hayatabad Medical Complex, where PTI leader Imran Khan was also expected to attend inauguration ceremony of the Out Patient Department (OPD).⁴⁸ Later, on February 21, three suicide bombers, sent by Jamaatul Ahrar, came through the fields and attempted to enter the tehsil courts and secretariat in the Tangi area of Charsadda. When policemen at the gate stopped them, the attackers opened fire and hurled grenades and an encounter ensued that continued for about 20 minutes. One bomber blew himself, while two others were shot dead by police. Seven civilians were also killed and 22 others injured.⁴⁹

Again in Charsadda, on March 4, a senior lawyer, Mohammad Jan Gigyani, also a leader of the Qaumi Watan Party, was killed and his nephew Advocate Raham Shah suffered injuries in an attack on their vehicle by armed men near Shabqadar. The Jamaatul Ahrar claimed the attack.⁵⁰

2.1.7 Attacks on educational institutions

Five reported attacks on educational institutions in parts of KP and FATA killed one person and injured 9 others. Three of these attacks took place in FATA – 2 in

Khyber Agency and one North Waziristan Agency – and one attack each happened in Peshawar and Swat districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Lashkar-e-Islam, TTP, and local Taliban were behind these attacks.

The attacks in Khyber Agency and Peshawar only partially damaged the buildings of targeted schools – including a girls' school – without causing any casualty.

In Swat, children of a private school in Shamzai were playing outside their school during break time when a bomb hidden in sand exploded injuring 5 of them. Those injured aged between 6 and 8 years.⁵¹ In North Waziristan, militants planted an IED near a private school in Danday Darpa Khel area and detonated it with remote control. One person died and 4 others were injured in the blast.⁵²

2.2 Balochistan

Just as in past three years, the highest number of terrorist attacks for any one region of Pakistan was reported from Balochistan (165 attacks, or 44 percent of total attacks in Pakistan). These attacks, which also included 10 suicide bombings, killed at least 288 people – 35 percent of the total number of people killed across Pakistan in acts of terrorism in 2017 – and injured 532 others. Those killed included 193 civilian, 26 FC men, 36 policemen, 14

army soldiers, 8 Levies, as well as 11 militants.

Compared to 2016, the reported 165 attacks in Balochistan in 2017 marked a 9 percent increase; however, the number of people killed and injured in these attacks plummeted by 30 percent and 24 percent, respectively.

A bulk of casualties in terrorist violence in Balochistan (133 dead; 282 injured) resulted from 27 terrorist attacks carried out by Islamist militants including the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, ISIS affiliates/supporters as well as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami. Some major among these attacks were suicide blasts that targeted convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri in Mastung, shrine of Pir Rakhyal Shah in the Fatehpur area of Jhal Magsi district, as well as suicide bombings in Quetta including near Inspector General Police (IGP) office, an on-duty army truck, an FC convoy, Rapid Response Force of Balochistan Police, and the Bethel Memorial Methodist Church.

Different Baloch insurgent groups, including the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and Lashkar-e-Balochistan, perpetrated 131 attacks in Balochistan's 20 districts claiming 138 lives and wounding 239 other people. Unlike largely low-scale attacks in past years, Baloch insurgents carried out some relatively more intense attacks in the

year 2017, mainly against security forces, which will be described later at Section 2.2.2.

Seven sectarian-related attacks, mainly targeting Hazara Shias, caused death to 17 people and injuries to another 11 persons.

As in the past year, the provincial capital Quetta faced the highest number of terrorist attacks in 2017 (35 attacks), killing 90 people and wounding another 209. As many as 23 attacks were reported from Kech, 16 from Dera Bugti, 13 from Gwadar, 12 from Panjgur, 9 from Nasirabad, and 8 attacks from Mastung. A single attack in Jhal Magsi claimed 22 lives and 2 attacks in Harnai caused 10 deaths. (*See Table 3*)

Table 3: Terrorist attacks in Balochistan in 2017

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Awaran	4	5	9
Bolan	7	2	10
Chagai	2	4	3
Dera Bugti	16	13	19
Gwadar	13	16	49
Harnai	2	10	0
Jhal Magsi	1	22	31
Kalat	3	2	3
Kech	23	38	38
Kharan	3	6	2
Khuzdar	6	2	11
Kohlu	7	6	9
Lasbela	2	1	2
Mastung	8	35	60
Nasirabad	9	6	13
Nushki	2	0	1

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Panjgur	12	15	22
Pishin	1	1	0
Qilla Abdullah	5	7	36
Quetta	35	90	209
Sibi	3	3	5
Zhob	1	4	0
Total	165	288	532

In all, 430 people lost their lives and 624 others sustained injuries in a total of 237 incidents of violence of different types reported from Balochistan in 2017. These overall violent incidents included 165 terrorist attacks cited earlier, 39 anti-militant operational attacks by security forces, 13 armed clashes and encounters between security forces and militants, 13 cross-border attacks in areas bordering Iran and Afghanistan, 5 inter-tribal clashes, and 2 incidents of mob violence.

Apart from that, a total of 29 dead bodies were also recovered from different areas of the province during the year; identities of most bodies and their killers were unknown.

Also, security forces, either independently or in collaboration with bomb disposal squad, foiled 17 terror bids in Balochistan in 2017.

2.2.1 Attacks by religiously-inspired militants

Out of 27 terrorist attacks perpetrated by the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar and other groups with similar objectives such as ISIS

affiliates and LeJ-A, as many as 15 concentrated in Quetta, which killed 67 people. Four attacks by these so-called religiously-inspired militants were recorded in Qilla Abdullah and 2 in Mastung. One such attack each took place in Chagai, Harnai, Jhal Magsi, Khuzdar, Panjgur, and Zhob.

As many as 14 of these attacks targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies, 6 hit civilians, 2 targeted members of Christian community, 2 hit political leaders, and one attack each targeted a school, and Chinese nationals. Some major attacks of this type are narrated below:

- May 12: A suicide blast targeting convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri killed 26 and injured 40 people in Mastung. Maulana Haideri was injured in the attack. The militant group ISIS claimed the responsibility; however experts believed a faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi close to ISIS could be involved. Those killed also included Maulana Hafiz Qudratullah, deputy emir of Quetta district chapter of the JUI-F and Iftikhar Mughal, director staff of the Senate.⁵³
- June 9: In response to an attack targeting Chinese nationals in the province, China and Pakistan said they were investigating ISIS claim to have killed two Chinese teachers in Mastung

- who were kidnapped on May 24 in Quetta. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said initial official information hinted at the killings. A spokesman for the Balochistan government also confirmed the deaths.⁵⁴
- June 23: Police officials stopped a suspicious vehicle at a checkpoint near Inspector General Police (IGP) office in Quetta. The suicide bomber in the explosive-laden vehicle exploded himself and the explosives killing 14 people including 7 policemen and a leader of a JUI Nazriati faction; 21 others were injured. Jamaatul Ahrar and ISIS separately claimed the responsibility of the attack.⁵⁵
 - July 13: Masked militants on motorcycles opened fire on a police vehicle in Quetta killing Superintendent Police Mubarak Ali Shah and his 3 police guards; the driver was seriously wounded. Asad Mansur, a spokesman of Jamaatul Ahrar, claimed the attack on social media.⁵⁶
 - August 12: At least 15 people lost their lives, including 8 army personnel, and 25 others were injured, when a suicide bomber on a motorcycle blew himself up near an on-duty army truck. The explosion also set several other vehicles on fire.⁵⁷ Reportedly the TTP militants carried out the attack.
 - October 5: A suicide bomber exploded his vest when a policeman stopped him at the entrance to the shrine of Pir Rakhyal Shah in the Fatehpur area of Jhal Magsi district, killing at least 19 people and injuring over 30 others; death toll reached 22 the next day. Police claimed ISIS was behind the attack.⁵⁸
 - October 18: At least 7 members of the Rapid Response Force of Balochistan Police and a passerby were killed and 22 others injured in a suicide blast in the Sariab area of Quetta. The policemen were on a routine patrol when a vehicle laden with explosives hit the truck carrying them. The TTP claimed the attack.⁵⁹
 - November: A series of attacks by militants targeted mainly security forces and law enforcement personnel in November. On November 9, a suicide bomber struck the vehicle of DIG Police Telecommunication Hamid Shakeel Sabir in Quetta killing him and two of his colleagues. The TTP claimed the attack.⁶⁰ On November 15, Acting Superintendent Police (SP) Investigation Mohammad Ilyas was gunned down in the Nawan Killi area of Quetta; his wife, son and six-year-old grandson were also killed in the firing, and a four-year-old granddaughter was injured.⁶¹ On November 25, a suicide bomber targeted an FC convoy in the Sariab

Road area Quetta killing 5 passers-by and wounding 27 others; those traveling in the commandant's vehicle remained safe as it was bombproof, however, 2 FC men in an escort vehicle were injured.⁶²

- December 17: At least 9 members of Christian community were killed and 56 injured in a suicide attack on the Bethel Memorial Methodist Church in Quetta. At least two suicide attackers had struck the church while 400 worshipers were attending the service inside. One of the attackers exploded his vest at the entrance and the other was killed by police.⁶³

2.2.2 Attacks by Baloch insurgents

Seven (7) more than previous year, Baloch insurgent groups carried out 131 terrorist attacks in 20 districts in Balochistan in 2017. These attacks killed 138 people – compared to 163 in 2016 – and injured 239 others.

Baloch insurgents were found relatively more active in Kech, Quetta, Gwadar, Dera Bugti, Nasirabad, and Panjgur districts of the province; they perpetrated a total of 86 attacks in these 6 districts. Others districts from where attacks by Baloch insurgents were reported included Awaran, Bolan, Chagai, Harnai, Kharan, Khuzdar, Kohlu, Lasbela, Mastung, Nushki, Pishin, Qilla Abdullah, and Sibi. The attack tactics employed by the insurgents included 51

incidents of firing or targeted killing, 58 IEDs blasts, 15 grenade attacks, and 7 rocket attacks.

Baloch insurgents targeted security and law-enforcement personnel, their convoys and check-posts in a total of 51 attacks killing as many people and wounding 94 others. Those 51 killed in these attacks included 25 FC troops, 6 army men, 5 police officials, 8 Levies, one civilian and 6 militants. These attacks were reported from 19 districts of Balochistan with 11 from Kech, 8 from Quetta and 5 from Gwadar.

A review of such attacks suggested that the Baloch insurgents intensified attacks on security forces in Balochistan in 2017, mainly the Frontier Corps (FC). They were quick in claiming the attacks as well. If sustained in next months and years, it would be a significant development as in the recent past Baloch insurgents had been usually carrying out low-intensity and low-profile attacks. Some of the relatively more intense attacks by insurgents against security forces in the year 2017 are listed below:

- April 23: Militants ambushed an FC vehicle in Mand area of Turbat. They first opened fire and then exploded an IED close to the vehicle causing death to 5 including 4 FC men; 3 FC soldiers were also injured. The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility for the attack.⁶⁴

- June 19: Four militants riding two motorcycles opened fire on a vehicle carrying Pakistan Navy officials in Jiwani, Gwadar. Three officials were killed and three others injured in the attack. A spokesman for the banned Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack.⁶⁵
- August 14: During August 2017, the BLA and BLF militants launched at least 4 attacks on the FC personnel which claimed the lives of 11 FC officials. In one of these attacks, on August 14, the independence day of Pakistan, a vehicle carrying FC personnel was hit by a powerful bomb when it was passing through Khost, about 16km from Harnai town. Six FC soldiers lost their lives while the driver and a non-commissioned officer of the paramilitary force succumbed to their injuries a day after in hospital. The BLA claimed the responsibility of the attack.⁶⁶
- September 4: BLF insurgents ambushed an FC convoy in the Shangar area of Panjgur district. As a result of heavy firing, three FC personnel, including lieutenant colonel Aamir Waqar, lost their lives while Colonel Shahjeeullah and two other FC soldiers suffered injuries.⁶⁷

attacks claimed 40 lives and wounded 32 others. The targeted laborers and workers belonged to Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Such attacks were recorded in Kech (5 attacks), Gwadar (2 attacks), and one attack each from Bolan, Kharan and Khuzdar. The Baloch insurgent groups BLA and BLF perpetrated all these 9 attacks.

On April 5, four Sindhi laborers were gunned down by BLA militants in Kharan, who were working on construction of a road project of the National Highway Authority.⁶⁸ On May 13, 10 Sindhi laborers were shot dead at different places in Gwadar, including 3 brothers. The banned BLA claimed the responsibility.⁶⁹ In October, two attacks hit non-Baloch workers and settlers in the province, in Gwadar and Khuzdar districts. In November, in two horrible incidents, a total of 20 people were killed, most of them Punjabi, by nationalist insurgents in Kech district. First, on November 15, bullet-riddled bodies of 15 men hailing from Punjab were found in Buleda area of Kech district. The banned Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) headed by Allah Nazar Baloch claimed the killing of the men who were supposedly aspiring to sneak into Iran and then reach Europe illegally.⁷⁰ Just two days after, another five bullet-riddled bodies of non-Baloch people were found in the Tajban area of Turbat tehsil in Kech district.⁷¹

Non-Baloch workers and settlers from other provinces were targeted in 10 attacks, including some lethal ones, in Balochistan during the year 2017. These

Separately, 3 laborers working on a motorway project linked to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) were gunned down by militants in Hoshab area of Kech on May 19. The dead laborers worked for Frontier Works Organization. The banned Baloch Liberation Army claimed it had carried out the killings.⁷²

Civilians were hit in a total of 41 attacks by nationalist insurgents in 12 districts of Balochistan. As many as 35 people lost their lives and 93 were injured in these attacks. Civilians faced highest number of insurgent attacks in Dera Bugti (12 attacks), followed by Nasirabad (8 attacks) and Kohlu (6). Three insurgent attacks each hit civilians in Quetta and Panjgur, and two such attacks each were reported from Awaran and Gwadar. Furthermore, one such attack hit civilians in each of Kech, Khuzdar, Lasbela, Mastung, and Sibi districts. Most of these attacks were incidents of landmine blasts (27) that suggested that though civilians or their vehicles hit those landmines but they may or may not be the intended targets; other attacks employed IED of other types (7 attacks), hand grenades and rocket attacks (3 attacks each), and one targeted killing.

Baloch insurgents also targeted political leaders in the year in a total of 7 attacks in Kech, Gwadar, Panjgur as well as Quetta districts killing in all 4 people and injuring 5 others. The BLF was reportedly involved in most of these attacks with BLA also

behind few of them. Leaders of National Party (NP), and Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) were mainly targeted in these attacks. Those killed in these attacks included a main leader of BNP-M Malik Naveed Dehwar in Quetta, and BNP local leader Nasir Shawani in Quetta, and the chairman of Buleda Municipal Committee and leader of the NP Changez Buledi in Gwadar. Balochistan Minister for Health Rehmat Saleh Baloch and Information Secretary of the NP Jan Buledi survived separate targeted attacks in Panjgur and Kech, respectively.

Sporadic attacks by nationalist insurgents also targeted gas pipelines, power pylons, and railways tracks and trains. Nine such low-intensity attacks injured 6 people in all. These attacks were reported from Nushki, Bolan, Dera Bugti, Gwadar and Kech.

Three attacks by Baloch nationalist insurgents also targeted media and journalists in Kalat, Kech and Awaran. On January 12, a journalist Mohammad Jan Shahbaz Samalani was on his way to a bazaar from his house in Kalat when he was targeted and killed by armed motorcyclists.⁷³ In October, media in Balochistan came under attack from Baloch insurgents twice. The attacks were part of the campaign some separatist militant groups launched against media houses for not publishing their statements in newspapers. On October 26, Baloch insurgents riding a motorbike hurled a

grenade at Pak-News Agency in Turbat town of Kech district, leaving eight people injured, including an on-duty traffic police constable, staff of the newspaper agency, and a child.⁷⁴ Similarly, Baloch insurgents opened fire on a vehicle carrying newspapers in Awaran area, burst all its tyres with gunshots and torched the newspapers.⁷⁵

2.2.3 Sectarian-related attacks

Two more than in the year before, a total of 7 sectarian-related attacks took place in Balochistan in 2017, including 6 in Quetta and one in Mastung. All these attacks targeted Hazara Shia community and were launched by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and its global arm, i.e. LeJ Al-Alami. In all, 17 people were killed and 11 injured in these attacks. Some of these attacks are narrated below:

- July 19: A Hazara Shia family, traveling to Karachi from Quetta in a rented car, was attacked by armed men on motorcycles in the Killi Choto area near Mastung. Four family members including a woman were killed and a man injured in the attack.⁷⁶
- September 10: Four members of the Hazara community, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed and two women injured in Kuchlak near Quetta when militants on a motorcycle opened fire on them when they

stopped near a petrol pump for a brief rest.⁷⁷

- October 9: Militants on a motorcycle opened fire on a van carrying vegetable sellers to the Hazar Ganji area, Quetta, killing in all 5 people including three members of Hazara Shia community, and critically injuring another.⁷⁸

2.3 Sindh

As many 31 attacks took place in Sindh – 24 in Karachi and 7 in interior of Sindh – which killed total of 119 people and injured 293 people. Most of the terrorism-related casualties in Sindh (91 dead; 250 injured) resulted from a single suicide blast reported from Sehwan Sharif, Jamshoro, at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar.

The reported 31 attacks in Sindh in 2017 marked an over 42 percent decrease from such attacks in the province in previous year. However the number of people killed and injured in these attacks increased by 89 percent and 181 percent, respectively, mainly due to Sehwan Sharif blast cited earlier.

Among those killed in these attacks were 99 civilians, 18 policemen, one army official, and one militant; those injured included 284 civilians, 8 policemen and one militant.

The TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), ISIS

affiliates/supporters, and a new group Ansarul Shariah Pakistan carried out 22 attacks in Sindh – all in Karachi with the exception of one in Sehwan Sharif – killing 116 people and wounding 266 others.

Sindhi nationalist insurgents, mainly Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA), Balochistan's BLA, and another hitherto unknown group Sindhu Desh Revolutionary Army, carried out a total of 7 attacks in Sindh – 3 in Karachi, and one attack each in Ghotki, Hyderabad, Shikarpur and Sukkur. These attacks killed 2 and wounded 26 people.

Meanwhile one sectarian-related attack was reported from Karachi that claimed the life of a Shia youth.

Table 4: Terrorist attacks in Sindh

Types of Attacks	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
By nationalist insurgents	7	2	26
By Taliban and similar militants	22	116	266
Sectarian-related attacks	2	1	1
Total	31	119	293

Regional distribution of terrorists attacks in Sindh in the year 2017 is given at Table 5.

Table 5: Regional distribution of terrorist attacks in Sindh

Location	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Ghotki	1	0	2
Hyderabad	1	0	23
Jamshoro (Sehwan Sharif)	1	91	250
Karachi	24	25	16
Larkana	1	0	1
Sanghar	1	1	0
Shikarpur	1	2	1
Sukkur	1	0	0
Total	31	119	293

2.3.1 Karachi

Compared to 2016, the number of terrorist attacks in Karachi in 2017 decreased by about 49 percent, and the number of those killed and injured in these attacks also fell by 58 percent and 79 percent, respectively.

Out of 24 reported attacks from Karachi, as many as 14 targeted personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies, mainly policemen. Although diverse brands of militants were reportedly found involved in these attacks including the TTP and its splinter Jamaatul Ahrar, AQIS, and ISIS affiliates, a new group Ansarul Shariah Pakistan perpetrated at least 5 of these attacks. Secondly, most of these attacks on law enforcers (10) were incidents of targeted

killings, or direct shootout; 2 attacks each employed IEDs and hand grenades.

In January, the AQIS and TTP reportedly carried out 3 attacks in the city against police officials, killing one policeman – sub-inspector Iqbal Mehmood – and one civilian and wounding 2 policemen. On April 5, a retired colonel of Pakistan army, Tahir Zia, was in a car near the Baloch Colony bridge when two assailants on a motorbike rode up to his vehicle and shot at him with a 9mm pistol. Zia was killed in the gun attack, while a passerby was injured by stray bullets.⁷⁹ On May 20, the policemen were sitting in their stationary police van near Daud Morr when militants fired upon them killing two policemen ASI Iftikhar and head constable Raja Younus and injuring another. Jamaatul Ahrar claimed the attack, while police suspected the claim.

On June 23, four militants on motorcycles wearing helmets shot dead 4 policemen busy in having Iftar (fast breaking) dinner in a mobile van in SITE area of Karachi. A newly established group Ansarul Shariah Pakistan (ASP) claimed the attack by throwing leaflets in the van.⁸⁰ Next month, on July 21, six ASP militants on motorcycles opened fire on policemen in Korangi, leaving the 3 policemen and two passer-by boys injured. All except one boy succumbed to their injuries in a hospital.⁸¹ Again on August, the group launched 2 attacks against policemen killing 3 and injuring another. On August 11, militants

on 3 motorcycles opened fire on a police mobile van in Azizabad area of Karachi killing DSP traffic police M. Hanif Khan and his guard constable Sultan.⁸² In a related attack, on August 17, a police Qaumi Razakar (National Volunteer) officer Jamshed Ahmed was shot dead and another injured when militants opened fire on them while they were returning home after performing their duty.⁸³

Separately, MQM Pakistan leader, and the leader of opposition in Sindh Assembly, Khawaja Izharul Hassan escaped a targeted attack on September 2, but four others were reportedly injured; an MQM leader said one of the three injured police guards and a passerby child died. One of the attackers was killed in cross-fire and another injured who managed to escape. Few days later, police said they were searching for Abdul Karim Sarosh Siddiqui, a central commander of Ansarul Shariah, alleged mastermind of the attack.⁸⁴

One sectarian-related attack also took place in Karachi, killing one Shia youth.

Unknown militants targeted civilians with 3 hand grenade blasts in Lyari and Orangi Town areas injuring in all 6 people. One attack targeted a media DSNG van, on February 12, killing a media worker of Samaa TV channel, Taimur, near KDA Chow-rangi in North Nazimabad. Taimur was with a team of the TV channel covering a cracker attack on a police mobile in the same vicinity.⁸⁵ In another

targeted attack, two militants on a motorcycle opened fire at the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) office in Gulistan-e-Jauhar area, causing the death of two security guards.⁸⁶

Three attacks were perpetrated by Sindhi and Baloch nationalist insurgents in Karachi which caused no casualty. On May 17, a low-intensity bomb explosion damaged a gas pipeline in the Manghopir area of Karachi, disrupting supply to adjoining areas. Next day, a statement by police officials said Baloch insurgents could be involved in the attack. Two days later, two suspected BLA militants were also held for their alleged involvement in the attack.⁸⁷ The other two attacks were conducted by Sindhi nationalist insurgents and targeted a power pylon and convoy of a Chinese engineer.

2.3.2 Interior Sindh

Just same as in previous year, 7 terrorist attacks took place in interior Sindh during the year 2017, including 4 carried out by Sindhi insurgent insurgents, one by ISIS affiliates and one sectarian-related attack. However, the number of people killed in these attacks surged significantly from 3 in 2016 to 94 in 2017; at least 277 others were also injured in these attacks.

Most of these casualties, as noted earlier, were the result of a single terrorist attack that hit a shrine in Jamshoro district. Initially 76 people were killed and over 250

injured when a suicide bomber exploded himself in the compound of the crowded Sufi shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan Sharif, where *dhamal* (a Sufi dance) was taking place. Nine women, 20 children and 3 Hindus were among the dead. The death toll reached 88 on February 17 and later, on February 24, daily *Dunya* reported that it had reached 91. The Islamic State group claimed the responsibility for the attack.⁸⁸ Experts on militancy believed that local militants in Balochistan and Sindh belonging to Jundullah and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi had carried out the attack on behalf of the ISIS. Arrests of alleged facilitators of the attack were however made in different parts of the country including also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

A sectarian-related attack was reported from Larkana, where a Sunni cleric was shot dead. Separately, in Sanghar, a suspect in a blasphemy case, who was recently released from prison after a medical board declared him 'mentally challenged', was gunned down while taking a bath in a watercourse in Kamal Buriro village near Tando Adam town.⁸⁹


Sindhi nationalist insurgents perpetrated low-intensity attacks in Hyderabad, Aukkur, Shikarpur and Ghotki. In Shikarpur, on June 20, nationalist insurgents opened fire on a police van tasked to ensure security of a pipeline killing 2 policemen and injuring one other.⁹⁰ In Hyderabad, as many as 23

people were injured including 4 minors in a cracker blast near New Bridge (Naya Pul) in Hyderabad. SSP Hyderabad said nationalist insurgents could be behind the blast.⁹¹ In Ghotki, attackers on a motorcycle fired at Chinese official Yehoshing and his security guard Yar Muhammed Mashori in the limits of Sarhad police station injuring them. The Chinese official was supervising the ongoing Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (PKM), which is a part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).⁹²

2.3.3 Ethno-political Violence in Karachi

Compared to 5 in previous year, one incident of ethno-political violence took place in Karachi in 2017 in which a worker of the Pak Sarzameen Party was shot dead by unknown motorcyclists in in Orangi Town area of the city.

Chart 1: Trends of ethno-political violence in Karachi (2012-17)



2.4 Punjab

Double than in 2016, as many as 14 terrorist attacks took place in Punjab in the year 2017 including 3 suicide blasts against security forces and law enforcement personnel and government officials conducting census. These attacks claimed 61 lives – a decrease of 24 percent from the year before – and injured another 194 people. The TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami as well as some unidentified militants launched these attacks. Those killed in these attacks in Punjab included 35 civilians, 18 policemen, 6 army officials, and 2 militants; those injured were 159 civilians and 35 policemen.

One of the reported 14 attacks was sectarian-related that claimed one life.

Over 88 percent of the total number of people killed in terrorist attacks across Punjab province concentrated in Lahore alone. Sporadic attacks were also reported from 8 other districts of the province as listed at Table 6.

Table 6: Terrorist Attacks in Punjab

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Dera Ghazi Khan	1	1	0
Faisalabad	1	2	0
Gujranwala	1	0	2
Lahore	6	54	190
Multan	1	1	0
Rahim Yar Khan	1	1	0
Rajanpur	1	0	1

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Sheikhupura	1	1	1
Sialkot	1	1	0
Total	14	61	194

Jamaatul Ahrar and TTP launched 3 suicide attacks in Lahore, which in all claimed 50 lives. On February 13, a suicide blast ripped through the camp of protesting chemists in front of the Punjab Assembly building in Lahore, when some police officers were trying to persuade them to call off the protest. Six police officials including Lahore Traffic DIG retired Captain Syed Amad Mobin and SSP Zahid Gondal (acting DIG operations) were among those 13 killed (one wounded person died 2 days later and another succumbed to his injuries on February 17, raising the death toll to 15); over 70 others were injured. Jamaatul Ahrar claimed the attack saying the police officers were the target.⁹³ Later on April 5, at least 6 people were killed including 4 army soldiers and 19 others were injured when a suicide bomber exploded his vest near a vehicle of army men providing security to a census team on Bedian Road in Lahore. Daily *Dawn* reported on April 19 that another army man succumbed to his injuries at the Combined Military Hospital (CMH).⁹⁴ The TTP claimed the attack. In the third suicide blast reported from the city, on July 24, a suicide bomber on an explosive-laden motorcycle exploded himself near about 100 anti-riot policemen on duty to prevent any resistance to the demolition of the illegally encroached

buildings in Kot Lakhpat area on the outskirts of Lahore. The blast killed at least 26 people, including 9 policemen, and wounded 56 others. The banned TTP claimed the responsibility.⁹⁵

Attacks on security and law enforcement personnel were recorded in other cities of Punjab also. In Faisalabad, 2 policemen were shot killed by 2 militants on a motorcycle in a drive-by shooting on January 13.⁹⁶ In DG Khan, a policeman Javed Iqbal was on duty at Adda Khad Buzdar near Triman check post in Taunsa Sharif when two militants on motorbike shot him dead.⁹⁷ In Multan, an intelligence agency personnel Mahar Muhammad Yasir Manzoor was gunned down by unknown attackers in Cantonment Bazaar on August 8. Police said it was a targeted killing.⁹⁸

Members of Ahmedi community were targeted in 4 attacks in different cities of the province. On March 30, militants shot dead a local leader of Ahmedi community advocate Malik Saleem - a cousin of noble laureate Dr Abdus Salam - in Nankana Sahib, in Sheikhupura district. His son accompanied him on a motorcycle who sped away after the attack to save his life; he got minor injuries. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami (LeJ-A) claimed the attack and said Latif had been killed for spreading Ahmadi beliefs in the region.⁹⁹ On April 7, Dr Ashfaq Ahmad, a retired professor belonging to the Ahmedi community, died in his car after being shot at close range by an assailant riding a motorcycle in

Sabzazar area of Lahore. LeJ-A claimed the attack.¹⁰⁰ On April 18, another member of Ahmedi community, a retired assistant professor of molecular genetics at Punjab University Ms Tahira Malik, was found murdered in her house in Lahore. Police ruled out the robbery, suggesting it could be a targeted killing.¹⁰¹ Later, on May 4, an Ahmedi man Basharat Ahmed was shot dead in the Saddar area of Rahim Yar Khan by unknown militants.¹⁰² Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya spokesman stated that Basharat was targeted because of his religious beliefs and that he had no enmity.

In one of the two attack targeting civilians in Punjab, on August 7, two persons were killed and 46 others were injured when an explosion occurred in a truck at a parking stand on Outfall Road of Lahore. It was a powerful blast, caused by explosives inside truck, which also damaged more than 100 small and big vehicles and windowpanes of nearby buildings. The truck carried crates of apricot being transported from Swat.¹⁰³

2.5 Islamabad

Same as in past two years, 3 attacks took place in Islamabad in 2017 that killed 2 persons and injured 5 others. Two of these attacks were sectarian-related, which targeted members of Shia community. One sectarian-related attack took place in the federal capital on November 29, when militants on a motorcycle opened fire on the people coming out of Babul Ilm

imambargah in I-8 Sector of the city. An Intelligence Bureau official Syed Hubdar Hussain Shah died on the spot while 4 others were injured. One of the injured Sayeddain Zaidi, a former Additional Attorney General, succumbed to his wounds at a hospital.¹⁰⁴ In the second related attack, unknown armed men beat and injured Muhammad Raza Monafi, Iranian news agency IRNA's bureau chief in Islamabad, on June 1.¹⁰⁵

On October 27, unknown men attacked with knife and beat *The News's* investigative reporter Ahmed Noorani, seriously injuring him.¹⁰⁶

2.6 AJK

Three terrorist attacks were reported from Azad Jammu and Kashmir in 2017, including one sectarian-related. These attacks claimed one life and injured 10 people. All these attacks took place in Muzaffarabad, the capital of AJK. These attacks are narrated below:

- February 15, Allama Syed Tasawwar Naqvi al Jawadi, secretary general of the AJK chapter of Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen (MWM), and his wife were critically wounded when militants fired multiple shots at them.¹⁰⁷
- May 29: At least four people sustained injuries in a blast after their vehicle ran over an improvised explosive device (IED) along the Line of Control in the Khilana area of Chakothi sector.

A second attack happened at the same place when an ambulance reached there, however it caused no casualty.¹⁰⁸ Yet another bomb blast happened when an official investigation team reached at the place near the LoC. A government official Muhammad Tazeem died while 4 others sustained injuries.¹⁰⁹

2.7 Suicide attacks

Compared to 17 in 2016, as many as 24 suicide attacks took place in Pakistan in 2017, indicating an increase of 41 percent. However the number of people killed in suicide attacks in 2017 fell by 25 percent, from 382 in 2016 to 286 in 2017; the number of those injured in such blasts also decreased from 856 to 723.

Those killed in suicide attacks included 207 civilians, 40 policemen, 5 FC men, 16 army personnel, one Levies, and 17 militants. Those injured included 610 civilians, 89 policemen, 10 FC men, and 14 army soldiers.

Relatively more lethal of the reported suicide blasts in 2017, in terms of casualties they caused, included attacks on the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalanadar in Sehwan Sharif (interior Sindh); Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri in Mastung (Balochistan); anti-riots policemen in Lahore (Punjab); and the shrine of Pir Rakhyal Shah in Jhal Magsi district (Balochistan).

Out of the 24 suicide attacks in 2017, as many as 10 took place in Balochistan, which claimed 108 lives besides inflicting injuries on 262 others. Provincial capital Quetta faced 6 suicide blasts, followed by Qilla Abdullah (2 attacks). One attack each took place in Mastung and Jhal Magsi districts but caused significant fatalities, 27 and 22, respectively. The TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar and ISIS affiliates perpetrated reported suicide blasts from Balochistan, which mainly targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel (7 attacks); one suicide blast each targeted convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri in Mastung, Pir Rakhyal Shah shrine in the Fatehpur area of Jhal Magsi district, and the Bethel Memorial Methodist Church in Quetta.

As many as 7 suicide blasts took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – 3 in Peshawar, 2 in Charsadda and one attack each in Bannu and Upper Dir – which claimed 27 lives and wounded 62 others. Suicide blasts in KP targeted security and law enforcement personnel (5 attacks) and judges and lawyer community (2 attacks). The highest number of casualties in any one suicide blast in KP was reported from Charsadda, where 7 civilians and 3 militants were killed in a gun-and-suicide coordinated attack on the tehsil courts and secretariat in the Tangi area. The TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Islam perpetrated suicide blasts in KP province.

Jamaatul Ahrar conducted three suicide

bombings in Mohmand and Khyber agencies of FATA, killing 10 and wounding 5 people, in all. Two of these attacks targeted security personnel and one hit the office of Political Agent in Mohmand Agency.

The TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar militants also targeted Lahore, provincial capital of Punjab, with 3 suicide attacks which caused 50 deaths and injuries to another 144 people. The police, army and government officials were hit in these attacks.

A single suicide blast reported from Sindh – Sehwan Sharif in Jamshoro district – claimed 91 lives and injured 250 others. ISIS affiliates were involved in the attack.

Table 7: Suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2017


District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Bannu	1	1	2
Charsadda	2	13	24
Jamshoro	1	91	250
Jhal Magsi	1	22	31
Khyber Agency	1	2	2
Lahore	3	50	144
Mastung	1	27	40
Mohmand Agency	2	8	3
Peshawar	3	7	32
Qilla Abdullah	2	5	31
Quetta	6	54	160
Upper Dir	1	6	4
Total	24	286	723

2.8 Sectarian violence

A visible downward turn in the incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan, which started in the year 2014 and sustained in subsequent years, continued in 2017.

Marking a decrease of 41 percent from previous year, as many as 20 incidents of sectarian violence – including 19 sectarian-related terrorist attacks and one armed sectarian clash – took place in Pakistan during the year under review. The number of people killed in such attacks and clashes in 2017 also decreased by about 29 percent, from 104 in 2016 to 74 in 2017. As many as 106 people were also injured in sectarian-related attacks and clashes in 2017, a decrease of 34 percent from previous year.

Chart 2: Trends of sectarian violence (2011-2017)




As many as 16 and 3 sectarian-related attacks, respectively, targeted members of Shia and Sunni communities/groups, while another was incident of sectarian clash between two rival Sunni groups, reported from Khairpur, Sindh.

Sunni sectarian groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami (LeJ-A), and a Shia group Sipah-e-Muhammad as well as Jamaatul Ahrar were reportedly involved in carrying out sectarian-related terrorist attacks in 2017.

About 89 percent of the total number of people killed and 91 percent of those injured in sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes across Pakistan in 2017 were concentrated in Kurram Agency in FATA, Quetta in Balochistan and DI Khan in KP. (See Chart 3)

Chart 3: Sectarian flashpoints in 2017



As in previous years, most of the sectarian attacks and clashes (17) in 2017 were incidents of targeted killing or firing. Two attacks employed IEDs and another was an act of sabotage.

The highest number of incidents of sectarian violence for any one region of Pakistan was recorded in Balochistan, where 7 such incidents killed 17 people, mostly Hazara Shias, and injured 11 others.

However, in terms of casualties in violent sectarian incidents, FATA was the worst-affected region, where 45 people lost their lives and 79 others were injured in 3 recorded incidents of violence.

As many as 3 sectarian-related terrorist attacks and clashes were reported in each of Punjab-cum-Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh. (See Table 8)

On the whole, sectarian-related attacks and clashes were reported from 10 districts/regions from across Pakistan in 2017.

Table 8: Incidents of sectarian violence in 2017

Province	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Punjab & Islamabad	Islamabad	2	2	4
	Sialkot	1	1	0
	Punjab Total	3	3	4

Province	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Balochistan	Mastung	1	4	1
	Quetta	6	13	10
	Balochistan Total	6	15	9
Sindh	Karachi	1	1	0
	Larkana	1	0	1
	Khairpur	1	3	9
	Sindh Total	3	4	10
KP	D.I. Khan	3	5	0
	KP Total	3	5	0
FATA	Kurram Agency	3	45	79
	FATA Total	3	45	79
AJK	Muzaffarabad	1	0	2
	AJK Total	1	0	2
Pakistan Total		20	74	106

In **FATA's Kurram Agency**, militant and violent sectarian groups launched few major attacks in 2017. At least 3 of these attacks were clearly sectarian-related; others hit public places and may or may not have sectarian orientation. That suggested that militant groups including violent sectarian had placed their exclusive focus on the agency that borders Afghanistan and hosts a sizeable population of Shia Muslims. While the agency has a history of sectarian violence but in the past it was between Shia and

Sunni tribes, who over the time learned to live in peace and harmony. The recent spate of violence is however triggered by Sunni violent sectarian and militant groups who are launching major targeted attacks against civilians including Shia population. That also indicates that militants are well aware of the sectarian cleavage that exists in the country and can exploit it by carrying out targeted attacks in sectarian sensitive areas. This is what makes the groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, ISIS and Jamaatul Ahrar even more dangerous for Pakistan due to their sectarian credentials and tendencies.

On March 31, an explosives-laden car parked at the women's entrance of the main Imambargah in Parachinar, headquarters of the agency, went off hours before the Friday congregation. At least 29 people, including a woman and two children, were killed and 70 others wounded. Jamaatul Ahrar said while claiming the blast that it was part of its Operation Ghazi. A spokesman of the group said the attack had targeted members of the Shia community who the group alleged were involved in the killing of *ulema* (religious scholars) and attack on [a Sunni] Madrassa Taleemul Quran in Rawalpindi.¹¹⁰ The group launched another sectarian attack in Kurram Agency, on April 25. Reportedly, militants hit a passenger van in Gowdar area of the agency, largely populated by Shia Muslims, with a land mine blast. At least 14 people

were killed in the attack including 5 women, 4 children and 4 Khassadar officials who were on census duty. A spokesman of Jamaatul Ahrar told Reuters they had attacked the van to target Shias and census workers traveling in it.¹¹¹

On May 14, an official of the Kurram Agency political administration Sarfraz Hussain and his guard were killed when their vehicle came under targeted fire. The banned sectarian organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility for the attack.¹¹²

In Balochistan, 7 sectarian-related attacks took place, compared to 5 such attacks in 2016. However, the number of people killed in sectarian violence significantly fell from 62 in 2016 to 17 in 2017, and those of injured also plummeted from 102 to 11. Most of these attacks (6) happened in Quetta and one in Mastung. All these attacks were incidents of targeted killing launched by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (6 attacks) and its global arm LeJ-Al-Alami (1 attack). These attacks are described below:

- January 6: As many as 5 members of Shia Hazara community were injured when gunmen on 2 motorcycles attacked their vehicle near the Killi Mubarak area on Spiny Road, Quetta. LeJ-A claimed the attack.¹¹³
- June 4: Two people including a woman belonging to Hazara Shia

community were shot dead in Quetta.¹¹⁴

- July 19: A Hazara Shia family, traveling to Karachi from Quetta in a rented car, was attacked by armed men on motorcycles in the Killi Choto area near Mastung. Four family members including a woman were killed and a man injured in the attack.¹¹⁵
- September 10: Four members of the Hazara community, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed and two women injured in Kuchlak when militants on a motorcycle opened fire on them when they stopped near a petrol pump for a brief rest.¹¹⁶
- October 9: Militants on a motorcycle opened fire on a van carrying vegetable sellers to the Hazar Ganji area, Quetta, killing in all 5 people including three members of Hazara Shia community, and critically injuring another.¹¹⁷
- December 9: A man belonging to Hazara community was injured and two others remained unscathed when the taxi they were travelling in came under attack from people riding a motorcycle on the Brewery Road near Wahdat Colony.¹¹⁸
- December 22: Two coal miners belonging to the Shia Hazara community were killed and another two injured when the van they were

travelling in came under fire in the western bypass in Quetta.¹¹⁹

In **Sindh**, compared to 19 in the year before, a total of 3 incidents of sectarian violence took place – one each from Karachi, Larkana and Khairpur. As many as 4 people were killed in these incidents, compared to 31 killed in such attacks in Sindh in 2016, and 10 others injured. Details on these incidents are narrated below:

- January 24: A young man Muhammad Kazim Raza, hailing from Gilgit, was gunned down in Gulistan-e-Jauhar area of Karachi reportedly by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants.¹²⁰
- March 18: An assailant shot and wounded Dr Mohammad Idrees Rajput, district president of the banned Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), when he was sitting at his clinic in Luhar Colony, Larkana.¹²¹ Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan was reportedly involved in the attack.
- November 30: Three men were killed and nine others wounded in an armed clash between two religious groups in the Jani Buriro police post area of the Kot Dijji police station.¹²²

In **Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**, as many as 3 sectarian-related attacks took place in 2017, as compared to 8 in previous year. These attacks killed 5 people, a decrease of 50 percent from 2016. All these attacks took place in D.I. Khan; 2 attacks targeted

Shia Muslims and one hit members of Sunni religious community.

On February 26, Saqlain, Ali Raza and Jamil were going to their fields when armed motorcyclists opened fire on them on Ghonser Road in Prawa tehsil. Saqlain's father Mukhtar Ali, who was caretaker of a local Imambargah, was also target killed last year.¹²³ In August, 2 more incidents of sectarian targeted killing were reported from DI Khan. On August 13, militants knocked at the door of a Shia Muslim Mazhar Hassan Sherazi and when he came out shot him dead. Sherazi was brother of a former FIA director.¹²⁴ Later, on August 19, rival sectarian militants shot dead Deobandi scholar and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam's (Fazal) local leader Maulana Attaullah Shah when he came out from a mosque after offering morning prayers.¹²⁵

In **Punjab & Islamabad**, 3 reported sectarian attacks claimed 3 lives and injured 4 others. On April 19, 3 armed women entered the house of Fazal Abbas in Sialkot, an accused-turned proclaimed offender in a sacrilege case, and shot him dead. Later, these women, who were from Raiah Khas village of Narowal district, surrendered themselves to the police.¹²⁶ Two sectarian attacks took place in Islamabad. On November 29, militants on a motorcycle opened fire on the people coming out of Babul Ilm imambargah in I-8 Sector of the city. An Intelligence Bureau official Syed Hubdar Hussain Shah died on the spot while 4 others were injured. One

of the injured Sayeddain Zaidi, a former Additional Attorney General, succumbed to his wounds at a hospital.¹²⁷ In the second related attack, unknown armed men beat and injured Muhammad Raza Monafi, Iranian news agency IRNA's bureau chief in Islamabad, on June 1.¹²⁸

In **AJK**, Allama Syed Tasawwar Naqvi al Jawadi, secretary general of the AJK chapter of Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen (MWM), and his wife were critically wounded when militants fired multiple shots at them.¹²⁹ MWM is a Shia religious-political body.

2.9 Violence against political leaders and workers


As many as 13 terrorist attacks in 2017 targeted political leaders and workers, which claimed the lives of 38 people and injured 50 others. Though these attacks posted a decline of 35 percent from the year before, the number of deaths they caused surged by 153 percent.

Incidents of ethnic and political violence in Pakistan fell significantly, from 12 in 2016 to 4 in 2017; the number of people killed in these incidents also decreased, by about 28 percent, to 10.

Thus, a total of 17 reported incidents of violence in 2017, including terrorist attacks and incidents of ethno-political violence cited earlier, targeted political leaders and

workers, which claimed the lives of 48 people and injured 54 others.

Chart 4: Violence against political leaders, workers in 2017



2.9.1 Terrorist attacks on political leaders

The Taliban militants, including the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, and local Taliban groups, as well as other similar groups such as Ansarul Shariah Pakistan and ISIS affiliates/supporters perpetrated 6 terrorist attacks against political leaders and workers. These attacks – reported from Bajaur Agency, Harnai and Mastung districts in Balochistan, Karachi and Lower Dir and Peshawar districts of Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa – killed 34 people and injured 45 others. The worst of these attacks was reported from Mastung and targeted the convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, killing 26 people; Maulana Haideri survived the attack.

As many as 7 such attacks by Baloch nationalist insurgents – recorded in Panjgur, Quetta, Kech and Gwadar districts of Balochistan – claimed 4 lives and injured 5 others. Most of these attacks were carried out by BLF and BLA groups and mainly targeted political leaders of National Party (NP) and Balochistan National Party (BNP) including its Mengal faction.


The political leaders and workers killed in these targeted terrorist attacks included Maulana Hafiz Qudratullah, deputy emir of Quetta district chapter of the JUI-F and Iftikhar Mughal, director staff of the Senate, in Mastung; Malik Naveed Dehwar, a main leader of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), in Quetta; BNP local leader Nasir Shawani in Quetta; JUI-F leader Hashim Khan in Lower Dir; a NP leader Changez Buledi in Gwadar; and Awami National Party (ANP) leader Abdul Razzaq Achakzai and his brother Abdul Khaliq in Harnai.

Some survived terrorist attacks, such as: Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) MPA Fazl Elahi survived an IED attack on his house on the outskirts of Peshawar; Balochistan

Minister for Health Rehmat Saleh Baloch and some other leaders of the NP survived a rocket attack on their convoy in Panjgur; MQM Pakistan leader, and the leader of opposition in Sindh Assembly, Khawaja Izharul Hassan escaped a targeted attack in Karachi; and Information Secretary of the NP Jan Buledi survived a targeted shootout in Turbat (Kech).

Out of the total 13 attacks targeting political leaders, 9 took place in Balochistan alone. Two such attacks happened in KP and one attack each was also reported from FATA and Karachi. (See Chart 6)

Chart 5: Terrorist attacks on political leaders/workers in 2017



Like in previous year, leaders and workers of former Balochistan chief minister Abdul Malik Baloch's National Party (NP) faced the highest number of terrorist attacks (5) in 2017 compared to other parties. (See Table 9)

Table 9: Distribution of attacks in terms of targets and areas

Target	No. of Attacks	Geographical Spread of Attacks	Responsible Groups
ANP	2	FATA (Bajaur); Balochistan (Harnai)	Jamaatul Ahrar, TTP
NP	5	Balochistan (Panjgur, Kech, Gwadar)	BLF
BNP-M	1	Balochistan (Quetta)	BLA
BNP	1	Balochistan (Quetta)	BLA
JUI-F	2	KP (Lower Dir); Balochistan (Mastung)	Local Taliban, ISIS
PTI	1	KP (Peshawar)	Local Taliban
MQM	1	Sindh (Karachi)	ASP
Total	13 Attacks		

2.9.2 Political violence

Compared to 12 in 2016, 4 incidents of political violence were reported from Pakistan in 2017, which killed 10 people and wounded 4 others. (See Table 10) Two incidents of ethno-political violence were reported from Punjab and one each from Karachi and Islamabad.

Most of the casualties reported in these incidents were caused by a clash between supporters of a religious-political party Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah and police in Islamabad, on November 25, when the later tried to disperse the former from a 2 week-long sit-in. Those killed included one policeman and 7 civilians.¹³⁰

Table 10: Incidents of political ethnic violence in Pakistan

Region	District	No. of Incidents	Killed	Injured
Punjab	Bahwalnagar	1	1	1
	Sargodha	1	0	3
Punjab Total		2	1	4
Islamabad		1	8	0
Sindh	Karachi	1	1	0
Sindh Total		1	1	0
Total (Pakistan)		4	10	4

In Bahawalnagar, on February 6, a Pakistan Peoples Party leader Shaukat Mahmood Basra was injured and his secretary killed when his political rivals opened fire on them in a rally.¹³¹ In another related incident reported from Punjab, three PML-N workers suffered injuries in an armed clash with PML-Q activists at a corner meeting of the ruling party at Chak 35-SB in Sargodha district, on April 18.¹³²

A worker of the Pak Sarzameen Party was shot dead by unknown motorcyclists in a suspected targeted attack in Orangi Town area of Karachi.¹³³

2.10 Violence against religious minorities

One more than in 2016, as many as 6 terrorist attacks in 2017 exclusively targeted members of minority communities including a suicide blast in Quetta against a church. These attacks claimed 13 lives – compared to 82 in 2016 – and wounded 57 others.

Four of these attacks hit members of Ahmedi community in 3 cities of Punjab as listed at Table 11. These targeted attacks – 2 of which were claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami – killed: a local leader of Ahmedi community Advocate Malik Saleem in Nankana Sahib, Shekhupura; two educationists belonging to Ahmedi community, Dr Ashfaq Ahmad, a retired professor, and retired assistant professor of molecular genetics at Punjab University Ms Tahira Malik, in 2 separate attacks in Lahore; and an Ahmedi man Basharat Ahmed in Rahim Yar Khan.

In Quetta, at least 9 members of Christian community were killed and 56 injured in a suicide attack on the Bethel Memorial Methodist Church in Quetta on December 17. At least two suicide attackers had struck the church while 400 worshipers were attending the service inside. One of

the attackers exploded his vest at the entrance and the other was killed by police. ISIS claimed the attack.¹³⁴ Earlier, on October 8, some unknown militants had also lobbed a hand grenade in the compound of a church in Quetta. However no loss of life or damage to property was reported.¹³⁵

Table 11: Terrorist attacks against religious minorities

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured	Target
Quetta	2	9	56	Christian community/churches
Lahore	2	2	0	Ahmedi community
Rahim Yar Khan	1	1	0	Ahmedi community
Sheikhupura	1	1	1	Ahmedi community
Total	6	13	57	

Besides terrorist attacks against minority communities cited earlier, an incident of mob violence against Hindu community, was also recorded in Hub during the year, which is narrated in the following section on “Faith-based Mob Violence”.

2.11 Faith-based mob violence

Five (5) incidents of faith-based mob violence were also recorded in 2017. Worst of these incidents was that of the killing of a university student Mashal Khan

in Mardan. These incidents are narrated below:

- January 15: A group of people asked the local authorities to allow them to meet Qatari Prince Jassim bin Faisal in **Musakhel**, who was on hunting trip to Pakistan, to seek donation for a mosque. As the authorities refused, people became violent and attacked the convoy of the prince injuring 3 people.¹³⁶
- April 13: A mob comprising hundreds of university students lynched a fellow student Mashal Khan on the campus of Abdul Wali Khan University, **Mardan** over allegations of blasphemy. The crowd attacked and injured two other students on the same pretext.¹³⁷
- April 21: Police had to fire tear gas shells to disperse the mob in **Chitral**, estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000, which wanted the police to hand over a deranged blasphemy-accused to them, apparently for killing him. Police said they had arrested the man and booked him under Section 295-C (Use of derogatory remarks, etc., for the Holy Prophet) of the Pakistan Penal Code.¹³⁸
- May 4: Violence erupted in **Hub** area after police refused to hand over a Hindu man Prakash Kumar suspected of blasphemy to an angry mob, who pelted stones at police. Two police officials and Additional Deputy Commissioner Tariq Javed Mengal

were injured in the violence, along with an Edhi rescue official and a child. The child later succumbed to his injuries, as he had received bullet wounds which turned fatal.¹³⁹

- September 8: A local prayer-leader cleric Bacha Jan and his supporters raided a musical party and torched the musical instruments in Landi Kotal tehsil of **Khyber Agency**. The cleric had earlier announced that a ban had been imposed on all types of music in the area, which were according to him un-Islamic.¹⁴⁰

In a related incident of individual faith-based violence, one person Ikram Khan attacked a Tablighi Jamaat member Rehman with a knife in a mosque in Chiniot and killed him. Another member of the preaching party, Abdullah, who tried to save Rehman was also critically injured by the attacker and later died in a hospital. Reportedly Ikram attacked the preachers after he thought they had committed blasphemy during a previous argument between them.¹⁴¹

2.12 Violence against media, journalists

Compared to 2 in the year before, Pakistani media and journalists came under 9 attacks in 2017, including 3 by Baloch insurgents in Balochistan and 6 by the TTP and some unknown militants of similar type. Geographical spread of these attacks is given at Table 12.

Table 12: Terrorist attacks against media, journalists

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Awaran	1	0	0
Haripur	1	1	0
Islamabad	1	0	1
Kalat	1	1	0
Karachi	1	1	0
Kech	1	0	8
Kohat	1	0	1
Swabi	1	1	0
Tank	1	0	0
Total	9	4	10

Those 4 killed in the reported attacks on media and journalists included: a journalist Mohammad Jan Shahbaz Samalani in Kalat; A worker of Samaa TV channel, Taimur, in Karachi; Bakhsheesh Elahi, bureau chief of Urdu-language daily K-2 in Haripur; and a local journalist Haroon Khan, a correspondent for Waqt News TV in Swabi. Those injured in these attacks included: *The News's* investigative reporter Ahmed Noorani in Islamabad; Aleem Haider Zaidi, a correspondent of a private TV channel in Kohat; and 8 others including on policeman in Kech.

2.13 Drone strikes

Compared to 3 in the year before, as many as 9 US-led drone strikes took place in 4 agencies of FATA; 5 in Kurram, 2 in North Waziristan, and one in each of Orakzai and South Waziristan agencies.

These attacks killed a total of 30 suspected militants and injured 4 others. Haqqani Network of the Afghan Taliban, TTP, ISIS supporters were mainly targeted in these drone strikes. These strikes are narrated below:

- On March 2, Afghan Taliban commander Qari Abdullah from Khost and his aide Shakir were killed in a drone strike in Ahmadi Shama Saraghorga area of Kurram Agency.¹⁴²
- April 27: A US drone fired two missiles at the compound and training camp of Taliban commander Mulla Akhtar Muhammad in North Waziristan; Akhtar and his aide Abdur Rehman Sidgai were among 7 TTP and 3 other militants killed.¹⁴³
- May 24: Three TTP commanders including Abdullah Kashmiri were reportedly killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan on May 24.¹⁴⁴
- June 13: An Afghan Taliban commander Abu Bakar, linked to Haqqani Network, was killed along with his one aid while 3 other persons were injured in a drone attack in Orakzai Agency.¹⁴⁵
- July 3: A US drone fired two missiles at a vehicle carrying commander Pir Agha of the militant Islamic State group and his three aides in Marghalan village in South Waziristan Agency, killing all four men on the spot.¹⁴⁶

- September 15: Three people were killed reportedly including a Haqqani Network affiliate Maulvi Mohib when a US drone fired 2 missiles at a compound in the Ghuzgarhi area near the Afghan border in Kurram Agency.¹⁴⁷
- November 30: A US drone fired 2 missiles at a compound in the use of an alleged Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Rasheed killing 4 suspected militants. There were no reports about the killing of commander Rasheed.¹⁴⁸
- December: Two drone strikes took place in Kurram Agency. First, on December 18, a drone fired a missile, reportedly at a compound of a TTP commander Basharat Khan, in the Mata Sangar area. No casualty was reported.¹⁴⁹ Later, on December 26, a US drone fired missiles at a moving vehicle in the same area, killing two suspected militants. One of the deceased was identified as Commander Jamiuddin.¹⁵⁰

(28; compared to 18 in 2016) and Iran (12; compared to 5 in 2015).

On the whole, 188 Pakistani citizens were killed in these cross-border attacks – an increase of 132 percent from previous year – and 348 others were also injured. Those 188 killed included 68 civilians, 25 army troops, 6 FC men, and 89 Afghanistan-based Pakistani Taliban militants, who were killed by security forces in retaliatory fire.

In general, the situation at Pakistan's border with India – along the LoC in Azad Kashmir and the Working Boundary (WB) – remained relatively more volatile in terms of the number of cross-border violations recorded during the year. However, comparatively more number of people were killed in incidents of cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, though most of them were militants; 117 people were killed in cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, compared to 69 and 2 killed, respectively, in similar attacks from India and Iran.

2.14 Border attacks

As compared to 2016, a significant surge of about 131 percent was witnessed, during the year under review, in cross-border attacks and clashes from Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran. A total of 171 cross-border attacks took place from the country's borders with India (131 attacks; compared to 51 in 2016), Afghanistan

Table 13: Border attacks/clashes in 2017

Nature of Attack	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Pak-Afghan border	28	117	102
Pak-India border	131	69	245
Pak-Iran border	12	2	1
Total	171	188	348

2.14.1 Pak-Afghan

Out of the total 28 reported cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, as many as 27 took place in FATA – 12 in Khyber, 6 in Mohmand, 5 in Kurram, 2 in Bajaur and 2 in South Waziristan Agency – while one such attack happened in Balochistan, in Chaman.

Most of these attacks (26) were launched by the Pakistani Taliban militants who have taken refuge in bordering areas of Afghanistan, including mainly the TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Islam. Six cross-border attacks were conducted by the Afghan security forces including 4 in Khyber and in Kurram agencies of FATA, and one attack at Chaman in Balochistan.

Security forces and their check-posts, mainly in Pakistani tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, were the prime targets of these attacks, and were hit in 22 attacks; the remaining 6 attacks apparently targeted pro-government tribesmen and civilians.

Among those 117 killed in these attacks were 12 Army officials, 6 FC men, 10 civilians and 89 militants, who were killed in retaliatory fire by security forces. Those injured included 12 FC troops, 16 army officials, 45 civilians, and 29 militants.

Some of the incidences of heightened cross-border tension are narrated below:

- **February:** Four cross-border attacks were reported in the month and successfully repulsed by Pakistani security forces, killing 29 militants; 5 army soldiers were injured in these attacks. Militants from across the Afghan border made incursions in small groups in Mohmand, Kurram, South Waziristan and Bajaur agencies to target security forces and their check-posts.
- **March:** Three cross-border attacks/clashes in Khyber and Mohmand agencies killed 31 people – 24 militants, 5 army soldiers and 2 FC officials – and injured 20 militants and 4 FC men. In one of these attacks, on March 6, over 40 militants crossed the Pak-Afghan border from Kunar province and attacked 3 posts at the Gora Pari top in Mohmand Agency with light and heavy weapons. The attack claimed the lives of five soldiers. Security forces retaliated and killed 15 militants. Jamaatul Ahrar claimed responsibility for the attack.¹⁵¹
- **May:** The situation at Pakistani-Afghan border remained tense, mainly at the Chaman in Balochistan and Torkham in Khyber Agency, after May 5th incident of Afghan forces' firing in two villages on Chaman border. The border at Chaman remained closed until end of the month. In all, 4 cross-border attacks were reported from Afghanistan, three by Afghan forces and one by Pakistani militants

- sheltered there. On May 5, at least 12 people, 10 civilians and 2 security personnel, lost their lives and around 40 others were injured in firing and shelling after Afghan forces attacked FC personnel guarding the staff conducting census in two villages on the Chaman border.¹⁵² Pakistani security forces claimed they had killed 50 Afghan forces in retaliatory fire. Afghanistan's top envoy to Pakistan Omar Zakhilwal however denied the claim and said only 2 Afghan soldiers were killed and 7 injured.¹⁵³
- **September:** Pakistani Taliban militants sheltered in Afghanistan opened fire at a security check post in Rajgal area. As a result, the commanding officer of the post, 22-year-old Lieutenant Arslan Alam, lost his life. Three militants were also killed in retaliatory fire by security forces.¹⁵⁴
 - **November:** The TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar militants of Pakistani origin and currently sheltered in Afghanistan launched 2 cross-border attacks inside Pakistani tribal areas bordering on Afghanistan, killing 3 army officials and wounding another 4 soldiers. As many as 17 militants were also killed in retaliation fire by security forces.

Meanwhile, one particular aspect of tense Pak-Afghan relations in 2017 was also linked to cross-border incursions of militants to either side to launch terrorist attacks. In August, the US president

Donald Trump finally announced his government's policy on Afghanistan and South Asia. Besides promising a surge in the number of the US troops in Afghanistan, Trump criticized Pakistan for allegedly supporting the Afghan Taliban engaged in destabilizing Afghanistan. He also invited India to play a more active role in bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan, despite the fact that Pakistan has been expressing serious concerns about Indian presence and 'anti-Pakistan' activities in Afghanistan including alleged support to anti-Pakistan militants such as the Pakistani Taliban sheltered in Afghanistan as well as the Baloch insurgents fighting against Pakistani state in the province of Balochistan. However, growing tensions with the US and Afghanistan for the moment only added to Pakistan's challenge of managing and securing the country's border with Afghanistan. Secondly, as the US President Donald Trump's policy on Afghanistan entailed the use of force against militants as one of the stated components, incidents of US-led drone strikes increased in border areas; drone strikes in 2 days in a row killed over 2 dozen suspected militants in Pak-Afghan border areas in October, reportedly in Afghan province Paktia, close to Kurram Agency of FATA in Pakistan. Some reports hinted at the killing of Jamaatul Ahrar chief Omar Khurasani in one of the attacks; the group reportedly chose Dost Muhammad Afridi as the new head.¹⁵⁵ Also, Omar Mansoor Narray, the

mastermind of 2014 attack on Army Public School, Peshawar, was reported killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan. Later, another report claimed that the death of Khurasani was not yet confirmed. The report said that the Senate Standing Committee on Defence was informed that the death could not be confirmed so far.¹⁵⁶ A statement of Khurasani also emerged after the reports of his death.

Pakistan, nonetheless, also continued its efforts to secure the border and check cross-border movement of militants. An increased vigilance at, and, at times, closure of the border by Pakistan was apparently meant to prevent the movement of militants into Pakistan in the garb of routine visitors. During the month of March, Pakistan also began fencing of its borders with Afghanistan, starting from bordering areas of Mohmand and Bajaur agencies; these areas were recently frequently used by Pakistani militants sheltered in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan to cross into FATA and launch attacks. A statement issued by the ISPR said the fencing commenced with the announcement made by Chief of the Army Staff Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa during a visit to border areas in Mohmand. A media report quoted some informed officials as saying that the fencing "[was] part of a multibillion rupee border management plan that involves building hundreds [423 to be precise] of small forts and installation of radars,

sensors and other technical surveillance equipment to effectively check cross-border movement."¹⁵⁷

In April, the Senate's Standing Committee for Defense was informed that fencing along the Pak-Afghan border was at initial stages. Around 700 kilometers long fencing will be done with the cost of PKR 20 million per kilometer. The meeting was further informed that security check-posts will also be established along with the fence, a project anticipated to be completed in 3 years. Until April, 43 check-posts had been completed.¹⁵⁸ Officials of the Pakistan Army and the Afghan National Army also established a hotline link in April to discuss the border situation. According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), "first hotline communication took place between Commander of the Southern Command Lt. Gen Aamir Riaz and commander of the Afghan National Army's 205 corps Lt Gen Daud Shah Wafadar." Both sides discussed issues related to Pakistan-Afghan border, the ISPR press release said.¹⁵⁹

In June, Pakistan army said that steady progress was being made in fencing Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, and about 50km of the border had been fenced. According to a media report, 237km of a high infiltration-prone zone in Khyber, Bajaur and Mohmand tribal regions was being fenced in first phase. "In phase 2, fencing of remaining border areas in KP and Balochistan will be done," the

reported said quoting an Inter-Services Public Relations official.¹⁶⁰

Later, in late December, a media report claimed that 150 kilometers of the Pak-Afghan frontier had already been fenced, against a yearly target of 120 kilometers. The report also said that the work on fencing more than 800 kilometers of the border will be completed in the next two years, while "in the first phase, 432 kilometers of the border would be fenced at the most critical and crossable places."¹⁶¹ Meanwhile out of the planned 443 big forts along the Pak-Afghan border, security forces have already established 150 such forts.¹⁶²


2.14.2 Pak-India

As many as 92 – or 70 percent of the total cross-border attacks reported from India in 2017 – concentrated in 3 AJK districts Bhimber, Kotli and Poonch, along the Line of Control (LoC).

On the while, 117 cross-border attacks took place along the LoC in at least 9 districts of AJK, as given at Table 14, which killed 58 people. Meanwhile 14 such attacks took place along the Working Boundary (WB) in Kasur, Narowal, Okara and Sialkot districts of Punjab province, claiming 11 lives.

The situation at the Pak-India border remained tense throughout the year with varying frequency of attacks in each month, as shown at Chart 4.

Chart 4: Trends of cross-border attacks from India in 2017



In January, 6 attacks from Indian side in Poonch, Neelum, Kotli, and Bhimber districts killed one Pakistani citizen and injured 4. In one of these attacks, on January 31, Indian Border Security Force (BSF) troops shot dead a farmer in Nali village of Samahni sector. Reportedly Nazir Hussain was cutting grass for animals near the LoC when he was targeted. Indian troops took his dead body with them.¹⁶³ In February, 7 attacks claimed the lives of 4

people in Kotli (Khuiratta sector and Janjot Bahadar village) as well as Bhimber. On February 13, 3 Pakistan army soldiers succumbed to injuries after being shot at from across the LoC in the Thoob sector of Barnala tehsil in the southern Bhimber district.¹⁶⁴ In March, Indian BSF perpetrated 9 attacks killing 2 people and injuring 13 others. Seven persons, including two women and an infant, were injured when Indian troops shelled Pakistan Army posts as well as civilian populations in Dharra, Batol, Polas, Kakota and Chirikot.¹⁶⁵ On the same day, a 70-year-old cardiac patient, identified as Afsar Jan, died from panic when a shell landed in the courtyard of her house in Polas village, in Poonch.¹⁶⁶ Later in the month, a 60-year old woman Manzoor Begum was standing near her house in Thandi Kassi village of Khuiratta sector when she was hit by splinters of a mortar shell fired from the LoC. She succumbed to her injuries.¹⁶⁷ Seven such attacks were also recorded in April, which in all injured 13 people in Bhimber, Kotli and Poonch sectors.

The frequency of cross-border attacks and consequent casualties started to rise in May. During the month, as many as 14 such violations were recorded mainly in Khuiratta, Nakyal, and Charohi sectors in Kotli district; Smahni, Baroh and Khanjar (Baghsar) sectors of Bhimber district; Chakothi in Muzafarabad district; and Charwah sector along Sialkot Working Bounday. These violations killed 3 and

wounded 30 people. Another 11 attacks happened in June killing 6 and injuring 23 people in Bhimber, Hattian, Haveli, Kotli and Poonch districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

The highest number of cross-border attacks from India in any one month of the year was recorded in July. Almost double than in previous month, Indian BSF troops launched 19 cross-border attacks during the month, all along the LoC in Bhimber, Hattian, Haveli, Kotli, Neelum, and Poonch districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Due to increased border violations and intense shelling by Indian forces, thousands of people fled their homes in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Local authorities claimed on July 10 that around 3,000 people had left their villages in Abbaspur sector alone after heavy shelling by Indian troops over the past two weeks.¹⁶⁸ As many as 15 Pakistani citizens lost their lives – 5 army soldiers and 10 civilians – and 55 others were injured in these cross-border violations in July, which were mostly incidents of mortar shelling as well as artillery firing. On July 16, Indian troops targeted a Pakistan Army vehicle moving along the Neelum River at Athmuqam. The vehicle fell into the river and four soldiers drowned. The vehicle carried 6 soldiers, two were tossed onto the river bank and thus remained safe. One civilian was also injured in the shelling.¹⁶⁹

In August, Indian BSF troops carried out 8 cross-border attacks inside Pakistani

territory during the month under review, which killed 4 and wounded 5 people. Seven of these attacks were recorded along the Line of Control (LoC) in Bagh, Bhimber, Kotli, and Poonch districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and one took place across the Sialkot Working Boundary.

Cross-border attacks from Indian again intensified in September and October. In September, Indian BSF troops carried out 17 cross-border attacks inside Pakistani territory, which claimed the lives of 16 Pakistani citizens including 15 civilians and one army soldier, and injured 50 others. Nine of these attacks were recorded along the Line of Control (LoC) in Haveli, Kotli, and Poonch districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and eight from across the Sialkot Working Boundary. Similarly, in October, Indian BSF troops carried out 18 cross-border attacks inside Pakistani territory, which claimed the lives of 8 Pakistani citizens and injured 29 others including women and children. All of these attacks were recorded along the LoC in Bhimber, Hattian, Haveli, Kotli, Poonch and Rawalakot districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

In November, 9 such attacks claimed the lives of 4 Pakistani citizens and injured 12 others. Six of these attacks were recorded along the Line of Control (LoC) in Haveli, Poonch and Rawalakot districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and 3 others took place along the Working Boundary, in

Shakargarh, Kasur and Okara districts of Punjab. In last month of the year, BSF conducted 5 attacks killing 6 people – including 4 army officials – and wounding 4 people. In one of these attacks, on December 25, three Pakistan Army personnel were martyred and one was injured due to heavy cross-border shelling by Indian forces at Rukh Chakri sector in Rawlakot.¹⁷⁰

The apex body for civil-military coordination on national security matters met on September 29 and expressed deep concern over repeated ceasefire violations by India resulting in the loss of several innocent lives.¹⁷¹ Also, as media reports suggested, the Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Sahir Shamshad Mirza communicated these violations to his Indian counterpart, whenever need arose, in hotline contacts.¹⁷²

On the whole, DGMOs of Pakistan and India made 5 reported unscheduled or special contacts in the year 2017, which are described as following:¹⁷³

- May 2: Commanders of the Pakistani and Indian armies made hotline contact after India accused Pakistan of killing of two of its troops and mutilating the bodies.
- June 5: The Pakistani DGMO asked for 'actionable evidence' on allegations of infiltration while Indian warned of appropriate retaliatory action.

- June 17: After a Pakistan Army vehicle was attacked, it threatened to choke Indian supply lines. The Indian DGMO threatened retaliatory action.
- September 22: As death toll from Indian firing rose [to six] in two days, Pakistan warned Indian that violations have undermined all understandings on the issue.
- October 30: Pakistan protested the [Indian accusation of] ‘deliberate targeting of civilians’ while Indian warned of continued retaliation to ‘acts of aggression.’

Later, Pakistan Rangers and India’s BSF agreed at the conclusion of biannual talks held on November 10, 2017 to work for peace and return to the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the two countries. “The Pakistani version of the talks sounded welcoming and friendly whereas the Indian press release was remonstrative, even if this might not have been the intention of the interlocutors,” a news reported noted. The 23-member Indian delegation was led by BSF Director General K.K. Sharma while Maj Gen Muhammad Saeed, Director General of Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), led a 19-member delegation. Both sides also had representatives from respective interior and foreign ministries along with officers from narcotics control and survey departments.¹⁷⁴

2.14.3 Pak-Iran

Compared to 5 in previous year, Iranian border security forces carried out 12 cross-border attacks in 2017 in Balochistan’s Chagai, Kech and Panjgur district. Two Pakistani citizens were killed and another injured in these attacks, which were largely incidents of mortar shelling and rocket firing. Iran claims that its attacks are meant to chase and target Iranian Baluch insurgents operating from its Sistan-Baluchistan province along Pak-Iran border areas.

In April, the situation at the Pak-Iran border, and between the two countries, became tense after 10 Iranian border guards were reportedly killed by militants of Jaishul Adl – a Sistan-Baluchistan-based Iranian militant group that Iran believes also operated in Pak-Iran bordering areas – on April 26.¹⁷⁵ Iranian President Hassan Rouhani reportedly wrote a letter to Pakistani Prime Minister and Iran’s foreign ministry summoned the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran to protest “a lack of appropriate measures and necessary prosecution on the part of the Pakistani government [that] has caused great loss of lives and property for Iran.”¹⁷⁶ Pakistan’s Foreign Office had earlier offered cooperation for improving security along the border but rejected the Iranian protest saying the incident had happened on Iranian soil.¹⁷⁷

In May, the head of the Iranian armed

forces warned Pakistan that Tehran would target militants' bases inside Pakistan, who attack inside Iran, if the government did not confront them. Major General Mohammad Baqeri, the head of the Iranian armed forces, was quoted by IRNA as saying: "We expect the Pakistani officials to control the borders, arrest the terrorists and shut down their bases." "If the terrorist attacks continue, we will hit their safe havens and cells, wherever they are," he said.¹⁷⁸

In December, Pakistan and Iran agreed on "joint aerial monitoring of their border to cope with any possible danger and avoid an untoward situation."¹⁷⁹ The agreement emerged at the conclusion of a meeting between officials of the two countries held at the Pakistani border town of Taftan.

Table 14: Regional distribution of cross-border attacks

Border	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Pak - Afghan	Bajaur Agency	2	14	5
	Khyber Agency	12	25	20
	Kurram Agency	5	19	4
	Mohmand Agency	6	44	32
	Qilla Abdullah (Balochistan)	1	12	40

Border	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
	South Waziristan	2	3	1
	Total	28	117	102
Pak - India	Bagh (LoC)	1	2	3
	Bhimber (LoC)	21	7	47
	Hattian (LoC)	7	4	15
	Haveli (LoC)	8	6	18
	Kasur (WB)	1	1	0
	Kotli (LoC)	43	15	76
	LoC (Unspecified)	2	2	2
	Muzaffarabad (LoC)	1	0	0
	Narowal (WB)	2	0	3
	Neelum (LoC)	2	4	5
	Okara (WB)	1	0	0
	Poonch (LoC)	28	13	39
	Rawalakot (LoC)	4	5	3
	Sialkot (WB)	10	10	34
	Total	131	69	245
Pak - Iran	Chagai (Balochistan)	2	0	0
	Kech (Balochistan)	2	1	1
	Panjgur (Balochistan)	8	1	0
	Total	12	2	1
Total from 3 borders		171	188	348

CHAPTER 3

Militant landscape of Pakistan in 2017

Muhammad Amir Rana⁵

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2017 has witnessed further decline in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, but the militant groups still pose a potent threat to internal security of the country. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA) and sectarian terrorist groups launched terrorist attacks throughout the year, though with a comparatively less frequency than in previous year. While security forces and law enforcement agencies damaged operational capabilities of some sectarian terrorist groups, few new violent actors emerged or old ones got reactivated.

In 2017, Lashkar Jhangvi lost its operational strength and JuA also failed to keep its operational momentum as of previous years. However, a major change observed in militant landscape was related to widening gulf among the religiously motivated militant groups. In 2016, various militant groups, mainly including Daesh, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Alami, Jundullah, and factions of TTP, had almost agreed to form an operational alliance. But in 2017, these attempts failed because of theological and tactical issues. These developments will be discussed in later part of the report.

Previous year's security review mentioned the ongoing transformation among the militant groups, which continued in 2017, and new changes emerged in the militant landscape of the country. The emergence of a little known militant group Ansarul Shariah in Karachi and increasing footprints of Daesh, an acronym of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in parts of the country indicated the new challenge

for the law enforcement departments of the country.

Among non-religious groups, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) were the leading actors of instability in the Balochistan province.

The chapter will examine some significant developments, which shaped the militant landscape in 2017. It will also focus on changing targets and tactics of the groups and complex case of Daesh in Pakistan.

3.1 Major actors of instability in 2017

3.1.1 Religiously-inspired militant groups

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

In 2017, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) once again proved itself the most lethal militant group in Pakistan and managed 70 terrorist attacks across the country, which claimed 186 lives and left 360 others injured. (See Table 1) As many as 53 of these attacks took place in FATA and KP, but the group also expanded its outreach in Balochistan by launching 11 attacks as well as in Punjab with two major terrorist incidents.

Apparently, TTP carried out 34 percent less attacks comparing 2016 but it has overcome its internal difference and one of its major faction from South Waziristan led by Khalid Mehsud Sajna rejoined the central group, which caused more attacks in FATA; i.e. 31 compared to 25 in 2016.

The merger also contradicted the statement of JuA former spokesperson and its important leader, Ehsanullah Ehsan, which he gave after surrendering to Pakistani security forces in a television talk, that TTP is not a organized movement anymore.¹⁸⁰

To increase its operational strength, TTP also formed a wing of trained suicide commandos, called Taliban Special Group. According to the media reports, the group was tasked to launch operations in Punjab.¹⁸¹ However, security forces dismantled the terrorist cell found involved in a terrorist attack near Arfa Karim tower in Lahore and it was less heard about this special group after that.

But the Counter Terrorism Department Sindh was concerned by the appointment of Dawood Khan as the new TTP chief in Karachi and feared TTP was re-establishing its financial support networks in the city and rebuilding the capability to launch large-scale attacks on public places or security forces.¹⁸²

The major losses TTP suffered in 2017 was the killing of Tariq Geedar group head Umar Mansoor in a drone strike in Afghanistan¹⁸³ He was responsible for the deadliest terrorist attack on Army Public School in Peshawar in 2014.

TTP also launched its first women magazine "Sunnat-i-Khula, attempting to increase its appeal among Muslim

women.¹⁸⁴

Jamaatul Ahrar

In 2017, JuA accepted the responsibility for or was found involved in 37 terrorist attacks comparing 66 in 2016. In these attacks the group killed 123 people and injured 306 others. Most of its attacks remained confined in FATA and KP province where it managed 32 of its total 37 attacks. In FATA its operations were concentrated in Kurram, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies and in KP it launched attacks mostly in Charsadda district.

JuA suffered major losses in 2017 both in terms of internal rifts and killing of its important commanders. Pakistan also got JuA listed as a terrorist group by the U.N. in 2017.¹⁸⁵

JuA lost its seven important commanders in an encounter with Afghan Special Force¹⁸⁶ and its head Omar Khalid Khurasani was also seriously hurt in a drone strike in Afghanistan's Paktika province¹⁸⁷ and one of his close aide and cousin Abdul Rauf was killed in the attack.¹⁸⁸ According to the initial reports, he was killed in the attack, later it emerged he survived. But it further deepened the differences within the group as in his absence a commander Dost Muhammad alias Asad Afridi was announced the new leader. Even after the reports of denial of his death,¹⁸⁹ internal crisis remained. A faction led by

commander Mukarram parted ways and formed a separate group Hizbul Ahrar.¹⁹⁰ The group claimed that it had support from most of senior members of the central committee. Thus the survived JuA leader Omer Khurasani offered to surrender in favor of junior colleague to resolve the disputes. So far new group has not launched any major terrorist attack inside Pakistan.

Earlier, Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, TTP's former spokesperson, after getting assurance from security establishment that he would not face any terrorism or criminal case against him in any court of law including the military court, had surrendered.¹⁹¹

Local Taliban

The small militant groups in KP and FATA, described as the local Taliban,¹⁹² carried out 29 terrorist attacks in 2017. It is an over 50 percent reduction in such attacks launched by Local Taliban groups in 2016. Attacks by these groups caused 17 deaths and injuries to 38 others. The decrease in the attacks by local Taliban indicates not only the better responses by the law enforcement agencies but also decreasing appeal of the violent actors in the areas of FATA and KP, where they had been more active in past.

Lashkar-e-Islam

Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) – a Khyber Agency-based militant group and an important ally

of Islamic State Khurasan chapter in Afghanistan¹⁹³ – was found involved in 21 terrorist attacks in 2017, compared to 18 in 2016. As many as 19 of these attacks were reported from Khyber Agency, which indicates the group still wants to regain its spaces in the area, and 2 in Peshawar's Hayatabad area, adjacent to Khyber Agency. If the group succeeds to reconnect with its support base, it would help Daesh and its Khurasan chapter to expand its outreach inside Pakistan. Daesh could even claim the attacks launched by LI as both are strategic allies.

Daesh

Daesh expanded its operational outreach in Pakistan while conducting 6 major terrorist attacks in 2017, compared to 3 in 2016. These attacks caused 153 deaths and injuries to 380 others. Four of these attacks took place in Balochistan – including a suicide attack on the convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri in Mastung – as well as one attack each in and Sindh. In Sindh, the attack was the deadliest in terms of casualties and targeted a Sufi shrine in Sehwen Sharif. The group also kidnapped two Chinese nationals from Quetta and killed them in Mastung. The increasing attacks by Daesh also indicate that the group may have decreased dependence on local partners and is now actively executing terror plots by itself.

Table 1: Terrorist attacks claimed/perpetrated by terrorist groups

Organization	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad & AJK	KP	Punjab	Sindh (excluding Karachi)	Karachi	Total
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	11	31	-	22	2	-	4	70
Jamaatul Ahrar	3	27	-	5	1	-	1	37
Daesh	4	-	-	1	-	1	-	6
Lashkar-e-Islam	-	19	-	2	-	-	-	21
Local Taliban	-	1	-	28	-	-	-	29
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	6	1	(AJK: 1)	1	-	-	1	10
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami	2	2	1	1	2	-	-	8
Ansarul Shariah	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	41	-	-	-	-	-	1	42
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	39
Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Lashkar-e-Balochistan	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Sindhu Desh Liberation Front (SDLF)	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
Sindhu Desh Revolutionary Army	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
AQIS	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Rival Sectarian group	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	3
Nationalist insurgents	10	-	-	-	-	1	1	12
Unknown militants	10	2	4 AJK: 2 Isb: 2	9	8	1	7	41
Total	165	83	6	71	14	7	24	370

Ansarul Shariah Pakistan

A new group Ansarul Shariah Pakistan (APS) managed 6 terrorist attacks in Karachi, which killed 15 security officials and civilians. The entry of the group caused confusion among law enforcement agencies. Initially security officials believed APS was created by Al-Qaeda¹⁹⁴ to target the security officials but after investigation it was revealed that the group was comprising some self radicalized educated youths who themselves contacted Al-Qaeda for affiliation.¹⁹⁵ It was a unique case that an Al-Qaeda-inspired group emerged in Pakistan, when Daesh was on security radars. The group has been busted which was comprising on around 10 members and almost all its members were taken into custody and being interrogated.¹⁹⁶ The members derived their ideology from Al-Qaeda and operated from their homes in the metropolis.

(For the complete profile of this group, see Dr. Farhan Zahid's "Jamaat ul Ansar al-Sharia – A new endeavor by Al-Qaeda to regain ground" and Syed Arfeen's expert opinion "The tale and context in making of Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan" in this issue)

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) a fatal Sunni sectarian terrorist group, was found responsible for 10 terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Six of these attacks were reported from Balochistan, and one

happened in each of FATA, KP, Karachi and AJK. A faction of LeJ, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami conducted 8 terrorist attacks in all regions of Pakistan except Sindh. When counted together, the attacks by these two LeJ factions claimed 132 lives. About 90 percent of these attacks occurred in first half of the 2017. In subsequent months, frequency of attacks by these two groups scaled down and the major reason was the disruption of their network in Balochistan and Sindh. Sindh police killed a high-profile Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant Kamran Bhatti, provincial chief of Naeem Bukhari faction, who was wanted in many cases of terrorism.¹⁹⁷ The CTD officials in Sindh claimed that the capability of banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi had 'almost' been wiped out in Karachi.¹⁹⁸ But the escape of two "high-profile militants" of LeJ from Karachi's Central Jail caused worries as these militants had reportedly crossed over to Afghanistan from the Chaman border in Balochistan¹⁹⁹ and CTD feared they could reorganize the group. The names of these two terrorists were Shaikh Muhammad Mumtaz, alias Firaun, and Muhammad Ahmed Khan, alias Munna.

Meanwhile, the most wanted terrorists' list of Punjab police indicates that 28 LeJ terrorists are still at large, which include its senior members Matiur Rehman, Mansoor and Qari Ihsan, who were involved in several terror incidents including attacks on some former senior government

officials. The eighth edition of Sindh police's Red Book also includes 11 high profile terrorists' names belonging to LeJ apart from 17 belonging to TTP, 8 to Jundullah and 4 to Daesh.²⁰⁰

Table 2: Casualties in terrorist attacks

Group Responsible	Killed	Injured
TTP	Balochistan: 47 FATA: 62 KP: 40 Karachi: 3 Punjab: 34	Balochistan: 96 FATA: 76 KP: 113 Karachi: 1 Punjab: 74
Jamaatul Ahrar	Balochistan: 20 FATA: 67 KP: 18 Punjab: 16 Karachi: 2	Balochistan: 43 FATA: 156 KP: 36 Punjab: 70 Karachi: 1
BLA	Balochistan: 51	Balochistan: 87
Local Taliban	FATA: 3 KP: 14	KP: 38
BRA	Balochistan: 24	Balochistan: 39
BLF	Balochistan: 48	Balochistan: 65
LeJ	KP: 3 FATA: 2 Karachi: 1 Balochistan: 17	Balochistan: 6 Kashmir: 2
Lashkar-e-Islam	FATA: 17 KP: 1	FATA: 11 KP: 6
Unknown militants	Balochistan: 8 KP: 10 FATA: 1 Karachi: 3 Punjab: 8 AJK: 1 Interior Sindh: 1	Balochistan: 21 KP: 14 Islamabad: 2 AJK: 8 Punjab: 49 Interior Sindh: 1 Karachi: 6

Group Responsible	Killed	Injured
AQIS	Karachi: 1	Karachi: 2
Ansarul Shariah	Karachi: 15	Karachi: 6
Daesh	Balochistan: 60 Sindh: 91 KP: 2	Balochistan: 127 Sindh: 250 KP: 3
SDLF	-	Sindh (excl. Karachi): 25
Nationalist insurgents	Balochistan: 7 Sindh: 2	Balochistan: 22 Sindh (excl. Karachi): 1
Rival sectarian group	Punjab: 1 KP: 2	-
Sipah-e-Muhammad	-	Sindh (excluding Karachi): 1
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami	Balochistan: 3 FATA: 101 Punjab: 2 Islamabad: 2 KP: 1	Balochistan: 6 FATA: 248 Punjab: 1 Islamabad: 3
Lashkar-e-Balochistan	Balochistan: 3	Balochistan: 20

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), the operational front of Al-Qaeda, was found involved in two terrorist attacks on policemen in Karachi. But CTD officials consider the group a potent threat as it has allies in many militant organizations.²⁰¹ However, during last two years, the group remained focused on Afghanistan while recruiting and generating the resources from Pakistan. In 2017, it has suffered losses in Afghanistan where its important

leaders were killed in clashes with security forces or in drone strikes including Osama Mehmud, a Pakistani national and operational commander of the group, Qari Omer alias Qari Hamad, another important commander and Indian national,²⁰² and Omar Khetab (a.k.a. Omar Mansour), “a senior Al-Qaeda leader.”²⁰³ Four leading Al-Qaeda terrorists were also gunned down in Karachi in an encounter with police, including Mullah Akbar Swati, the Karachi chief of AQIS.²⁰⁴

3.1.2 Nationalist insurgent groups

These groups are mainly concentrated in Balochistan province and they follow radical nationalist agendas. Such small groups are also present in Sindh province but their sabotage activities are limited in certain areas. Nationalist insurgent groups mostly use locally-made improvised explosive devices – including landmines – and firing in their small-scale attacks. The destructive edge of the Baloch nationalist insurgent groups, however, increased in 2017 as Baloch Liberation Army, Balochistan Liberation Front and Balochistan Republican Army manage 4 more attacks comparing with 2016. All active Baloch nationalist militant groups were found involved in 132 small and medium scale terrorist attacks in 2017; Sindhi nationalist insurgents launched 6 attacks.

Balochistan Liberation Army

Among Baloch separatist groups, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) remained the most fatal group in Balochistan in 2017, which carried out 42 terrorist attacks, killing 51 people and injuring 87 people. (*See Table 1*) These attacks are lesser comparing with 55 attacks launched by the group in 2016. Quetta, Bolan, Kech, Khuzdar and Kohlu districts in Balochistan were the major areas of operation of this group in 2017.

Baloch Republican Army

Baloch Republican Army (BRA) was found involved in 30 terrorist attacks mainly in Dera Bugti, Nasirabad and Kholu districts of Balochistan. These attacks killed 24 people and injured 39 others.

Lashkar-e-Balochistan

Lashkar-e-Balochistan carried out 9 low-intensity terrorist attacks in 2017. The group was mainly active in Makran coastal belt and neighboring districts.

Balochistan Liberation Front

After BLA, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) was the most active nationalist militant group of the year as it conducted 39 terrorists attacks, compared to 27 attacks in 2016. In these attacks 48 people were killed and 65 got injured. BLF attacks mainly remained confined in the southern coastal Makran belt and Khuzdar. Its operational

capabilities increased because of merger of small insurgent groups in the organization.

Sindhu Desh Liberation Army or Front (SDLA)

The SDLA, also known as SRLF, was believed to be involved in 3 small-scale terrorist attacks in 2017. The number is one down from 2016. The group was involved in attacks on railway tracks, banks and inter-provincial transportation system. A relatively new Sindhi nationalist group Sindhu Desh Revolutionary Army also accepted responsibility of one attack in Karachi.

3.1.3 'Unidentified' militants

The religiously motivated militants, whose group identities and organizational affiliations were not defined or reported by media and law enforcement and security officials, were involved in 41 terrorist attacks across the country. These numbers are much higher comparing 2016 in which such militants conducted 14 attacks. In Balochistan, 10 such incidents were reported about which law enforcement agencies suspected were managed by nationalist and sectarian groups. Nine and 8 attacks were launched by unknown militants in KP and Punjab respectively and prime suspects of these attacks were sectarian groups and Daesh.

3.2 Changing strategies and tactics

Besides 24 suicide blasts, militants employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types in launching 159 attacks. A considerable number of reported attacks in 2017 — 141, or over 38 percent — were incidents of targeted killing or shooting. Other attack tactics used by terrorists included grenade blasts (33), rocket attacks (8), mortar fire (2), missile attacks (one) and sabotage (2 attacks).

Terrorist groups often play a game of bluff to mislead the security agencies and confuse the public. In what has now become a common practice, many of them jump in to claim responsibility after every attack. The practice appears to have become the norm with groups like the militant Islamic State group (Daesh), Jamaatul Ahrar as well as a faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami (LeJ-A). Every attack is followed by a race between them to claim credit. Claims are usually considered authentic only if terrorist groups release details of an operation, such as in the form of videos or pictures. Sometimes, however, bigger groups tactically do not accept responsibility, making the claims of smaller groups seem 'reliable'. This reliability is then taken at face value by security bodies. The so-called security alerts start echoing names of these smaller groups. Obviously then,

investigations into the attack are troubled from the start.

Table 3: Terrorist attacks' tactics in 2017

Tactics	Attacks
FR	141
IED	159
HG	33
RA	8
Suicide Attacks	24
SAB	2
Mortar	2
Missile	1
Total	370

Take the case of LeJ-A's claim about the Parachinar attack in 2017. The group does not have an operational network in the area, but many security officials gave weight to the group's claim because it is considered a strategic partner of the Daesh, which recently tried to expand its outreach to the Tora Bora caves, a part of which lies on the other side of the border between Kurram Agency and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As terrorist attacks rise, groups gain tactical edge by managing bluffs easily and even appear to be expanding their geographical outreach.

3.3 Assessing the Daesh threat

The 2017 was significant in terms of Daesh its control over the territories in Iraq and Syria, which the group held for more than three years. Its military defeat raised

concerns of reassembling of its fighters in Afghanistan. The law enforcement agencies in Pakistan were also cautioned about the return of the local fighters, who had joined the terrorist group during last four years. Law enforcement agencies have made few arrests in this regard, which include the arrest of a widow of Daesh fighter at Sialkot airport. She was deported from Turkey with her four daughters²⁰⁵ and his husband was killed fighting for Daesh in Syria.

However, the 2017 witnessed contradictory developments regarding Daesh influence in Pakistan. Daesh's traditional allies among sectarian militant groups distanced themselves from the Daesh, which gave an impression that the meltdown of Daesh has started in Pakistan. LeJ-A distanced itself from Daesh, and emergence of Ansarul Shariah in Karachi – which not only distanced itself from Daesh but categorically declared an affinity with Al-Qaeda – strengthened the doubts about reducing appeal of Daesh in Pakistan.

Later it appeared that Daesh had changed its strategy and was bringing the cadre of its strategic allies in its fold, rather to develop partnerships with them. The change in the approach annoyed many groups as their members started joining the Daesh. The process mainly happened in Balochistan and northern Sindh where Jundullah and LeJ militants preferred to join the group.

Apart from realignment with local partners, Daesh continued forming independent terrorist cells in Pakistan. Law enforcement agencies have identified following Daesh cells in 2017:

1. **Daesh-KP:** It was a group led by Muhammad Arif, former member of TTP of Tariq Geedar group. Muhammad Farid was identified as the deputy of the group. The cell killed at least 32 people including 15 policemen and five sex workers.²⁰⁶ The same group was suspected in murdering three clerics associated with Afghan Taliban.²⁰⁷ The cell was busted after killing of its members in a series of security forces' operations. The operation against the cell was complex as their members hid themselves among the masses and were using small businesses as a cover.²⁰⁸ They had been operating in Peshawar since 2015 and recruiting from TTP factions. The head of the cell Muhammad Arif was killed in a joint operation by Pakistan military and police, when he was hiding in an under construction floor mill.²⁰⁹ Even after the busting of this cell, law enforcement agencies traced down the recruitment of new members by Daesh in the provincial capital.²¹⁰
2. **Sehwen cell:** The head of this cell was Mustafa Mazari, who planned the Sehwan attack. He was killed in a military operation in Mastung in June 2017. Mazari organized the Sindh and Southern Punjab militants of sectarian terrorist groups and formed the Daesh cell.²¹¹ A CTD study pointed out that Daesh still existed in parts of northern Sindh and was exploiting existing sectarian hatred and divide there.²¹²
3. **Lahore cell:** This cell was led by Ghulam Ghous Kumar, who formed several others cells in Punjab and recruited 30 members for Daesh.²¹³ Reportedly he was recruiting the fighters for Syria. The cell was exposed when it recruited two men from a sub-district of Gujrat in Punjab and sent them to Syria; later their families moved into Afghanistan.²¹⁴
4. **Karachi jail cell:** An active Daesh cell was found in Karachi's Central Jail, where 30 prisoners were in the group and twelve out of them have been released on bail.²¹⁵
5. **Cyber cells:** The law enforcement agencies suspect that Daesh is active in cyber spaces and it has formed several cyber cells in Pakistan. The Daesh Lahore cell head Ghulam Ghous alone recruited 30 members using the Facebook.²¹⁶ Noreen Leghari, a medical student of Liaquat Medical University, Sindh was another victim of Daesh cyber cell. In September, Daesh flag was raised near Islamabad,²¹⁷ and Daesh graffiti appeared in Wah.²¹⁸ The law enforcement agencies perceived these incidents as the symptoms of Daesh indoctrination, which is going

on in cyber spaces. The government officials including law enforcement agencies are also not immune to these threats. Karachi CTD has arrested a provincial government employee, who was running 15 Daesh accounts on social media.²¹⁹

There is a probability that such cells will connect with Daesh chapter based in Afghanistan, commonly known as IS-Khorasan-Pakistan (ISKP). There are reports that the ISKP has lost a significant part of its stronghold in Nangarhaar

province and lost its leader Sheikh Abdul Haseeb.²²⁰ But it is still capable to recover its losses as it is continuously receiving human resources not only from Afghanistan and Pakistan but also from the broader region. Few analysts believes that Af-Pak is among attractive destinations for Daesh, which is on run from Iraq and Syria and bordering region between Afghanistan and Pakistan could provide strategic sanctuaries to it.²²¹ However, Pakistan is fencing its western border to secure the bordering region.²²²

State responses: anti-militant operations and National Action Plan

Safdar Sial*

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4.1 Operational front

Security forces and law enforcement agencies killed a total of 524 militants in 2017 – compared to 809 in 2016 – in military/security operations as well as armed clashes and encounters with the militants. As in previous year, these operations and clashes/encounters were not confined to a particular area or region but were reported from across 4 provinces of Pakistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as given at Tables 1 & 2, respectively.

Furthermore, security and law enforcement personnel, mainly the Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTDs) of police, apprehended a total of 908 suspected terrorists and members of militant groups in 277 search and combing operations conducted all over the country. These search operations do not include several other similar actions in which suspects were arrested and mostly released after preliminary investigation.

Also, security and law enforcement agencies either alone or in collaboration with officials of bomb disposal squads foiled 38 terror bids mainly by defusing IEDs; these also include the incidents where militants failed to reach and hit their targets either due to personal reasons or by intervention by law enforcers.

4.1.1 Military/security operations

Compared to 95 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted a total of 75

operational strikes and raids against militants in 2017, across 28 districts and regions of Pakistan.

Out of these 75 operational strikes, 39 were conducted in Balochistan, 18 in FATA, 8 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 7 in Punjab, and 3 in Sindh. However, relatively more number of militants were killed in FATA, followed by Balochistan, Punjab, KP and Sindh, respectively.

On the whole, these operational strikes killed a total of 296 people including 281 militants (compared to 492 in 2016), 14 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies and one civilian. Those 47 injured in these actions included 18 militants and 29 security personnel.

Table 1: Operational attacks by security forces, against militants and insurgents

Region	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Balochistan	Awaran	5	14	0
	Dera Bugti	11	19	0
	Gwadar	1	1	0
	Harnai	1	10	0
	Kalat	1	1	0
	Kech	10	21	5
	Kohlu	1	1	0
	Mastung	3	17	8
	Nasirabad	1	1	0
	Quetta	3	6	0
	Sibi	2	4	0
	Total	39	95	13

Region	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
FATA	Khyber	9	57	9
	Mohmand	2	41	0
	North Waziristan	2	8	6
	Orakzai	2	6	0
	South Waziristan	1	2	0
	Frontier Regions (FRs)	2	10	0
	Total	18	124	15
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	DI Khan	3	4	3
	Malakand	1	1	0
	Peshawar	1	3	7
	Swabi	2	17	0
	Swat	1	2	0
	Total	8	27	10
Punjab	DG Khan	4	30	3
	Khanewal	1	6	0
	Lahore	1	1	0
	Sheikhupura	1	6	0
	Total	7	43	3
Sindh	Jamshoro	1	0	1
	Karachi	2	7	5
	Total	3	7	6
Total Pakistan		75	296 (281 militant)	47 (18 militants)

Raddul Fasaad (Counter Turmoil/Mayhem) after the terrorists perpetrated some major attacks mainly in Lahore, Sehwan Sharif, KP and FATA. The stated purpose of the operation was to eliminate the residual elements of the terrorists and their support and facilitation structures. Unlike past operations, which were usually restricted to certain area(s), *Raddul Fasaad*, which still continues, entails security operations across Pakistan – mainly in form of search-and-hunt and combing actions against militants and their facilitators.

Around mid-July 2017, the Pakistan Army announced that it had launched a new military operation in Khyber Agency's Rajgal Valley, codenamed **Khyber-IV**. According to military spokesman Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor, who spoke at a press conference at the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) office, "operation Khyber-IV ha[d] been launched in Rajgal which, along with a similar size area in Shawal Valley, is one of the pockets that remain to be cleared."²²³ The area still had hideouts of the banned Lashkar-e-Islam, the Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA), and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Also, Rajgal Valley borders Afghanistan's Nangarhar province where ISIS has established itself, and it was feared that it may connect with terrorist groups like the TTP and the JuA that sympathize with it.

In February, the Pakistan Army Chief announced the launch of Operation

Security forces, on July 23, made further advancement into the tough terrain and

thick forests of Rajgal Valley and surrounding areas near the Pakistani-Afghan border after seizing control of three strategically located heights, Speenkai top, Saparay top and Sattar Kalay, in the cover of heavy artillery and aerial bombing.²²⁴ A number of hideouts and training camps of militants were destroyed in the offensive. Earlier, on July 22, Pakistan Army had announced to have completed the first phase of the operation after gaining the control of a key mountain top and clearance of the areas of Brekh Muhammad Kandao. The ISPR, the media wing of the military, had said that two soldiers were also martyred in the operation in which over 90 square kilometers of a total of 250 square kilometers had been cleared.²²⁵ Earlier in the month of August, security forces claimed they had "cleared almost 90 per cent area of the Rajgal Valley adjacent to Afghanistan's troubled Nangarhar province and troops have taken effective control of important heights."²²⁶ Later, on August 21, army announced the conclusion of the Operation Khyber-IV. The ISPR spokesman said now Pakistan Army was trying to consolidate the gains.

Some main anti-militant operational strikes were also reported from rest of the country. For instance, in 3 separate operations conducted by The Rangers and police in DG Khan between April 9 and 15 killed at least 20 militants including those linked to the BLA, TTP and others. Five

Rangers personnel also lost their lives in these actions. In another security operation conducted in Punjab in the same month, i.e. April, the CTD and intelligence officials killed a militant Ali Tariq in the Factory Area, Lahore and arrested his wife, an ISIS supporter, and an accomplice. The slain terrorist and his accomplices were planning an attack on an Easter-related ceremony in the city. The arrested wife of Ali Tariq, Naureen, confessed that she was to become suicide bomber for the attack. Two suicide vests and four grenades were seized from the house of the slain terrorist.²²⁷

Similarly, on June 3, high-profile militant commanders, affiliates of ISIS, assembled in an area in Mastung in Balochistan for a meeting when security forces launched an extensive operation. At least 12 militant commanders were killed and some others captured including ISIS Sindh chapter chief. Eight troops were also injured in the operation, including two officers. The militants were hiding in a cave and planning for major attacks in Balochistan; the hideouts were being used as an operational base of ISIS and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami.²²⁸

4.1.2 Security forces' clashes and encounters with militants

Apart from the anti-militant operations described earlier, security and law enforcement agencies also engaged in a total of 68 armed clashes and encounters

with militants, which represented a decrease of 35 percent from previous year, across 30 districts/regions of the country.

These clashes and encounters claimed, in all, 251 lives in 2017 – including 243 militants and 8 security personnel – indicating a decrease of near 28 percent in fatalities in such incidents from 2016. As many as 31 others were also injured in these clashes including 24 security and law enforcement personnel, 3 civilians and 4 militants.

The highest number of security forces' clashes and encounters with militants for any one region was recorded in Punjab (22), followed by 20 such incidents in Sindh, including 18 in Karachi alone, and 13 in Balochistan. The highest number of militants killed in such incidents concentrated in Karachi, followed by Punjab. See Table 2 for geographical distribution of reported clashes and encounters between security forces and militants in 2017.

Table 2: Clashes and encounters between security forces and militants

Regions	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Balochistan	Awaran	1	1	0
	Dera Bugti	1	4	0
	Gwadar	1	2	0
	Kech	3	4	4
	Panjgur	1	1	0
	Quetta	4	10	3
	Sibi	1	2	0

Regions	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
	Zhob	1	2	0
	Total	13	26	7
FATA	Khyber	1	6	0
	Kurram	1	8	2
	Mohmand	1	6	0
	South Waziristan	1	2	1
	Total	4	22	3
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Bannu	2	5	0
	D.I Khan	5	12	2
	Kohat	1	1	2
	Tank	1	2	0
	Total	9	20	4
Punjab	DG Khan	2	4	0
	Faisalabad	2	7	0
	Gujrat	3	10	0
	Khanewal	2	7	0
	Multan	3	6	0
	Lahore	5	25	0
	Layyah	1	5	0
	Muzaffargarh	1	6	0
	Rawalpindi	1	2	0
	Sahiwal	1	3	4
	Sheikhupura	1	8	2
	Total	22	83	6
Sindh	Karachi	18	96	11
	Sukkur	2	4	0
	Total	20	100	11
Pakistan Total		68	251 (243 militants)	31 (4 militants)

Some of the reported clashes and encounters between security, law

enforcement agencies and militants are described below:

- February 17: At least 27 suspected militants were killed in encounters with police and Rangers, in Malir and Manghopir localities of **Karachi**. The operations started after Sehwan Sharif suicide blast. Those killed included, according to Rangers, Malik Tassaduq — Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); Naushad Khan alias Mama — JuA and LeJ; Shiraz Ahmed — LeJ and the ISIS; Azizullah — the TTP and LeJ; Sherzad — JuA and LeJ; Amin alias Kala — JuA and LeJ; Arman Ahmed — LeJ and ISIS; Yasir Siddiqi — JuA and ISIS.²²⁹
- February 22: The police conducted a raid on the hideout of militants of the TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar in Malir, **Karachi**, who were planning major terrorist acts at sensitive installations. Eight militants were killed including a former TTP local chief Gul Zaman and a suicide bomber. The police also seized a 'laptop bomb', weapons and ammunition.²³⁰
- March 6: The CTD of police claimed to have killed Dildar alias Chacha, head of a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Naeem Bukhari) cell and detained four of his accomplices after an encounter at their hideout in Korangi area of **Karachi**.²³¹
- April 8: According to police, a CTD team was taking five arrested Jamaatul Ahrar militants including Anwarul Haq, mastermind of Feb 13 Lahore attack, to Manawan, **Lahore** for seizing weapons and explosives when they were attacked near Ring Road by nine terrorists. In the retaliatory fire, 10 terrorists were killed, including Haq and facilitators of the Lahore attack.²³²
- April 10: The CTD claimed to have killed a high-profile Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant Kamran Bhatti, provincial chief of Naeem Bukhari faction and wanted in cases of terrorism, in an encounter on Stadium Road in **Sukkur**, interior Sindh.²³³
- April 19: The CTD officials killed 8 suspected terrorists in an encounter in **Sheikhupura** (Punjab); 2 CTD personnel were also injured. Meanwhile 4 terrorists managed to escape. The terrorists had planned a major attack in Lahore.²³⁴
- September 4: Police and intelligence officials conducted a raid in a housing society in **Karachi** to arrest Abdul Karim Sarosh Siddiqui, a suspected militant of Ansarul Shariah who masterminded the attack on MQM leader Khawaja Izhar. In the crossfire, one intelligence official and two policemen sustained bullet wounds and one of them, identified as Constable Aijaz, died. The militant managed to escape.
- October 22: Eight suspected militants belonging to the Ansarul Sharia Pakistan militant group were shot dead

in an encounter with Pakistan Rangers, Sindh and the police's Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) in Baldia's Raees Goth in **Karachi**. Two personnel of the paramilitary force and one policeman were injured during the heavy exchange of fire.²³⁵

4.1.3 Terrorists arrested

A total of 908 suspected terrorists and members of militant groups were arrested in 277 search and combing operations conducted by security and law enforcement personnel all over the country. As cited earlier, these search operations do not include several other similar actions in which suspects were arrested and mostly released after preliminary investigation.

Those arrested included 243 suspected militants linked to different TTP factions as well as local Taliban groups. As many as 191 among those detained were reportedly affiliated with different [unspecified] banned militant groups, and another 147 were suspected members of various Baloch insurgent groups. (See Table 3)

Table 3: Suspected terrorists arrested in 2017

Militant Organization or Association	Search Operations & Raids	Terrorists Arrested
Afghan militants	4	10
Al-Qaeda	4	9
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent	1	2

Militant Organization or Association	Search Operations & Raids	Terrorists Arrested
Ansarul Shariah Pakistan	10	34
Banned militant outfits (inclusive of all)	42	191
BLA	4	17
BLF	2	9
BRA	4	24
Foreign militants (excluding Afghans)	1	1
Hafeez Pandrani Barohi group	1	3
Hizb-ul-Tahreer	1	1
Indian Intelligence Agency (RAW)/Facilitators	1	3
ISIS	18	55
Jamaatul Ahrar	16	39
Lashkar-e-Islam	2	3
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	28	64
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami	1	2
Local Taliban / TTP	106	243
Nationalist insurgents	14	147
Shia sectarian group	1	1
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan	2	5
Suspected spies	1	1
Unknown militants	13	44
Total	277	908

In April, ISPR director general Major General Asif Ghafoor stated that former spokesman of the TTP and a senior leader of Jamaatul Ahrar Ehsanullah Ehsan "had turned himself in to Pakistan's security agencies." He described it a big

achievement that the people "who've been planning attacks on Pakistan's soil from across the border have started to see that the situation has changed."²³⁶ On April 26, Pakistan Army released a video showing the confessional statement of Ehsanullah Ehsan. With real name Liaquat Ali, Ehsanullah Ehsan made some startling revelations, including the claim that the "TTP and JuA have been coordinating with Indian and Afghan security agencies to move freely in Afghanistan and have been guided by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India's apex spy agency, in infiltrating into Pakistan."²³⁷ Ehsan, also said that "these [militant] organisations have twisted Islam to suit their own ends and are actively looking to recruit young men and women through propaganda and false interpretations of Islam spread through social media."²³⁸

4.1.4 Failed/foiled terror bids

Meanwhile, 38 terrorist attempts were thwarted by the security forces, either independently or in collaboration with officials of bomb disposal squads, mostly by defusing the IEDs. (See Table 4)

Table 4: Failed/foiled terror bids in 2017

District	Bids Foiled	Killed	Intended Target
Awaran	1	1	Unknown
Bannu	1	0	Civilians
Bolan	1	0	Railway tracks, trains

District	Bids Foiled	Killed	Intended Target
Dera Bugti	2	0	Unknown
Hangu	1	0	Civilians
Jamshoro	1	0	Educational institutions
Karachi	1	0	Worship places, shrines, imambargahs
Kech	1	0	Govt. officials
Khairpur	1	0	Civilians
Khyber Agency	2	0	Civilians, media, journalists
Kohat	1	0	Civilians
Lahore	1	0	Govt. installation
Lakki Marwat	1	0	Civilians
Mardan	1	0	Civilians
Mastung	1	0	Judges/lawyers /courts
Nasirabad	3	0	Civilians, railway tracks, trains
North Waziristan Agency	2	0	Civilians
Peshawar	5	0	Civilians, worship places, shrines
Qilla Abdullah	1	0	Political leaders/workers
Qilla Saifullah	1	0	Civilians
Quetta	4	0	Civilians, govt. installations Railway track, trains, security forces
Rajanpur	1	0	Railway tracks, trains
Rawalpindi	2	0	Unknown
Sibi	1	0	Civilians

District	Bids Foiled	Killed	Intended Target
Zhob	1	0	Security forces/law enforcement
Total	38	1	

4.2 Implementation on National Action Plan – 2017

The National Action Plan (NAP) has completed its three years. A major hurdle in the way of effective implementation of the NAP was the lack of a centralized mechanism. To deal with the issue, National Security Committee has given this task to Federal Interior Minister, Ahsan Iqbal to convene the implementation of NAP with the assistance of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA).²³⁹ Previously this task was with the National Security Advisor to the PM Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nasser Khan Janjua. Still, there is

confusion over the precise works of Interior Ministry, NACTA, NSA, provincial apex committees, and the implementing committees formed when NAP was conceived first in 2014.

Yet another common trend in some of the progress made is that while claims are made that the government bodies have formulated policies or initiatives against different aspects of the NAP, those policies or initiatives are still not release in the public domain. Examples include status of FATA, progress on madrassah reforms, national counter-extremism policy, among other things.

4.2.1 Overview of progress on NAP points

Following chart provide an overview of the implementation of NAP in 2017. The report also contains official data of NAP implementation since its inception in 2015.

Table 4: National Action Plan in 2017 – Summary

No	Point	2017
1	Death penalty	According to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 44 militants have been executed in 2017. Of these, 80 percent were not “jet black terrorists”, but criminals.
2	Military courts	The tenure of military courts, which were set to expire in January 2017, has been extended for two more years; additionally, 11 new courts have been notified.
3	Militant outfits and armed gangs	Actions are being taken against anti-Pakistan group; even new ones like Ansar-ul-Sharia are not spared. Yet, question marks on tackling all, including those attacking out of Pakistan, remains.

No	Point	2017
4	NACTA	NACTA launched a new website with details of its actions with regards to NAP. NACTA claims Rs. 1528.727 million has been demanded for the year of 2017-18 of which Rs. 1,643.019 million has been approved and Rs. 530.839 million has been released. ²⁴⁰ NACTA also claims the Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) is also being staffed and has received its first office building as well as initial group of officers. ²⁴¹
5	Hate literature/speech	Calls are made to implement the existing laws, but the proper of vague definition "hate speech" remains; a law is direly needed to this end.
6	Terror financing	The State Bank of Pakistan inaugurated a data center to track down money laundering and terror financing. The challenge is to track down the non-banking channels. NACTA has taken following measures in this regard: 1. Model law for facilitation and regulations of charities, 2. National Task Force on choking terror financing, 3. Regulation and Monitoring of cross-border movement of currency, 4. Developing units CFT units in provincial CTD's. ²⁴²
7	Action against defunct militant groups	Some militant groups made news for trying to contest as political parties. Although this process is termed as mainstreaming by some, in reality, the groups did not shun the parochial worldview. Election Commission of Pakistan disallowed one such party from registering, due to which its candidate tried to contest as independent, exposing the loopholes.
8	Establishing a dedicated counterterrorism force	The government claims to have established such forces in all provinces. Apparently, these have been established inside the police, which themselves need reforms.
9	Counter extremism and protection of minorities	There were several high-profile incidents of faith-based agitations or killings. Such actions were seen as direct warning to minorities. Even the government seemed unable to control that; government's own office holders were issued threats.
10	Registration and regulation of religious seminaries	A fresh survey has been conducted internally: there are 3.8 million students in 35,000 seminaries. Government claims to have made headway in mainstreaming madrassah students, with an attempt to providing them equal opportunities in the future, though exact details are not publicly released.
11	Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist groups through print and electronic media	The regulator of electronic media has been quick in issuing warnings to channels broadcasting what is considered as hate speech. However, print media remains divisive, with outfits themselves publishing their own magazines.

No	Point	2017
12	FATA reforms and repatriation of IDPs	Speculations were rife about possible merger of FATA with KP. The status was kept in limbo, after ruling parties' allies called for exploring other options. Meanwhile, in December, it emerged that the Prime Minister might have administrative reforms in FATA such as scrapping the existing Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). A report in December even claimed that the National Implementation Committee (NIC) on Fata Reforms has endorsed the merger of FATA with KP and has also agreed to let FATA elect 23 members to the KP Assembly in the 2018 general elections. Yet, another report revealed that the federal government has converted the NIC on Fata Reforms into a cabinet body. The details of any such approval, however, did not come from the government.
13	Dismantling communication networks of terrorists	Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), telecom's regulator, has been blocking more open channels of communication such as blocking SIMs. Nonetheless, doubts remain over the capacity of government in taking action against encrypted communication among terrorists.
14	Countering terrorism in cyber spaces	The concern that Pakistan Electronic Crime Act might be misused, owing to its wide-ranging definition of terrorism, seemed somewhat true when it emerged that some rights activists or critics of state's policies might be booked against this law.
15	Countering extremism in Punjab	Government claims to be taking across-the-board action, with some operations too undertaken. While the government has been placing individuals on fourth schedule list, which bars their easy movement, one such individual led a sit-in in Islamabad, after traveling in Lahore; reportedly, several of his other allies were released from the list.
16	Karachi operation	There has been decline in violence in Karachi, with the Rangers taking credit. However, the motive of law-enforcement agencies always came into question in the tug-of-war between central and Sindh government.
17	Political reconciliation in Balochistan	Several Baloch separatists surrendered. Largely, political reconciliation process was nowhere in sight, as it used to be two years ago.
18	Countering sectarianism	Sectarian environment remains, not only due to internal factors but also because of the broader regional politics in the Middle East. Sectarian and sub-sectarian parties are becoming part of mainstream politics, either by trying to ally with dominant parties or forming their own parties and alliance.
19	Policy on Afghan refugees	The Proof of Registration of Afghan refugees will expire on Dec. 31, after which it is expected the registration will be extended for yet another year or six month. The extensions put refugees in precarious situation, awaiting any durable solution.
20	Reforming criminal justice system	A committee has been constituted under the Prime Minister, but details are awaited. The higher courts were mostly engaged in high-profile political cases.

4.2.2 Progress on National Action Plan, as per Government of Pakistan

Various actions by the federal and provincial governments fall under different points of NAP. Data of these actions are documented at central level and marked against different points of NAP. Below are the summaries of the progress on each points of NAP as documented by the government. This has been compiled by the office of National Security Advisor:

1: Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism

Total cases considered: 621	621
Total cases approved: 465	465
Cases approved in 2017	135

2: Special trial courts under the supervision of army

Special Trial Courts notified	11
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3: Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	ICT	GB	AJK	FATA	Total
Combing	108,180	60,807	38,413	1698	926	1136	498	602	212,260
Stop and Search	3821324	116600	2887	16760	12276	4671	4006	166	3978690
Arrests	21632	77218	184538	9200	4448	690	1667	1551	300944
IBOs	2062	239	1164	8979	280	22	43	71	12860
Helpline	2911	211	296	57	196	4	18	8	3701
Intelligence Shared	407	989	1279	609	184	171	163	1276	5078

4: NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution, will be strengthened

Tasks	Progress
Office Space	Buildings allotted/hired, renovation in progress
Budget 2016/17	Demanded: PKR 1559.0 million Released: PKR 1545.5 million
Budget 2017/18	Demanded: PKR 1643.019 million Released: PKR 530.839 million

5: Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	ICT	GB	AJK	Total
Hate speech	958	106	210	51	13	241	11	1373
Arrests	2042	64	364	48	4	35	9	2566
Misuse of loud speaker	10379	1027	6952	113	106	7	103	18687
Arrests	10987	803	7257	97	28	21	229	19422
Premises sealed	41	-	-	25	-	1	3	70
Material/equipment confiscated	1085	15	6256	1200 books, 383 items	-	13	110	7479

- NACTA is developing an application for reporting against hate speech/content
- NACTA has launched a social media campaign "Surf Safe" for reporting and profile TUI (Terrorist Use of Internet)
- Registration of complaint from the general public against hate speeches on NACTA helpline 1717

6: Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations

Activity initiative	Status
Choking Financing for Terrorism (CTF) Units in provincial CTDs	Established (Need for strengthening)
Task force on CFT to coordinate efforts of all stakeholders	Established at NACTA, 3 monthly meetings held
Model law for regulation and facilitation of charities	Shared with provinces for implementation
Asia Pacific Group (APG) Mutual Evaluation 2018	Preparations in progress with federal and provincial stakeholders
Curbing collection of donation by illegal entities	Meeting with stakeholders scheduled to discuss "Alternatives for disposal of animal hides"
Policy on branchless banking	Prepared, shared with SBP for implementation
Obligatory Money Declaration	Implemented
Hawala Hundi	Cases: 919 Arrests: 1209 Recovery: 1489.918 million
Anti-money laundering	Cases: 426 Arrests: 574
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR)	STRs received from FMU: 207 Converted into cases: 49 Closed: 48 Under process: 110

7: Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations

- 4th schedule total activists: 8374
- Number of accounts frozen: 5089
- Amount frozen: Rs. 157 million
- Following actions have been taken against proscribed persons:
 - o Passport/Travel embargo
 - o Freezing of bank accounts
 - o Ban on financial support and services by financial institutions
 - o Arms license embargo
 - o Provincial governments to enforce legal action under ATA 1997

8: Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	ICT	GB	AJ&K
Sanctioned strength	5000	1000	2206	2000	970	-	500
Present	4300	728	2080	1000	378	168	260

9: Taking effective steps against religious persecution

- Data of all cases of religious persecution being collected from provinces by NACTA

10: Registration and regulation of religious seminaries

- Registration and data forms finalized in consultation with Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), federal and provincial stakeholders
- It has been shared with provinces for implementation

11: Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media

- Strict implementation of ban on electronic media of activists of proscribed organizations.
- Any violation is instantly reported to concerned quarters and action taken.
- Visible improvement noticed.
- NACTA has identified periodicals/books containing hate content. List is being shared with the provinces with the request for taking legal action against publishers/printing progress.

12: Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPS

- Federal Cabinet has approved in principle recommendations of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) reforms committee. Implementation in progress.

13: Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely

- 291.1 million Sims issued.
- 78 million Sims blocked.
- Biometric verification system in place.
- Loopholes in the system identified by NACTA. PTA has been requested to address the issue.

14: Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism

- 1,447 URLs with extremist content have been blocked by PTA.
- NACTA/FIA coordinating on the issue. Three meetings have been held.
- Tat'heer (literal meaning "to sanitize") is a multi-pronged Cyber Counter-Terrorism (Cyber CT) drive by NACTA which includes mapping of radical content available on internet/ social media and their countering.

15: Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab

- Due to massive operations 278 militants/ terrorists killed and 898 arrested, resulting in improvement of security situation.

16: Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end

Area	Status
Target killing	97 % down
Murder	87 % down
Terrorism	98 % down
Robberies	52 % down
Weapons recovered	33,378

17: Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders

- Surrender and reconciliation/ rehabilitation of "Farraris/ outlaw in progress.
- Initiation of dialogue with exiled Baloch leaders.

18: Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists

- Drastic decline in sectarian terrorism

19: Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees

- Total registered Afghan refugees= 1,386,985.
- Total estimated un-registered refugees (approx.) = 600,000.
- Total Afghan refugees repatriated under UNHCR plan voluntary= 4,360,187.
- The Federal Cabinet approved the repatriation and management policy.
- POR cards valid upto 31-12-2017, visa forms developed.
- Tripartite agreement for voluntary repatriation has been extended for one more year.
- The ministry of SAFRON in consultation with NADRA has finalized

- an operational plan for documentation of unregistered Afghan refugees.
 - Draft National Refugee Law has been prepared by SAFRON and shared with stakeholders.
 - implementation plan in consultation with all stakeholders now submitted to competent authority.
 - NACTA has requested PM Office to extend timeline of the Criminal Justice System Improvement Committee (CJSIC) and NACTA to be made part of it.
- 20: Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system**
- Recommendations of NACTA on Criminal justice System along with

Security of CPEC in 2017

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Introduction

More attacks on Chinese workers were reported this year compared to previous year. Except for Punjab, all areas reported incidents of violence – although infrequently. To protect Chinese workers, provincial governments started raising their own forces, which, it appears, will serve in addition to the existing military-run force. Officials pointed fingers at external hands, notably India. American defence secretary's reservation over the larger project of which CPEC is a part, also drew criticism in Pakistan.

Security incidents

Concerns about security of CPEC workers did emerge from Balochistan and Sindh. In Balochistan's case, some concerns were indirect.

One direct attack in Balochistan occurred in October, when some unknown people threw a hand grenade at Gwadar Port, injuring 26 workers.²⁴³

Yet another incident happened in May, when two Chinese nationals were abducted from Quetta and killed a month later, by the militant Islamic State (IS).²⁴⁴ Even though it emerged that the two Chinese were not in Quetta for business purpose, the abduction nonetheless raised worries about security to Chinese in the province.

At least, two incidents of attacks indirectly linked to CPEC were noted too. Those

killed in the attacks were labourers, who were working on a road that, in turn, was linked to another CPEC project. One of these was carried out in Gwadar at a road; another too on a road, connecting Gwadar to Quetta. The first attack was claimed by separatist BLA, and the claimant of the second is unknown.^{245 246}

These attacks were not directly on CPEC; non-Baloch workers have been a target, especially by separatists. At the same time, however, the incidents call for taking steps that don't led influx of workers from outside the province, to spill into any untoward situation.

Attacks in Sindh were more direct and against Chinese nationals. In July, one Chinese worker, along with his security guard, was shot and injured by the unidentified motorcyclists in Ghotki.²⁴⁷ In the same month, an improvised explosive device (IED) along the road tried to target the Chinese working on CPEC projects in Thatta; this attack, which failed, was claimed by Sindh Revolutionary Army (SRA), a separatist group, as per a senior police official.

A newspaper report detailed that Sindh law enforcement agencies have adopted strict measures against Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM), another separatist outfit, primarily for sabotaging CPEC projects and workers in the region.²⁴⁸

A train accident in Sattiana resulted in loss of two Chinese engineers.²⁴⁹

From KP, in August, 4 employees of a Chinese oil and gas company were abducted from the area close to semi-tribal area of Tank and Lakki Marwat. These include a Chinese too. All the 4 were recovered by security forces the next month.²⁵⁰

Punjab remained largely safe for CPEC. There was one incident, of abduction of a CPEC worker from Attock, but even that crime was filed against suspicious colleagues.

Security measures

In 2017, the security apparatus meant to secure CPEC was further increased, this time by each provincial government increasing their force and by the central SSD recruiting more personnel.

In June, the KP government set up the special security force of around 4,000 personnel to ensure the security of foreigners, mainly Chinese working under the CPEC.²⁵¹ Of these, 1,500 personnel have been freshly inducted, while the rest 2,500 cops were acquired from the police, as per a government official.²⁵² In what appears to be related development, the government has allocated around 1 billion rupees for security of CPEC, with some saying it is meant for establishing the force, others say it is meant for buying training equipment; it could possibly be a mixture of both.²⁵³

One Special Protection Union, with 700 security personnel, has been set up for the CPEC security in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).

Meanwhile, two Special Protection Units have been set up for the security of CPEC in Sindh. This is in addition to a protective division of 2600 police officers to protect Chinese workers in the province. Police department was also asked to set up jammers in vehicles with Chinese workers.²⁵⁴

Punjab government assigned CPEC security to the already-functional Dolphin forces.²⁵⁵ This force was originally set up to deal with street crime in urban Punjab, notably Lahore.

Meanwhile, Punjab government assured to deploy the officials of Special Protection Unit (SPU) at Islamabad and Lahore airports to collect the data of visiting Chinese and other foreigners working on CPEC.²⁵⁶ The existing SPU in Punjab was meant for the security of VIPs.

All these forces are in addition to the already-existent Special Security Division (SSD) and Navy's Task Force-88, the latter though is meant for security of sea lanes. In August 2017, a total of 15,000 military personnel were deployed as part of the SSD and maritime security force.²⁵⁷

In 2017, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) ensured security to CPEC projects; this essentially meant that all three armed forces have stepped into securing the CPEC. An air

force official underlined untapped potential of “aerial dimension of CPEC”, recommending that a working group involving PAF and Aviation Division be formed for this purpose.^{258 259}

This wide apparatus have different lines of authority: SPUs come under the provincial government, while the SSD comes under the Interior Ministry; at the same time, while the provincial SPUs are essentially civilian in nature, the SSD is military-manned. It is important that the prevalence of so many bodies meant to secure CPEC do not result into overlap, confusion, or finger pointing in the time of crisis.

One of the suggested ways is to clearly identify the roles of these different bodies. SPUs are reported meant for protecting Chinese workers, but so is the SSD.²⁶⁰ The SSD is also being held responsible for the security of the area within a 5-km radius of CPEC-related projects. That could be one of the differences, but more clarity is clearly sought.

Lately, data about Chinese workers is also being acquired. After it was reported that the Chinese couple killed in Balochistan were not in Pakistan for business purpose, interior ministry announced establishing a databank of Chinese nationals in Pakistan and even to revise the visa issuance policy for foreigners, particularly Chinese. The status of these initiatives, databank and visa revision, is unknown.

From China’s side, its embassy has been trying to stay in touch with Chinese nationals working in Pakistan; all those who disembark at airports in Pakistan are given a leaflet with information about the embassy. In 2017, the embassy issued what appeared to be a high-level alert warning of a “series of terrorist attacks”.²⁶¹

China also offered assistance to Pakistan in capacity building of their civil armed forces, besides offering skill development training to officials of SSD and other law-enforcement agencies.^{262 263}

International context

Pakistani officials tend to point towards the external threats or challenges confronting CPEC.

Of these, India is ranked as the top one. Pakistan says that India has not perceived CPEC a project of regional connectivity but opposed it under the garb of sovereignty issue by objecting to the territory through which it traverses. In 2017, serious allegations against India’s design against CPEC were made: Pakistan’s army official alleged India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had established a cell in Balochistan in 2015 dedicated to sabotage CPEC;²⁶⁴ further, GB police claimed to have curbed a plan of RAW meant to sabotage the projects.²⁶⁵

Pakistan was also dismayed at US Secretary of Defence expressing concern

on Belt and Road Initiative for its passage through disputed territory. To Pakistan, the statement reflected the closeness of US and India on the issue, despite many other US officials being supportive of CPEC.

Meanwhile, Afghan government declared it will not join CPEC unless Pakistan allows its route to Afghanistan for transiting to India.²⁶⁶ Afghanistan was largely enthusiast about opening of Chahbahar port in Iran.

However, Iran underlined that Chahbahar and CPEC ports will "complement each other in cooperative framework."²⁶⁷ This position is maintained by Pakistan too; a Pakistani minister was at the opening ceremony of Chahbahar too.²⁶⁸

Largely though US top official's concern to BRI, Afghanistan's conditional support to CPEC, and Indian resentment have added into national security concerns. In fact, attacks inside Pakistan, especially in

Balochistan, are even clubbed with the broader geo-strategic reading.

Conclusion

CPEC has been facing variety of security challenges at both internal and external fronts. The government of Pakistan has adopted various security measures such as by establishing SSD and SPUs. At the same time, it is essential that government pays heed to domestic concerns that have contributed in raising internal security concerns for CPEC.

Additionally, there is no clarity about assigned budget for the SPU and SSD; at the same time, people are concerned about a decision of letting power producers charge consumers via tariff to raise budget for the CPEC security.

Moreover, Pakistan and China should organize a joint security mechanism to deal with the security challenges at domestic and international fronts.

CHAPTER 6

Securing Pakistan Interview with **Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nasser Khan Janjua,** National Security Advisor



Conducted by:
**Muhammad Amir Rana and
Muhammad Ismail Khan***

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This interview was conducted in December 2017.

National Security Advisor explains:

- National security is an all-encompassing area that should aim at securing common people of Pakistan.
- Issues like climate change, human resource development, energy security – these and other similar issues should be considered in national security.
- Our future is in becoming a massive trade corridor.
- In our immediate neighbourhood, the goal for Afghan conflict should be its closure, rather than victory.
- National Action Plan should be looked at as a long-term plan. Extremist thoughts, grounded in certain religious interpretation, cannot be dealt with in haste, as that can divide us further.
- Our fight with militants is about narratives, and there cannot be two narratives in one religion. A peaceful narrative could be: دین کا غلط استعمال نہ کریں (stop misusing religion).
- Madrassah students should be mainstreamed, thereby providing them with equal opportunities.
- Further efforts have to be made to consolidate successes in Balochistan.
- Cracking down on all outfits require a well-devised strategy.
- Our own people be dealt with honour and respect.
- Pakistan is a great country with great and resilient people. We have everything; we only need to reform ourselves. Also, we should bear in mind that we are morally-correct nation: we also stood on the right side of history; we stood with Afghans after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and with international community after the 9/11 attacks.

PIPS: Every now and then, question marks are raised on NAP. Why so?

NSA: Whenever there is a terrorist attack, or there are sightings of proscribed organizations, or there is any slight manifestation of extremism, people will start questioning the efficacy of NAP and saying that the plan has simply failed. In short, today, NAP is viewed as a quick remedy to all ills. Instead, it should be looked at as a long-term plan.

National Action Plan has twenty points. In essence, these are 20 vacuums of our society, each one needing a separate plan. And those 20 points then need to be pursued at national and provincial levels.

PIPS: Despite successes claimed by Operation Zarb-e-Azb and 4 operations in Khyber Agency, more people have been killed in FATA in 2017 in terrorism-related incidents, compared to 2016. How do you view that?

NSA: Well, it is little realized that our enemy – the militants – has transited to another sovereign country. Pakistan has successfully conducted [anti-militant] operations on its territory, including in North Waziristan, once considered as bastion of militancy. But we cannot conduct operations across the border. There, the enemy is well protected and supported, due to

which they sometime succeed in carrying out one odd attack.

Secondly, it is not that terrorists are having their field days. They are on the run. What is not realized that many, many attacks have been foiled, and are continued to be foiled. Law-enforcement agencies have been carrying combing operations, intelligence-based operations, and other raids regularly – all meant to mitigate the threat.

PIPS: You have recently been tasked to formulate or finalize the National Security Policy? Can you share the update?

NSA: The policy has been formulated and is being forwarded to relevant committees. It will most likely be released in 2018. As to the broader framework, I have provided my input, calling for all encompassing framework of security including food security, energy security, taking stock of regional and global dynamics. *(Views of NSA on what constitutes security and how Pakistan should respond, are provided ahead.)*

PIPS: Who is responsible for National Action Plan – you, the NSA; apex committees, or NACTA? Are the roles clearly defined? Does it result in overlap or buck passing?

NSA: In 2016, I was tasked as convener of NAP. Recently, in December 2017, the government has tasked

Interior Minister to serve as convener of National Action Plan. My role, National Security Advisor's, will be to assist Interior Minister on NAP.

In the provinces, chief ministers are conveners of NAP in their provinces. When it comes to implementation, most of the issues of NAP are devolved to the provinces. Foremost among them are education and police departments.

PIPS: What about apex committees?

NSA: Apex committee is entirely different forum at provincial level. It will continue. It discusses security situation in general, not specific to NAP.

PIPS: As convener of task force on NAP, you were asked to "speed up" the pace of NAP implementation. Why is it slow in the first place? Which issues are difficult to handle?

NSA: As I said, NAP is a long-term plan and should be viewed thus. Secondly, those points of NAP that touch upon extremist thoughts are highly sensitive; one way or the other, they are linked with religious thought and interpretation. If we go faster, i.e. unprepared, on those points, we can falter; there is even fear of further dividing our society.

These include cracking down on hate speech, for instance. Books published by one sub-sect as refutation of another sub-sect, are purely on doctrinal issues. Would that qualify as hate speech? And how do you stop that? The challenge is faced not only in Pakistan, but across the Muslim world. When it comes to such thoughts, NAP cannot simply mitigate them by a single stroke. Such thoughts have emerged in the last 40 years.

PIPS: And what do you think should be done to that end?

NSA: To counter such thought, we need to come up with a pro-peace narrative. When I was serving in Swat, I realized, at the end of the day, our fight with militants is about narratives, and there cannot be two narratives in one religion. A peaceful narrative could be this: دین کا غلط استعمال نہ کریں (stop misusing religion).

PIPS: What about "madrassah reforms"? You have also presented your findings on upgrading madrassas. Can you elaborate?

NSA: For madrassah students, it is not appropriate to use the term "madrassah reforms." They say they are teaching religion. A more appropriate term could be "educational reforms." When it

comes to the issue of madrassah students, the goal is to mainstream them, providing them with equal opportunity. Madrassah administrators have agreed to teach their students English, Mathematics, General Science, and Pakistan Studies. Once they undertake examinations in these subjects, madrassah students will be awarded with additional degree by education boards of respective provinces.

By way of these reforms, madrassahs students will be able to opt for technical education and even read upto achieve M.Phil and PhD. Provinces will fund these madrassahs as a state responsibility and devolved subject.

Moreover, a survey of madrassahs has also been conducted: there are 3.5 million madrassah students in around 38,000 madrassahs. In the future, it is hoped madrassah students can join any profession and any field. The suggestion has been shared with madrassah educational boards. It will be released after consultations, in 2018.

PIPS: There were significant cross-border fires from India in 2017. How do you view that?

NSA: India has been trying to heat up the Line of Control so as to divert

attention from the real, larger issue of Kashmir. India has been trying to dub whatever happens in Kashmir as terrorism. They say there is infiltration, so as to paint black Pakistan. By terming the issue as pertaining to border, the entire cause of Kashmir is reduced. By heating up the LoC, India is enabling itself to blame Pakistan.

PIPS: What about other points of NAP like glorification of militants on media?

NSA: While media have been keeping militants off the screen, there are on and off reports that tend to give the militants some breath. This is often because these militant groups keep media in stress. The ultimate goal should be to keep militants invisible in light of the UN resolution.

PIPS: Ever since you served as Commander Southern Command, you have been expressing optimism about situation in Balochistan. This despite that Balochistan has been facing most incidents of violence compared to others? Why is so?

NSA: Well, situation in Balochistan did change when I was there. The larger issue in Balochistan was that Pakistan's flag had been burnt and people had refused to sing

national anthem. Alhamdullilah, people have now picked up the flag of Pakistan and are singing national anthem everywhere. That is why I am optimistic about Balochistan, that we have reversed a huge distance from burning of Pakistani flag to raising it once again.

But I was not alone. Everyone played a positive role – the chief minister, military, law-enforcement agencies, FC and above all, people of Balochistan, its youth and children. The positive change is owed to them.

I would like to say, "I love you, Balochistan". Balochistan is now ringing with slogans of *Jeevay Balochistan* and *Jeevay Pakistan*.

PIPS: What about political reconciliation in Balochistan, as enlisted in NAP?

NSA: Around 2,000 separatists have surrendered in the last few years; this in a way is a result of reconciliation.

When it comes to top leaders of the separatists, patronage provided to them by different countries is an issue. To this end, country-to-country engagements are undertaken; countries are told not to prefer individual over state.

Also, bringing the top leaders back to Pakistan can cut both ways –

they can secure peace with us or give a fillip to violence. This has to be weighed properly.

PIPS: The FATA reforms committee, of which you were a member, recommended mainstreaming FATA. Still, there is no progress. What are the main obstacles?

NSA: Undertaking reform process may take time. The concern is – what if the reforms once implemented face resistance? That is why the government feels that political consensus and people support is critical. That is why the government is convincing its political allies.

As far as the future status is concerned, the FATA reforms committee (of which I was a member) recommended mainstreaming, with merger as one of the three options. One has to keep in mind that KP, like FATA, is not much developed. The actual plan was to develop FATA first, bring it at par with KP and then merge. On ground, however, merger finds more acceptance.

PIPS: What about cracking down on all outfits? Is that being done?

NSA: A decision taken in haste can be counter-productive. The state is already cracking down the anti-Pakistan groups. For all the successes against them, a lot still

needs to be done. In such a context, cracking down those groups who do not attack inside Pakistan can backfire. In any case, for any government, it will be difficult to be seen as compromising Kashmir issue; the government, like the society in general, is stuck with Kashmir. It will be inadvisable to put everything on fire, especially when even Taliban could not be eliminated completely. Cracking down on all outfits required a well-devised strategy.

PIPS: And is there any strategy in mind? Are soft approaches being adopted?

NSA: Well, a lot of our attention has been towards hard approaches. A thought should also be given to adopting soft approaches, that is,

convincing the groups to lay down arms.

The purpose of such an exercise [of pursuing soft approaches] should be that others fall down too, kick-starting a trend. In Balochistan, around 2,000 individuals were made to surrender [employing soft approach]; this is a big figure. Similar attempts can be made with others [willing to quit violence].

Use of force has to be very selective, and is thus taken with those who are fighting us. Our own people be dealt with honour and respect.

PIPS: **Any other thought?**

NSA: Pakistan is a great country with great and resilient people. We have everything; we only need to reform ourselves.

Securing Pakistan

In December 2017, the Prime Minister of Pakistan tasked National Security Advisor Lt. Gen (Retd) Nasser Janjua to present National Security Policy. As of now, the policy has been documented and circulated to the relevant committees; it is expected that the policy may be launched in 2018. PIPS sat down with the NSA to discuss his vision of national security, which is likely to be reflected in the new document.

Contemporary security is multi-dimensional

Much of the [traditional] understanding of national security used to revolve around territorial integrity. The goal of any state was to secure the territory. While that element is still central, but if the goal is to secure or protect someone, the concept has to go beyond that traditional lens. If people are not secured, irrespective of the underlying cause, the country cannot be. And hence, any effort of shaping national security should

take into consideration the varied forces underneath. At the end of the day, it has to be about a common Pakistani and his security.

The next challenge is how to approach the subject? Which framework is important, or which causes are to be prioritized over others?

In my view, national security has to adjust to the various security layers, most importantly global and regional. In today's time, even space security is critical: If a person walking on the street in a major town of country is vulnerable from some technology above in the space, how can we say we are secure?

Global security as key influencer

Global level of security is the key to understanding the dynamics of national security. It is about the security dynamics at international level.

At such level, whether one likes it or not, the focus is mostly on what is called as "global power politics" – the interplay among powerful countries. Leading countries play pivotal role at this level, while all others play to the gallery. The most obvious example is that of Cold War, when developing countries like ours were literally divided into two competing blocs, either with the US or the Soviet Union.

Under the current security dynamics at international level, it is best to explore the trends of global power politics.

Changing world

The world today is in a flux. While the US is going down, with a significant deficit, China is rising up, with a significant surplus. The Middle East or the Muslim world is in chaos. Meanwhile, Russia is seeking resurgence.

Of these, one change curiously followed is the relation between China and US. A lot is being said and written about how their relations may transpire; projections range from cooperation to competition.

If one looks at the presence of US troops around the world, one realizes that significant numbers are stationed to the east of China or west of Russia. Words like "containment" of China or "pivot to Asia" naturally point to the direction the global politics is heading, and what it means for this part of the world.

One, therefore, wonders if the grand design of the US is of competition, of checkmating the lead challenger, in this case China. After all, it is hard to hand over baton of superiority. This flux at global level has obvious ramifications for countries like Pakistan. This is where regional security comes in.

Changing region

Issues or countries that come in at the regional level are those in immediate neighbourhood as well in the broader region.

Going back to the competition between US and China, one of the ways China might be kept in its backyard is by choking the South China Sea at Malacca Strait, thereby putting a blockage to much of China's trade. Pakistan comes in direct play too. It can provide rescue to the Chinese. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor provides China with a route to Indian Ocean and a major lifeline.

This scenario is not a figment of imagination. In the past, Pakistan used to say that the Soviet Union is eyeing for Indian Ocean. At that time, this "warm water" theory was often brought into disrepute. But the Red Army's subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 showed that the projection was not entirely wrong.

There is more to baton-passing. India is being empowered militarily as well as economically, to curtail China. In fact, the US has already hugged India. There have been agreements upon agreements between US and India, in the field of trade, defense, logistic exchange, communication interoperability, maritime, spatial, cyber security, and so on. In short, India is being nurtured as strategic counter-weight.

Impact on Pakistan

All the above changes have impact on Pakistan too. US's approach towards Pakistan is increasingly being shaped along that line. The reservation of the United States to Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), of which CPEC is a part, and US inviting India to play role in Afghanistan are some such examples. While India is seen as land of opportunity, Pakistan is seen as land of threat.

India realizes that conventional war with Pakistan is not possible, due to a host of reasons. That is why it is opting for non-conventional war. It has been luring Afghanistan. Even terrorism in Pakistan is perpetrated by groups based in Afghanistan, many with India's backing.

When the regional dynamics are read collectively, it appears as if two-front situations are emerging for both Pakistan and India. While Pakistan thinks it is being jawed by India and Afghanistan, India can come to assume that it is inside the jaws of Pakistan and China. Likewise, in the shape of extremism, both countries have to deal with same internal challenges.

Similarly, India wants strategic alliance of US. If past is any trend, this can be counter-productive. Instead, the prospects for peace will greatly increase in the region, if US reduces its presence. The most obvious impact of US presence will be felt on Afghanistan. Instability there has fallout on the entire region, especially Pakistan. Peace from there will spread widely.

Moving forward

Closing Afghan conflict

The goal for Afghanistan should be closing the conflict. Presently, the goal is to win the conflict. This may linger the conflict further. In any case, victory seems far-fetched: 44% of Afghan territory is under Taliban.

The issue in Afghanistan is more political than military. The US may well appoint a political authority in Afghanistan, as empowered as military authority.

Meanwhile, Afghan government and Afghan Taliban, who both represents Afghans, should sit together, clearly conveying that the drawdown of US presence.

Regional connectivity

To get out of conflict-prone entanglements, better invest in geo-economics. There is realization that connectivity has to be part of national security. Our future is in becoming a massive trade corridor.

There are several ways. Inside the country, Pakistan may well declare Balochistan as industrial province or create international cities in the province along the coast. There can be other internal ways too. On the external front, a strong economy, backed by connectivity projects, will make it a hub of trade corridor traversing the region, all the way to China, CARs, and Russia.

Re-adjusting national security

Changes at global and regional level do constitute concerns for national security. At the same time, Pakistan's position and response is greatly contingent on how it has addressed some of the underlying causes that result in insecurity in the first place – what is being done at the national level.

Some of the issues that should be made part of any national security document are following: Climate change; political stability; governance; human security; food security; human resource development; education reforms [including diversifying job options for madrassah students]; energy security; water security; economic goals like tax collection; redress of fault lines like religious, sectarian, terrorism, sub-nationalism, civil-military relations. Issues affecting global politics in recent times are cyber security, economic policies and trends, internal policies, and nuclear strategy, as a country's image affects its standing too. All these should be taken into consideration. It has to be about a common Pakistani!

An all-encompassing security vision will help us realize Pakistan's true potential. Many look towards Pakistan for taking mantle of the Muslim world, which otherwise is in chaos these days. While Pakistan's defense is already strong, a strong economy will give a further impetus.

CHAPTER 7

Making NACTA effective

Interview with

Ihsan Ghani

National Coordinator, NACTA



Conducted by:

**Muhammad Amir Rana and
Muhammad Ismail Khan***

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Muhamamd Ismail Khan works as Senior Project Manager at PIPS, where he also edits the Conflict and Peace journal. He has also contributed articles to leading newspapers of Pakistan.

This interview was conducted in December 2017.

National Coordinator, NACTA, explains:

- There is a need to review National Action Plan, engaging parliamentarians, experts, implementers of NAP, and even its critics.
- Joint Intelligence Directorate will be functional in 2018.
- National Counter Extremism Policy is in the stage of approval. The policy includes short-term, medium-term, and long-term initiatives and actions to counter extremism.
- Over the years, several institutions were tasked to look after NAP. NACTA's jurisdiction is to monitor and review NAP.
- The threat of foreign fighters returning to Pakistan continues to evolve.
- National Internal Security Policy, which was first released in 2014, is presently being reviewed.

PIPS: Who is responsible for National Action Plan – NACTA, the NSA, apex committees, or interior minister? Are the roles clearly defined? Does it result in overlap or buck passing?

NC: First a brief backgrounder: National Action Plan, as you know, has twenty points meant to deal with different aspects of countering terrorism. For these different 20 points, initially, 16 different committees were constituted, each other different high-ranking officials. We came to know that these committees had met only once, around the time when NAP was rolled out. 12 of these committees have interior minister as the head. Later National Security Advisor assigned to look after the NAP, provincial Apex committees also exist. There is need to evolve a uniform system for the implementation and monitoring of NAP. We, NACTA, wrote to the interior minister back then to issue a date for another meeting.

Then, we said there is a need of review of National Action Plan. We proposed engaging three groups of people. The first group will be of the parliamentarians and experts who were involved in designing the NAP. The second will be implementers, like law-enforcement officials. And the third would be those who are

critical of different aspects of NAP. In all these, NACTA's role was coordinate, that is coordinate NAP. Then, in the provinces, there are different apex committees, meant to implement things on ground.

NACTA was meant to create national action plans to counter violent extremism, monitor the progress against those plans, and then report to the ministry. The former Interior Minister, speaking on the floor of the parliament, said he was not interested in implementing NAP. [He had taken the responsibility on Prime Minister's advise.]

Meanwhile, on its own, NACTA has conducted 25 meetings on NAP, including some special meetings on special points like counter-terror financing.

As to the NSA, he was asked to serve as convener of the Task Force on Implementation of NAP. So, in 2016, we did not much, ever since this appointment was made. But in August 2017, we started doing the work.

All in all, this meant that several different institutions came up to look after NAP: the 16 implementing committees constituted in the start, apex committees in the provinces, National Security Advisor, NACTA, and Ministry of Interior.

As far as our jurisdiction is concerned, our work is to monitor and review NAP.

Also, as of now, National Internal Security Policy, which was first released in 2014, is presently being reviewed.

PIPS: What about the JID?

NC: Well, JID is in the pipeline. Its core group has been recruited. Job description has been announced. Half of its building is ready. Recruitment of the staff will start by early next month and hope it will be functional before June 2018.

There are plans of it will start working in the next few months.

PIPS: In one of your presentations to a parliamentary standing committee, you talked about the threat of foreign fighters coming to Pakistan? How graver is the threat?

NC: Well, that threat is continuously changing. There was a time when Pakistan was known more for surplus of fighters, exporting them. But lately, with some new developments, threats continue to change. Lately, with provinces, we are going to the houses of everyone who has been abroad with potential of falling to militancy. We are doing it along with the CTD and Special Branch.

PIPS: What about National Counter Extremism policy? What are its key features and when will it be announced?

NC: It too will be announced soon. It is with the minister; after he approves it, it will be unveiled in a press conference by the minister.

As to its feature, it includes three major strands. One are the short-term, long-hanging, initiatives like youth engagement. These are the activities that do not require funding or legislation. Then, there are medium-term initiatives, which required policies and funding. And finally, there are long-term issues that required legislation.

Lately, we have given briefings to the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir as well as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

PIPS: What are the three critical challenges to NACTA?

The first is about ownership of NACTA. It should be an independent body like Federal Board of Revenue. It is finally getting it, but a lot still is required. The Board of Governor meeting has yet to be held. The second issue is about the status of NACTA. The third is its focus – it should focus on NAP.

CHAPTER 8

Security landscape of Punjab in 2017

Shahzada Irfan Ahmed*

* Shahzada Irfan Ahmad is a senior investigative journalist based in Lahore, currently working with *The News*.

As with the past several years, in 2017 too, for Punjab government and its law-enforcement agencies, maintaining law and order, controlling crime and averting terrorism remained the biggest challenges.

Success benchmark

According to a top ranking police official, there has been considerable improvement in security in Punjab. For one, there has been no terrorist incidence of sectarian nature of the last 3 to 4 years and that a strong terrorist group like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) has been exterminated from the province. There was neither any sectarian attack nor resurgence of the LeJ during the year.

Besides, one CTD official shared, a large number of terrorists and their supporters arrested during the Intelligence-based Operations (IBOs) and raids have been booked in terrorism cases and many of them have been sent to prisons by courts. Fortunately, there was no loss of life among CTD staff during combat with terrorists in 2017, but two personnel were injured, one in Sahiwal and another in Rahim Yar Khan.

Similarly, Amir Zulfiqar, DIG Operations, Punjab, and spokesperson for IG Punjab, claims that security situation in the province improved over the year and a proof of this is that international cricket matches were played in Lahore during 2017. The clearance for these matches, he says, were also given by teams coming from abroad who were more than satisfied

with the arrangements made in this regard.

Terrorist incidents

Four key incidents in the provincial capital Lahore, are noteworthy:

The first one of these took place on February 13 at Chairing Cross, The Mall, near Punjab Assembly building, during a protest by associations of pharmacists and chemist. Two high-ranking police officers, SSP Operations Zahid Gondal and DIG Traffic Capt (retd) Ahmad Mobin, who had reached there to hold negotiations with the protesters, were among the 13 individuals who lost their lives in this suicide blast.

Then there was the attack at Bedian Road on April 5, where a van carrying census team was hit by a suicide bomber riding a motorbike, resulting in seven casualties including five of army personnel.

The third suicide attack targeting anti-riot police unit personnel deployed near Arfa Karim Software Park, Ferozepur Road, occurred on July 24 and caused 27 deaths.

In the fourth incident, which was not a suicide blast, a truck loaded with explosives and parked at Outfall Road for some days exploded on August 7 and claimed one life.

The number of injuries in all these incidents was quite high and their intensity ranged from minor to serious and crucial.

Successes or failures, all about technology

A CTD official, who does not want to be named, shares that though the February 13 blast did irreparable damage, the culprits including the handlers were traced within two days of this tragic incident. This was due to the footage of CCTV cameras and some technical solutions like geo fencing and geo tagging employed by the law enforcing authorities. In a way, he says, this can be called a success but it would have been a far bigger success if the blast could have been avoided altogether and precious lives saved.

The prosecution wing of CTD, he shares, has been trained well to establish charges against the accused through irrefutable evidence and credible witness accounts, among other things. Another plus is that the Punjab government has been generous in sanctioning funds for the department to buy equipment and weapons and recruit more staff. Recruitment of corporals continued during the year 2017 as well.

Amir Zulfiqar, DIG Operations, Punjab, and spokesperson for IG Punjab, shares the use of technology, especially the information technology, by Punjab police has helped a lot in reducing crime and creating fear among the criminals of being apprehended. One example, he says, is that of installing 8,000 security cameras in Lahore and soon extending it to five more districts. He adds police management

system has improved manifold and now there is no possibility of hiding the proceedings of a criminal case from seniors.

From the moment an FIR is registered, the senior officials at different levels can keep track of the progress and detect anything that is going wrong. Furthermore, he says, the proactive role of police under the National Action Plan (NAP) has invoked fear among habitual offenders who were visited by the personnel of law enforcing authorities and asked to refrain from criminal activities. "The perception that they are being watched does deter them from going the wrong way", he maintains.

Amid these claims of increased efficiency by police, independent security experts believe there was sheer oversight in cases of two incidents of terrorism in Lahore.

The first pertained to the suicide attack outside Arfa Karim Software Park. When the suicide attacker targeted a police team there, near the residence of Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, it was found that the cameras installed there under the safe city project were not working. The footage of the incident available with the authorities had been captured by a camera installed at a nearby office – not safe city project.

Similarly, the truck bearing number plate LPT-7083 used in the Outfall Road Blast was parked there for a couple of days, but

the local police had not bothered to inspect it despite being informed about it. This incident occurred on the once-proposed but later-on cancelled route of Nawaz Sharif's rally that was supposed to pass through this point on August 7. It was suspected that this truck had been parked there with the intention of targeting the former prime minister's rally.

Dr Haider Ashraf, DIG Operations, Lahore is grieved at the loss of lives and injuries in these terrorist acts. However, he claims there were thousands of terrorist threats during the year 2017 which the police was able to thwart due to timely action. For example, he says, there were threats to Moharram processions, churches, activities related to Rabi ul Awal, schools, political leadership, political gatherings, schools, cantonments, intelligence agencies' establishments, mosques, schools, cinemas etc but and a large number of these were real.

Haider shares they are aware of the challenges and for that matter bringing efficiency in the working of police force and making them feel comfortable at the same time. On one hand, he says, digital cards have been introduced to ensure their attendance in police stations and on the other welfare steps for them like making of a hospital, announcement of insurance scheme and securing quotas for their children. Once they have peace of mind they will be alert, charged and able to

perform their duties in a much better way, he adds.

Role of Rangers

In addition to the civil and military agencies, Pakistan Rangers, the paramilitary force working under the command of the federal interior ministry extended a helping hand in this fight against the miscreants. It was approached to help the district administration in handling protests and agitations that started in the aftermath of the operation against followers of Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah in Islamabad in November.

Throughout the year, the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of the Punjab Police remained extraordinarily busy chasing terrorists, looking out for sleeper cells, carrying out Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs), taking pre-emptive measures and foiling attempts to fan hatred among different rival groups, confiscating caches of weapons, explosives and suicide jackets, having armed combats with terrorists and so on. In this connection, there were successes for CTD as well as failures and loopholes in dealing with challenges that have existed for long.

To support CTD and other forces in their hunt for terrorists, five companies of Pakistan Rangers were deployed in Punjab on April 22, 2017 for a limited period. Later on, this stay was extended with the aim of engaging this paramilitary force in

carrying out IBOs along with the CTD and the regular police in the whole province.

Pakistan Rangers were given powers of police officers under Section 5 of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Under these powers, they were authorised to register cases just like the CTD officers and given a legal cover for all their actions taken during and after the operations for maintenance of peace. An important duty assigned to Pakistan Rangers was to check terrorists' entry into Punjab through bordering districts such as Attock in the north and Rajanpur in the south.

Challenges

A police official confided that the maintenance of public order was something that they had to tackle with extreme care. The CTD official says the sit-ins by religious organizations, agitations by charged protesters etc were hard to manage especially in a scenario where police was not willing to use force. He says the CTD has to keep a watch at such gatherings as terrorists may hit here just like what happened during the protests of pharmacists and chemists; he elaborated:

"The policemen nowadays are reluctant to do that as they fear nobody would come to their rescue if there is any damage to life and property of the protesters. The Model Town tragedy has taught them many lessons."

The other challenges during fight against terror included unearthing of sleeping cells in a scenario where international terrorists are getting support from Pakistan. Daesh is clear example, trying to have foothold in multiple regions and countries including Iraq, Syria, UK, Indonesia, Pakistan. On December 22, it was reported that a woman, along with her four daughters, originally from Gujranwala on their way to Syria to join their family member, associated with Daesh, were deported by Turkey.²⁶⁹

Similarly, while there is no doubt that the challenges pertaining security and law and order are too big to be tackled by a single entity and without the support of others having similar mandates. But a common perception is that there is lack of coordination among CTD, the district police and the civil and military intelligence agencies. There are assumptions that CTD works independently and does not even consult with the IG who heads the province's department.

The CTD official cited above dispels this impression and says that the different wings of police cooperate with each other though the CTD performs the sole function of fighting terrorism. The district police on the other hand, he says, has to perform myriad functions including patrolling, operations, investigations etc. Similarly, he says, the IGP does command CTD but most of the times does not interfere in its matter out of his own will. At time he has


to decide whether a case falls under the category of pure terrorism or a heinous crime to be booked under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA).

Last but not the least, the politics of compromise and succumbing to pressure groups also compromises security of the state. The example here is that of the leaders and members of Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah whose names have been removed from the fourth schedule under an agreement worked out with the government. The Fourth Schedulers are bound to submit surety bonds with the police stations concerned and if they create law and order situation, they are to


be booked under the ATA. They are also supposed to inform the concerned police stations before leaving and returning to their places.

Many believes exempting this group from following these procedures is likely to create severe public disorder and situations that may lead to armed clashes among different groups. Another concern is that if one group is given this concession, many others like them will demand the same on similar grounds. This issue is of great importance and the advice for political leadership is that it must realize this as well and avoid being lenient in such cases.


Suicide Attacks in Pakistan (2008-2017)



Incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan (2009-2017)




KP / FATA



- | | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|
| 1-Chitral | 21-FR Kohat |
| 2-Swat | 22-Khyber Agency |
| 3-Upper Dir | 23-Orakzai Agency |
| 4-Kohistan | 24-Kurram Agency |
| 5-Battagram | 25-Hangu |
| 6-Mansehra | 26-Kohat |
| 7-Abbottabad | 27-Karak |
| 8-Shangla | 28-North Waziristan Agency |
| 9-Haripur | 29-FR Bannu |
| 10-Swabi | 30-Bannu |
| 11-Buner | 31-Lakki Marwat |
| 12-Malakand | 32-FR Lakki Marwat |
| 13-Lower Dir | 33-South Waziristan Agency |
| 14-Bajaur | 34-FR Tank |
| 15-Mohmand Agency | 35-Tank |
| 16-Mardan | 36-Dera Ismail Khan |
| 17-Nowshera | 37-FR Dera Ismail Khan |
| 18-Charsada | |
| 19-Peshawar | |
| 20-FR Peshawar | |

Balochistan




- | | |
|-------------------|---------------|
| 1-Sherani | 18-Kalat |
| 2-Musakhel | 19-Jhal Magsi |
| 3-Zhob | 20-Jaffarabad |
| 4-Qilla Saifullah | 21-Nushki |
| 5-Barkhan | 22-Chaghi |
| 6-Loralai | 23-Washuk |
| 7-Kohlu | 24-Kharan |
| 8-Sibi | 25-Khuzdar |
| 9-Harnai | 26-Lasbela |
| 10-Ziarat | 27-Awaran |
| 11-Pishin | 28-Panjgur |
| 12-Qilla Abdullah | 29-Kech |
| 13-Quetta | 30-Gwadar |
| 14-Mastung | |
| 15-Bolan | |
| 16-Dera Bugti | |
| 17-Nasirabad | |


- More than 50 attacks in the year.
- More than 20 and less than 50 attacks in the year.
- More than 10 and less than 20 attacks in the year.
- More than one and less than 10 attacks in the year.
- No attack in the year.

Geographical Spread of
Insecurity in Pakistan

2017





Sindh



- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| 1-Karachi | 18-Qambar Shahdadt |
| 2-Thatta | 19-Larkana |
| 3-Tharparker | 20-Shikarpur |
| 4-Umerkot | 21-Ghotki |
| 5-Badin | 22-Kashmore |
| 6-Tando Muhammad Khan | 23-Jacobabad |
| 7-Mirpurkhas | |
| 8-Tando Allahyar | |
| 9-Hyderabad | |
| 10-Sanghar | |
| 11-Matiari | |
| 12-Jamshoro | |
| 13-Shaheed Benazirabad | |
| 14-Khairpur | |
| 15-Sukkur | |
| 16-Naushahro Firoze | |
| 17-Dadu | |


- More than 50 attacks in the year.
- More than 20 and less than 50 attacks in the year.
- More than 10 and less than 20 attacks in the year.
- More than one and less than 10 attacks in the year.
- No attack in the year.

Punjab



- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|
| 1-Islamabad | 20-Bhakkar |
| 2-Rawalpindi | 21-Jhang |
| 3-Jhelum | 22-Faisalabad |
| 4-Gujrat | 23-Okara |
| 5-Sialkot | 24-Pakpattan |
| 6-Narowal | 25-Sahiwal |
| 7-Gujranwala | 26-Toba Tek Singh |
| 8-Mandi Bahauddin | 27-Bahawalnagar |
| 9-Chakwal | 28-Vehari |
| 10-Attock | 29-Khanewal |
| 11-Sheikhupura | 30-Layyah |
| 12-Lahore | 31-Muzaffargarh |
| 13-Nankana Sahib | 32-Dera Ghazi Khan |
| 14-Kasur | 33-Multan |
| 15-Hafizabad | 34-Lodhran |
| 16-Sargodha | 35-Rajanpur |
| 17-Chiniot | 36-Bahawalpur |
| 18-Khushab | 37-Rahim Yar Khan |
| 19-Mianwali | |

Intensity of terrorist violence in Pakistan (2008-2017)



CHAPTER 9

Balochistan security in 2017

Maaz Khan*

* Maaz Khan is a security expert with key interest on internal physical security, mainly of Balochistan.

With regards to law and order in Balochistan, 2017 did not go smoother than 2016. In 2017, over 160 terrorist incidents were reported from Balochistan, resulting in the death of over 280, including 85 personnel of law-enforcement and security agencies. A year earlier, in 2016, 150 such incidents took place in which over 400 died.

Holistically stating, the government failed to materialize its claims of "succeeding in breaking the backbone of terrorists". It continued to say that "some handful elements" who were left will be "perished soon." But soon never came.

Various groups active in Balochistan

Apart from Baloch insurgents, various religiously-inspired violent sectarian as well as Taliban-like and Islamist militant groups are active in Balochistan.

In 2017, some high-profile attacks took place on senior police officials in 2017. The groups involved included Daesh, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami, Jamaatul Ahrar, and TTP.

Although these groups apparently are different by their names, organizational structure, command, among other things, they are believed to share their manpower, logistics, finances, hideouts with each other.

LJ and LJ-A are active in Brahvi-speaking Baloch areas like provincial capital of

Quetta and districts of Mastung, Nushki, Chaghi, Bolan, Sibi, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad, Jhal Magsi. Security officials believe that with the help of these groups, TTP and Daesh started penetrating into the areas and in return they provide all helps to the activists of LJ/LJ-A.

The local leadership/commanders of these terrorist groups keep changing their positions and code names for security/organizational reasons and particularly after killing or arresting of their operatives. The investigators say that even the activists are unaware of the real names or identity of their commanders or leadership for security reasons and that was why the security agencies face many difficulties to track down the leaders and commanders. The commanders and leaders, they say, are identified when they are killed or arrested or their close associates are arrested.

Investigators also say that these organizations have different sources of funding that include foreign funding, local finances/donations and criminal activities such as abduction for ransom. TTP and LJ activists have been involved in abducting foreign tourists, local notables and local workers of foreign funded NGOs and successfully extorted ransom from their countries and managements/families. There are some businessmen, the authorities believe, who make under compulsion donations to these militant groups. Now-a-days, it is said that major portion of their funding is being made

from India with the collaboration of Afghanistan.

Iran has been registering its protest with Pakistan over free movement of Jundullah/Jaish-ul-Adl activists on Pakistani side. Hundreds of Iranian guards and civilians have been killed in attacks of Jundullah/ Jaish-ul-Adl inside Iran. Jundullah is no more active leaving the space for Jaish whose activists have been carrying out severe attacks inside Iran. Meanwhile, LJ's outfit Jamaat Ahle Sunnat and Ghulaman-e-Sahaba have been extending support to both Jundullah and Jaish.

- **Marks of Daish in Balochistan**

There has been debate over whether the Islamic State (IS) group, or Daesh, will be able to make presence in Pakistan. In Balochistan, they left some traces. According to some estimates, IS or its local allies/supporters were involved in over two dozen terrorist attacks, mainly on Police and Frontier Corps. IS's emergence is quite a challenge for government, who were used to trivializing it.

The presence of IS has been marked in neighbouring Afghanistan. Afghan government, at the highest level, has expressed concerns. One such concern was shared by Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah to a group of visiting Pakistani journalists, saying that Daesh is gaining strength in northern and eastern Afghan provinces (adjacent to Pakistan).

Any gains made by this group in Afghanistan will double the trouble for Pakistan, already fighting its own war against militants. Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal admitted, in a press chat during his visit to Quetta, that the emergence of Daesh in neighbouring Afghanistan may have fallout effects in Pakistan. That is why, he said, Pakistan is putting extra efforts at border management on the western front, so as to ensure tight security to check infiltration into Pakistan.

The group was beyond several high-profile terror attacks in 2017 in the province. In May 2017, the group claimed to have abducted a Chinese couple Quetta, and after a month, released the video on social media showing them being slaughtered. IS also claimed on deputy Chairman Senate and a leader of JUI(F) Maulana Ghafoor Haideri in his constituency Mastung. He remained unhurt, but 26 persons were killed and 40 got injured. In what is counted as the first incident against minority, two suicide bombers claimed by IS stormed Methodist Church in Quetta, killing 9 people. The group was also behind the attack on Fatahpur shrine in Jhal Magsi, killing 20 devotees including a police constable and injuring 30.

- **Areas of concern**

One of the areas that have become main centres for the religious militant outfits is Quetta's adjoining district of Mastung.

It was in the mountains of Koh-e-Maraan (Mountain's Snakes) that the security forces conducted operation to rescue abducted Chinese couple, killing 13 members of Daesh and an abducted businessman. It later emerged that the couple was kept anywhere else but in Mastung. The bodies of slain Chinese couple, however, were found in Mastung.

Another area that has become the hiding place for the activists of these groups is Wadh tehsil of Khuzdar district on main Quetta-Karachi highway.

According to government administrative officials, Shafiq Mengal, son of a former caretaker chief Minister Balochistan Mir Naseer Mengal provides shelter to the activists of TTP, Daesh and LJ. Two years ago, Sindh police arrested a teenage Afghan suicide bomber after the abortive attempt of suicide blast in a Shia Muslim mosque in Shikarpur. He disclosed to his interrogators that after entering Pakistan, he stayed in Wadh with Shafiq Mengal for some time. The administrative officials also believe that the suicide bomber was sent from Wadh to Shah Noorani shrine in the adjacent district of Lasbela in November 2016, in which 52 devotees were killed while over 100 got injured.

Shafiq had raised a private militia against separatist groups in Khuzdar, Kalat and Awaran districts. (It is commonly said the government forces supported him first, but

later withdrew after he started settling his own score with his arch rivals.)

Baloch insurgents

Baloch insurgents also made their presence felt in 2017. Over 120 incidents were reported in the press during the whole year, marking the involvement of different banned organizations. The available data reported in the press as well as collected by some other sources shows that BLA claimed the responsibility for over 50 incidents during 2017 whereas BLA around 40 and BRA 30.

Reports came from districts like Turbat, Awaran, Punjgoor, Gwader, Khuzdar, Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Naseerabad and Jaffarabad and Mastung. According to some reports, the insurgents have been active in 24 of total 34 districts in the province; in some districts, however, they had token presence.

BLA was involved in attacks on security forces in eastern Balochistan like Musakhail, Harnai, Barkhan, Kohlu, Sibi, Loralai while BLF headed by Dr. Allah Nazar remained active in whole Makran division and Awaran district. BRA of Brahamdagh Bugti is confined to four districts of Dera Bugti, Sohbatpur, Naseerabad and Jaffarabad. Usually their claims of attacks are not carried in local papers owing to government restrictions.

These incidents include attacks on civilians and security forces like explosion of Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) and armed attacks.

However, during the whole year United Baloch Army of Mahran Marri, Lashkar-e-Balochistan of Jawaid Mengal and Baloch Republican Guards of Bakhtiar Domki were not active. The main factor for their being inactive is active role of forces, tight security in their areas and surrender of a number of their foot soldiers.

Both BLA and BLF developed sharp differences after former's two important commanders defected to the latter. Aslam Achoo alias Ustad got serious injured in an operation but managed to escape and is believed to have reached Afghanistan. Another commander Bashir Zaib joined the ranks of BLF along with Achoo.

Government has been claiming that separatist commanders like Dr. Allah Nazar, Achoo and Nabi Bungalzai of United Baloch Army have been killed. Some however claim they managed to cross into Afghanistan with the support of Kabul authorities and are commanding their groups from there. Security officials also believe that Iranian authorities adopted a lenient policy towards Baloch insurgents who cross into Iran without any difficulty.

Meanwhile, security forces have been conducting operations (IBOs) during the whole year on the basis of intelligence

gathering against separatists' banned organizations across the province, killing around 50 insurgents and arresting around two dozen.

The government claimed that over 3000 insurgents including around local commanders have surrendered before the authorities under the government policy of amnesty for all. The foot soldiers, under the policy receive half a million rupees while commander one million and more according to his status besides security, government jobs and other incentives like tractors and land for agriculture. Frontier Corps adopted a number of government schools besides setting up its own educational institutions for the local population and the children of insurgents who surrendered.

• **Reconciliation?**

Like previous year, no initiative was made in 2017 viz.-a-viz. reconciliation with Baloch leadership living outside the country. Former Chief Minister Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch was given mandate by top military brass under NAP for political reconciliation with all state holders. Malik Baloch himself held negotiation with Brahamdagh Bugti in Geneva and conveyed the demands/reservations of separatist leader to military high-ups.

The provincial coalition led by Nawab Sanaullah Zehri and Baloch members of his cabinet are deadly against

reconciliation with Baloch leaders sitting abroad. They have convinced the military establishment that any such attempt may aggravate the situation instead of improvement.

Swiss authorities in November, 2017 refused Brahamdagh political asylum and also rejected Pakistan government plea of handing him over. This left him with limited option of either moving back to Kabul or India, if he is asked to leave the country.

In a latest development, Gazain Marri, a former Balochistan Home Minister, returned home after giving up his 15 years self-exile in Dubai. He was arrested upon his arrival on the charges of being involved in murder and sabotage activities, but was released on bail after two months. His elder brother Changaiz Marri, a sitting provincial minister of PML-N, who now became the chieftain of the tribe, is not even on talking term with his brother. Changaiz who in the life of his father Nawab Khair Bakhsh parted ways with his brother, condemns armed struggle and is strongly opposing his brother.

National Action Plan – in Balochistan

The pace of implementation on National Action Plan in 2017 remained as slow as it was during 2016, except on some points.

Some work has been done towards

banning literature and newspapers promoting hatred and extremism. Moreover, IBOs have also been increased against both Islamist and Baloch militants.

Registration of seminaries has almost been completed too – reportedly, take account for over 2500 seminaries, but under a careful estimate, there are many more seminaries, which could not be registered for being located in far-flung areas. More so, after the registration process, no further measures were taken for de-radicalization of these religious institutions.

As to the points without any progress, these include putting more efforts to choke funds of terrorist organisations, establish a dedicated counter-terrorism force, effective steps against religious persecution, measures against abuse of social media, initiate negotiation with angry self-exiled Baloch leaders, formulate a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, and reformation of the criminal justice system.

The government and its agencies could make progress in tracking down some groups or commanders affiliated with extremist groups like ISIS, TTP and Jamaat Ul Ahrar. These groups were involved in sectarian killings and attacks on the personnel of security forces.

The security agencies could track down some gangs involved in the suicide attacks in 2016 on three different institutions

namely Sandeman hospital, Police training College and Shah Noorani shrine in Lasbela district. Jahangir Badini, the head of TTP and Daesh Balochistan and his relative Saeed Badini who were the mastermind of all these three major attacks and other targeted killings of police and FC personnel were arrested and later killed in encounter, along with two accomplices. Their patrons, security officials, say are sitting in Afghanistan.

No achievement has also been made in the context of unearthing the facilitators of those militants, who provided shelter and logistics and made arrangements of their safe travel from Afghan border to their targets. Security officials believe that clusters of Afghan population provide friendly environment for the terrorists brought safely from across the border.

The tale and context in making of Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan

Syed Arfeen*

* Syed Arfeen is an investigative journalist based in Karachi.

In the late hours of October 21, 2017, Pakistan Rangers, Sindh, and Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of Sindh Police jointly raided a place in Raees Goth, a vicinity of district West, Karachi. Gun battle ensued. Rangers and CTD personnel were injured, while around 8 militants were killed.

Next day, at a joint press conference by the Rangers and CTD officials, it was disclosed that the dead militants belonged to Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan (ASP), a group that had just recently been in the news. This group, it turned out, was involved in the target killing of a retired military officer, policemen, security guards and police volunteers, and employees of other public sector bodies.

What really is the group? And what does it stand for? This is the story of Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan and how this group is one of the many small cells formed by the radicalized educated youth.

Scratching Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan

- **Marking presence**

It was on April 5 that the name Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan had first emerged. Back then, the group had shot to dead a retired army colonel near Baloch Colony Bridge located at Shakra-e-Faisal, the main artery of Karachi. A pamphlet left on the spot claimed responsibility on this group, the ASP, which was then quite a murky outfit.

Later, on May 20 and June 23 at Dhora Jee and SITE area of the city, 6 policemen were gunned down. The forensic examination of the bullet casings revealed that same weapons were used in these two different incidents, as well behind the killing of the army colonel. The assailants had dropped same pamphlets, bearing ASP's responsibility, on the two spots. Again, the details were unknown.

On June 11, 2017, the group had itself released a statement on social media, claiming to have created a new terror outfit – "Jamat Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan." The statement read:

"A large number of Mujahideen from Karachi, Punjab and tribal areas are leaving ranks of ISIS and disassociating from such DAWLAH which has spread differences in spite of caliphate and dispersion & secession instead of unity. Now in collaboration with the Mujahideen of other Jihadi organization, who are practically active since the initiation of jihad in Pakistan, we officially announce JAMAT ANSAR-UL-SHARIA PAKISTAN".

Without showing allegiance to any foreign terror outfit, the group was found to be inspired by Al-Qaeda. "We consider origin for this noble act (Jihad), the ideology and philosophy of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman-al-Zawahiri", the statement added. As per this announcement, a veteran tribal militant leader Haji Mansoor Mehsud

played an important role in ASP's establishment.

By the end of June, the ASP's sharia committee published "*General Guidelines for Public*", which alerted people to avoid roaming around military institutions, centres and installations. The statement also highlighted precautionary measures to be taken by the general public in case there is any attack by the militants. At one point, the guideline read, "After the blast, get away from scene as there might be a possibility of a second blast."

Even though the group was involved in around seven attacks, there was no clue how to track it. Instead, policemen, particularly those on the traffic duty, were asked to wear bullet-proof vests. It would take some more months that the group's details will be revealed.

- **Revealing the network**

On September 2 morning, when the Pakistani nation was preparing for the Eid-ul-Azha prayers and offering animal sacrifices, some people in Karachi were gearing to wear police uniform to ensure bloodbath. They wanted to kill opposition leader of Sindh Assembly. Something however went wrong and the target escaped unhurt. His police guard and a teenager lost their live in the cross-fire. A police mobile stationed near-by rushed to the spot and the chase began.

One of the attackers opened fire at the corps van. Police retaliated. In the gun battle, one assailant received a bullet wound but escaped. He was later encircled by the mob and apprehended. Police reached to this person too, but while shifting to the hospital, he mysteriously expired.

A highly crucial phase of investigation kicked off, in search of the other person and about the murdered person. This person, who died mysteriously, was identified as Hassan Nazeer, a former engineering student of NED and Sir Syed University Karachi. Nazeer was working as a data lab technician at Dawood Engineering University.

Meanwhile, investigators received an important tip-off from the area where Nazeer was residing. On the wee hours of September 4, a house in Kaneez Fatima Society of district Malir was raided and one Dr. Abdullah Hashmi was taken into custody.

On the information provided by Hashmi, security officials raided a house of Rofi Rose Patel in Karachi Development Society (KDA). Due to the ill planning of the LEAs officials, one of the key leaders of the group, by the name of Siddiqui, escaped. Siddiqui, it turned out, was a former student of Department of Applied Physics in Karachi University.

Subsequently, it emerged that Dr. Abdullah Hashmi was the spokesman of ASP. His name was mentioned on pamphlets found on various killing sites. During probe, it was further unearthed that Hashmi, the spokesman, was also the organization's head. The real name of Dr. Abdullah Hashmi was Sheharyaruddin Warsi. Although he was responsible for the selection of the targets, he never participated in any terror operation. During the raid, Warsi or Hashmi didn't resist at all and was ready to cooperate on the assurance that he will not be killed.

Sheharyaruddin Warsi revealed to the investigators that the death squad of ASP comprised of four to six men, including Danish Rasheed, Sarosh Siddiqui, Muzammil Ali Junaidi and Hassan Nazeer. Two of them were assigned to shoot, one was tasked for making video of the attack and the last one was responsible for providing backup to rest of them. Before shootings, the group would carry out complete reconnaissance of the target, on the video camera. Investigators recovered reconnaissance and live videos of all terror attacks of the group.

The forensic examination of Sheharyaruddin Warsi's laptop provided an important lead that connects him to the members of proscribed organization responsible for another major attack of the country. This attack took place in Karachi in 2014; ASP's head, Warsi, was then in touch with the members of the plan.

Following on the names provided, the LEAs went after Sarosh Siddiqui's house, from where they confiscated few laptops. Forensic examination showed that he had developed software that changed the Internet Protocol addresses and tempered with International Mobile Equipment Identity. The evidence collected from his house also showed that the upper portion of the house acted as headquarter of ASP.

According to an officer whose team participated in the raid at Sarosh Siddiqui's house, his (Sarosh Siddiqui's) father misled security officials by saying he had gone to offer prayers in a nearby mosque; Siddiqui was rather present upstairs. When the police team moved to the upper portion of the house for search, Sarosh opened fire with his two pistols, resulting in the death of a policeman and injuring a policeman and intelligence official. Meanwhile, Sarosh Siddiqui attacked a bullet proof vehicle of the officials and took away an AK-47 rifle.

During the course of investigation, it was unfolded that as members of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Sarosh Siddiqui, Sheharyaruddin Warsi, Muzammil Ali Junaidi and Osama went to Afghanistan in 2015 and received militant training at Baramcha area. There, they joined Al-Qaeda. On their return to Karachi, a clash erupted with JeM activists in Orangi Town area in which where Sarosh was reportedly injured.

After landing back to Pakistan, these people formed Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan in 2016. The head of the ASP told investigators that before naming their group as Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan, three other names came under consideration – Jamaat Ansar-ul-Islam, Al-Aqsa Brigade and Mohammad Bin Qasim Brigade. These men were remained in contact with Abdullah Baloch, who was operating from Afghanistan.

- **The trail**

According to foreign media, Ansar-ul-Sharia was initially formed by a Tunisian-born Saifullah Bin Hussaini alias Abu Lehad Al Tunisi in April 2011.

Saifullah initially joined Al-Qaeda in 1990s and was later even considered as one of the closest commanders of Osama Bin Ladin. In 2001, he fought alongside with Bin Ladin at Tora Bora in Afghanistan. Afterwards, he escaped to Pakistan and later Turkey. He initially formed his own Tunisian Combat Group (TCG). He was later arrested in Turkey, extradited to Tunisia in 2003 and imprisoned there for terrorist activities.

During Arab Spring in 2011, the then Tunisian government released hundreds of prisoners. Hussaini was among them. He had already organised his group while spending time behind the bars. As soon as he stepped out from the prison, he formed

a new organization Ansar-ul-Sharia Tunisia (AST).

In the first phase, the initial contingent who joined his rank included his former inmates. He later escaped to Libya and founded Ansar-ul-Sharia Libya. These days, the outfit also operates in Yemen and have claimed some major terrorist attacks.

In June 2015, Saifullah Bin Hussaini was killed in a United States airstrike at Libya. There are even reports that he provided two suicide bombers that targeted Afghanistan's Northern Alliance key commander, Ahmed Shah Mehsud in September 2001.

An investigator who is privy to the Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan-related developments claimed that ASP militants were vexed over Pakistan's policies:

"According to ASP militants, there were at least 5 reasons that let them to establish this group. It includes Pakistan foreign policy, Pakistan Army's stand on Dr. Afia Siddiqui imprisonment in United States and the departure of Shia men to Syria".

- **Members**

The group had 12-15 boys. Except Sarosh Siddiqui and Muzammil, all key members were rounded up.

An important member of the gang, Danish Rasheed, returned to Pakistan, after completing his studies from Anglia Ruskin University of United Kingdom. His father, Dr. Abdul Rahseed has served as the Dean of Department of Islamic Studies.

Dr. Abdul Rasheed (Danish's father) himself was once nominated in a First Information report (FIR) by the former slain professor of the varsity, Dr. Shakeel Auj. According to the FIR lodged at Mubina Town Police station on November 5, 2012, Dr. Auj stated that Dr. Rasheed along with others are inciting people for his killing on the pretext of fake fatwa (Islamic decree). Accused were arrested but were later released due to complexities of Cyber Crime Law.

Highly-placed sources revealed that the one of Danish's brothers, Junaid had cleared the Inter-Services Selection Board test, qualifying him to join Pakistan Air Force. There are reports that he is also missing.

Educated militants – Not a limited phenomenon

The emergence of Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan, with its highly educated individuals, has lent credence to the theory that militancy is making roots with students of universities. In a conference hosted in the wake of some of the militant developments, leading academics argued, "The next generation of militants re more

likely to have university education rather than a madrassah background."

In recent times, there have been several such examples. On February 10, 2017, one Noreen Leghari, a medical student of second year living in Hyderabad, Sindh, was mysteriously disappeared. After few weeks, she texted her brother, claiming that she had reached Syria. The local police submitted a report that she had left for Lahore via a bus.

However, on April 14, Military Intelligence (MI) conducted an operation in the area of Punjab Housing Society, Lahore where terrorists opened fired, and during an encounter, a suspected terrorist was killed and a girl was taken into custody. This girl turned out to be Noreen Leghari.

Leghari was brain washed by local Islamic State militants via Facebook. She was, however, not the first one to fall on social media, According to the Sanaullah Abbasi, Additional Inspector General of Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), Sindh, "Social media has become a tool for Islamic State to lure in people towards them. They are using fake and factitious videos to gain sympathies of the ignorant people."

More so, the trend of educated youth falling in the hands of extremist elements is not new. The trail is long enough, but, a surge is being witnessed in the recent past.

The resurgence of this militancy cult – involving educated youth – was blatantly exhibited in May 2015 when Ismaili community bus near Safora roundabout, Karachi, came under attack. More than 40 people were brutally massacred including women and old men. Investigators later found that the majority of 11 attackers of the bus were highly educated individuals, including engineers and business executives.

The most well-known name to this end is of Saad Aziz, one of the attackers. Aziz was a graduate of prestigious Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi. He was also a prime accused in the murder of social activist Sabeen Mehmood.

He was not the only one with such background. Saad himself was brainstormed, during his internship, by one Ali Rehman alias Tona, a mechatronic engineer of acclaimed National University of Science & Technology (NUST), as per the investigation report. Ali Rehman, in turn, was deputy of Hafiz Umar, electronic engineer, who headed a local gang of IS that was busted by intelligence agencies. One of his brothers Hafiz Nasir had a master's degree in Islamic Studies from University of Karachi. Nasir too was involved in Karachi's Safora carnage.

The phenomenon is not restricted to Karachi alone. Similarly, the ring leader of the kidnappers of Shahbaz Taseer, son of slain governor of Punjab, was Usman

Basra, a graduate of University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore. Basra was earlier involved in the abduction of an American aid worker Dr. Warren Weinstein.

The phenomenon is not about the IS either. The former Deputy Amir of Al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Ustaaad Ahmed Farooq studied in International Islamic University, Islamabad. Ahmed Farooq, whose real name was Raja Muhammad Salman, was a son of Islamabad based well-off educated family; his father was a graduate of Columbia University, New York. After Ustaaad Ahmed Farooq, the command has been taken over by Atif Ghori, alumnus of International Islamic University.

When, in July 2015, some militants of Al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were apprehended from Karachi, more than dozen young boys studying in eminent educational institutions of Pakistan were taken into custody. They had planned to carry out attack on Corps Commander Karachi office, DG Rangers Sindh and ISI Sindh Headquarter. A high ranking security official disclosed that few among the arrested had a family background of armed forces and at least 4 boys were picked up from garrison area of Malir Cantt Karachi. Their gang leader was a son of a known religious-cum-political group leader of metropolis. The AQIS militant confessed of killing two professors of Karachi University including Professor Dr. Shakeel

Auj and Professor Waheed-ur-Rehman. Three boys of the gang were engineers and were working on anti-drone technology.

- **Emerging trends**

Last year, CTD Sindh conducted a survey inside Central prison, Karachi, with more than 500 alleged incarcerated terrorists including hard-core militants. Some 22 questions were asked. According to the details, out of 500 respondents, 64 were had post-graduate degrees and 70 were graduates. When the inmates were inquired about their family monthly income, 117 disclosed that it was above 50,000 rupees. This reiterated the prevalence of radicalism among well-off and educated youth.

Today's younger generation is internet-savvy. Millions of youngsters use social media applications, feeling as if the entire world is on their palm. Global militant organizations consider these apps as essential tools to propagate their agenda and a medium to connect themselves with their future human fuel. The majority of foreign militants who travelled to war theatres of Syria and Iraq, were influenced and brained washed through internet.

In this regard, the Pakistani cyberspace is unguarded against cyber terrorism threat. Institutions like Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and

Federal Investigation Authority (FIA) are ill equipped to counter online terrorism.

Since everything is getting globalised, radicalization is also getting globalised, affecting educated youth as well. They do not get much exhaustive exposure to different narratives, thereby ensnaring them toward radicalism.

A lot their vulnerability comes from the victimhood sense. As per the CTD survey, quoted above, the prevalent injustice, unemployment and economic reasons, ideological and religious concerns, physical abuse by family members and others, perceived grievance of west against Islam ultimately influenced in developing extremist views and provided them justification to use violence in the name of religion.

The youth of today are highly educated but misguided. The state has failed to provide moral authority and guidance to these youngsters. The youth are invariably influenced by the environment. They are by and large a product of society that has not seen social justice and rule of law. There is cut-throat competition and success is achieved through means foul or fair. In their urge to do well, these youths, with a revolutionary mind, opt for alternative socio economic systems. There is a need to explore healthy avenues to harness the potential of the youth.

CHAPTER 11

Jamaat ul Ansar ul-Sharia – a new endeavor by Al-Qaeda to regain ground

Dr. Farhan Zahid*

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It appears the momentum of Islamist terrorist organizations like Daish, its local affiliates and other like-minded groups appeared to have been reversed in terrorism-hit regions across the world. The once-dreaded Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), or Daish, has lately been losing territories it once led in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Libya. Many of its associates are facing assaults. This seems to be a momentarily trend – at least in the Middle East and North Africa.

In Pakistan, ISIS's parent organization Al-Qaeda could resurge in an attempt to regain its lost position. In June 2017, an organization by the name of Jamaat ul Ansar ul-Sharia Pakistan surfaced from the port city of Karachi. It was responsible for deadly attacks the same month. JAS, the city's counter-terror officials revealed, comprises of returnees from the war in Syria, who were now eyeing to resurrect al-Qaeda in Pakistan.²⁷⁰ Not all of them, it later emerged, were war returnees.

Enter Ansar ul-Sharia Pakistan

On June 22, 2017, in the month of Ramzan, four on-duty police officers in the SITE suburb of Karachi were sitting on a roadside stall to break their fast. Two motorcyclists surreptitiously stopped close to the stall, and within no time, fired the officers with their 9mm pistols.²⁷¹ All four died on the spot.

Before fleeing, the assassins dropped pamphlets. The pamphlet claimed the attack; more than that, it did so in the

name of Jamaat Ansar ul-Sharia Pakistan with the goal of reviving al-Qaeda in Pakistan. It read:

"We announce to Inshallah continue our struggle through Dawah & Jihad against infidels and apostates following ahl-e-sunnat wal jamaat²⁷² methodology and we consider origin for this noble act, the ideology and philosophy of patron of Ummah Shaikh Osama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden Shaheed (May Allah accept him) and Imam-ul Mujahedeen Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri (May Allah protect him)."²⁷³

This new organization appears an agglomerate of some old Islamist terrorist organizations, all endeavoring to converge at a platform to reintroduce al-Qaeda and thereby restart terrorist activities under its banner. It seem a last-ditch effort groups linked to al-Qaeda or inspired by ISIS, to make a comeback, just before the eventual fall of ISIS's caliphate in Raqqa.

Till date, JAS has been involved in six terrorist strikes in Karachi and Balochistan. The SITE attack on four police officers was its fifth attack. Its earlier attacks were killing of a retired army colonel in Karachi, killing of a security guard mistaking him as an off-duty policeman; assassinating two police officers in Karachi; and attacking a security forces vehicle with IED in Mastung, Balochistan.²⁷⁴

Clearly, JAS, as its pamphlet showed, was a break from how al-Qaeda was faring lately. In June 2014, when Daish announced its so-called caliphate and invited all Islamist jihadi groups to pledge allegiance to its caliph, around 50 Al-Qaeda-linked and other jihadi groups the world. From Pakistan, many members of anti-Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its local partners went; and radicalized individuals of urban-educated backgrounds formed cells too.²⁷⁵ Such has been the caliphate's attraction, to the disadvantage of al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda's rebound

Al-Qaeda the premier global Islamist terrorist organization was born in Pakistan in the aftermath of Afghan War (1979-89). After the 9/11 attacks, which it carried out, al-Qaeda managed to have its presence in more than 60 countries, with its franchised groups perpetrating terrorist acts in four continents.

Pakistan remained central to the group. The group's high command preferred to hold up in Pakistan, a reason why al-Qaeda in Pakistan is termed as al-Qaeda central or al-Qaeda core. Ever since Afghan War, Al-Qaeda developed a close bond with Pakistani militants of all sorts – Kashmiri, sectarian, Islamist-Afghani, Deobandi and Salafist. Simply put, al-Qaeda's leadership was more comfortable in Pakistan.

There were several Al-Qaeda-linked groups in Pakistan, which the author has termed as "Al-Qaeda network". Groups like Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI), Harkat ul Mujahedeen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Brigade 313 were among the most violent in more than 60 Islamist outfits listed in the official proscribed terrorist organizations' list maintained by National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)²⁷⁶.

Pakistani law-enforcement agencies have been launching severe crackdown on al-Qaeda-allied groups in Pakistan. The group had even attempted to assassinate former Pakistani President and military chief General Pervez Musharraf in 2003.

With the death of al-Qaeda's emir Osama bin Laden in 2011, and subsequent killings of its next generation strategists like Anwar Awlaki and Ilyas Kashmiri, al-Qaeda had substantially weakened. By 2013, splintering and factional fighting had started among factions of TTP too, a leading al-Qaeda-allied group in Pakistan. Factionalism grew after the death of TTP's own emir Hakeemullah Mehsud that year.

It was precisely in those times, in 2013, that ISIS splintered out of Al-Qaeda's Iraq franchise. And in 2014, the group took over Mosul and proclaimed Islamic Caliphate. All these events had an enormous effect on the working of al-Qaeda Core.

The new Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, though, more seasoned and experienced, lacked the charisma of Bin Laden to lead a global organization and issue operational guidelines for commanders all over the world. Amid the ISIS media hype during last three years, it seemed that ISIS had dethroned al-Qaeda from global jihadi scene.

And now, after those three years, Al-Qaeda as an inspiration has made headline in the shape of JAS. After carrying out attacks, the JAS pledged allegiance to the mission of al-Qaeda and Bin Laden; at the same time, it expressed abhorrence to ideology and tactics of ISIS. The group clearly said that all of its “policies and operations will be compiled and rendered in accordance with acts and sayings of leadership of Qaidat-ul-Jihad be Iznillah.”

While Al-Qaeda may not be able to resume its former role on the global jihadi landscape, in Pakistan, its re-emergence will have some impact. Firstly, the al-Qaeda-linked TTP has been able to regroup²⁷⁷ and Punjabi militant outfits in mainland Pakistan, like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), are also trying to make a comeback. These can add to the strength of Al-Qaeda.

The turning point

On the Eid day in 2017, falling on September 1, two Ansar militants attempted to assassinate a politician from

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), an overtly secular leader, and leader of opposition in Sindh Assembly. The attempt failed as the politician’s bodyguards fired back, but one of them died as well as a passerby child. One militant was killed whereas the other managed to flee.

Subsequent investigations revealed the JAS comprised of highly-educated young militants. The Emir of JAS was found out to be Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqui, a drop out of the Applied Physics department at University of Karachi.

Equally revealing has been the identity of militant killed by the body guard. An electronic engineer, Hassan bin Nazeer did his bachelor of engineering from Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology and Master’s from NED University of Engineering and Technology. He was working as a laboratory assistant at Dawood University of Engineering and Technology in Karachi.

The Saroush-led Ansar has been able to mastermind and perpetrate a number of attacks in a short period of time. For Al-Qaeda, JAS is a big catch. If not arrested, Saroush can potentially regroup Ansar and resume terrorist activities.

Why Pakistan is important for al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda seemed to have somewhat survived, despite sustained crackdown on

it and despite the depletion of its ranks by the ISIS. Its presence, even if meager, can be deadly. For one, the group can reap the benefits of ISIS's falling empire, ranging from embracing the recruits to capitalizing on the training skills especially social media. The impact on Pakistan can be alarming.

Leadership

Despite repeated military operations and law enforcement measures against al-Qaeda and its linked groups in Pakistan, the al-Qaeda high command did not get much bothered. In any case, all its high-value leaders were targeted by the US-led drone campaign. Once the US drone campaign shifted to Iraq-Syria theatre, they got some breathing space. Those who survived stayed aloof from Pakistanis.

The hideout of Al-Qaeda's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is uncertain, but it is expected he might be holding up somewhere in Pakistan and maintaining a flow of communications with his field commanders. Although not as charismatic as his predecessor, Zawahiri has sustained ISIS deluge and managed to secure most of its rank and file from falling into the hands of ISIS-Khurasan. His strategy was wait-and-see, as if he had an idea that that the ISIS phenomenon was temporary. Whether or not that fleeting stage for Al-Qaeda has passed is to be seen.

Establishing Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent

In September 2014, Zawahiri inaugurated the South Asian chapter of Al-Qaeda by the name of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in September 2014. This appears to be in sheer competition with ISIS-Khurasan, to claim the lost ground. Zawahiri, in his 55-minute video message, celebrated its formation:

"This entity was not established today, but it is the fruit of a blessed effort for more than two years to gather the mujahideen in the Indian subcontinent into a single entity to be with the main group, Qaedat al-Jihad, from the soldiers of the Islamic Emirate and its triumphant emir, Allah permitting, Emir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid." (Message translated by SITE Intelligence Group, September 2014)

The AQIS attempted to hijack a Pakistani Naval frigate PNS Zulfiqar amid ongoing naval exercises in September 2014. The planned attack failed, but AQIS left a mark. The group's spokesperson claimed responsibility.²⁷⁸

From then, the AQIS project did not yield any material objectives for Al-Qaeda, while ISIS-K continued to gain media attention. Not until the JAS came in this year.

Capitalizing on ISIS's downfall

In an interview to *Nawa-e-Afghan Jihadi*, an AQIS magazine, Zawahiri desired to embrace those who left Al-Qaeda to join ISIS. Meanwhile, the ISIS-K, with all its efforts, has not been able to gain strength – they have come under attack by US and Afghan forces as well as Afghan Taliban, and across the border by Pakistan. The “Daesh meltdown”, in the words of a leading analyst, has become eminent.²⁷⁹

The lowering of morale of ISIS's general command amid death of al-Baghdadi and subsequent losses in Mosul and elsewhere have torn apart the inevitability of ISIS in the eyes of its supporters and potential recruits. This allowed Zawahiri to further his plan of action; soon after, Ansar ul-Sharia surfaced and perpetrated acts of terrorism in Karachi and Balochistan.

Regrouping and assessing the needs

Al-Qaeda now endeavors to embrace the Pakistani jihadis back into its fold. Given that AQIS failed at attracting ISIS-K returnees from Iraq and Syria, Ansar ul-Sharia may try to do so. The group was established as the focal group for luring them back into al-Qaeda's fold. The purpose is to regroup and rework things out as once used to be for al-Qaeda in Pakistan before the advent of ISIS-K in the arena of jihad.

Creating new fronts

Perhaps al-Qaeda is endeavoring to bring the old item in new wrapping but old brand name. This is one reason that first AQIS was established to reinvigorate al-Qaeda in Pakistan with a widened scope; hence, the ISIS returnees. In the past too, Al-Qaeda had tried to attract Punjabi and non-Arab jihadists in its folds who worked in different brigades.

Avoiding competition

Although anticipated, Al-Qaeda wanted to avoid competition with ISIS-K. It did not clash with the latter, as Afghan Taliban did in Afghanistan. This strategy was praised among ranks of Pakistani jihadi community, who hoped the two can join hands.²⁸⁰ Little did they know that the two groups have been fighting each other in Syria.

The future of Al-Qaeda

The surfacing of Jamaat ul Ansar ul-Sharia Pakistan is yet another attempt by Al-Qaeda to reinvigorate itself in Pakistan. Past attempts in the shape of AQIS have failed. But things are different this time, as described above: while its core leadership is somewhat intact, that of ISIS is on the decline. Arguably, Al-Qaeda's future in Pakistan may now depend upon Ansar al-Sharia. It has highly-trained and seasoned cadre.

Conclusion

Al-Qaeda was able to fit in the jihadi landscape of Pakistan for long, starting all the way from Afghan War. It has had links with militants of all sorts in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. The only time this bond was weakened was the surfacing of ISIS in 2014, as groups and individuals flooded to ISIS. The most significant attempt by AQ to revive itself, in the shape of a chapter in Indian subcontinent, was

made amid the height of ISIS's rise. No wonder that failed.

But now, in 2017, after the (near anticipated) fall of ISIS, al-Qaeda has started to work over resurrecting itself. It is trying to woo those who left it earlier. This may gain prominence, as it already has the know-how of the militant landscape of this region. This is the singular warning for Pakistani policy makers emerging out of 2017.

CHAPTER 12

Educated, urban and destructive: the new breed of jihadis in Pakistan

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On September 2, 2017, two assassins tried to kill a notable politician in Karachi. One of them died while the other managed to flee on his motorbike. It was later revealed that the perpetrators were members of Jamaat al-Ansar al-Sharia Pakistan,²⁸¹ a newly-claimed militant outfit.

The dead militant was identified as Hassan bin Nazeer, a laboratory technician at Dawood Engineering University and PhD candidate in engineering. The other, who managed to flee, was Abdul Kareem Saroosh Siddiqui, a dropout from department of Applied Physics of University of Karachi. According to police sources, Siddiqui is also the leader of Ansar al-Sharia.

Investigators revealed that other members of the Ansar were equally well-educated, urban, and ideologically-driven individuals. Before their latest assassination attempt, they were involved in scores of other terrorist attacks.

In what was taken as an aberration, analysts wondered how come some educated individuals go the militant way.

This phenomenon is not new however. Many members of Al-Qaeda central had highly-specialized skills: its present emir is a medical surgeon. In more recent times, attention to this phenomenon was drawn after the proclamation of caliphate by Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), or Daesh. In response to its call to join the caliphate, many educated, urban young people signed up to the group or went far

away to Syria, the seat of the caliphate. One estimate put the movement of around 40,000 radicalized individuals from more than 100 countries.²⁸²

The number of such people, surely, may not be comparable with thousands of foot soldiers of militant outfits. But the crucial roles of the educated terrorists cannot be set aside. Largely because of their background, they have conducted terrorist strikes with precision, of greater magnitude in terms of influence and effects.

Similarly, the subject matter issue may be analyzed without considering whether they acted at the behest of any other organization like Al-Qaeda or ISIS. The core issue is the attraction for individuals from affluent, educated, and urban backgrounds towards Islamist terrorist groups.

The attraction of terrorism for the educated youth has been greatly studied the world over. This article attempts to do so in the context of Pakistan. It endeavors to study the issue in the light of certain parameters such as socialization, family backgrounds and origins, type of school attended and quality of education.

The term 'educated' in this study includes those who educated from private sector, foreign educated, urban residents, university dropouts and those from affluent backgrounds.

It is pertinent to mention that in Pakistan, there are at least four educational systems

– madrasahs, public schools, private schools, and public schooling in regional languages. There is a huge gulf as far as quality of education is concerned in the four systems: madrasahs provide religious education and a large number of enrolled students are from lower-lower stratum of Pakistani society; public schools both federal and regional levels are mostly attended by lower-middle classes; finally, the private schooling, which is considered the most expensive one in Pakistan, is a domain where mostly middle-classes and upper-middle classes send their children.

On the basis of available database, an attempt could be made to study the profiles and reach a conclusion though with limitations. The dataset is based upon individuals of Pakistani origins remained involved in acts of terrorism, in Pakistan and abroad. After discussing their profiles, we would then move forward to analyze the factors influencing their behaviors.

The KSM family

Some of the notorious educated militants are drawn from the notorious Khalid Shaikh Mohammad's family.

Khalid (aka Mukhtar or KSM) is no ordinary terrorist. He masterminded the 9/11 attacks whereas his nephew Ramzi Yousaf masterminded the 1993 WTC bombing.

Seven members of the KSM family have been found involved in plotting and

perpetrating massive acts of terrorism in five countries. These are KSM, Ramzi Yousaf, Amr al-Baluchi, Aafia Siddiqui, Dawood Badini, Idris al-Baluchi, Haji Sahab. Apparently terrorism has become a norm in KSM's family; the family members compete and take lead in committing acts of terrorism of greater magnitude.

Of these family members, at least three – if not all – are foreign educated: KSM, Ramzi and Aafia. These three remained associated with Islamist political activism from the platform of one Islamist political party in Pakistan. Most have links with anti-Shia violent sectarian organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, while Dawood Badini remained Emir of LeJ Balochistan chapter.

Atta ur Rehman and Jundullah

The Karachi-based Jundullah was the first Al-Qaeda-associated cell to emerge in an urban center after the commencement of war against terror.

Jundullah made headlines after its extremely well-planned and executed attack on the cavalcade of Corp Commander Karachi in 2004. The General barely managed to escape, whereas seven security officials escorting him along with two police officers were gunned down. Other major terrorist attacks of the group included the bombing of US Consulate in Karachi, bombing of Pakistan-American Cultural Center, bomb attack outside a concert hall where an Indian singer Sonu

Nigam was performing in Karachi, bomb blast at Bible Society in Karachi, bomb attack on police station and armed attack on a Pakistan Ranger's mobile in 2008.

This cell comprised of educated youth from middle-class families of Karachi. Jundullah's first Emir Ata ur Rehman was a student of Statistics department of University of Karachi and a worker of Islami Jamiat-e-Talba. He later joined Harkat ul Mujahedeen and, during training in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, came closer to Al-Qaeda leadership. Other members arrested in 2007 included Deputy Emir Shahzad Ahmed Bajwa, Yaqoob Saeed, Uzair Ahmed, Shoaib Siddiqui, Danish Inam, Najeebullah and Khurram Saifullah. They had different educational background; the deputy emir was an engineer. Jundullah militants also had the financial blessings from notorious Waheed Brothers, who bankrolled the organization for launching terrorist attacks in Karachi for many years.

Hammad Adil Cell and Al-Qaeda's Islamabad Cell

Most of the members of Al-Qaeda's Islamabad Cell, which was busted in September 2013, were students of International Islamic University, Islamabad.

It was revealed that the cell had been active in perpetrating terrorist attacks in collusion with Al-Qaeda since 2007.

The cell was headed by Abdullah Omar, a 24-year student of Islamic Sharia law at IIUI.²⁸³ Abdullah was head of planning and operations and was assisted by Hammad Adil, younger brother of Superintendent of Police Kamran Adil²⁸⁴, who also studied at Sharia law department at IIU. Another member Haris Khan was a government officer's son; two brothers Saad and Fahd were sons of a retired government officer; and Tanveer, a loner became their aide in striking targets all over Islamabad.²⁸⁵

The Islamabad Cell was responsible for some of the major terrorist attacks in Islamabad. It was responsible for the murder of Federal Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti, March 2011; assassination of senior prosecutor of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Choudhry Zulfiqar Ali, who was also the prosecution lawyer of former President General Pervez Musharraf, May 2013; suicide bombing of Danish Embassy, July 2008; assassination attempt on former President and military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, 2012; and burning of NATO convoys at two different terminals in Islamabad and Rawalpindi²⁸⁶. With the busting of the cell in 2013, the terrorist activities took a nosedive in Islamabad.

Saad Aziz group of Karachi

Majority of the members of this Al-Qaeda-linked cell in Karachi were highly educated, affluent and hailed from secular families;

the most important among them was Saad Aziz.

This cell remained active for at least last five years, carrying out a range of targets including on attacks on police patrols and paramilitary Rangers; assassination of social and secular activists like Sabeen Mehmood; target killing workers of secular and overtly anti-Taliban political parties like Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM); suicide attack on Brigadier Basit of Sindh Rangers in Karachi; target killing of three members of Bohra community; firing and critically wounding American Professor Dr Debra Lobo in Karachi; magnetic bomb attack and killing Naval Officer in Karachi and killings of Ismaili Shias.²⁸⁷

The cell reached its zenith when the members planned and targeted a bus full of members of Ismaili-Shia community in Karachi, killing 54. Finally the police investigators were able to successfully investigate and apprehend the cell.

The cell was an interesting combination of individuals from various different socio-economic strata of society. The cell leader, Tahir Minhas, hailed from Bahawalpur district, a rural district of Punjab province, and was a high class drop out. Saad Aziz, his second-in-command was highly educated with upper-class-urban family background.

Contrary to Minhas's upbringing, Aziz was born and raised in Karachi to an educated

Punjabi family long settled in Karachi. His father, himself a business graduate had worked for an American multinational corporation, the Unilever as executive director in Karachi.

Interestingly, Aziz once a very normal, fun-loving kid, started to radicalize at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA). His exposure to Islamism and radical ideas associated with it began at IBA. Earlier Aziz was fond of football, had a girlfriend and friends from same socio-economic status, and performed well in studies during first two years of business school. His radicalization began when he joined Iqra Society, a religious reading and discussion group at IBA. The society was formed by members of Jamaat-e-Islami the Islamist twin of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Pakistan. From then onwards he gradually disconnected himself from all of his previous friends and only maintained contacts with his religious friends. The Islamist members of Iqra Society exposed Aziz to the writings of ultra-radical Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb. He once asked his friend "Have you read *Milestones* by Sayyid Qutb? It has changed my life²⁸⁸." Some of his friends even believe that he received training at some jihadi camps as he was out of contact for some months. One of his friends remarked "he went somewhere for a few months. Someone said he had gone for jihad training.²⁸⁹"

Ansar al-Sharia

Jamaat Ansar al-Sharia is apparently an agglomerate of Islamist terrorist organizations endeavoring to converge at a platform to reintroduce al-Qaeda and restart terrorist activities under its banner. It appears to be an attempt by al-Qaeda linked and ISIS-inspired groups to make a comeback before the eventual fall of IS's capital in Raqqa.

Led by Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqui, a drop out of Applied Physics department of University of Karachi, the Ansar has hitherto involved in six terrorist strikes in Karachi and Balochistan.

This group comprises of highly-educated young militants. Hassan bin Nazeer, the one killed, was an electronic engineer. He did his bachelor of engineering from Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology and masters degree from NED University of Engineering and Technology and working as a laboratory assistant at Dawood University of Engineering and Technology in Karachi.

Common features and shared ideology

In above-mentioned cases, most of the arrested leaders are from middle class Punjabi families, urban, and highly educated backgrounds, based in urban centers showing the peculiar nature. Apart from linking to al-Qaeda and its associated

network, these Islamist terrorist cells have a number of common features.

The above mentioned case studies allow to study, assess and analyze the common traits on the basis of which their motives and primary pre-al-Qaeda joining sources could be identified. Not to mention that all belonged to Deobandi and Salafi streaks of Islam.

Islamist background

The cells discussed above have one principal commonality, and that is their Islamist political backgrounds. The cell members had all remained part of political Islamist parties, who inspire young, educated, urban, and at times, affluent individuals to join their ranks. A number of cell members started their Islamist career from student unions of Islamist political parties and later moved on to join either violent sectarian groups or regional Islamist groups before joining global Islamist terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda or Islamic State.

Globalists

The nature of terrorist activities of these cells are not very different from local Islamist terrorist organizations but their aptitude appear to be global rather regional or domestic.

Terrorism is mostly local in any region of the world, though there are some

transnational trends. The Islamist cells discussed above seem to have developed an international or globalist approach to their cause. They find more affinity with Al-Qaeda and ISIS than local Islamist terrorist cells, to whom they have worked with before developing such tendencies.

Comparing the urban Islamist cells' terrorist activities with rural area-based terrorist organizations like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan would be an interesting study if undertaken in future. Apparently the urban area based cells are more globalist in trends because of their seemingly clear tilt towards global jihadi organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Motivations

Level of motivation of these cells appears to be much higher than the local Islamist terrorist cells. The ferocity and consistency of terrorist attacks show the highly educated youth associated with these cells are dedicated to their cause, ready to spend for the cause whatever finances they have and seem more ruthless than other local and regional groups.

The scale of terrorist strikes could be compared with other Islamist cells, but

these groups with meagre resources and small number appear to have done much more than other terrorist groups. Their dedication to the cause is apparent in their actions but it is worth researching whether these cells have been able to cause more damage than other Islamist terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad operating in the same localities.

Conclusion

The study was aimed at analyzing a set of urban-based cells comprising of educated (university educated) youth involved in terrorist activities at the behest of Islamist terrorist organizations in Pakistan. The phenomenon of urban Islamists joining terrorist organizations is not new; their shared traits have been studied in this article. There is a further need to broaden the scope of this research in future with a focus on figuring out the comparison of rural and urban terrorist cells and their magnitude and direction of terrorist attacks. Further it is pertinent for policy makers to analyze the common traits of individuals joining Islamist terrorist organizations in Pakistan.

CHAPTER 13

Fate of FATA still hangs in balance

Tahir Khan*

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Although situation in FATA has been considerably improving, with Taliban having no area under their control, acts of violence continued to occur. 2017 was therefore no exception. The more worrisome was little investment in mainstreaming the tribal areas, despite historic opportunities to do so.

Marks of violence

In what has now become a norm for more than decade, FATA continued to come under militant attack in 2017 too.

On December 5, a bomb attached to a motorcycle hit a vehicle of security forces in North Waziristan, killing at least 6 people, according to officials. A day earlier, a leader of the pro-government peace committee was killed in South Waziristan in an attack.

Such incidents, occurring at the end of the year, raises questions about the security forces' claim of complete success in clearing the agency of militants following the major offensive "Zarb-e-Azb" launched in June 2014. To many, it appears that the area is not yet completely eliminated from the militants.

Some of the militant incidents bear resemblance with what they used to do when they were at their height of strength.

On December 11, body of a man who was tortured to death, was found in Shadi Khel area in FR Lakki. A paper was found near the body in which the TTP Mehsud faction

had warned "those who will cooperate with the army will face consequences." The message threatened those who are encouraging the Taliban to surrender. It was meant by Taliban to show they are still around.

More so, it evoked memories of the time when people in the tribal regions, especially in North Waziristan, would find bodies with a note that the man has been killed over spying.

Locals in Waziristan say they have seen such elements who have returned who had been part of the violence during the Taliban control. People do not want to see them back and expect the military take action.

Yet for all the incidents of violence by Taliban-like groups, it is now largely acknowledged Taliban groups currently do not have any area under their control.

Cross-border firing

Cross-border firing by the militants remained another challenge for the forces in 2017.

There had also been several cross-border attacks on Pakistani check posts in Rajgal Valley, Khyber agency and Bajaur agency, from September to November. At least 5 Pakistani security personnel were killed in terrorists' firing from the Afghan side of the border, which Afghans call Durand Line, in three months from September to November.

TTP and splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar had claimed attacks on borders posts in Rajgal Valley in Khyber Agency and Bajaur.

Pakistani security officials insist TTP and Ahrar operate from their sanctuaries in Afghanistan's border provinces – Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, Paktiya and Paktika as well as Nuristan. Pakistani militant groups never admitted they have sanctuaries but on September 29, the Jamaat ul Ahrar spokesman Asad Mansoor, confirmed seven of the group members were killed in operation by the Afghan forces that was an admission that the group is based in Afghanistan.

Key violent incidents

Kurram agency witnessed several deadliest attacks in 2017 that had sectarian nature and Shiite Muslims were massacred in the markets in Parachinar.

On January 22, a blast ripped through a vegetable market in Parachinar, killing at least 25 people and leaving 87 injured. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) had claimed responsibility. On 31 March, a car bombing at a market in Parachinar, killed at least 24 people and wounded more than 70. In early June twin blasts, targeting members of Shia community in Parachinar took the lives of over 100, in the holy month of Ramazan. "Lashkar-i-Jhangvi al-Alami," considered close to Daesh, had claimed responsibility.

There were some attacks in Bajaur this year. On Sept. 17 a roadside bomb killed, political tehsildar Fawad Ali and 4 of his guards in Bajaur's Tangi area of Loi Mamond tehsil. TTP had claimed the attack. On Aug. 11, a remote-controlled bomb hit a truck killing three people and injuring over 20 others in Bajaur's Nawagai sub-division.

In spite of the forces' major operation in North Waziristan, the militants continued attacks in the area this year. On Dec. 12 the military said terrorists fired on army vehicle from surrounding mountains in North Waziristan Agency and killed an officer 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Moeed and Sepoy Basharat. On Dec. 5: An IED attached to a motorbike killed at least six people exploded near an army vehicle in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan. Army recruits were in the vehicle at the time of the attack, according to media reports. The TTP had claimed responsibility. On Oct. 9, three soldiers were killed and seven others injured in an attack on a vehicle of the Frontier Corps in Razmak sub-division of North Waziristan Agency.

Khyber, Mohmand and Orakzai agencies remained relatively peaceful in 2007 with few small attacks. In Mohmand On Feb. 15, 2017, a suicide bombing had killed 6 security men and civilians in Ghalanai, in Mohmand. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar group, which is consisted of Taliban from Mohmand region, had claimed the attack in a statement.

Incidents occurred in KP too, especially in Peshawar, where Taliban carried out several attacks. On Dec. 1 a group of Taliban bombers killed nine people, mostly students and injured more than 30 when they attacked hostel of the Directorate of Agriculture Extension in Peshawar. The alleged attackers were shown in Taliban photograph along with the TTP Chief Maulvi Fazalullah.

Odd kidnapping

One of the striking incidents in 2017 was kidnapping of a local politician. In Wana, the local Taliban (Mullah Nazeer group) kidnapped a local leader of the Awami National Party Ayaz Wazir in April.²⁹⁰

Strikingly, Wazir was reportedly kidnapped after he and some other local politicians formed a political alliance and supported merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

According to locals, the group involved in the kidnapping and other activities is not part of the TTP and is considered close to the authorities. This group, led by Salahuddin Ayubi, is considered in the good-book as it does not carry out attacks on the security forces in Wana but is involved in violence in other areas.

The need for winning hearts and minds

An unannounced operation in South Waziristan was conducted in November, 2017, forcing hundreds of families to shift to a camp near Bannu that was set up for the uprooted people of North Waziristan after the operation was launched in June 2014.

According to Tribal News Network, online and radio news agency serving radio audiences in FATA and KP reported at least 204 families were affected due to the operation in Shaktoi area, which was launched on 8 November. Operation Rah-e-Nijat was launched in South Waziristan in 2009, but Shaktoi having population of 50,000 was not cleared.

There is also some anger among the people, especially in Waziristan about the security forces approach towards the common people. People complain about their mistreatment at check posts manned by the army. For example, the use of motorcycle was banned in North Waziristan by the political administration after the Dec. 5 attack. This was discriminatory action with people of FATA as no such ban enforced in Pakistan whenever bikes were used for attacks.

In a positive development, a cricket match was played in Miranshah in September but curfew was imposed at the same time that was not taken well by the locals. The

military authorities had announced to open Ghulam Khan border in North Waziristan on Dec. 15 but it did not happen. It was closed when "Zarb-e-Azb" was launched in June 2014.

Halted progress on mainstreaming FATA

There had been some efforts for the mainstreaming FATA in 2017 but there no implementation of any suggestion until mid-December.

The government showed non-serious approach towards the mainstreaming FATA, apparently due to pressure from its two allies Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) and Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), which are opposed to the reforms. Both call for referendum to let the people decide about their future. The PML-N did not want to lose support of the two parties in view of political crisis it faced after the Supreme Court ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. JUI-F and PKMAP stood behind the government during the crisis.

On Dec. 11, the government removed from the agenda of the National Assembly a bill to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (*The Supreme Court and High Court (Extension of jurisdiction to Federally Administered Tribal Areas Bill, 2017)*).

Minister of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), Abdul Qadir Baloch and Sartaj Aziz, who headed committee to introduce reforms in FATA, had announced on Dec. 8 at a presser in Islamabad that the bill would be introduced in the parliament on Dec. 11. But reports suggested that JUI-F chief Maulana Fazal ur Rehman spoke to SAFRON minister and warned him of parting with the government if the bill was introduced. Opposition parties later protested over the government abrupt removal of the bill from the order-of-the-day.

Political parties seemed divided over the FATA reforms. Major parties PPP, PTI, ANP, Jamaat-e-Islami and majority of FATA lawmakers threw weight behind the FATA merger with KP. However, JUI-F and PKMAP insisted on referendum and some support for the option to declare FATA as a separate province.

FATA lawmakers had earlier been divided over the merger issue, but in early November minister of state for States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) Ghalib Khan said at a news conference that all FATA lawmakers have agreed on FATA merger with KP.

However, there had been no progress even after the minister's public announcement.

The role of the army, the main decision maker in FATA, has also been very vague.

Although the corps commander Peshawar hinted support for the merger at Geo TV interview, there had been no practical step. The military leaders said on a number of occasions to support mainstreaming of FATA but nothing has happened. There could be some progress towards the mainstreaming had the security establishment show some interest.

It was unfortunate and shows the lack of interest of all stake holders that they even did not remove or introduce changes in the British-era Frontier Crimes Regulations

(FCR) (until Dec: 12) despite widespread support for its repeal.

Conclusion

There is no doubt the situation in FATA is changed in a sense that the armed groups currently have no area under their control but they carry out attacks to show their presence. The state has not taken any step to win the heart of the tribesmen; most importantly, is the authorities do not show respect to their freedom of movement and expression.

CHAPTER 14

Sindh in 2017 – same old pattern

Zia Ur Rehman*

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The trend of militancy in 2017 was continuation of the previous few years: while Karachi saw relative peace, largely because of the operation, rural Sindh has been attracting militants, resulting in attack on a major shrine. One of the most significant developments was emergence of educated young individuals.

Karachi

2017 marked the fifth year of the Rangers-led targeted operation in Karachi. Ever since the operation has been launched in 2013, there has been considerable improvement in the law and order situation in the city, a trend that continued in 2017. The military takes credit for the operation; reportedly, the military chief in a briefing to the Senate's committee of the whole also cited the operation in Karachi for decreasing violence in the city.

The ongoing crackdown in Karachi mainly targeted four sorts of violent actors. These are the Taliban groups such as Pakistani Taliban; sect-based militant groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; militant wings of the ethno-political parties in Karachi; and the criminal gangs operating in Lyari area, weakening their network. It is because of the crackdown that fatalities from political and sectarian violence and gang wars have sharply declined in Karachi.

2017 saw emergence of a new trend on the militant landscape – transitional militant outfits and self-radicalized, educated militant in the affluent and middle-class neighborhoods of the city.

The most notable to this end was the emergence of Ansar-ul-Sharia Pakistan (ASP).

In September 2017, the group attacked Khawaja Izharul Hassan, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P)'s deputy parliamentary leader in Sindh Assembly. Earlier, the group was also reportedly involved in slaying of police personnel and a retired Pakistani army colonel over the past five months. Unlike the TTP and the LeJ that used to carry out suicide attack, the ASP militants mainly preferred to hit soft targets using guns.

Law enforcement agencies in its crackdown on the ASP killed the outfit's key leaders, including its founder Sheheryar alias Dr Abdullah Hashmi, in October. Police officials claim the outfit has been weakened greatly.

Also, the Sindh Police's Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) convened a meeting with representatives of the province's 40 public and private universities to devise a strategy to stop militancy on the campus.

However, in Karachi, and rest of the Sindh province, government did not implement the NAP, especially its key points, such as misuse of loud speakers; hate literature, registration of madrassas, stopping proscribed outfits to work with new names and restricting them from collecting donations.

It is being said that the Sindh government mainly follows the decisions made in meetings of the Apex Committee. One

security official, when asked about NAP, said "NAP means nothing anymore in Sindh." "It is fizzled out", he argued, adding that provinces keep on passing the buck around. "They say let Punjab do it first, in madrassa reforms for instance. Punjab says let Khyber Pakhtunkhwa does it first."

Rural Sindh

Rural areas of Sindh, especially its northern region, have been emerging as a new hotbed of militancy in Pakistan.

In the past few years, the region has been witnessing large-scale terror attack, mainly targeting Shia community and Sufi shrines. This trend continued in 2017. In February, 2017, a suicide attack inside the Shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, in Sehwan town, killed around 90 people and injured over 200 others.

Police officials believe that after crackdown in tribal areas and Karachi, Taliban groups and sectarian outfits have found new sanctuaries in districts of northern Sindh sharing borders with Balochistan and South Punjab.

Law enforcement agencies believe that Hafeez Brohi (or Hafeez Pandrani), a resident of Shikarpur, has been heading a

militant group in rural Sindh and involved in recent terror attacks. The group, linked with the TTP and the LeJ, has made connections with sectarian outfits operating in Balochistan.

Law enforcement agencies after the February 2017 suicide attack on Qalandar shrine, has launched a crackdown against Hafeez Brohi's group, arresting a number of its members.

Yet another concern of the provincial authorities in interior Sindh have been the protection of Chinese working in Sindh province on different projects of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

According to some sources, members of Jeay Sindh Mutahida Mahaz, a proscribed Sindhi separatist group, tried to target Chinese personnel working in the Sindh province. JSMM is only Sindhi nationalist party which has been declared proscribed by the federal home ministry in 2013 for their alleged involvement in subversive activities.

In response, law enforcement agencies launched a full-fledged crackdown against the outfit, killing their members and leaders. It is being said the outfit has been weakened to great extent.

CHAPTER 15

Disbursing Faizabad sit-in: action and way forward

Imran Mukhtar and Azam Khan*

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On the morning of November 25, 2017, Pakistanis woke to the news that the law-enforcement agencies have finally launched an operation against the protesters of Faizabad Interchange in Islamabad. Around three weeks have passed to the sit-in of the protesters. Because the bridge lies on the main artery connecting Islamabad with Rawalpindi, residents of the cities faced severe difficulty in travelling around. Question marks were raised over what the government was up to, and whether anything at all will be done to clear the area.

And then the operation happened, without achieving its objective. The “November 25 botched operation”, as it is now called, was launched by the civilian law-enforcement agencies to disperse the protesters, has not only raised questions on the efficiency and training of the police and other law enforcers to deal with such situation but also aroused the need for a complete policy review.

This article tries to dig deep in the way this operation was conducted. It does so by exploring which law-enforcement agencies were responsible for dealing with the protest; how did they perform; where there any gaps; and what can be learnt from the entire operation.

Police action

On the morning of November 25, 2017, the law-enforcement agencies led by Islamabad Police launched an operation to

clear Faizabad Interchange – the major entry and exit point of Islamabad and Rawalpindi – from the protestors of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA), a religious party, who vowed not to move unless their demands were met. All the law enforcers were unarmed in the operation, only having batons, anti-riot equipment and tear gas shells, under the instructions of the court as well as Interior Ministry.

The operation failed to achieve its purpose. Instead, the LEAs retreated, following which the operation hours were suspended.

The botched operation forced the government to surrender before the protestors through a controversial agreement and fulfil their demands including immediate removal of then law minister Zahid Hamid. Hamid. The protestors were making demands for taking to task all those who, they accused had brought about a controversial change in the law regarding declaration form of electoral candidates about Finality of Prophethood of Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH).

Removal of the minister was widely criticized. Chairman Senate Mian Raza Rabbani lamented that the government surrendered to a handful of protestors, objecting to the way protestors were dealt with and the way government settled terms with the protesting party.

What really had happened?

The purpose of the operation was to clear the area where the protestors were grounded. The lead agency responsible for the operation was Islamabad Police, which was also assisted by Frontier Constabulary, a civilian paramilitary force; Rawalpindi Police and Rangers, military-run civil armed force.

According to Islamabad Police and the Ministry of Interior, the operation was launched on the directions of Islamabad High Court (IHC), which had ordered the police and local district administration to clear the area from the protestors. The court had observed that the sit-in, which continued for over 21 days, had crippled the life of the twin cities.

Police reports and background interviews with a number of police officials indicate that ill planning, weak coordination among the law enforcement agencies, half-hearted effort and lack of training of the police and other civil armed forces to deal with the protestors led to the failure of the operation.

A day before the launch of operation, the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration (ICTA), in a letter, wrote to the TLYRA leadership that the security situation mandated prior permission from the administration. This was considered last warning to the protestors. It said:

"Due to precarious security environment section 144 CrPC has

been imposed in the Islamabad Capital Territory, all public gathering are banned. Therefore, any public event requires prior coordination and permission for necessary security arrangements and relaxation of section 144 CrPC from the District Magistrate, ICT."

The letter said that ICT administration had neither received any request from TLYRA to hold any public event in the territory of the capital nor has such permission been given under the law:

"Therefore in the light of the direction of Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan and Honorable Islamabad High Court, you are directed to immediately call-off your dharna or shift to Parade ground (Shakarparian) Islamabad after obtaining the due approval/NOC from the district administration."

The letter warned that non-compliance will lead to contempt of court, due to which competent authority would be compelled to initiate strict legal action against the illegal protest sit-in to fulfil the requirement of law and writ of state.

The next morning, the operation started. In the start, the Islamabad police and FC had succeeded in vacating some of the areas of overhead bridge of Faizabad Interchange.

According to a senior police official, the law enforcers were near at dismantling the main stage installed at the venue, but instantly some people from the adjoining areas of Rawalpindi joined the protestors, thus increasing their number. As the number of protestors increased, they forced the law enforcers to retreat and leave the operation unfinished.

One official was of the view that Rawalpindi police had failed to fully seal the area and had no strategy how to stop the people joining in who had watched live coverage of the operation on the TV.

Rawalpindi Police had very weak coordination with the Islamabad Police that was leading the operation. Rawalpindi police totally failed to seal the area to ban the entry of more sympathizers of the protestors into the protest venue. At the end, Rawalpindi police had to run away, leaving their prison and mobile vans that were later burnt to ashes by the protestors.

The police and FC were so weak in their strategy that it could not even dismantle the sound system of the TLYRA leadership, as they all started making fiery speeches from the main stage. When the operation was started, the speeches aroused the people to show bravery and challenge the police.

The internal coordination within Islamabad police and with the FC also looked nil.

Some police officials stress that the personnel of police and FC who were conducting operation in the first tier could not get support from the second tier of the police that was deployed around the protest venue. As those in the first tier got exhausted, the protestors got enough time to force the police to retreat, amid heavy baton charge and tear gas shelling, as the second tier of deployment did not replace the first one. Rangers had been deployed in the last tier but that they did not take part in the operation.

The FC, Islamabad Police as well as Rawalpindi Police had launched the operation simultaneously from four sides — Express Way, Sohan Area, Club Road and Inter Junction Principal (IJP) Road. Forces from all sides were led by a superintendent of police each.

Many see Faizabad operation as a repeat of the episode of the police action made on the night of August 30, 2014, when the protestors of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and Pakistan Awami Tehreek had attempted to attack the parliament. The police at one time had succeeded to disperse the protestors from the main Constitution Avenue but because of weak coordination and ill-planning, the protestors got a chance to reconvene, and police had to move back. In both operations, a number of police officials sustained injuries.

Another view is that during the operation, the law enforcers advanced half-heartedly

as, in their opinion, the protestors were holding a sit-in for a noble cause. A junior level police official in an interview said that while challenging the protestors, it appeared as if they were compromising their conscience. It was actually the duty of the police high ups to sensitize the police that they were doing nothing illegal by taking part in the operation.

On the eve of November 25, the Ministry of Interior wrote a letter to the General Headquarters (GHQ), the seat of the military, requisitioning army in aid of civil power, under the Article 245 of the Constitution, to control law and order situation in ICT. The GHQ replied with its own letter, showing apprehensions while dealing with protestors. The letter wrote:

“While dealing with protestors of TLYRA, police has not been optimally utilized to its full capacity...Pakistan Rangers, backing up to Police as 2nd tier force physically deployed with Police in Islamabad, have not been given written instructions as already agreed for their employment.”

Experts have opposing views about the timing for the action. Some, for instance, say that such operations are conducted in the wee hours and not in the day light. Others said that the timing was appropriate as darkness might lead to a major mishap.

Former interior minister Rehman Malik questioned timing of this operation and held that no out-of-the-box solutions worked on to disperse the agitators. He said that routes around the interchange were also not cordoned off properly to block entry of fresh protestors.

Former IGP and ex-Director General of Intelligence Bureau (IB) Sindh Shoaib Suddle maintains that police were not allowed to launch operation as per its own way prescribed in the law. He argues that the police was asked to vacate the area while throwing them before the angry mob without equipment. “Police is always given a specific task to accomplish it under the law with no ifs and buts,” he said adding that police was given the task to clear Faizabad Interchange but with some restrictions that ultimately led to the failure of the operation. He further said that the law allowed the police to remain armed while carrying out such operations but in this case, the police was unarmed.

Way forward

Experts believe that there was need of a complete review of the policy of the federal and provincial governments regarding the training of the police to deal with such protests.

It has been suggested that police should be the leading agency in such operations and other civil armed forces should be on their back as supporting force.

They argue that there was need not only of changing the training modules of the police to deal with such situations but also to provide it complete logistics to carry out such tasks. To be sure, the Punjab Constabulary, a civilian reserve force in Punjab, is also being considered as anti-riot police force. However, its officials get training from the same police schools and its training modules are not different from that of the other police.

Similarly, they say that there was need to establish a separate anti-riot police units at

the federal level and in each province that should only be specialised, in technology, training and equipment, to deal with the protests.

There is also a need to restructure the local police station system to improve the performance of the police. "Old ways of policing are now died out and there is need to at least establish 50 different specialized units within our police," one official said.

CHAPTER 16

Faith-based violence & rule of law

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2017 seemed to be high time to expect dividends to materialize from National Action Plan for countering terrorism, Raddul Fasad and the litany of other security operations against militants, terrorists and other mischief makers across the country. However, targeted violence of different hues suggested we are some way from celebrating substantial peace.

Throughout 2017, individuals and places of religious significance faced a number of horrific attacks on account of affiliations with various religions and sects.

Early in the year, a suicide attack at the shrine Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh, claimed at least 90 lives. As the year was drawing to a close, two suicide attackers stormed a church in Quetta, killing nine people. The Sehwan attack, in February, targeted the devotees of the Sufi saint when they were performing *dhamaal* (a trans-like devotional dance).

As the year was closing in, the attackers stormed Quetta's Bethel Memorial Methodist Church where the Sunday service was in progress, a week before Christmas.

Islamic State, the erstwhile Middle East-based militant group, claimed responsibility for both attacks.

Between these two attacks there were many faith-based targeted assaults and instances of mob violence in 2017 which should give those at the helm of affairs sleepless nights if they value citizen's basic freedoms and rule of law.

Hazara Shias in Balochistan appeared to bear the most severe brunt of the repeated targeted attacks.

In July, four family members belonging to the Hazara Shia community and their driver were shot dead when unidentified gunmen opened fire on their car near Mastung district. The victims were on their way to Quetta from Karachi when gunmen riding a motorcycle targeted their car.

In September, four members of the Hazara community were killed and two others severely injured in an attack in Kuchlak area of Balochistan. The victims were coming to Quetta from Chaman town on the Afghan border. They had stopped near a petrol station when the attackers on motorcycles shot at them. A 12-year-old boy was among the victims, while two women travelling with them remained unhurt as they were sitting in a vehicle when the attackers opened fire on the men who were standing outside.

In what has become a well-known pattern to target Hazaras, three Hazara vegetable vendors were killed in Quetta in an attack on their vehicle when they were going to get their merchandise from the market in October.

The assailants escaped unidentified and unhurt after carrying out these attacks.

Faith-based attacks on Ahmadi continued in 2017 too. At least four Ahmadis were killed in separate targeted attacks in various parts of Punjab.

The attacks, including sectarian assaults, are too numerous to recount here. But the trends need to be focused on. Needless to say, such targeted attacks fly in the face of the constitutional guarantees regarding freedom of religion as well as the promise that no person shall be deprived of life except in accordance with law.

During the year 2017, several instances of mobs seeking to exact 'justice' following accusations of blasphemy also took place. In further proof of brutalization of society, these frenzied mobs were ever-more eager to take the matters into their hands rather than waiting even to see if there was any truth to the accusations.

The April 2017 killing of Mashal Khan, 23, a student at Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, on campus following accusations that he had committed blasphemy on the social media sent shockwaves across the country. It later became apparent that the blasphemy accusation had been devised to exact "revenge" because the student had criticised the institution.

Some might argue that it was perhaps the manner of the killing—and not so much the killing itself—that caused uproar even in a society inured by decades of senseless and brutal blood-letting.

Mashal was stripped, beaten with sticks, bricks, kicked, punched, shot and thrown from the second floor of his university hostel. Graphic video footage of the brutal

killing showed an angry mob beating and stomping Mashal's lifeless body had played a part in the unequivocal condemnation of the murder.

However, newspaper editorials fearing that the rare uproar could prove transient might not have been far off the mark.

Within weeks of his killing, Mashal's father was seeking security for his daughters, saying they could not continue their education due to threats to their lives. In June, the gentleman had to move the highest court in the land for his daughter's safety and for transferring the case from Mardan where he alleged the proceedings could be influenced. Accounts of intimidation of witnesses in the case have already surfaced, further clouding prospects for justice for Mashal's murder. In October, a key witness disowned an earlier statement.

Mashal's was not the only case of angry mobs seeking to take matters into their own hands over faith-blasphemy accusations.

A little over a week after Mashal's lynching, police in the northwestern Chitral district had to fire tear gas shells to keep at bay a mob exceeding 2,000 people that demanded the police hand over an apparently mentally challenged man accused of blasphemy. Paramilitary troops had to be summoned to help control the situation.

On May 4, violence erupted in Hub area of Balochistan after police refused to hand over a Hindu man accused of blasphemy to a stone-pelting mob. Two policemen, the district's additional deputy commissioner and a child were injured in the violence. The child later succumbed to his injuries.

Towards the end of the year, some clerics and their supporters held several sit-ins of varying lengths on main roads in several cities to press the government to agree to their demands, mainly resignations of the federal and Punjab law ministers.

The federal law minister resigned in late November to "pull the country out of a crisis-like situation". The minister bowed out three weeks after hundreds of Tehreek-e-Labbaik supporters descended on Islamabad's Faizabad traffic interchange on November 6, calling for the federal law minister to resign. They accused him of being behind a hastily-abandoned amendment to the oath of elected representatives.

A day before his resignation, thousands of police and security forces had tried and failed to end the sit-in. Soon afterwards the minister's ancestral home had been attacked by protesters and he apparently had concerns about his and his family's safety.

Earlier, the minister had also released a video message on popular video-sharing

website YouTube to assert that he was a devout Muslim.

After the federal law minister's resignation, the protestor's demand converged on sacking or resignation of the Punjab law minister, who they accused of making an allegedly pro-Ahmadi statement.

All of these developments present challenges of different dimensions to the state.

Without pretending to lecture anyone on security matters, it is easy to agree that the masterminds of the faith-based blood-letting and targeting of places of religious significance, and the mindset that propagates such actions, have not been defeated.

Some of the more easily doable steps have not been initiated. The Supreme Court judgment of June 2014 on challenges for religious minorities had called for a number of measures to protect the religious minorities' sacred places including the creation of a special force to guard them. There has been no movement towards that.

Prime Minister and senior officials joining and speaking on religious minority communities' religious festivals send an important message but it is action that speaks louder than words.

Through the year, security was stepped up any time a place of religious significance

was targeted. However, if the heightened security measures were supposed to reassure the citizenry, they simultaneously served as reminders that these citizens were still vulnerable, still under attack.

The sit-ins of late 2017 and their outcomes so far augur well neither for the state nor the citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The roadblocks were aimed, from the very beginning, at capitulation of the state to their demands. Those seeking to impose their dictates on the state might not want to stick to the tried and tested modus operandi.

Unless clear thinking emerges and soon, no number of police or troops will be enough to control a handful of demonstrator's intent on blocking one thoroughfare or another. The way the security personnel asked to end the Faizabad sit-in were dealt with by the protesters and abandoned by the authorities, it would not be surprising if police are not keen to take on a mob when faith-related accusation, however unfounded, or issues of religious sensitivity are involved.

Dark days for freedom of expression

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It is customary at December's end to look back at the outgoing year and reflect on the gains and losses for any number of issues and themes. So it is with the right to freedom of expression in Pakistan in 2017.

Anyone familiar with the general context knows that Pakistan has been consistently considered among the most dangerous countries for journalists. A range of state and non-state actors have been blamed for violence against journalists.

Furthermore, international media watchdogs have regularly categorized Pakistan among the countries where killers of journalists are not brought to justice. In fact, in all but four years since 2000, Pakistan has been counted among the top 10 countries with the highest impunity levels for crimes against journalists. Just three cases of murdered journalists have been resolved out of over 100 journalists killed in the country on account of their work since January 2002. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Pakistan's impunity rating shot up by 113 percent over the past decade.

It was in this context that Pakistan was included among the five pilot countries for implementation of the United Nations Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, which was unveiled in 2012 and launched in Pakistan by UNESCO in March 2013. Pakistan endorsed the objectives of the UN Plan of Action in 2013. While there are no more pilot

countries, Pakistan continues to be a country of focus of the UN Plan of Action.

Pakistan has been reviewed thrice under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council. The UPR process involves a review of the human rights records of all UN member states. In all three reviews—in 2008, 2012 and 2017—several recommendations that Pakistan received, and accepted, stressed the need for strengthening the freedom of expression, access to information and to protect journalist and end impunity for crimes against them.

According to research database maintained by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), as many as three journalists and one media worker were killed on account of their work in Pakistan during 2017. In addition, there were numerous attacks against journalists and offices and property of media organisations.

Freedom of expression, of course, is not an entitlement solely of the journalists or the conventional news media. Nonetheless their ability to operate safely and independently is a telling indicator of the extent of this crucial freedom in the country.

Although the death toll among journalists in Pakistan has been in single figures in 2017, the challenges facing media practitioners and other citizens exercising their freedom of expression did not recede in any way. In fact, in many respects the

challenges grew in their frequency and intensity.

The year began with around half a dozen bloggers going missing in early 2017. Although all later returned home but the manner of their disappearance was interpreted as an attempt to stifle critical voices in the cyber space and on social media.

Application of the cybercrime law to interfere with journalists' work was also visible in the outgoing year. Journalists being summoned by an investigation agency solely on account of their work demonstrated that the apprehensions of civil society, which had vociferously opposed adoption of this law, were not misplaced.

The targeted journalists have often been those reporting on armed conflict, politics, corruption, and human rights. Journalists have faced threats not just in remote areas or theaters of armed conflict, but also in the main urban centres. Ahmed Noorani, a well-known reporter, was attacked in broad daylight at a busy intersection in the federal capital Islamabad in October 2017. Noorani sustained multiple injuries in the attack.

While no part of the country may be considered safe for media practitioners, practicing journalism is more hazardous in some areas of the country than in others. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

and Balochistan remain particularly problematic. The main problem in FATA was that of access, both to information and physical access to many parts of the conflict-hit region.

On top of the prevailing security problems for journalists in Balochistan, the distribution of local and national newspapers in southern and central parts of the province was suspended for weeks, starting October 25, following threats by Baloch militant groups.

The militants had stated that they would allow distribution of newspapers only if their point of view was given space in the media. Militants also attacked the Hub Press Club and a shop selling newspapers in Turbat with grenades earlier. Some vehicles transporting newspapers were damaged and newspapers set on fire.

How tenuous media freedoms in the country could be was again demonstrated in September, when a draft law, the Pakistan Print Media Regulatory Authority (PPMRA) Ordinance, 2017, was suddenly unveiled. The proposed legislation's stated aim was to regulate the print media. It sought to make it mandatory for newspapers to seek annual renewal of their licenses and empowered authorities to raid media houses at will.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan stressed that it was "imperative to understand where this draft emanated

from all of a sudden and at whose behest.” Opposition parties asked for an inquiry into how the draft was “secretly drafted in the darkness of the night, behind the back of parliament and stakeholders to stifle newspapers through unprecedented coercive measures”.

The federal information minister stated that she had nothing to do with the proposed draft. The government quickly withdrawal of the proposed draft law amid pressure from media, civil society and opposition parties. It ordered strict action against three officers for unilaterally moving ahead with the proposal.

The manner of many media organisations’ treatment of their workers further added to the vulnerability of the latter. Many media owners are often quick to paint themselves and their organisations as victims of violations of freedom of expression when a journalist working for their organizations is targeted. Yet they have no qualms about sending their reporters, photojournalists and media workers to dangerous assignments without ensuring that they have the proper equipment and training to do their job safely. Life insurance is not provided to journalists and media workers most at risk.

Numerous new media organisations continued to pay meagre salary to their staff and often none at all to their correspondents in the districts. This practice forced many journalists,

particularly in the northwestern parts of the country, to take on dangerous assignments to augment their income.

Numerous news media organisations have grown fond of hanging on to their staff’s dues for as long as they can, citing financial crunch. The same crunch, however, does not prevent them from incurring other expenses. Some well-known media organisations delayed payment of staff salaries by as much as six months. Organisations working on journalists’ safety highlighted that media houses are not playing their role in protecting journalists.

Finally, safety risks for journalists increase further due to unethical or unprofessional journalism and on account of an overall lack of training to assess and manage risks.

While the challenges were legions, the list of positives in terms of freedom of expression in the country in 2017 was not long. Two issues that remained untouched were the safety of media practitioners and impunity for violence against them. A law for journalists’ welfare and safety was yet to materialize despite repeated promises. The draft being considered focuses more on the welfare aspect and not enough on journalists’ safety and ending impunity for crimes against them. Civil society groups lobbying for journalist safety in the country voiced apprehensions that the proposed legislation fell short of addressing the scale

and complexity of impunity of crimes against journalists and media workers.

It is not difficult to comprehend why conventional and citizen journalists and bloggers are in such dire straits in the face of such intimidating circumstances. This context seems to be leading to growing self-censorship among conventional journalists as well as bloggers, in an apparent bid to avoid threats, attacks, harassment, arrests, hefty fines or legal fees.

The need to protect individuals from attacks or intimidation on account of exercise of the right to freedom of expression is paramount, because absence of such freedom will deprive society of information and transparency that are vital for it.

Blaming a problem on anyone bringing attention to it is of course not a terribly new idea. That was how the phrase “don’t shoot the messenger” became part of the English lexicon. The phrase is meant as an advice not to be angry with the bearer of bad news. We can do well to heed that advice.

An appraisal of India-Pakistan relations in 2017

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Introduction

2017 did not witness any significant change in India-Pakistan relations. Communication channels such as people-to-people contacts, back-channel talks and even track-II dialogues, have largely been condensed due to on-going tensions at the state level. Not a single concerted initiative was taken by either country put the ties on track. Even the international community did not take any concrete steps to resume dialogue between India and Pakistan.

This year too, the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, a major bone of contention, remained central to the India-Pakistan relations. No respite in the practices of human rights violations in the Indian-held Kashmir was reported. The resistance leaders, such as those belonging to All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), were not allowed to run any political campaign. The exchange of fire along the Line of Control (LoC) became a regular feature of the human life there. It is widely believed in Pakistan, that India has funded "Free Balochistan" advertisement campaigns in Geneva and London,²⁹¹ which further deteriorated the already fragile relations. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders frequently used anti-Pakistan diatribe in the state elections to their advantage. Consequently, the relations with Pakistan became a major issue in India's political discourse.

This paper is intended to review the progress of India-Pakistan relations and

analyze the pitfalls which are confronted by both the countries.

Diplomatic deadlock persists

During 2017, Pakistan and India could not conduct normal diplomatic relations, what to talk about the resumption of dialogue. The opportunities for brief interaction such as at the sidelines of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana, or the United Nations General Assembly Annual Session in New York, or even Heart of Asia Conference were not properly used to improve the frosty ties.

In September, Pakistan once again ferociously raised the Kashmir issue in the United Nations General Assembly session, alleging that India had committed gross human rights violations in the Kashmir Valley. India retaliated and blamed Pakistan for inciting violence inside Kashmir. Likewise, during the Human Rights Council session in Geneva, both countries severely criticized each other regarding the human rights situation on both sides of Kashmir. Besides, Indian-backed NGOs ran a campaign in favor of 'free Balochistan' slogan in Geneva. Pakistan responded in the same coin and ran a counter-campaign wherein India's alleged atrocities committed in several Indian states such as Nagaland and North Eastern parts of India were highlighted. No significant positive development was noticed during this year between India and Pakistan at diplomatic front, despite replacing their respective High Commissioners.

Shrinking spaces for people to people linkages

The trade and travel between two countries are touching its lowest ebbs. Overall, the chances of bilateral forums of dialogue and negotiations are dried up. The people-to-people linkages got drastically reduced during the past few months. India has placed an efficacious blanket ban on already complex and slow visa issuing process for the Pakistani nationals. Even the medical visa applications were rejected when India's arrested spy Kulbhushan Yadav was announced to be sentenced to death on 10th April.

The stringent visa process from Indian side drastically shrinks cultural linkages. On 8th June, the Indian Government prohibited over 200 visitors from entering Pakistan through Wagah border who wanted to attend Shaheedi Jor Mela — celebrations for the fifth Guru of the Sikh religion. Subsequently, another group of 300 Sikh pilgrims was not allowed to enter Pakistan for attending Maharaja Ranjeet Singh's death anniversary²⁹².

Artists, singers and actors belonging to Pakistan were not allowed to perform in India. A few of them were even forced to leave India. Pakistani actors are no longer allowed to work in India and the Pakistani drama serials have also disappeared from the Indian TV channels. The frequent interaction between parliamentarians and

civil society had been a regular feature taking place inside India as well as Pakistan. However, since the last one year, such initiatives also got reduced to a minimal level.

Challenges to bilateral trade

The worsening political situation had a negative impact on bilateral trade. The total volume of bilateral trade has decreased alarmingly over the past three years whereas both the countries have exhibited higher volumes of trade with other neighbours this year. Pakistan faced a trade deficit of \$672m with India during the first eight months of the current fiscal year which was recorded \$993m during the same period last year.²⁹³

India is developing Chabahar Port in Iran to increase its trade relations with Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian States, circumventing Pakistan in sea trade. Another passageway, namely Kabul to New Delhi Air Cargo Corridor, has also been established to bypass Pakistan in trade. This project is aimed at reducing Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan and its sea routes.

Pakistan has ignored Afghanistan's repeated calls to provide transit route to India for transporting its goods to Afghanistan and the Central Asia. Kabul has threatened to block Pakistan's trade routes to Central Asia if Pakistan doesn't

allow India to trade through Wagah-Attari route.

Pakistan factor in Indian State elections

The anti-Pakistan sentiment remained at peak during the state election campaign in India. The recent elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP), one of the largest States of India, were contested on anti-peace agenda and Pakistan bashing schema. Besides, anti-Pakistan narrative was also central to the elections campaigns in Punjab, Goa, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, and Gujarat. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during the elections campaign of the Gujarat Assembly, alleged Pakistan for interfering in the election process. He targeted the opposing Congress Party also for having ties with Pakistani state and intelligence agencies who were trying to manipulate the elections in Gujarat State²⁹⁴.

Ruling party cherished its global campaign to isolate Pakistan at the diplomatic front and an upsurge in propaganda to malign Pakistan for terrorism was noticed this year.

CPEC: a new bone of contention

The 56 billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, commonly known as CPEC, has unnerved India to a great extent. India's Prime Minister Narendra

Modi called it 'unacceptable', only two months after its inauguration by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015. While speaking at a seminar, Modi stated: "Only by respecting the sovereignty of countries involved, can regional connectivity corridors fulfill their promise and avoid differences and discord."

Since then, India has left no stone unturned in opposing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is considered a game changer and a landmark in the history of Pakistan. Opposition to CPEC is not limited to India, but its allies also toe the line. For instance, the current US administration led by President Donald Trump had communicated to the US Congress stating that CPEC passes through a disputed territory. This was, initially, an Indian claim aimed at thwarting the development plan.

The US Defense Secretary, James Mattis had told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The One Belt, One Road also goes through the disputed territory, and I think that in itself shows the vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate."²⁹⁵

It seems that opposition to CPEC has become a cornerstone of India's foreign policy, immensely affecting Pakistan and China's strategy for trade which will be pursued in the years to come. Therefore, the US, Japan, India and Australia have

joined hands to pose a stiff resistance to CPEC projects largely behest of India.²⁹⁶

The fast-growing nexus between India and US against the CPEC has deeply upset Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistani National Security Advisor (NSA) Nasser Khan Janjua while speaking in a seminar in Islamabad stated, "As part of its policy to counter Chinese influence in South Asia, the US is conspiring against China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along with the Indians. The US-India has an identical stance on the Kashmir issue, and America frequently gives India preference over Pakistan,"²⁹⁷

Hafiz Saeed's detention

The activities of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and his party, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) have always been a cause of great concern for the Government of India. To address these concerns, the Government of Punjab placed him under house arrest on 31st January this year which – after several extensions – lasted for 10 months till 22nd November, when he was released following the orders of the Judicial Review Board of Punjab. Indian Government termed the decision "lack of seriousness" by Pakistan in bringing to justice the "mastermind" of Mumbai attacks which claimed 166 lives in 2008.²⁹⁸

Despite the Indian demands of reinvestigating Mumbai attack case, no significant development was observed in

2017 in the matter which is under trial in an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) in Rawalpindi since 2009. Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of not cooperating to keep the trial smooth by providing sufficient evidence relevant to the case including sending 27 Indian witnesses to Pakistan to testify against seven suspects in the case including Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi. Following court orders, the prime accuse of the case, Lakhvi was released in April, 2015 for not having enough evidence to keep him detained, while another suspect Sufyan Zafar, who was arrested in 2016, was also released in July this year.

Fueling terrorism inside Pakistan

In 2017, the Government of Pakistan repeatedly alleged that India is fomenting terrorism in Pakistan through terrorist support networks based in Afghanistan. In April 2017, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, turned himself to Pakistan's security agencies in his video recording and made startling revelations about the foreign secret agencies' involvement in domestic affairs of Pakistan²⁹⁹. It reinforced the establishment's perception that the current Indian Government is involved in supporting anti-Pakistan outfits, being operated from Afghanistan.

In March last year, one of RAW's alleged spy, Kulbhushan Yadav was arrested in

Balochistan who confessed his involvement in espionage and terrorist activities in Pakistan. However, New Delhi denies any official links with him and maintains that he was possibly abducted from Iran.

The arrest turned into a flash point between India-Pakistan when a military tribunal, after three-and-a-half months of trial, sentenced death to Yadav in April 2017. His appeals against the conviction have been rejected by the military appellate court and his mercy petition is lying with the Army Chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa.

India has challenged Pakistan's refusal to grant consular access to the spy in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is hearing the case and has restrained the Pakistan Government from executing Yadav till it decides the case.³⁰⁰

Pakistan repeatedly rejected Indian demands of providing counselor access to Yadav since his arrest. His family also approached Pakistani authorities, requesting to let his relatives meet Yadav but due to stringent bilateral relations, the requests were initially refused and then approved later on humanitarian grounds. His mother and wife met Yadav in Islamabad on 25th December. Their meeting flared a new controversy in India for not allowing Yadav's mother and wife to give him any gift, and asking them to remove all jewellery and shoes they wore,

and change their dress before the meeting.

Escalation on the LoC

Violence across the Line of Control (LoC) witnessed sharp increase as both countries exchanged heavy fire, resulting in loss of lives and property. Pakistan often summoned Indian envoy to negotiate over cross-LoC violations while India has been doing the same to register protest against the ceasefire violations. India and Pakistan share a 3,323 km-long border including 740 km of the LoC that divides the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir State between India and Pakistan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan recently stated that till 8th December, 2017, India has committed more than 1,300 ceasefire violations- the highest ever in the recent past, resulting in 52 deaths and 175 people severely injured.³⁰¹

Likewise, New Delhi claims that Pakistan has violated the ceasefire along the International Border (IB) and the Line of Control more than 720³⁰² times in 2017, the highest in the past seven years.

A large number of people have been displaced from LoC during the current year due to heavy firing and shelling. Only in the month of July 2017, Pakistani authorities confirmed the exodus of around 3,000³⁰³ people who had left their villages along the LoC in Abbaspur sector

after massive shelling by the Indian troops.

The Government of Pakistan and particularly the Army leadership frequently visited the LoC to boost the morale of the local population as well as the troops stationed there. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa offered Eid prayers with troops³⁰⁴ at the Line of Control (LoC) in June this year.

Challenges to cross-LoC trade and travel

During 2017, due to the exchange of fire between Indian and Pakistani forces at the Line of Control, cross-LoC trade and travel have been stopped several times and then resumed later. The Chakanada Bagh-Tetrinote trade point (Poonch) remained closed for more than four months³⁰⁵ due to cross-LoC firing.

Likewise, at Chakothi-Salamabad trading point, trade and travel faced frequent interruptions since July, 2017. On July 21, trade was suspended after a driver was arrested by authorities in the Indian held-Kashmir allegedly carrying drugs in his truck. However, trade was resumed after two weeks on 8th August but the arrested driver is still in jail on the other side of the LoC. Three other drivers and trader workers who were arrested by the Indian authorities under the same charges are already in prison.

Additionally, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and other Indian agencies have been frequently urging the Indian Government to stop the cross-LoC trade initiated in 2008 from two different points, Chakanada Bagh-Tetrinote in Poonch and Chakothi-Salamabad in Muzaffarabad divisions, alleging that the trade is largely being misused and several traders are involved in funding terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir³⁰⁶. Traders on both sides of the LoC blamed the authorities for trying to gradually reduce the trade volume and limiting it to fresh fruit only. Moreover, NIA launched a multidimensional investigation for the traders involved in cross-LoC trade as well as the political leaders to probe their alleged links with different militant groups.

Conclusion

- It seems that the domestic political atmosphere as well as the fast-growing rivalry between the United States and China may not allow India or Pakistan to take a fresh diplomatic initiative in order to improve bilateral relations or address the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir in the near future.
- Additionally, Pakistan has almost entered into the election mode wherein engagement and dialogue with India at the government level does not seem to be a priority. By the time a new Prime Minister takes over

in Islamabad, India would have begun general elections campaign.

- The rift in the India-Pak relationship is squeezing spaces for constructive initiatives at all levels. All the key forums such as media and think tanks, TV talk shows and seminars, ascribe to war rhetoric more often than ever in both countries. Newspapers and television screens are full of the hate speech and venomous propaganda against each other.
- As far as the Kashmir issue is concerned, it has always been a central point in India-Pakistan relations. The harsh political climate in the region does not allow an initiative of peace from either of the two sides. Ironically, the international community and particularly the United States' current administration have shown no interest to help India and Pakistan in resuming the stalled dialogue process.
- Last but not least, the prolonged deadlock between India and Pakistan has potential to further complicate the relations. It also gives free hand and empowers to non-state actors to act without any fear of states joint wrath. The absence of dialogue also increases the level of violence inside Kashmir Valley and along the LoC. Therefore, it would be in the interest of Pakistan to adopt an approach which may compel India to resume the dialogue process and announce new Confidence Building Measures (CBM) to ease the life of people of Kashmir.

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Annex 1: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2017

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of responsibility
07 Feb, 2017	Bannu	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 1	Pol - 2	TTP
15 Feb, 2017	Peshawar	Judges/lawyers/courts	Civ - 1 Mil - 1	Civ -18	TTP
21 Feb, 2017	Charsadda	Judges/lawyers/courts	Mil - 3 Civ - 7	Civ - 22	Jamatul Ahrar
17 Mar, 2016	Charsadda/Sh abkader	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 2 FC - 1	FC- 2	Jamatul Ahrar
17 Jul, 2017	Peshawar	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 1 FC - 3	Civ - 6 FC - 2	TTP
09 Aug, 2017	Upper Dir	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 2 Lvs - 1 Arm - 3	Arm - 4	TTP
24 Nov, 2017	Peshawar	Security forces/law enforcement	Pol - 1	Pol- 6	Lashkar-e-Islam
Total		7 Attacks	27 Killed	62 Injured	

FATA

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of responsibility
15 Feb, 2017	Mohmand Agency	Govt. installation/hospitals/banks/property	Civ - 2 Mil - 1 Pol - 3	Civ - 3	Jamatul Ahrar
15 Feb, 2017	Mohmand Agency/Lower Mohmand	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 1 FC - 1		Jamatul Ahrar
14 Jul, 2017	Khyber Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 2	FC - 2	Jamatul Ahrar
Total	3	10	5		

Balochistan

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of responsibility
12 May, 2017	Mastung	Political leaders/workers	Civ - 25 Pol - 1 Mil - 1	Civ - 40	ISIS affiliates/supporters
23 Jun, 2017	Quetta	Security forces/law enforcement	Pol - 7 Civ - 7	Pol - 9 Civ - 12	Jamatul Ahrar
10 Jul, 2017	Qilla Abdullah/Chaman	Security forces/law enforcement	Pol - 2 Civ - 1	Pol - 5 Civ - 5	TTP
12 Aug, 2017	Quetta	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 8 Civ - 7	Arm - 10 Civ - 15	TTP
18 Sep, 2017	Qilla Abdullah/Chaman	Security forces/law enforcement	Civ - 2	FC - 2 Civ - 19	Jamatul Ahrar
05 Oct, 2017	Jhal Magsi	Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	Pol - 1 Civ - 21	Pol - 1 Civ - 30	ISIS affiliates/supporters
18 Oct, 2017	Quetta	Security forces/law enforcement	Pol - 7 Civ - 1	Pol - 22	TTP
09 Nov, 2017	Quetta	Security forces/law enforcement	Pol - 3	Pol - 9	TTP
25 Nov, 2017	Quetta	Security forces/law enforcement	Civ - 5	Civ - 25 FC - 2	TTP
17 Dec, 2017	Quetta	Christian community/Church	Civ - 9	Civ - 56	ISIS affiliates/supporters
Total	10	108	262		

Punjab & Islamabad

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of responsibility
13 Feb, 2017	Lahore	Security forces/law enforcement	Civ - 9 Mil - 1 Pol - 6	Civ - 70	Jamatul Ahrar
05 Apr, 2017	Lahore	Govt. officials	Arm - 5 Civ - 2	Civ - 18	TTP

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of responsibility
24 Jul, 2017	Lahore	Security forces/law enforcement	Pol - 9 Civ - 17 Mil - 1	Pol - 35 Civ - 21	TTP
Total	3	50	144		

Sindh

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Claim of responsibility
16 Feb, 2017	Jamshoro/Sehwan Sharif	Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	Civ – 91	Civ - 250	ISIS affiliates/supporters
Total		1	91	250	

Annex 2: Drone Attacks in Pakistan in 2017

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Detail
02 Mar, 2017	Kurram Agency	Mil - 2		A US drone fired 2 missiles on a motorcycle in Ahmadi Shama Saraghorga area of Kurram Agency. As a result, 2 motorcyclists were killed; they were identified as Afghan Taliban commander Qari Abdullah from Khost and his aide Shakir.
27 Apr, 2017	North Waziristan Agency/Datta Khel	Mil - 10		A US drone fired two missiles at a compound in the Gorweek village in Dattakhel sub-division near the Afghan border. The compound served as training camp of Taliban commander Mulla Akhtar Muhammad, having close links with Uzbek militants. Akhtar and his aide Abdur Rehman Sidgai were among 7 TTP militants killed in the attack; 3 other militants were also reported killed.
24 May, 2017	North Waziristan Agency	Mil - 3		A US drone fired 2 missiles on a hideout of militants in bordering areas of North Waziristan with Afghanistan. As a result, three militant commanders of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan including Abdullah Kashmiri were killed. The political administration of the agency confirmed the attack.

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Detail
13 Jun, 2017	Orakzai Agency	Mil - 2	Civ - 3	A US drone fired two missiles on a house in Spin Thall area of Orakzai adjacent to Hangu district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province where an Afghan Taliban commander Abu Bakar, linked to Haqqani Network, was living. Abu Bakar was killed along with his one aid while 3 other persons were injured in the attack that completely destroyed the house. The Spin Thall area borders on North Waziristan, Kurram Agency and Hangu district.
03 Jul, 2017	South Waziristan Agency	Mil - 4		A US drone fired two missiles at a vehicle carrying commander Pir Agha of the militant Islamic State group and his three aides in Marghalan village, killing all four men on the spot.
15 Sep, 2017	Kurram Agency	Mil - 3	Mil - 1	Three people were killed reportedly including a Haqqani Network affiliate Maulvi Mohib when a US drone fired 2 missiles at a compound in the Ghuzgarhi area near the Afghan border in Kurram Agency.
30 Nov, 2017	Kurram Agency	Mil - 4		A US drone fired 2 missiles at a compound in the use of an alleged Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Rasheed killing 4 suspected militants. There were no reports about the killing of commander Rasheed.
18 Dec, 2017	Kurram Agency	-	-	A US drone fired a missile at a compound in the Mata Sangar area near the Afghan border in Kurram Agency. No casualty was reported. According to locals, the targeted compound belonged to militant commander? Bashrat Khan, affiliated with the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.
26 Dec, 2017	Kurram Agency	Mil - 2	-	A US drone fired missiles at a moving vehicle in Kurram Agency, killing two suspected militants. One of the deceased was identified as Commander Jamiuddin.
Total	9	30	4	

Annex 3: Cross-Border Attacks and Clashes in 2017

Pak-Afghan Border

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
30 Jan, 2017	Khyber Agency	Security check posts	Arm - 1	-	TTP
10 Feb, 2017	Mohmand Agency	Security check posts	Mil - 14	Arm - 1	Unknown/unknown militants
19 Feb, 2017	Kurram Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 15	Arm - 2	TTP
26 Feb, 2017	South Waziristan Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	-	Arm - 1	TTP
28 Feb, 2017	Bajaur Agency/Nawagai	Security forces/law enforcement	-	Arm - 1	TTP
06 Mar, 2017	Mohmand Agency	Security check posts	Mil - 15 Arm - 5	Mil - 20	Jamatul Ahrar
17 Mar, 2017	Khyber Agency	Security check posts	Mil - 6 FC - 2	FC - 4	Jamatul Ahrar
18 Mar, 2017	Khyber Agency	Security check posts	Mil - 3	-	TTP
02 Apr, 2017	Kurram Agency	Civilians	-	-	Unknown/unknown militants
11 Apr, 2017	Mohmand Agency/Baizai	Security check posts	Mil - 2	Arm - 1	Jamatul Ahrar
22 Apr, 2017	Kurram Agency	Security check posts	-	-	TTP
01 May, 2017	South Waziristan Agency	Security check posts	Mil - 3	-	TTP
05 May, 2017	Qilla Abdullah/Chaman	Civilians	Civ - 10 Arm - 1 FC - 1	Civ - 40	Afghan security forces
05 May, 2017	Khyber Agency/Landi Kotal	Security forces/law enforcement	-	-	Afghan security forces
12 May, 2017	Kurram Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	-	FC - 2	Afghan security forces
17 Jun, 2017	Kurram Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 4	-	TTP
17 Jun, 2017	Mohmand Agency	FC/army/police convoys	-	-	Jamatul Ahrar

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Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
27 Jul, 2017	Khyber Agency	Civilians	-	-	Afghan security forces
15 Aug, 2017	Khyber Agency/Landi Kotal	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Afghan security forces
15 Aug, 2017	Khyber Agency	Civilians	-	-	Afghan security forces
15 Sep, 2017	Khyber Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	-	Civ - 3 FC - 6	Unknown/unknown militants
23 Sep, 2017	Khyber Agency/Rajgal Valley	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 3 Arm - 1	-	TTP
03 Oct, 2017	Khyber Agency/Tirah Valley	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 1	Arm - 1	TTP
23 Oct, 2017	Mohmand Agency/Safi	Security forces/law enforcement	-	Arm - 5	Jamatul Ahrar
29 Oct, 2017	Khyber Agency/Landi Kotal	Pro-govt tribesmen/peace committee members	Mil - 2	-	Lashkar-e-Islam
09 Nov, 2017	Khyber Agency/Tirah Valley	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 1 Mil - 5	Mil - 4	TTP
13 Nov, 2017	Bajaur Agency/Mamund	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 2 Mil - 12	Arm - 4	Jamatul Ahrar
22 Dec, 2017	Mohmand Agency	Security forces/law enforcement	Mil - 5 FC - 3	Mil - 5	TTP
Total	28		117	102	

Pak-India Border Attacks

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
01 Jan, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
13 Jan, 2017	Neelum	Civilians	-	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
19 Jan, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
29 Jan, 2017	Bhimber	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
30 Jan, 2017	Bhimber	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
31 Jan, 2017	Bhimber	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
02 Feb, 2017	Bhimber	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
03 Feb, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
06 Feb, 2017	Narowal/Zafarwal	Civilians		-	Indian BSF
07 Feb, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
13 Feb, 2017	Bhimber	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 3	-	Indian BSF
26 Feb, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
26 Feb, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
02 Mar, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
09 Mar, 2017	Bhimber	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
12 Mar, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
13 Mar, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ - 7	Indian BSF
13 Mar, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
14 Mar, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
18 Mar, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
18 Mar, 2017	Kotli/Goi	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
19 Mar, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
01 Apr, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
05 Apr, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
08 Apr, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
09 Apr, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 5	Indian BSF
16 Apr, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
17 Apr, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
17 Apr, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
05 May, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
06 May, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
08 May, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
09 May, 2017	Muzaffarabad/Chakothi	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
11 May, 2017	Kotli/Charohi Sector	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
11 May, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
11 May, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 7	Indian BSF

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Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
12 May, 2017	Sialkot/Charwah	Security check posts	-	-	Indian BSF
13 May, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	Civ - 5	Indian BSF
13 May, 2017	Bhimber	Civilians	-	Civ - 8	Indian BSF
16 May, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
24 May, 2017	Bhimber	Foreign interests/ Diplomats/Foreigners	-	-	Indian BSF
26 May, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
31 May, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
01 Jun, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 6	Indian BSF
02 Jun, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
07 Jun, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
08 Jun, 2017	Hattian	Civilians	-	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
10 Jun, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
12 Jun, 2017	Kotli/Tatta Pani Sector	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
14 Jun, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
15 Jun, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
16 Jun, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
28 Jun, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
30 Jun, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
08 Jul, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
08 Jul, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 6	Indian BSF
08 Jul, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
09 Jul, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
10 Jul, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
10 Jul, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
11 Jul, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
12 Jul, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
16 Jul, 2017	Neelum	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 4	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
17 Jul, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ - 3	Indian BSF

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Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
18 Jul, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 12	Indian BSF
18 Jul, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
19 Jul, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 10	Indian BSF
19 Jul, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
19 Jul, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
19 Jul, 2017	Loc	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm - 1	Arm - 2	Indian BSF
21 Jul, 2017	Hattian/Leepa Valley	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
30 Jul, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
31 Jul, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
07 Aug, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
14 Aug, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
20 Aug, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
20 Aug, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
22 Aug, 2017	Poonch/Madarpur	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
26 Aug, 2017	Sialkot	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
27 Aug, 2017	Bagh	Civilians	Civ - 2	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
30 Aug, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
02 Sep, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
09 Sep, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
11 Sep, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
13 Sep, 2017	Sialkot	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
14 Sep, 2017	Sialkot/Bajwat	Civilians	Civ - 1	-	Indian BSF
14 Sep, 2017	Sialkot/Bajwat	Civilians	-	Civ - 3	Indian BSF
15 Sep, 2017	Sialkot/Shakargarh	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
15 Sep, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
16 Sep, 2017	Sialkot	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
17 Sep, 2017	Sialkot	Civilians	-	Civ - 4	Indian BSF
20 Sep, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	Civ - 1	Indian BSF
21 Sep, 2017	Sialkot	Civilians	Civ - 5	Civ - 11	Indian BSF
22 Sep, 2017	Sialkot	Civilians	Civ - 3	Civ - 14	Indian BSF

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
23 Sep, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 2	Indian BSF
27 Sep, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 6	Indian BSF
28 Sep, 2017	Kotli/Khuiratta	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
29 Sep, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	Arm-1 Civ-2	Arm -3	Indian BSF
02 Oct, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	Civ-1	Civ -5	Indian BSF
04 Oct, 2017	Rawalakot	Civilians	Civ -2	-	Indian BSF
07 Oct, 2017	Rawalakot	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
08 Oct, 2017	Bhimber/Smahni	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
11 Oct, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
13 Oct, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
13 Oct, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
14 Oct, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
14 Oct, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	Civ -1	-	Indian BSF
14 Oct, 2017	Kotli	Civilians	Civ -1	Civ -2	Indian BSF
16 Oct, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
18 Oct, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Sector	Civilians	-	Civ -8	Indian BSF
21 Oct, 2017	Hattian	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
22 Oct, 2017	Hattian	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
23 Oct, 2017	Hattian	Civilians	-	-	Indian BSF
24 Oct, 2017	Hattian/Leepa Valley	Civilians	Civ -3	Civ -6	Indian BSF
27 Oct, 2017	Haveli	Unknown	-	-	Indian BSF
29 Oct, 2017	Hattian	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
02 Nov, 2017	Narowal/Shakargarh	Civilians	-	Rng -1 Civ -2	Indian BSF
12 Nov, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
14 Nov, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	Civ -1	-	Indian BSF
17 Nov, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	Civ -1	Civ -1	Indian BSF
17 Nov, 2017	Haveli	Civilians	Civ -1	Civ -4	Indian BSF
18 Nov, 2017	Kasur	Civilians	Civ -1	-	Indian BSF
24 Nov, 2017	Rawalakot	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Perpetrator
26 Nov, 2017	Okara	Unknown	-	-	Indian BSF
28 Nov, 2017	Poonch	Civilians	-	Civ -2	Indian BSF
05 Dec, 2017	Loc	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm-1	-	Indian BSF
07 Dec, 2017	Poonch/Abbaspur	Civilians	Civ -2	Civ -1	Indian BSF
17 Dec, 2017	Poonch/Hajira	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
21 Dec, 2017	Poonch/Hajira	Civilians	-	Civ -1	Indian BSF
25 Dec, 2017	Rawalakot	Security forces/law enforcement	Arm -3	Arm -1	Indian BSF
29 Dec, 2017	Kotli/Nakyal Secto	Civilians	--	Civ -1	Indian BSF
Total		131	69	245	

Pak-Iran Border Attacks

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Responsibility
21 Jan, 2017	Panjgur	Security forces, law enforcement	-	-	Iranian border security forces
09 Feb, 2017	Panjgur/Parome	Civilians	-	-	Iranian border security forces
10 Feb, 2017	Panjgur	Civilians	-	-	Iranian border security forces
11 Mar, 2017	Chagai	Unknown	-	-	Iranian border security forces
21 May, 2017	Chagai	Unknown	-	-	Iranian border security forces
27 May, 2017	Panjgur	Civilians	Civ -1	-	Iranian border security forces
18 Jun, 2017	Panjgur/Parome	Civilians	-	-	Iranian border security forces
08 Jul, 2017	Panjgur/Parome	Civilians	-	-	Iranian border security forces
19 Aug, 2017	Kech/Buleda	Unknown	-	-	Iranian border security forces
27 Sep, 2017	Kech/Tump	Civilians	Civ -1	Civ -1	Iranian border security forces

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured	Responsibility
04 Oct, 2017	Panjgur	Civilians	-	-	Iranian border security forces
08 Oct, 2017	Panjgur	Unknown	-	-	Iranian border security forces
Total		12	2	1	

Annex 4: Attacks on Educational Institution in 2017

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured	Responsible group
Gujranwala (Punjab)	1	0	2	Unknown/unknown militants
Khyber Agency (FATA)	2	0	0	Lashkar-e-Islam
North Waziristan Agency (FATA)	1	1	4	TTP
Panjgur (Balochistan)	1	0	0	Unknown/unknown militants
Peshawar (KP)	1	0	0	Local Taliban
Swat (KP)	1	0	5	TTP
Total	7	1	11	

Annex 5: Attacks on Shrine and Worship Places

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured
16 Feb, 2017	Jamshoro/Sehwan Sharif	Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	Civ -91	Civ -250
05 Oct, 2017	Jhal Magsi	Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	Pol -1 Civ -21	Pol -1 Civ -30
Total		2	113	281

Annex 6: Attacks on Govt. Offices, Institutions and Officials

Date	Location	Targets	Killed	Injured	Responsibility
04 Jan, 2017	Nasirabad/C hattar	Govt. installation/hospitals/banks/property	-	-	BRA
15 Feb, 2017	Mohmand Agency	Mohmand Agency headquarters	Civ -2 Mil -1 Pol -3	Civ -3	Jamatul Ahrar
01 Mar, 2017	Gwadar / Pasni	Pasni Municipal Committee office	-	-	BLF

Date	Location	Targets	Killed	Injured	Responsibility
12 Mar, 2017	Gwadar	Govt. installation/hospitals/banks/property	-	-	BLF
16 Mar, 2017	Mastung	Municipal Committee - Office	-	-	Nationalist insurgents
21 Mar, 2017	Charsadda	Govt. officials	Mil -1	Pol -1	Local Taliban
05 Apr, 2017	Lahore	Govt. officials	Arm-5 Civ -2	Civ -18	TTP
06 Apr, 2017	Peshawar	Govt. officials		Civ -2	Local Taliban
06 Apr, 2017	Kech/Mand	Govt. officials		Arm -1	BLF
14 May, 2017	Kurram Agency	Govt. officials	P-mil 1 Civ -1		LeJ
29 May, 2017	Muzaffarabad/Chakothi	Govt. officials	Civ -1	Civ -4	Unknown/unknown militants
22 Aug, 2017	Panjgur/Gichk	Govt. officials	Civ -1		BLF
28 Aug, 2017	Karachi	Govt. officials	Civ -2		Unknown/unknown militants
21 Sep, 2017	Khyber Agency/Landi Kotal	Govt. officials		Pol -1 Civ -1	Lashkar-e-Islam
12 Nov, 2017	Quetta	Electric Supply Company's office			BLA
01 Dec, 2017	Peshawar	Hostel of Agricultural Training Institute	Civ -6 Mil -3	Pol -1 Civ -34 Arm -2	TTP
Total	16 Attacks		29	68	

Annex 7: Attacks on Members of Peace Committees or Pro-Govt. Tribesmen

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Responsibility
13 Jan, 2017	Bajaur Agency/Mamund		Lvs -1 Civ -1	Jamatul Ahrar
07 Feb, 2017	Khyber Agency/Landi Kotal	Civ -3		Lashkar-e-Islam
14 Apr, 2017	Hangu		Civ -1	Local Taliban
22 May, 2017	Khyber Agency/Tirah Valley	Lvs -1 Civ -4		Lashkar-e-Islam
29 May, 2017	Peshawar	Civ -4		Unknown/unknown militants
29 May, 2017	Khyber Agency/Tirah Valley	Civ -1	Civ -2	TTP

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Responsibility
30 May, 2017	Khyber Agency/Tirah Valley	Civ -2	Civ -2	TTP
11 Jul, 2017	Bajaur Agency			Jamatul Ahrar
24 Aug, 2017	Mohmand Agency/Utman Khel (Ambar)		Civ -5	Jamatul Ahrar
01 Sep, 2017	Mohmand Agency	Civ -3	Civ -2	Jamatul Ahrar
30 Nov, 2017	South Waziristan Agency	Civ -5	Civ -2	TTP
02 Dec, 2017	Mohmand Agency			Jamatul Ahrar
Total	12	23	16	

Annex 8: Breakdown of Terrorist Attacks

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	6	1	41
February	7	23	43
March	7	9	7
April	5	5	6
May	10	12	22
June	3	5	1
July	10	9	17
August	8	12	16
September	3	2	6
October	3	2	1
November	5	2	11
December	4	9	37
Total	71	91	211

Balochistan

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	14	7	35
February	8	9	23
March	9	0	12

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
April	10	12	13
May	13	42	70
June	8	25	28
July	18	33	23
August	17	42	40
September	12	17	36
October	22	47	124
November	18	39	55
December	16	15	73
Total	165	288	532

FATA

Month	Frequency	killed	Injured
January	3	27	50
February	10	19	14
March	9	36	74
April	6	18	12
May	10	13	5
June	3	82	209
July	11	13	23
August	4	6	33
September	9	10	28
October	5	10	16
November	5	7	8
December	8	12	19
Total	83	253	491

Punjab

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	2	2	2
February	1	16	70
March	1	1	1

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April	4	10	18
May	1	1	0
July	1	27	56
August	3	4	46
November	1	0	1
Total	14	61	194

Sindh (excluding Karachi)

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
February	2	91	273
March	2	0	1
June	1	2	1
July	1	0	2
August	1	1	0
Total	7	94	277

Karachi

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	4	3	2
February	3	1	1
April	1	1	0
May	3	2	2
June	3	4	4
July	3	5	2
August	3	5	1
September	1	3	4
November	2	1	0
December	1	0	0
Total	24	25	16

Islamabad

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
June	1	0	1

October	1	0	1
November	1	2	3
Total	3	2	5

AJK

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
February	1	0	2
May	2	1	8
Total	3	1	10

Annex 9: Incidents of Ethnic and Political Violence in 2017

Region	Location	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Punjab	Bahawalnagar/Haroonabad	1	1	1
	Sargodha	1		3
	Islamabad	1	8	0
	Punjab Total	3	9	4
Sindh	Karachi /Orangi Town	1	1	0
	Sindh Total	1	1	0
Total Pakistan		4	10	4

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	0	0	0
February	1	1	1
March	0	0	0
April	1	0	3
May	0	0	0
June	0	0	0
July	1	1	0
August	0	0	0
September	0	0	0
October	0	0	0
November	1	8	0

December	0	0	0
Total	4	10	4

Annex 10: Major Targets of Terrorism in 2017

Targets	No. of Terrorist Attacks	Killed	Injured
Personnel, check posts and convoys of Security forces/law enforcement agencies	160	283	516
Educational institutions	7	1	11
Non-Bloch settlers/workers	10	40	32
Gas pipelines, power pylons, railways tracks/trains	12	0	6
Govt. officials, departments and offices, etc.	9	14	28
Tribal elders	1	3	0
Civilians	86	170	546
CD/other shops/private property	1	0	0
Shia religious scholars/community	16	68	96
Worship places/shrines/imambargahs	2	113	281
Govt. installation/hospitals/banks/property	7	15	40
Sunni religious leaders/community	4	4	4
Political leaders/workers	13	38	50
Christian community/Church	2	9	56
Ahmedi community	4	4	1
Foreign interests/ diplomats/foreigners	1	2	0
Media/journalists	9	4	10
Health/polio workers	3	2	0
Pro-govt. tribesmen/peace committee members	12	23	16
Judges/lawyers/courts	3	13	41
Afghan Taliban/Others	2	2	0
CPEC projects/workers	3	3	2
Blasphemy accused	1	1	0
Former militants	2	3	0
Total	370	815	1,736

Annex 11: Terrorist Attacks' Tactics in 2017

Tactics	Attacks
FR	141
IEDs	159
HG (Hand Grenades)	33
RA (Rocket Attacks)	8
Missiles	1
Sabotage acts	2
Suicide attacks	24
Mortar shells	2
Total	370

Annex 12: Operational Attacks by Security Forces 2017

Region	Location	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Punjab	Dera Ghazi Khan	4	30	3
	Khanewal	1	6	0
	Lahore	1	1	0
	Sheikhupura	1	6	0
	Punjab Total	7	43	3
Sindh	Jamshoro	1	0	1
	Karachi	2	7	5
	Sindh Total	3	7	6
KP	D.I Khan	3	4	3
	Malakand	1	1	0
	Peshawar	1	3	7
	Swabi	2	17	0
	Swat	1	2	0
	KP Total	8	27	10

Region	Location	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Balochistan	Dera Bugti	11	19	0
	Gwadar	1	1	0
	Harnai	1	10	0
	Kalat	1	1	0
	Kech	9	19	5
	Kohlu	1	1	0
	Awaran	4	12	0
	Mastung	3	17	8
	Nasirabad	1	1	0
	Quetta	3	6	0
	Sibi	1	2	0
	Balochistan Total	36	89	13
FATA	FR Regions	2	10	0
	Khyber Agency	9	57	9
	Mohmand Agency	2	41	0
	North Waziristan Agency	2	8	6
	Orakzai Agency	2	6	0
	South Waziristan Agency	1	2	0
	FATA Total	18	124	15
Total Pakistan		75	296	47

Annex 13: Faith-based MobViolence

Date	Location	Target	Killed	Injured
15 Jan, 2017	Musakhel	Foreign interests/ Diplomats/Foreigners		Pol - 2 Civ - 1
13 Apr, 2017	Mardan	Civilians	Civ - 1	Civ - 2
21 Apr, 2017	Chitral	Civilians		
04 May, 2017	Lasbela/Hub	Hindu community	Civ - 1	Pol - 2 Civ - 2
08 Sep, 2017	Khyber Agency/Landi Kotal	Civilians		
Total		5	2	9

Annex 14: Proscribed organizations

Below are the organizations proscribed by the government of Pakistan; the list is retrieved from NACTA's website (<http://nacta.gov.pk/proscribed-organizations/>):

S. No	Name of Organization	Date of Notification
1	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)(Afghanistan)	14 Aug 2001, 3 Feb 2003 under UNSCR 1267
2	Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	14 Aug 2001
3	Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)	14 Jan 2002, 17 Oct 2001 under UNSCR 1267
4	Laskar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)	14 Jan 2002, 2 May 2005 under UNSCR 1267
5	Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	14 Jan 2002
6	Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TJP)	28 Jan 2002
7	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM)	14 Jan 2002
8	Tehreek-e-Islami	14 Jan 2002
9	Al-Qa'ida(Afghanistan)	17 Mar 2003, 6 Oct 2001 under UNSCR 1267
10	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP)	15 Nov 2003
11	Khuddam-ul-Islam (Ex JeM)	15 Nov 2003
12	Islami Tehreek Pakistan (Ex TJP)	15 Nov 2003
13	Jamat-ul-Ansar	20 Nov 2003
14	Jamat-ul-Furqan	20 Nov 2003
15	Hizb-ul-Tahreer	20 Nov 2003
16	Khair-un-Naas International Trust (Splinter Gp. of Jamat-ul-Da'awa (JuD)	27 Oct 2004
17	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	07 Apr 2006
18	Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan	21 Aug 2006
19	Lashkar-e-Islami	30 June 2008
20	Ansar-ul-Islam (Iraq)	30 June 2008, 24 Feb 2003 under UNSCR 1267
21	Haji Namdaar Group	30 June 2008
22	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Afghanistan)	25 Aug 2008, 29 July 2011 under UNSCR 1267
23	Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	08 Sep 2010
24	Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	08 Sep 2010
25	Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB)	08 Sep 2010
26	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	08 Sep 2010
27	Balochistan Musalla Defah Tanzeem (BMDT)	08 Sep 2010
28	Shia Tulaba Action Committee, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011
29	Markaz Sabeel Organization, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011
30	Tanzeem Naujawana-e-Ahle Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit	10 Oct 2011
31	Peoples Aman Committee (Layari)	10 Oct 2011
32	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ) Ex-SSP	15 Feb, 2012
33	Al Harmain Foundation	6 March 2012, 26 Jan 2004 under UNSCR 1267
34	Rabita Trust	6 March 2012, 17 Oct 2001 under UNSCR 1267
35	Anjuman-e- Imamia Gilgit Baltistan	24 April 2012
36	Muslim Students Organization (MSO) Gilgit	24 April 2012
37	Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat, Gilgit	5 June 2012
38	Balochistan Bunyad Parast Army	04 Aug, 2012

S. No	Name of Organization	Date of Notification
39	Tehreek Nafaz-e-Aman	04 Aug, 2012
40	Tahafuz Hadudullah	04 Aug, 2012
41	Balochisan Waja Liberation Army	04 Aug, 2012
42	Baloch Republican Party Azad	04 Aug, 2012
43	Balochistan United Army	04 Aug, 2012
44	Islam Mujahidin	04 Aug, 2012
45	Jaish-e-Islam	04 Aug, 2012
46	Balochistan National Liberation Army	04 Aug, 2012
47	Khana-E-Hikmat Gilgit Baltistan, Gilgit	13 March,2013
48	Tehrik-e- Taliban Swat (TTS)	15 March,2013
49	Tehrik-e- Taliban Mohmand (TTM)	15 March,2013
50	Tariq Geedar Group (TGG)	15 March,2013
51	Abdullah Azam Brigade (Lebanon, Syria, Arabian Peninsula)	15 March,2013 23 Sep 2014 vide UNSCR 1267
52	East Turkemenistan Islamic Movement ETIM (Turkey, Afghanistan)	15 March,2013 11 Sep 2002 vide UNSCR 1267
53	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Uzbekistan)	15 March,2013 6 October 2001 vide UNSCR 1267
54	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) (Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Germany)	15 March,2013 1 June 2005 under UNSCR 1267
55	313 Brigade	15 March,2013
56	Tehrik-e- Taliban Bajaur (TTB)	15 March,2013
57	Amar bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir (Haji Nandaar Group)	15 March,2013
58	Baloch Student Organization Azad (BSO-A)	15 March,2013
59	United Baloch Army(UBA)	15 March,2013
60	Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM)	15 March,2013
61	Daish/ISIL/IS/ISIS(Afghanistan)	15 July 2015 by MoI, also vide UNSCR 1267
62	Jamat Ul Ahrar (JuA)	11 Nov. 2016 06 July 2017 vide UNSCR 1267
63	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi (LeJA)	11 Nov. 2016
64	Ansar-ul-Hussain	30 Dec. 2016
65	Tehreek-e-Azadi-Jammu & Kashmir (TAK)	08 June 2017

Organizations under watch list

S. No	Name of organization	Date of notification
1	Ghulaman-e-Sahaba (GS)	30 May, 2017
2	Maymar Trust	29 March, 2017
3	Jamaat-ul-Da'awa (JuD)	27 Jan, 2017
4	Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF)	27 Jan, 2017

Organizations enlisted under UNSCRs

S. No	Name of organization	Date of notification
1	Al-Akhtar Trust	01 Dec 2005
2	Al-Rashid Trust	01 Dec 2005

TIMELINES

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Security Situation (Initiatives, Trends)

Islamabad, KP, FATA and Northern Areas

Date	Progress	Source
January 20, 2017	"Terrorists will fail in their attempt to regain lost relevance," said Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa's message after a blast in Kurram Agency.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 21, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1309800/blast-in-parachinar-vegetable-market-kills-25
January 29, 2017	Police have found extremist literature from a missing cop's room. The cop got disappeared since September 22, 2016 from Islamabad.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , January 30, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1310877/violent-turn-extremist-literature-found-missing-cops-room/
January 30, 2017	According to a police official, police stations in Peshawar lack proper mechanisms to scrutinize all individuals put on the fourth schedule list.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , January 31, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1311718/loose-cannons-fourth-schedulers-lax-scrutiny/
February 19, 2017	To provide better security to judges in Islamabad, a special task force has been established.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 20, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1315837
February 25, 2017	According to a police official, 12 TTP-linked terrorists in the 4 th schedule are untraceable in Peshawar.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , February 26, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1339351/12-ttp-linked-men-off-radar-peshawar/
March 06, 2017	According to official document, under the counter-terrorism strategy, the KP police have arrested 1,182 militants and sent 786 attacks to the court.	<i>The News</i> , March 07, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/190632-1182-militants-held-786-cases-sent-to-courts-in-KP-in-two-years
March 21, 2017	Mishal Centre in Swat has de-radicalized and re-integrated more than 1,800 former militants, a report claimed.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 21, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1321804
	July	
July 16, 2017	The Pakistan Army announced a new operation in Khyber Agency's Rajgal Valley, i.e. operation Khyber-IV.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 17, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1345876
November 22, 2017	Army officer martyred in Dera Ismail Khan during an encounter with militants of banned TTP in a search operation.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372341
November 24, 2017	The second-in-command in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police was martyred and six other police personnel wounded in a suicide attack in Hayatabad, Peshawar.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372720
November 24, 2017	According to a report in a leading newspaper, 29 police officers have been killed over a decade in terrorist incidences in KP.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372789
November 24, 2017	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi took the responsibility of suicide attack on KP senior police officer in Hayatabad, Peshawar.	<i>Express (Urdu)</i> , Islamabad, November 25, 2017
December 08, 2017	KP police asked armed Aman Lashkars to hand back arms and night vision goggles; these lashkars were established in 2008 to fight militancy in the outskirts of Peshawar.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , December 09, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1579694/1-k-p-police-ask-aman-lashkars-hand-back-arms-goggles/

Date	Progress	Source
December 14, 2017	KP police said 2017 remained the most peaceful year in a decade with 51 percent decline in terrorist acts compared to last year.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1376753/2017-the-most-peaceful-year-in-decade

Sindh

Date	Progress	Source
January 12, 2017	Federal government has rejected Sindh government's appeal for taking action against alleged seminaries describing the information incomplete.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 13, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1308149
February 19, 2017	Sindh security establishment has requested the government for deploying a dedicated security force at Sindh-Balochistan border.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 20, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1315790
February 26, 2017	According to an official data prepared by Sindh government 1,500 alleged terrorists arrested by law enforcement agencies in Sindh haven't been convicted yet.	<i>The News</i> , February 27, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/189075-None-of-1500-alleged-terrorists-convicted-in-Sindh
March 04, 2017	According to a report in a leading newspaper, terrorist are using the unmanned spots in the Sindh- Balochistan border for movement.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , March 04, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1345526/terrorists-exploit-chinks-border-security-armour/
April 22, 2017	The Sindh cabinet extended the special policing powers granted to the Rangers for 90 more days.	<i>Dawn</i> , April 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1328608
May 28, 2017	Two significant laboratory facilities have been established in Sindh which will be useful in various investigation processes.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 28, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1335844
June 03, 2017	Sindh police recruited, for the first time ever, more than 40 women in the Counter-Terrorism Department and Rapid Response Force.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 04, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1337239/sindh-police-recruit-women-for-antiterror-operations
June 05, 2016	Sindh government announced a 10 percent increase in security budget.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 06, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1337631
June 15, 2017	12 jail officials have been arrested suspected to be involved in the escape of two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants from prison in Karachi.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 16, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1339836
July 30, 2017	High profile militants in Karachi Central prison have been shifted to various districts jails.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 31, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1348586
August 11, 2017	Sindh Apex Committee decided to transfer 270 prisoners from Karachi Central Jail to other prisons of Sindh.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , Islamabad August 12, 2017
August 15, 2017	Marine counter-terrorism Centre and second force protection battalion inaugurated in Karachi.	<i>Nawa-e-Waqt</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, August 16, 2017
October 02, 2017	According to a leading newspaper, 18 terrorists in Karachi central jail are likely to be shifted to other jails.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , October 03, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1521372/18-terrorists-transferred-central-jail/
October 04, 2017	Sindh Law Minister Ziaul Hasan Lanjar denied the reports of IS recruitments in Karachi central jail.	<i>Dawn</i> , October 05, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1361831
October 31, 2017	20 thousand police personnel of Sindh police would be provided Army training to counter terrorism.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 01, 2017

Balochistan

Date	Progress	Source
January 09, 2017	A leader of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) Balakh Sher Badini surrendered to the authorities and announced joining mainstream politics.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 10, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1307530
January 21, 2017	Balochistan government has put 396 people on the fourth schedule list because of their suspected links with banned groups.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1309935
February 03, 2017	Interior ministry stated Quetta commission report as a violation of fundamental rights. which was formed on Oct 06 for investigating last year suicide attack on Quetta's Civil Hospital which resulted in the death of 74 persons mostly lawyers	<i>Dawn</i> , February 04, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1312639
February 18, 2017	A Baloch Republican Army (BRA) commander Taja alias Sari surrendered along with his 8 fellow militants before security forces in Dera Bugti. Taja and his aides were reportedly involved in attacks on gas pipelines and security forces. Few days later, another 14 militants belonging to BRA, BLA and United Baloch Army surrendered before security forces.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 19, 2017
April 21, 2017	Around 500 militants linked with different banned Baloch militant organizations reportedly surrendered before authorities in Quetta.	<i>Dawn</i> , April 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1328539
June 17, 2017	According to official reports the abducted and then executed Chinese nationals near Mastung are suspected to be involved in missionary activities.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1340268
November 02, 2017	Four press clubs in Balochistan have been closed due to warnings from banned separatist groups.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 03, 2017
November 18, 2017	Five more dead bodies found in Turbat Balochistan.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 19, 2017
November 21, 2017	Two suspected militants killed, a soldier martyred and three others were injured in a security encounter in Turbat area.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372078
November 24, 2017	Two suspected militants arrested, explosive devices seized in a search operation in Balochistan.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372701
November 24, 2017	Two suspected militants killed in an encounter with security forces in Awaran, Quetta.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372704
November 24, 2017	2 suspected militants killed, two arrested and huge amount of explosives seized during a search operation in Balochistan.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 25, 2017

Punjab

Date	Progress	Source
January 05, 2017	13 imprisoned terrorist from Adiala Jail have been shifted to new high security prison in Sahiwal.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 06, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1306707

Date	Progress	Source
January 13, 2017	Pakistan's intelligence agencies have warned about the threat that Punjab-based militants attached with ISIS could pose threat to the province. Reportedly, some among the militants from Punjab who travelled to Syria are likely to return back through Afghanistan.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 14, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1308370
February 19, 2017	Punjab Apex Committee decided to ask for Rangers help in the ongoing operation against terrorism.	<i>The News</i> , February 20, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/187603-Punjab-to-see-Rangers-help-in-anti-terror-operation
February 19, 2017	220 terrorist sleeper cells have been discovered in 18 districts of Punjab including South Punjab.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 20, 2017
February 26, 2017	The Punjab Apex Committee decided to expand the range of Operation Raddul Fasad.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 27, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1317284
March 13, 2017	According to a high official source, small scale operations in Punjab led to the Rangers Operation.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, March 14, 2017
March 26, 2017	Pakistan's Ministry of Interior issued some data that said the security agencies had "registered 17,562 cases and nabbed 19,289 people to counter hate speech, extremist literature and misuse of loudspeaker." The authorities also "blocked 937 uniform resource locators (URLs) and 10 websites of banned organisations for abuse of internet and social media," the statement said.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 27, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1323112
March 26, 2017	The Interior Ministry said "a Counter Terrorism Force has been established which has a strength of 500 personnel in Islamabad, 1,182 in Punjab, 728 in Sindh, 1,000 in Balochistan, 2,200 in KP, 168 in Gilgit and 260 in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 27, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1323112/19289-arrested-over-hate-speech-extremist-literature-under-nap
March 29, 2017	The government decided to establish new security wing to provide security to Chinese nationals working in Punjab.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , March 30, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1369007/to-p-priority-new-security-wing-suggested-chinese-workers/
April 10, 2017	According to a report Punjab police is facing challenges in arresting 28 terrorists involved in sectarianism.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, April 10, 2017
June 10, 2017	Punjab government announced to arrest 14 suspected terrorists in Punjab.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, June 11, 2017
September 02, 2017	Punjab government informed Supreme Court about the establishment of three new prisons in Punjab in the current financial year.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1355434
September 11, 2017	Security audit of educational institutions in Punjab found more flaws in their security. The survey found that 78 percent of the institutions lack night vision CCTV cameras.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1356889
October 08, 2017	Special Branch asked Punjab Home Department to place 22 terror suspects on fourth schedule list.	<i>Dawn</i> , October 09, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1362641

Security agencies

Law-enforcement and intelligence agencies

Date	Progress	Source
February 22, 2017	The Pakistan Army Chief announced the launch of Operation <i>Raddul Fasad</i> (Counter Turmoil/Mayhem) after the terrorists perpetrated some major attacks mainly in Lahore, Sehwan Sharif, KP and FATA.	<i>The News</i> , February 23, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/188232-Army-kicks-off-countrywide-operation-Raddul-Fasaad
February 26, 2017	A newspaper report highlighted the challenges confronting security and law enforcement agencies in the form of rising militants.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 26, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1317085
March 02, 2017	Police killed a worker in Mardan, suspecting him as a terrorist.	Daily <i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, March 03, 2017
March 21, 2017	The Federal Cabinet has approved decision to pass cost of security for the CPEC enterprise into the power tariff and pass it on to the consumers.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1321981
April 08, 2017	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan chairman Dr Mehdi Hassan labeled the killing of suspected terrorists in Lahore as extrajudicial.	<i>The Nation</i> , April 09, 2017 http://nation.com.pk/national/09-Apr-2017/encounter-deaths-are-extrajudicial-killings-hrcp
April 17, 2017	ISPR DG Maj. Gen Asif Ghafoor announced in a media briefing that Jamat ul Ahrar spokesman Ehsan Ullah Ehsan had surrendered.	<i>Dawn</i> , April 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1327675
April 26, 2017	Pakistan Army released a video showing the confessional statement of Ehsan Ullah Ehsan that TTP and JuA have been coordinating with Indian and Afghan security agencies.	<i>Dawn</i> , April 26, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1329364/former-ttp-jua-spx-claims-terrorist-organisations-being-used-by-india-afghanistan
May 22, 2017	Additional Secretary retired Rear Admiral Faisal Lodhi told Senate Standing Committee on Interior that more information can be obtained from Ehsan Ullah Ehsan.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1334835
June 08, 2017	Maj. Gen Asif Ghafoor in a statement said that Mastung operation prevented Da'ish from establishing a foothold in Pakistan.	<i>Express Tribune</i> , June 09, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1430370/mastung-operation-foiled-potential-infrastructure-balochistan-ispr/
June 09, 2017	Sindh Rangers rehabilitated a group of 20 detainee youngsters, allured by militant and gangster groups.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 10, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1338574/20-potential-militants-gangsters-rehabilitated
June 19, 2017	During an operation at Karachi Central Jail, Rangers seized cellphones, anti-jamming devices and millions of rupees.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 20, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1340559
July 19, 2017	The US State Department said that terrorist attacks in Pakistan have declined.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 20, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1346470
August 30, 2017	Anti-terrorism squad killed one man and injured other by firing in Shehzad Town Islamabad after the two men refused to stop their vehicle.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, August 31, 2017

Date	Progress	Source
September 05, 2017	LEAs are planning to collect data of universities students in Karachi because of the growing concern over the involvement of educated youth in militancy and terrorism.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , September 06, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498592/kh-awaja-izhar-murder-attempt-police-arrests-three-ku-students/
September 06, 2017	According to one of the senior military officials there should be a state policy to deal with the militants who are willing to surrender.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 06, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1355917
September 08, 2017	According to South Asia Terrorism Portal report 6,813 security personnel were among 62,441 people killed in Pakistan in terrorist attacks in the period of 14 years.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 08, 2017
September 11, 2017	8,333 people have been placed under the 4 th schedule list, 63 groups have been placed under banned militant groups and 5,023 bank accounts have been frozen on federal and provincial governments orders.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 12, 2017
September 30, 2017	Punjab government has decided to start an operation in south Punjab against militant groups which are involved in circulating hate literature.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, October 01, 2017
October 25, 2017	Auditors revealed that Rangers have outsourced security at gas installations.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , November 26, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1541537/1-rangers-outsourced-gas-installations-security-pac-told/
November 13, 2017	Postmortem report confirms victim shot at point-blank range who was killed in a controversial encounter by Gulberg police in Faisalabad.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 14, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1370418
December 05, 2017	LEAs arrested suspected facilitators of a suicide bomber who in July martyred the top cop of Baluchistan's Qilla Abdullah district,	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , December 06, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1576598/1-facilitators-dig-hamid-shakeel-suicide-attack-arrested-quetta/
December 14, 2017	Supreme Court expressed disappointment over the killing of 20 young people who were trying to illegally cross the border in Turbat and Buleda, Balochistan.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1376724/s-c-assails-performance-of-agencies-over-kech-killings
December 19, 2017	Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, in a briefing to Senate, said that from January to October 2017, 16 terrorist incidences took place, while 18001 intelligence-based action has been taken and 4983 search operations conducted.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, December 20, 2017

Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs)

Date	Progress	Source
January 01, 2017	CTD Sindh has planned to deradicalise and rehabilitate around 300 militants imprisoned in different jails in the province.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 01, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1305848

Date	Progress	Source
January 06, 2017	The Punjab Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) has traced and almost dismantled a terrorist cell of around 10 militants, who were reportedly involved in Gulshan-e-Iqbal park suicide blast last year against members of Christian community celebrating Easter.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 07, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1306925
January 17, 2017	CTD of Punjab police claimed to have killed 4 suspected Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants in an encounter near Lahore, who were reportedly planning to attack an intelligence agency office in the provincial capital. Reportedly, Rizwan Ali Asif alias Asif Chotoo of Muzaffargarh, who had succeeded Malik Ishaq as chief of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), was among the militants killed.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 18, 2017
February 20, 2017	According to a study conducted by CTD, Sindh and other parts of the country provided a fertile growth to ISIS inspiration.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 21, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1315998
February 28, 2017	The Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTD) of both Sindh and Balochistan police decided to launch a "joint operation" in parts of the country's largest province, i.e. Balochistan, where the intelligence wings of the law-enforcement agency had identified "hideouts" of suspects allegedly involved in recent terrorist attacks in Sindh.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 01, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1317617/sindh-balochistan-police-decide-to-launch-joint-operation-against-militant-hideouts
February 28, 2017	CTD Sindh handed over alleged terrorists networks list involved in terrorist activities inside Sindh to Balochistan government.	<i>The News</i> , March 02, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/189614-Sindh-hands-over-details-of-terrorist-networks-to-Balochistan%3E
April 10, 2017	The Counter-Terrorism Department claimed to have killed a high-profile Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant Kamran Bhatti, provincial chief of Naeem Bukhari faction and wanted in cases of terrorism, in an encounter on Stadium Road in Sukkur.	<i>Dawn</i> , April 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1326186/lj-militant-linked-with-high-profile-terror-cases-gunned-down
April 17, 2017	A survey carried out by the CTD of Sindh police claimed that "most of the 500 or so militants languishing in jails across the province belonged to low-income groups	<i>Dawn</i> , April 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1327614/most-militants-surveyed-in-jails-suffering-from-psychological-problems-ctd
April 18, 2017	As per a news report counter-terrorism finance units will be set up in provincial counter-terrorism departments.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, April 19, 2017
May 01, 2017	Sindh CTD chief Dr Sanaullah Abbasi said that CTD Sindh will execute its inclusive deradicalisation plan from this month.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1330452
May 05, 2017	According to CTD of KP police, the number of terrorist attacks in KP reduced by 43 percent during the first 4 months of 2017, compared to 2016.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , May 06, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1402422/k-p-witnesses-43-drop-terrorism-incidents/

Date	Progress	Source
June 16, 2017	CTD Sindh took the custody of 12 suspected officials involved in the jailbreak probe for further investigation	<i>Dawn</i> , June 17, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1339975
June 18, 2017	CTD Karachi in-charge Raja Umar Khattab said the escaped Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants used the main gate of the central jail to flee.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , June 19, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1438891/escaped-lej-militants-walked-central-jail/
June 21, 2017	CTD Sindh asked the PTA to ban 25 suspected websites linked with militant groups and radical thoughts	<i>Dawn</i> , June 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1341033
June 22, 2017	CTD Sindh to recommend the cases of 227 alleged militants for military trials.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1341141
July 10, 2017	According to CTD inquiry report some militants were almost running the affairs of Karachi Central Jail.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1344467
August 03, 2017	CTD has issued eighth edition of its Red Book which contains profiles of wanted suspected terrorists.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , August 04, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1473300/sindh-wanted-one-book/
August 09, 2017	CTD Sindh held seven suspects including the head of Al-Kareem Islamic Academy, a seminary linked with the TTP, in SITE area.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 10, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1350620
August 20, 2017	CTD was unable to find exact location of the two escaped Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants from Karachi Central Jail.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , August 21, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1486655/ctd-struggles-pinpoint-whereabouts-escaped-lej-militants/
September 12, 2017	CTD Sindh officer Inspector Syed Ali Raza was terminated for sharing sensitive information with an MQM-London member.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , September 13, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1504459/ctd-official-sacked-sharing-info-political-partys-militant-wing/
October		
September 30, 2017	Jail officials accused CTD for being involved in the escape of the two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants from Karachi Central Jail.	<i>Dawn</i> , October 01, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1361042
November 07, 2017	According to CTD statistics, 19 militants were given sentences by the ATC in KP in just 2 months.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad, November 08, 2017
November 17, 2017	CTD and Rangers had arrested on Feb 16, Nadir Ali Jakhrani alias Murshid in Karachi, main suspect in Sehwan attack.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1371290

National Action Plan (NAP)

NACTA

Date	Progress	Source
January 09, 2017	Pakistan's Senate passed the amendment to National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) Law making it obligatory for the executive committee of the authority to meet at least once in three months to oversee the implementation of National Action Plan (NAP)	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , January 10, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1289786/upper-house-session-senate-amends-law-counter-terror-authority/

Date	Progress	Source
January 17, 2017	Brigadier Imran Mushtaq appointed as the head of Nacta's Joint Intelligence Directorate	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, January 18, 2017
February 04, 2017	Nacta's budget has been increased from PKR 110 million to PKR 1.56 billion.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 05, 2017
April 27, 2017	Nacta formed a framework for finalizing recommendations for judicial reforms.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad, April 28, 2017
May 26, 2017	Federal government allocated a reduced budget of PKR1.46 billion for Nacta in the fiscal year 2017-2018.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , Islamabad, May 27, 2017
June 03, 2017	Nacta has frozen accounts of huge number of suspected militants taking around \$3 million out of their pockets.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 04, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1337343
August 29, 2017	Nacta chief Ihsan Ghani said that they have compiled a data on suspected militants who fought in Yemen, Iraq or Syria.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1354832
September 08, 2017	According to Nacta's annual report during the year 2016, 785 terrorist attacks martyred 804 people and injured 1,914.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 08, 2017
September 08, 2017	Nacta's national coordinator Ihsan Ghani said National Counter-Extremism Policy (NCEP) Centralised Units will be established in all CM offices.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , September 09, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1501681/nacta-briefs-khattak-cm-offices-counter-extremism-units/
September 10, 2017	According to Nacta, Pakistan has 6 lac, 7 thousand 941 security forces to counter terrorism.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad September 11, 2017
October 03, 2017	A senior official said that Nacta has been unable to establish 'joint intelligence secretariat'.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, October 04, 2017
October 04, 2017	According to a Nacta's report 5,500 suspected bank accounts and 35 crore amounts have been frozen to stop terrorism financing.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, October 05, 2017
October 30, 2017	Nacta submitted final draft of national narrative on countering extremism to government.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , October 31, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1545683/1-nacta-submits-draft-national-narrative-govt/
December 15, 2017	NADRA with the assistance of NACTA has prepared database which will be helpful in eradicating crimes.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, December 16, 2017
December 17, 2017	NACTA has delineated national narrative to counter extremism and terrorism in the country.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, December 18, 2017

Terror Financing

January 05, 2017	The Punjab Apex Committee decided to ban all means of terror financing.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 06, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1306761
January 21, 2017	Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Asia Pacific Group has asked member countries to take measure against money laundering and terrorism financing.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, January 22, 2017
January 29, 2017	Law enforcers have taken different measures to stop terror funding including registering cases under financial acts.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, January 30, 2017

February 10, 2017	The State Bank of Pakistan has inaugurated data center to track down money laundering and terror financing.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1314123
March 03, 2017	The US State Department labeled Altaf Khanani group as a money laundering organization.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 04, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1318333
March 23, 2017	According to a report compiled by the Financial Monitoring Unit, around 233 national and international terrorist organizations are generating billions of operational budgets annually in Pakistan.	<i>The News</i> , March 24, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/194151-Terror-outfits-continue-to-generate-billions
July 03, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper Pakistan has to take important decisions for complying with the FATF Regime.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 03, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1342811
August 30, 2017	Ministry of interior notified people to distribute animals' skins to trusted organization on Eid-ul-Azha by issuing the list of militant and under observation groups.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, August 31, 2017
September 07, 2017	Pakistan ranked among 50 worst terror financing countries by Basil AML Index.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad, September 07, 2017

FATA

Date	Progress	Source
January 06, 2017	All parliamentary parties gave consent to the plan of merger of FATA with KP.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 07, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1306960
February 12, 2017	While talking to field commanders and soldiers during a visit to South Waziristan, Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa said the military will support the government's efforts to "mainstream" FATA	<i>Dawn</i> , February 13, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1314494
February 14, 2017	Members of opposition parties in the Senate staged a walkout to register their protest over the delay in issuance of final approval to the FATA reforms.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1314844
March 02, 2017	Most of the opposition parties in KP welcomed the federal government decision to merge Fata with KP but emphasized that it should be done before the next elections.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 03, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1318097
March 03, 2017	According to an analysis in a leading newspaper the implementation of Fata reforms will be challenging due to the lack of financial resources and administrative adjustments.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , March 03, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1344538/analysis-ready-k-p-merger/
March 23, 2017	On March 2, the federal cabinet approved recommendations on the FATA reforms, which includes, among others, the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)	<i>Dawn</i> , March 24, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1364653/fata-reforms-committee-elevated-federal-cabinet-body/
May 23, 2017	A report highlighted complexities linked to merging Fata with KP in five years period, political and electoral integration & resource allocation and development etc.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1334786

Date	Progress	Source
May 23, 2017	Federal government proposed Tribal Areas Riway bill in the National Assembly which will replace FCR if enacted.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1334805
June 05, 2017	All Fata Political Parties Alliance demonstrated serious concerns over the delay in implementation of FATA reforms.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 06, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1337692/fata-political-alliance-threatens-march-on-islamabad
June 16, 2017	5740 tribal people have been killed in the war against terror, as per government report.	<i>Roznama Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, June 17, 2017
September 08, 2017	PM Shahid Khaqan Abbasi has approved the appointment of chief operating officer to implement Fata reforms.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 10, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1356675
September 15, 2017	The government tabled in the National Assembly a bill aimed at extending jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Islamabad High Court to FATA.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 16, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1358054/bill-extending-sc-ihc-jurisdiction-to-fata-tabled-in-na
October 17, 2017	The National Implementation Committee on FATA Reforms directed the federal finance minister to seek approval of the National Finance Commission (NFC) for the allocation of a share from the divisible pool for FATA over the next 10 years	<i>Dawn</i> , October 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1364511
November 13, 2017	COAS Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa said that Pakistan Army fully supported mainstreaming of FATA and would pursue it in line with aspirations of tribal brothers.	<i>The News</i> , November 14, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/255825-mainstream-fata-coas
December 21, 2017	Former PM Nawaz Sharif asked PM Shahid Khaqan Abbasi to forge a consensus on FATA bill in the parliament.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1378105
December 21, 2017	National Assembly session adjourned due to lack quorum, as opposition members continued boycott over the delay in the presentation of Fata reforms bill.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1378121
December 27, 2017	The National Implementation Committee on Fata Reforms has been has been tasked to implement the already agreed recommendations for mainstreaming the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , December 28, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1594734/1-deliberations-fata-reforms-unlikely/

Madrasahs

Date	Progress	Source
January 22, 2017	Sindh government blacklisted 94 madrassas.	<i>Dunya</i> , January 23, 2017 https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-01-23&edition=ISL&id=2874221_29668020
February 06, 2017	Madrasa Taleemul Quran Wal Sunnah, associated with JUI-F, in Tangi, Charsadda was sealed, after suspected militants were arrested from there.	<i>Jang</i> , February 7, 2017

Date	Progress	Source
February 18, 2017	According to an Interior Ministry document pertaining to NAP implementation, as many as 2,327 madrassas had been closed in the country on the suspicion of their involvement or links to extremists and sectarianism as well as illegal functioning without registration.	<i>Dunya</i> , February 19, 2017 http://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-02-19&edition=ISL&id=2930277_55221222
February 24, 2017	The Senate Committee on religious affairs found huge corruption in Madrassa Education Board; the board also failed to meet over last 11 years.	<i>Dunya</i> , February 25, 2017 https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-02-25&edition=ISL&id=2941981_91987203
February 28, 2017	At least 299 madrassas were found involved in terrorism and sectarian activities in Punjab.	<i>Dunya</i> , March 1, 2017 https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-03-01&edition=ISL&id=2950256_51687019
March 11, 2017	PM Nawaz Sharif while addressing the annual Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi Seminar titled 'Unity of Muslim world, Need of the Hour' at Jamia Naeemia, requested ulema to disseminate anti-terror narrative at Madrasahs.	<i>The News</i> , March 12, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/191851-PM-urges-Ulema-to-give-anti-terror-narrative
March 17, 2017	A survey conducted by the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) administration revealed a majority of 374 madrassas were not registered with any government organization.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1321167/religious-seminaries-outnumber-schools-in-islamabad
March 20, 2017	The 2 nd Phase of the survey of religious seminaries completed by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) shockingly revealed that over 76 pc of the seminaries had been built without any approved building plans.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 21, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1321889/76pc-of-seminary-buildings-in-capital-unauthorised
March 26, 2017	Data issued by Ministry of Interior revealed that the "provincial governments had undertaken geo-mapping of religious seminaries, on the standard parameters, the progress of which included Punjab and Sindh 100 per cent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 75pc, Balochistan 60pc and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) 85pc.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 27, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1323112/19289-arrested-over-hate-speech-extremist-literature-under-nap
April 01, 2017	According to the Department of Building Control of Capital Development Authority (CDA), there were 48 mosques and seminaries in the name of lands occupied in Sector-G, Islamabad.	<i>Jang</i> , April 02, 2017
August 18, 2017	Law and Order Department of FATA said that out of 655 madrassas in FATA, 323 were unregistered.	<i>Nawa-i-Waqt</i> , August 19, 2017 http://www.nawaiwaqt.com.pk/E-Paper/islamabad/2017-08-19/page-12/detail-59
September 26, 2017	National Security Advisor, Lt-Gen (Retd) Nasser Khan Janjua presented an outline on upgrading madrassas in a meeting of the National Ulema Mashaikh Council.	<i>Dunya</i> , September 27, 2017 https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-09-27&edition=ISL&id=3401184_90075985

Date	Progress	Source
October 04, 2017	Geo mapping of madrassas had been completed in Islamabad, Punjab and Sindh, besides 75% in KP, 60% in Balochistan and 85% in FATA.	<i>Dunya</i> , October 05, 2017 https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-10-05&edition=ISL&id=3416794_80363059
October 04, 2017	According to government estimates, more than 3.5 million are getting education from nearly 35 thousand madrassas.	<i>Dunya</i> , October 05, 2017 https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2017-10-05&edition=ISL&id=3416794_80363059
October 12, 2017	A collective agreement on the madrasa curriculum between the federal government, the Wifaqul Madaris and Ittihad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris was reached.	<i>Express Tribune</i> , October 13, 2017 https://epaper.tribune.com.pk/DisplayDetails.aspx?ENI_ID=11201710130262&EN_ID=11201710130106&EMID=11201710130039
October 13, 2017	A report declared that Higher Education Commission (HEC) equated the madrasa degree of Shahadatul Alia to the Bachelor's-level degree.	<i>Daily Express</i> , October 14, 2017 https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1104632563&Issue=NP_ISB&Date=20171014
October 25, 2017	Sindh CM Murad Ali Shah regretted that the federal government was not ready to place 96 madrassas on watch list despite proof of their involvement in terror acts.	<i>The News</i> , October 26, 2017 http://e.thenews.com.pk/pindi/10-26-2017/page1.asp
October 26, 2017	A report shared possibility of approval of the third phase of the recruitment of teachers, under the promotion and reforms for modern education in religious seminaries of FATA.	<i>Daily Express</i> , October 27, 2017 https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1104674347&Issue=NP_ISB&Date=20171027
November 27, 2017	Education ministry has been tasked with mainstreaming the religious seminaries.	<i>Daily Express</i> , October 28, 2017 https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1104776123&Issue=NP_ISB&Date=20171128
December 07, 2017	Army Chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa has called for widening the scope of education at religious seminaries.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 8, 2017 https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailNews.php?StoryText=08_12_2017_001_001
December 08, 2017	An editorial in Dawn narrated that the state has the responsibility to regulate and reform the curriculum of madrassas.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 9, 2017 https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailNews.php?StoryText=09_12_2017_008_005
December 17, 2017	Religious leaders demanded KP government to establish a separate cell in the education department for seminaries registration.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1377342/religious-leaders-demand-separate-cell-for-seminaries-registration

Judiciary, military Courts

Date	Progress	Source
January 01, 2017	The uncertainty about military courts tenure has affected various terror cases, as per a report.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 03, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1306001

Date	Progress	Source
January 04, 2017	Attorney General of Pakistan has confirmed the establishment of special courts which will replace the military courts.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, January 05, 2017
January 06, 2017	Attorney General of Pakistan Ashtar Ausaf Ali Khan told journalist that military courts will come to an end on 7th January.	<i>The News</i> , January 07, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/177442-Military-courts-expire-today
January 07, 2017	The military courts have also convicted missing persons, as per a report.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 08, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1307086
January 08, 2017	The ISPR said that in two years out of 274 cases, military courts have announced 161 death sentences.	<i>The News</i> , January 09, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/177829-Military-courts-awarded-161-death-sentences-ISPR
January 10, 2017	According to official figures, 274 cases were referred to military courts out of which 161 were awarded the death penalty and 113 imprisonments of varying durations. Out of the 161 convicts, only 12 have been hanged.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1307695
January 26, 2017	ATC announced 45 years imprisonment to two militants for attempting to explode a railway track near Rahim Yar Khan.	<i>Dawn</i> , Islamabad January 27, 2017
February 23, 2017	Due to PPP's boycott of discussing the issue the stalemate over the extension of military courts continues.	<i>The News</i> , February 26, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/188477-Deadlock-over-military-courts-still-persists
March 20, 2017	The government passed two bills related to the military courts without the support of two of its allies i.e. Pakhtunkha Milli Awami Party and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 22, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1322108
March 28, 2017	The Senate passed the twenty-eight amendment bill to extend military courts for two more years.	<i>The News</i> , March 29, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/195155-Senate-also-okays-extension-to-military-courts
April 19, 2017	COAS Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa signed death sentences for 30 terrorists including those convicted for 2014 Peshawar APS attack.	<i>Dawn</i> , April 20, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1328108
August 31, 2017	The ATC acquitted five alleged Talibans and announced 17 years imprisonment to two police officials and declared Musharraf as an absconder in Benazir Bhutto murder case.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad September 01, 2017
September 08, 2017	ISPR said COAS confirmed death sentence of four militants including Riaz Ahmed, Hafeezur Rehman, Muhammad Saleem, and Kifayatullah. The statement also described the offenses committed by the convicts that they had admitted	<i>Dawn</i> , September 09, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1356554
September 17, 2017	Under the National Action Plan 483 terrorists have been given death sentences and other punishments, 2127 have been killed and 5884 have been arrested.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 18, 2017
September 20, 2017	ISPR said COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa confirmed death sentences awarded to another four militants for their involvement in heinous	<i>Dawn</i> , September 21, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1359074

Date	Progress	Source
	offences related to terrorism. The convicts (Shabbir Ahmed, Umara Khan, Tahir Ali, and Aftab ud din) were members of banned organizations and were tried in military courts and sentenced to death.	
November 04, 2017	The federal government decided to refer 29 cases of suspected militants to military courts after COAS Gen. Qamar Javed raised concerns about drying up of the cases in special courts.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , November 05, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1549648/1-federal-govt-caters-coas-concerns-29-new-cases-passed-military-courts/
November 10, 2017	An ATC court has sentenced death to three BLA members along with fine and confiscation of properties.	<i>Dawn</i> , Islamabad November 11, 2017

Criminal justice system, lawmaking

Date	Progress	Source
February 03, 2017	Under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 5,560 individuals have been placed under the fourth schedule list and further 7000 are under the process of investigation from all over the country.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 04, 2017
February 06, 2017	A new law has been passed in the National Assembly to amend various laws and curtail sectarianism, extremism, terrorism and protect minorities.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 07, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1313249
February 08, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper, the government has taken right step by amending the Criminal laws bill but the hard task is enforcing it properly.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 08, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1313356
March 08, 2017	According to a report, the fourth schedule list is still incomplete, not updated and full of contradictions.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, March 08, 2017
April 02, 2017	Federal government has introduced two amendments to ATA 1997 to prevent members of banned militant groups whose names were put in the 4 th schedule list from contesting any kind of election in the country.	<i>The News</i> , April 03, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/196193-Law-to-bar-militants-from-contesting-polls-on-the-cards
April 14, 2017	A parliamentary committee on national security consisting 33 members has been established. The TOR of the committee include urgent nature of national security discussions, review, monitoring and overseeing of implementation of NAP etc.	<i>The News</i> , April 15, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/198752-33-member-Parliamentary-Committee-on-National-Security-formed
August 14, 2017	Supreme Court has warned the lower courts that ATA 1997 should not be applied to ordinary crimes which don't have connection with militancy or terrorism.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1351635
August 18, 2017	Retired police officers established a think tank by the name of Former Inspector General of Police to improve the law and order and criminal justice system of Pakistan.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, August 19, 2017

Date	Progress	Source
August 21, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper because of ambiguity in the text of ATA courts have failed to interpret the ATA in a consistent manner.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 21, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1352821
September 09, 2017	The federal government has presented suggestions for changes in criminal justice system.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 10, 2017

Banned militant groups

January		
Date	Progress	Source
Jan 8, 2017	Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation, welfare wing of Jamat-ud-Dawa, is emerging as leading NGOs in Pakistan by their charity work.	<i>The News</i> , January 8, 2017 http://tns.thenews.com.pk/name-charity/#.WdXPX2hSzIU
Jan 8, 2017	According to the Counter-Terrorism Department, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is alleged to be behind the North Nazimabad Karachi gun and grenade attacks on police personnel on January 6.	<i>Dawn</i> , January 8, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1307010
Jan 11, 2017	Founder of Harkat ul Jihad- e Islami, Qari Saif Ullah Akhtar, killed while fighting the Afghan forces.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, January 11, 2017
Jan 19, 2017	Jamat-ud- Dawa (JuD) has filed a petition in the Islamabad High Court for the removal of its name from the watch list of the interior ministry.	<i>Dawn</i> , Jan 19, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1309335
Jan 30, 2017	US told Pakistan to take action against Jamat-ud-Dawa and warned of sanctions in case of not following the instruction.	<i>The News</i> , January 30, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/182751-Act-against-JuD-or-face-sanctions-US-tells-Pakistan
Jan 31, 2017	Government has placed Jamat-ud-Dawa leader Hafiz Saeed under house arrest and four other members of the group for six months.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad January 31, 2017
Jan 31, 2017	Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar said that steps have been taken against Jamat-ud-Dawa in the light of UN Resolution 1267.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, January 31, 2017
February		
Feb 01, 2017	Spokesperson of military's media wing, Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor said that keeping in view the national interest, actions have been taken against Jamat-ud-Dawa.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 01, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1311972
Feb 02, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper, JuD's leader Hafiz Saeed has been placed under house arrest because of pressure from Asia Pacific Group which works with Financial Action Task Force.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1312204

Feb 02, 2017	Pakistan placed Hafiz Saeed and 37 other members of JuD on the exit control list (ECL).	<i>The News</i> , February 02, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/183482-Hafiz-Saeed-37-JuD-activists-put-on-ECL
Feb 05, 2017	In 2017, Jamat-ud-Dawa will work under the banner of Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Jammu and Kashmir, as per a report in a leading newspaper.	<i>The Nation</i> , February 05, 2017 http://nation.com.pk/newspaper-picks/05-Feb-2017/jud-to-work-under-tajk-banner
Feb 08, 2017	Daesh threatened to target specific sect in FATA, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan.	<i>The News</i> , February 08, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/184775-Daesh-leaflets-in-Kurram-Agency-threaten-a-specific-sect
Feb 15, 2017	According to an article, both civil and military leadership are working on a new narrative to bring jihadi groups into mainstream politics under National Action Plan.	<i>The News</i> , February 15, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/186189-Hafiz-Saeed-and-new-narrative
Feb 15, 2017	In a statement, Lal Masjid administration calls Jamat-ul- Ahrar as 'anti-Islam and anti-state'.	<i>Express Tribune</i> , February 15, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1327115/lah-ore-attack-lal-masjid-calls-ttp-ahrar-anti-islam-group/
Feb 16, 2017	The Feb. 13 attack on Punjab Assembly, killing 13, has alerted law enforcers forcing them to assume that terrorists are regrouping.	<i>The News</i> , February 16, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/186681-Law-enforcers-on-their-toes-as-terrorists-trying-to-regroup
Feb 16, 2017	A public notice for wanted terrorists has been published in leading paper.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 16, 2017
Feb 17, 2017	Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) confirmed the death of militant leader Saifullah Akhtar who was killed fighting Afghan forces.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad, February 17, 2017
Feb 18, 2017	Punjab government revokes 44 arms licenses of Jamat-ud-Dawa and gives permission to arrest individuals in the fourth schedule list.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 18, 2017
Feb 18, 2017	The Punjab government included names of Hafiz Saeed and Qazi Kashif, leaders of Jamat-ud-Dawa, in the fourth schedule of ATA.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1315473
Feb 19, 2017	Pak Army has requested Afghan government to take action against 76 terrorists including Mullah Fazullah, Umar Khurasani, Ahsan Ullah Ahsan and other terrorists who had fled away from tribal areas of Pakistan.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 19, 2017
Feb 22, 2017	During a high profile police meeting in Islamabad, decision was taken to mount crackdown against terrorists in Islamabad under the NAP.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, February 22, 2017
Feb 24, 2017	Investigators took in custody four (4) suspected facilitators of Sehwan blast which took place on February 16.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , February 25, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1338386/four-suspected-sehwan-blast-facilitators-held/
February 28, 2017	Ministry of Interior has issued red warrant against Baloch Republican Party Chairman Brahamdagh Bugti and Sher Muhammad Urf Sher.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, March 01, 2017

	March	
March 01, 2017	KP police official said that Daesh (Islamic State) members hide among the general public using small business as a cover.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , March 02, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1343408/sm-all-trade-front-daish-members-hide-among-public-k-p/
March 02, 2017	Daesh is becoming more popular in Pakistan, claimed a report.	<i>The News</i> , March 02, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/189914-Daesh-gradually-gaining-ground-in-Pakistan
March 03, 2017	A Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant was sentenced life imprisonment by ATC in Patel Para blast incident in July 2013.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 04, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1318225
March 05, 2017	CTD said that a single terror group whose members are hiding in Balochistan is involved in the Feb. 13 attack in Sehwan and last Nov. attack in Shah Noorani.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, March 06, 2017
March 09, 2017	Police official said that ISIS terrorists are using messenger app to communicate in Pakistan.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , March 10, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1351302/tech-terror-using-messenger-app-communicate/
March 17, 2017	CTD of Sindh police arrested four Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militants including the LeJ Shikarpur Chief.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 18, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1321143
March 18, 2017	According to Hyderabad police, missing girl student has joined ISIS.	<i>The News</i> , March 18, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/193058-Missing-girl-student-has-joined-Daesh-claim-police
March 22, 2017	US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that IS is recruiting militants from Pakistan and Afghanistan.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 24, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1322488
March 30, 2017	TTP terrorist involved in 2012 Bannu jailbreak sentenced to death.	<i>Dawn</i> , March 31, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1323894
	April	
April 22, 2017	Police alleged IS for murder of three clerics in Peshawar.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , April 22, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1390253/peshawar-police-suspects-behind-weeks-murders-pro-afghan-taliban-clerics/
April 27, 2017	Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, TTP's former spokesperson, after getting assurance from security establishment that he would not face any terrorism or criminal case against him in any court of law including the military court, has surrendered.	<i>The News</i> , April 30, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/201621-Ehsan-returned-on-terms-of-revealing-Taliban-secrets
	May	
April 30, 2017	The house arrest of Hafiz Saeed and other JuD affiliates has been prolonged for another 90 days.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , April 30, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1397762/hafiz-saeed-aides-detention-extended-90-days/
May 04, 2017	Three TTP militants executed who were tried by military courts.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 05, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1331203

May 07, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper, since October 2015, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has not made any claim for violence in the country that has carried out many attacks against the Shia community in the past.	<i>The News</i> , May 07, 2017 http://tns.thenews.com.pk/making-breaking-lej/#.Wdyhe2hSzIU
May 12, 2017	Saleem Safi's interview with Ehsan Ullah Ehsan.	<i>The News</i> , May 13, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/204209-TTP-not-an-organised-movement-Ehsanullah
May 12, 2017	Islamabad High Courts permits Geo TV to telecast interview with TTP's former spokesperson Ehsan Ullah Ehsan; the interview drew controversy over whether it should be broadcasted.	<i>The News</i> , May 13, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/204218-IHC-allows-Geo-to-telecast-Ehsanullahs-interview
May 12, 2017	US imposed new sanctions on Lashkar-e- Taiba (LeT) and Jamaatul Dawa Al Quran (JDQ) to disrupt their leadership and financial network.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 14, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1333002
May 21, 2017	There has been report of the presence of Daesh in Balochistan.	<i>The News</i> , May 21, 2017 http://tns.thenews.com.pk/daesh/#.Wd23L2hSzIU
May 30, 2017	According to an investigation by <i>Dawn</i> , banned groups in Pakistan operate freely on Facebook.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1335561
June		
June 08, 2017	Mastermind of London Bridge attack Khurram Shehzad Butt had campaigned against Pakistan occasionally and talks about the overthrow of democratic set up.	<i>The News</i> , June 08, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/209477-Khurram-Butt-campaigned-against-Pak-democratic-set-up
June 15, 2017	Two LJ militants escaped from Karachi's Central Jail.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1339623
June 16, 2017	Police killed Daesh target killer in Peshawar.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , June 17, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1437594/police-van-ambush-terrorist-killed-peshawar-identified-daish-hitman/
June 20, 2017	Two brothers from Jalalpur Jattan, a city in Gujrat district of Punjab, have joined ISIS.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, June 20, 2017
June 23, 2017	Shuhada Foundation, a body set up by relatives of those killed in the Red Mosque operation, was declared as unregistered entity by ICT administration.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, June 24, 2017
June 24, 2017	Federal government has issued the list of 65 militant groups, among them four are put on the watch list.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, June 25, 2017
June 23, 2017	Two groups, Ansar al Sharia and Lashkar-e-Jahangvi separately claimed killing of policemen in Karachi which happened on June 23.	<i>The Nation</i> , June 25, 2017 http://nation.com.pk/karachi/25-Jun-2017/two-militant-groups-claim-responsibility-for-cops-killings
June 24, 2017	Daesh KP commander, along with his comrade, was killed in a flour mill in Peshawar.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , June 25, 2017
June 24, 2017	Investigators alleged the involvement of militants returning from Syria in the attack on policemen in Karachi.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1341574

June 28, 2017	Foreign Office expressed concerns about Trump-Modi joint statement which alleged Pakistan of cross-border incidences and asked Pakistan to take action against Pakistan-based terrorists.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 29, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1342031
June 28, 2017	Pakistan criticizes US decision to label Hizb ul Mujahideen chief a global terrorist.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , June 29, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1445826/trump-modi-meeting-pakistan-slams-us-move-label-hum-chief-global-terrorist/
July 01, 2017	Despite taking steps against terror financing like freezing bank accounts of 100 UN-listed entities and individuals, Pakistan still remains under the radar of terror financing watchdog.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 01, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1342535
June 30, 2017	Government banned Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir which is allegedly linked to Jamaat ud-Dawa.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , July 01, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1448035/jud-linked-tajk-listed-among-proscribed-outfits/
July 06, 2017	Pakistan succeeded in listing Jamaat-ul-Ahrar as a terrorist group by UN.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 08, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1343874
July 24, 2017	Four terrorist including the chief of AQIS killed in a police encounter in Karachi.	<i>The News</i> , July 25, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/218760-AQIS-chief-among-four-killed-in-Karachi-encounter
July 25, 2017	TTP's new wing 'Taliban Special Group' which includes highly trained suicide attackers, carried out the attack on Lahore's Ferozepur Road on June 24.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 26, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1347712
July 29, 2017	CTD feared that TTP is trying to re-establish its financial network and rebuilding the capability to launch a large scale attack in Karachi.	<i>Dawn</i> , July 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1348415
August 01, 2017	TTP launched its first edition of women's magazine by the name of 'Sunnat-i-Khula' which is actually meant to convince women to take up Jihad.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1349061
August 06, 2017	According to CTD Sindh, multiple groups are involved in the targeted killing of LEA officials.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 07, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1349997
August 07, 2017	Government decided to put Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation under the watch list.	<i>Daily Jang</i> , August 08, 2017
August 07, 2017	JuD formed political party named as 'Milli Muslim League (MML)' to enter mainstream politics	<i>Dawn</i> , August 08, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1350248
August 15, 2017	According to an article in leading newspaper ex-TTP spokesman fate is now dependent on the judicial system which he refuted in past.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1351657
August 16, 2017	According to an article in newspaper, JuD decided to enter mainstream politics because of the changing international scenario.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, August 16, 2017
August 16, 2017	US included Hizbul Mujahideen to its blacklist of terrorist groups.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , August 17, 2017
August 18, 2017	According to investigators, two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants stayed in Haripur for ten days after jailbreak.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 19, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1352419

August 20, 2017	A news report about a girl from Hyderabad joining Daesh turned out to be fabricated.	<i>The News</i> , August 21, 2017
August 21, 2017	Ansarul Sharia Pakistan kills three men in Karachi in revenge of using their name in the recent police killing in Karachi.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , August 22, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1487651/militant-group-kills-three-avenge-besmirching-name/
August 21, 2017	TTP militants admit involvement in 2013 Rawalpindi mosque attack in which nine people were killed.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , August 22, 2017
August 23, 2017	Maulana Samiul Haq leader of his own faction of Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam said that the army would not take action against the Haqqani network.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 24, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/135361
August 25, 2017	TTP had planned another attack on former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, had she survived the first one, revealed by the prosecutor of her murder case.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 26, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1353979
August 30, 2017	Mohammad Shakir-ullah alias Mufti Shakir who in 2014 confessed to CTD that he was involved in the killing of 10 policemen and a soldier, was bailed and fled to Afghanistan and he is now running an active training camp for militants.	<i>Dawn</i> , August 31, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1354971
September		
September 04, 2017	After Ansarul Sharia claimed the responsibility of an attack on MQM leader on the Eid day, intelligence officials raided a suspect house but the suspect escaped.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 05, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1355681
September 06, 2017	Ansarul Sharia's Chief Abdullah Hashmi confessed that he along with his accomplices started incidences in 2015 and approached Abdullah Baloch who was the commander of Al-Qaeda in Karachi to get affiliated with Al-Qaeda.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 07, 2017
September 07, 2017	Election Commission of Pakistan refused to recognize Milli Muslim League (MML) as political party.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 08, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1356284
September 08, 2017	Four women and a doctor arrested in Karachi who were alleged to be members of Ansarul Sharia.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 09, 2017
September 08, 2017	A forensic report of arms used in various targeted killings reveals that Ansarul Sharia has been active in Karachi since February 2017.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 09, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1356467
September 09, 2017	DG Rangers said Ansarul Sharia was created by former Al-Qaeda members.	<i>The Nation</i> , September 10, 2017 http://nation.com.pk/karachi/10-Sep-2017/ansar-ul-sharia-created-by-qaeda-dg-rangers
September 11, 2017	According to an investigation, a flourmill in Peshawar was being used as an operation center of IS.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 12, 2017
September 11, 2017	Justice Shaukat Aziz excused hearing of Maulana Masroor Nawaz Jhangvi petition against including his name in the fourth schedule list.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 12, 2017

September 12, 2017	Daesh Peshawar leader Nazir Afridi along with his two aides was killed in Afghanistan.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 13, 2017
September 12, 2017	Punjab Home Department said JuD chief pose great threat to public safety.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , September 13, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1504841/jud-chief-threat-peace-punjab-tells-lhc/s
September 13, 2017	22 years old US-returned IT grad from Peshawar joins IS.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , September 14, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1505846/dai-sh-recruits-us-returned-grad-peshawar/
September 15, 2017	According to an article in a newspaper, JuD is using charity and now recently politics to influence people	<i>The Friday Times</i> , September 15, 2017 http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/the-jud-let-guide-on-how-to-win-friends-and-influence-people/
September 20, 2017	COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa confirmed the death sentence to four terrorists.	<i>The News</i> , September 21, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/231501-COAS-confirms-death-sentence-to-four-hardcore-terrorists
September 24, 2017	IS flag near Islamabad has created a wave of terror for law enforcers	<i>Dawn</i> , September 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1359907
September 25, 2017	MPA Masroor Jhangvi has filed a petition in the IHC for removal of his name from the 4 th schedule list.	<i>The News</i> , September 26, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/232701-Jhangvi-moves-IHC-for-removal-from-4th-Schedule-list
September 27, 2017	According to a report imprisoned militants in Karachi Central Jail were caught recruiting members for Daesh.	<i>Nawa-e-Waqt</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, September 28, 2017
September 29, 2017	Ministry of Interior has requested ECP to ban Milli Muslim League.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1360966
September 29, 2017	IS graffiti was seen in Wah, Punjab.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1360962
September 28, 2017	Foreign Office spokesperson again denied the presence of IS in Pakistan.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1360857
October		
September 30, 2017	Jamaatul Ahrar confirmed the killing of its seven fighters by Afghan special forces.	<i>The News</i> , October 01, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/233772-Jamaatul-Ahrar-says-its-seven-fighters-killed-by-Afghan-special-forces
September 30, 2017	An arrested Daesh operator from Karachi is stated to be a government employee.	<i>The News</i> , October 01, 2017
September 30, 2017	Hafiz Saeed sent legal notice to Defence Minister Khawaja Asif in response of his speech in US in which he said that "don't blame us for the Haqqanis and don't blame us for the Hafiz Saeeds".	<i>Dawn</i> , October 01, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1361161
October 06, 2017	ECP declared Milli Muslim League as a militant group.	<i>Daily Express</i> , October 07, 2017
October 11, 2017	IS renewed its call for recruiting women.	<i>Dawn</i> , October 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1362987

October 11, 2017	ECP rejected registering Milli Muslim League as a political party.	Daily Express, October 12, 2017
October 11, 2017	ECP refuses to register Milli Muslim League (MML) as a political party.	The Express Tribune, October 12, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1528417/ecp-turns-milli-muslim-leagues-registration-application/
October 14, 2017	A federal review board withdrew an appeal for the extension in JuD leaders' detention.	Dawn, October 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1363932
October 18, 2017	TTP confirms the death of the mastermind of Army Public School in Peshawar, Umar Mansoor.	The News, Islamabad, October 19, 2017
October 18, 2017	Federal Government orders provincial governments to take action against banned religious groups.	Nawa-i-Waqt (Urdu), Islamabad, October 19, 2017
October 19, 2017	Lahore High Court issued notice for extension in Hafiz Saeed detention and the other four JuD members released who were also house arrested.	Express(Urdu), Islamabad, October 20, 2017
October 20, 2017	Dost Muhammad has been nominated as the new chief of Jamat ul Ahrar after the death of Khurasani.	Jang(Urdu), Islamabad, October 21, 2017
October 29, 2017	According to one of JuD's activist "Unity in the ranks of the JuD is fast eroding after the leadership decided to enter politics".	Dawn, October 29, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1366744
October 29, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper, there is no proper policy of mainstreaming militants in Pakistan.	Dawn, October 29, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1366753
November 05, 2017	Intiqam-e-Waziristan group's chief Maulvi Abdul Khaliq along with his son surrendered to security forces.	Jang(Urdu), Islamabad, November 06, 2017
November 06, 2017	A selfie of one of IS members in Peshawar led investigators to find out Daesh operating center in KP.	The Express Tribune, November 06, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1550390/10-selfie-cracked-daish-k-p/
November 07, 2017	NACTA has sent warning to Punjab Home Ministry that RAW has given 8 crore rupees to Jaish-e- Muhammad workers to kill Hafiz Saeed, as per a news report	Jang(Urdu), Islamabad, November 08, 2017
November 07, 2017	Three militants including Maulana Azhar's nephew and an Indian soldier killed in an encounter in IHK.	The News, November 08, 2017
November 15, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper Taliban have comeback in Wana, South Waziristan Agency in the guise of a peace committee.	Dawn, November 15, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1370585
November 21, 2017	National Assembly's fact-finding committee has started to investigate the links between militant groups and parliamentarians.	Jang(Urdu), Islamabad, November 22, 2017
November 22, 2017	A review board containing three judges orders the release of Hafiz Saeed.	Dawn, November 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1372329
November 27, 2017	Mastermind of Sehwan Attack which was carried out on Feb 16 and claimed lives of 84 people, confessed that the attack was planned in Dear	The News, November 27, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/249293-sehwan-attack-from-conception-to-

	Murad Jamali, Balochistan and executed in Sehwan Sharif.	execution
December 12, 2017	Widow and four daughters of a Pakistani Daesh were arrested at Sialkot airport, after being deported from Turkey.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, December 12, 2017
December 13, 2017	Peshawar High Court declared that TTP's former spokesman Ehsan Ullah Ehsan should not be released without court order.	<i>The News</i> , December 14, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/255871-phc-wants-taliban-s-ehsanullah-not-released-without-court-order
December 21, 2017	Police said that JuA chief Omar Khalid Khorasani's cousin was gunned down in Afghanistan.	<i>The Express Tribune</i> , December 22, 2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1590080/1-khorasanis-cousin-rauf-killed-afghanistan-says-police/
December 22, 2017	The Ministry of Interior rejected the registration of Milli Muslim League as a political party, terming it an off-shoot of proscribed groups. i.e. Jamat ud Dawa and Lashkar-e-Taiba.	<i>Dawn</i> , December 23, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1378346
December 24, 2017	JuD Chief Hafiz Saeed visited different places in Lahore's National Assembly constituency NA-120, where he also inaugurated MML office at Mohni Road Lahore.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, December 25, 2017
December 26, 2017	Punjab Home Department removed names of 25 leaders of Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah from 4th schedule list.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, December 27, 2017

Border and regional security

	January	
Date	Progress	Source
February 07, 2017	Government decided to strictly implement immigration laws on Afghan border.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 08, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1313489
February 22, 2017	Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi said in an informal meeting of UN General Assembly that "the root causes of terrorism should be identified to tackle the terrorism issue."	<i>The News</i> , February 24, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/188473-Pakistans-counter-terrorism-drive-has-entered-intense-phase-Lodhi-tells-UN
February 23, 2017	Foreign Office spokesman Nafees Zakaria in a media briefing said that 'Pakistan has showed willingness to resolve its tensions with Afghanistan and the decision to reopen Pak-Afghan border will be taken in due course'.	<i>Dawn</i> , February 24, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1316678
	April	
Date	Progress	Source
April 09, 2017	Five civilians are injured due to the shelling and firing by Indian forces at LOC.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, April 10, 2017
April 25, 2017	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Pakistan (UNODCP) and EU had signed three years technical cooperation program to counter-terrorism.	<i>Dunya</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, April 26, 2017
	May	
Date	Progress	Source
May 01, 2017	India and Turkey decided to work together to counter- terrorism.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad May 02, 2017

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May 01, 2017	Suspected militants killed seven people including five policemen by attacking a bank van in Indian held Kashmir on May 01.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1330509
May 01, 2017	Pakistan army denied Indian claims of beheading two Indian soldiers at LOC by Pakistani forces.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1330455
May 06, 2017	Pak-Afghan border standoff continues after Afghan forces attack.	<i>The News</i> , May 07, 2017 http://tn.thenews.com.pk/print/202945-Tension-prevails-on-Chaman-border-after-Afghan-attack
May 06, 2017	Tense calm prevails at Chaman border after two consecutive days of talks.	<i>Dawn</i> , May 07, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1331555
June		
Date	Progress	Source
June 12, 2017	Pak-afghan army officials decided to resolve border village issues during a flag meeting.	<i>Dawn</i> , June 14, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1339419
July		
Date	Progress	Source
July 26, 2017	Minister of Interior Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan said that Pakistan will discuss Karachi militancy matter with Britain and south African government.	<i>Jang</i> (Urdu), Islamabad July 27, 2017
August		
Date	Progress	Source
July 31, 2017	Pak-India track-2 dialogues held at Dubai by London-based-independent organization, Conciliation Resources, from 31 st July to August 01.	<i>The News</i> , August 01, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/220474-Pakistan-India-Track-2-diplomacy-in-Dubai
August 03, 2017	Foreign office spokesman said that Pakistan has conveyed US that the presence of Da'ish in Afghanistan is a threat to Pakistan and effective border management is necessary to curb it.	<i>The News</i> , Islamabad, August 04, 2017
September		
Date	Progress	Source
September 18, 2017	Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Farukh Amil asked his Swiss counterpart, Ambassador Valentin Zellweger, to take action against the display of 'Free Balochistan' posters displayed in Geneva.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 19, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1358578
September 24, 2017	Pakistan's permanent representative to UN Maleeha Lodhi using the right of response to Indian Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj's speech in UN General Assembly said that 'India is the mother of terrorism in South Asia'.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1359856
September 25, 2017	According to an article in a leading newspaper, common problems need to be addressed on international forum between India and Pakistan rather than focusing on blame game.	<i>Dawn</i> , September 25, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1359816
October		
Date	Progress	Source
October 15, 2017	Pak-Iran pledges not to allow their soil for terrorism and decided to take concrete steps for	<i>Dawn</i> , October 16, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1364130


	border management. It was decided in a meeting of Pak-Iran Joint Border Commission held in Gwadar on October 15	
October 15, 2017	Pak-Iran signed MoU for boarder management during two days meeting of the Pak-Iran Joint Border Commission in Gwadar	<i>Dawn</i> , October 16, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1364000
	November	
Date	Progress	Source
November 01, 2017	US provide the list of 20 terror organizations operating inside Pakistan to Pakistani officials	<i>Dawn</i> , November 02, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1367864
November 03, 2017	Two civilians and a Ranger got injured due to Indian Forces firing in Shakargarh, Punjab.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 04, 2017
November 10, 2017	India's Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan Rangers agreed to work for peace and return to the 2003 ceasefire in a bi-annual meeting held at Delhi from 8-10 November.	<i>Dawn</i> , November 11, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1369764
November 13, 2017	Two Pak Army soldiers and 12 terrorist killed in Bajaur terrorist attack on security forces by Afghan terrorists.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 14, 2017
November 17, 2017	Two civilians killed and five injured at LOC from Indian forces firing.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 18, 2017
November 17, 2017	LOC Firing: Indian High Commissioner called in Foreign Office.	<i>Nawa-i-Waqt</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 18, 2017
November 24, 2017	A woman suffered injuries due to Indian forces firing at LOC.	<i>Express</i> (Urdu), Islamabad, November 25, 2017
December 25, 2017	According to security officials, 150 km of Pak-Afghan border has been fenced and 150 forts have been built.	<i>The News</i> , December 25, 2017 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/260404-150-kms-of-pak-afghan-border-fenced-150-of-planned-443-forts-built



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