

Pakistan's achievements in

War on Terror

but at what cost: A special
review of the current decade



PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS)

**PAKISTAN'S
ACHIEVEMENTS IN
WAR ON TERROR BUT
AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE
CURRENT DECADE**

SAFDAR HUSSAIN, ANALYST PIPS, WROTE THIS REPORT BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC, AND SOCIOCULTURAL COSTS IN THE LAST ONE DECADE. (MARCH-APRIL 2019)

A REPORT PREPARED BY

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

Islamabad



Outline

1	Background of War on Terror and Pakistan's role	05
2	Pakistan's counterterrorism campaign since 2009	07
	2.1 Kinetic, military responses	
	2.2 Political, soft responses	
	Pre-APS attack phase	
	Post-APS attack phase	
3	The outcome of state responses	35
4	The cost and sacrifices	39
	4.1 Human cost	
	4.2 Sociocultural cost	
	4.3 Economic cost	
Annexures		55
Annexure-1:	Militant leaders killed in military/security operations in Pakistan (2007-18)	
Annex-2:	Major peace agreements between Government and other actors, mainly militants	
Annex-3:	Progress on National Action Plan – Government of Pakistan data (by December 2017)	



1. Background of War on Terror and Pakistan's role

National security and regional geostrategic imperatives had mainly weighed on Pakistan's policy choice to join the US-led War on Terror in 2001. Pakistan did not want these two challenges to grow stronger by staying away from international community's call to join hands against terrorists. While joining the WoT largely meant, at least in the initial phases, to support and facilitate the US war in Afghanistan, but Pakistan took no time to realise that the real war was here. Different brands of local, Afghan and other foreign militant groups sneaked into Pakistan's tribal areas while fleeing the bombardment by the US-led international forces in Afghanistan. That is how Pakistan's road to chaos started, where the international community kept judging Pakistan's 'contribution' in WoT only in Afghanistan's perspective, fully ignoring its own internal and regional security challenges and meager resources to cope with these.

Although Pakistan's internal security situation had started to deteriorate after 2001-02 but insecurity, violence and militancy became pressing challenges for the government particularly after 2005-06 when Islamist militants and Baloch nationalist insurgents intensified their attacks against the state, its institutions and people in northwest Pakistan and Balochistan, respectively. The Islamists later extended their terrorist activities to other parts of Pakistan.

Militant activities of the Pakistani Taliban, which were initially confined to South and North Waziristan and Bajaur tribal regions, gradually spread to all seven tribal agencies of erstwhile FATA, and to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's (KP) settled districts of Bannu, Kohat, Karak, Dera Ismail Khan, Dir, Lakki Marwat, Swat and Tank. As the year 2008 drew to a close, frequent Taliban attacks had spread to KP's capital Peshawar as well as to Charsadda, Shabqadar and Mardan (PIPS, 2009). The mushroom growth of Taliban groups in settled districts of KP was a major concern for Pakistan. Every group was largely independent in operations, which made it difficult for the security forces to identify and target them. Kohat and Swat were vivid examples of this situation. In Swat, the government's writ had virtually vanished when the government launched a military operation there in the last week of April 2009. That operation forced the militants to flee Swat.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

The Taliban militancy got impetus particularly after establishment of an umbrella organization of the Pakistan Taliban in December 2007 when more than 40 Taliban groups from the tribal areas and KP joined hands under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud to form the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with the agenda to liberate Afghanistan from foreign forces, target Pakistani security forces and pursue 'Talibanization' in Pakistan, particularly in the tribal agencies of FATA, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Rana, et al., 2010). Having close links with Al-Qaeda, the TTP had been extensively brutal towards local tribesmen, political leaders and Pakistani forces. The TTP had targeted even the Taliban and militant groups that did not join their cause in fighting against the Pakistani security forces. Lal Masjid crisis in July 2007 was also a key contributor to worsening security situation in the country. The incident not only put security of Islamabad at risk but also prompted the militants to launch revenge attacks in FATA, KP and other parts of the country.

Militancy and terrorism continued to play havoc with the lives of people until recently when after 2014 APS incident; a renewed military and political resolve uprooted the most dangerous TTP and its allies from erstwhile FATA. The Rangers-led operation in Karachi did the same trick there. The situation in Balochistan has also improved with a low-scale insurgency still underway. However, that does not mean the war against terrorism has been won in Pakistan, despite a significant drop in the number of terrorist attacks. For one, militants are still able to carry out terrorist attacks, though less frequently, and mainly in KP and Balochistan. Secondly, the extremist mindset that feeds into terrorism is still intact. The war against terrorists and their ideologies is still on, and Pakistan is aware of that.

This report describes Pakistan's efforts against militancy and terrorism, the cost and sacrifices it had paid in this campaign mainly being a US ally in the WoT, and the outcome of the war in terms of restoration of peace and security.

2. Pakistan's counterterrorism campaign since 2009

Pakistan's counterterrorism campaign, since early 2000's, has been largely kinetic, or muscular, and less soft, or political. Which is why much of the debate on countering extremism in Pakistan also revolves around countering terrorism or terrorists, leaving unaddressed the persistent factors of violent and non-violent extremism in society, which mainly require soft approaches to deal with.

Although the state's kinetic counterterrorism actions have achieved a lot in terms of peace and security, but their long-term effect or sustainability yet remains to be tested. A PIPS report based on consultations with 10 CVE expert groups in early 2017 had found that eliminating extremism – which is considered by many as a key prerequisite to counter terrorism – in Pakistan requires efforts at developing a holistic CVE strategy, covering multiple fronts. That strategy should not only focus on hard approaches, or fighting against the violent extremists, but also on developing intellectual, ideological responses to annul extremists' religious-ideological dogmas and evolving a comprehensive rehabilitation or reintegration of (repentant and ready-to-quit-violence) militants (PIPS, 2017).

2.1 Kinetic, military responses

As cited earlier, the use of force has been the major state response to counter militancy and terrorism. That resonated with the security imperative amidst growing terrorist violence mainly after 2006-07. With the exception of some small anti-militant actions in parts of erstwhile FATA in early 2000's, major military operations were launched after 2007 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal districts.

Small-scale search and hunt operations in Balochistan however have continued since 2005 sporadically. These operations in Balochistan were mainly intelligence-based or were launched following some terrorist attack in one area or the other. The FC takes lead role and police and Levies assist it. Pakistan Army is also involved in some operations, where needed.

The Rangers-led operation in Karachi has been continuing since 2013. Meanwhile in Punjab, the police and its counter terrorism department (CTD), and in some areas Rangers have been launching sporadic anti-militant actions.

(See **Annex-1** for militants leaders killed in military/security operations since 2007)

A chronology of Pakistan's major military operations/campaigns¹

2003

Pakistan Army launched its first military operation against a Wazir sub-tribe from Darra Akakhel in North Waziristan that helped Al Qaeda militants attack a US military camp located in a pass in July 2003. The Al Qaeda militants also abducted five US troops in that attack. Pakistan Army called the following action in Darra Akakhel, which lasted for three days, a “routine military exercises”. Military operations were intensified in October 2003, when the Zalikhel and Karrikhel tribes of Waziristan refused to hand over Al Qaeda and Taliban militants to the army. In the operations, carried out from October 12 to 18, 2003, 22 Al Qaeda militants and seven tribesmen were killed while their properties were destroyed. Following the launch of the operation, the tribal elders sought some time and then handed over around a dozen Al Qaeda militants to the army.

2004-05

Wana Operation: Pakistani troops launched the first full-scale military operation in Wana, headquarters of South Waziristan, in March 2004. Describing the operation as a success, officials stated that 63 militants, mainly from Chechnya and Uzbekistan, were killed and 93 Pakistani tribesmen and 73 foreigners were arrested. They said that 46 military and paramilitary troops were also killed and 26 injured in attacks by Al Qaeda and its local allies.

¹Details are mainly derived from PIPS Annual Security Reports as well as Rana, M. Amir et al. 2010. *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*. Islamabad: Narratives.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Shakai Operation: Started in April 2004 from Shakai, Wana and other areas dominated by Wazir tribes, the military operation spread in July to Mehsud tribes' areas including Karwan Manze, Kaniguram, Makeen, Jandola, Ladha and Spin Karzai. The Mehsuds were cooperating with the authorities against the militants.

From September 2005, Pakistani troops started the operation against the militants in North Waziristan, who had not been cooperating with the government and killed 20 foreign militants and arrested over 100 tribal militants.

2008

The troops launched an operation on January 23, 2008 in Makin, Sainki Raghzai and Tiara areas of South Waziristan, inhabited by Mehsud tribesmen. Fierce clashes continued between the security forces and the tribal militants in parts of the Mehsud-populated areas of South Waziristan, including Torwam, Tiarza near Shakai, Ladha, Sarwakai and Nawaz Kot on January 28 and 29.

Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) began in Bajaur Agency in August 2008 and was initially aimed at preventing the imminent fall of Khar, headquarters of Bajaur, to Taliban. The military operation was intended to eventually reclaim all of Bajaur from Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists. Bajaur remained a combat zone until Pakistan Army declared on February 2, 2010 that it had "cleansed" the tribal agency of terrorists and restored the writ of the government there.

2009

Operation Rah-e-Rast was launched in Swat on May 11, 2009 that continued for four months. It succeeded in dislodging the militants from Swat and other areas and capturing the second-tier leadership of the TTP-Swat chapter. The operation uprooted a substantial part of the population of the Malakand Division. Chief of banned *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM) Sufi Muhammad and TTP Swat Spokesperson Muslim Khan were also arrested during the operation. The internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Swat started returning home in August after the security forces cleared the

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

areas of militants. The operation was the most successful of all counter-terrorism operations launched by the security forces by them.

Operation Bia Darghalam was launched on September 1, 2009 in Bara sub-division of erstwhile Khyber Agency to counter the growing militant activities in the area. Another operation, named Darghalam, had been conducted in the area in June 2008. The September 2009 operation was carried out after local militant groups increased attacks on NATO supply trucks and fighting between rival groups deteriorated the law and order situation in the area.

Operation Rah-e-Nijat (path of deliverance) was launched on September 16, 2009 in the TTP stronghold of South Waziristan. More than 28,000 troops participated in the operation. Prior to the launch of the operation, three entry points to the agency, from Dera Ismail Khan, Frontier Region Tank and Zhob were blocked by the security forces. The operation was confined to the Mehsud-dominated areas away from the border with Afghanistan. Some 10,000 militants, including 1,500 foreign militants were believed to be in the area. The army claimed to have had cleared over 90 percent of the areas of militants' presence by February 2010.

2010

Military operation *Rah-e-Nijat* continued in 2010. During his visit to South Waziristan in December that year, Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kyani, said that 100 per cent of South Waziristan had been virtually cleared from militants. Anti-militant military campaigns were also launched in 2010 in Orakzai, Kurram, FR Kohat, FR Peshawar and Mansehra.

2011

In the year 2011, Pakistani security forces launched as many as 144 operational attacks as part of military operations against militants in various parts of FATA and KP. The major emphasis remained on Mohmand, Orakzai and Kurram tribal districts of FATA, where

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

113 attacks were launched. In all these operations in 2011 1,016 militants and 30 civilians were killed.

2012

Small-scale military operations continued in 2012, mainly in Waziristan, Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram tribal agencies of FATA. The military made major progress in an operation in Kurram after clearing the snow-covered Jogi mountain and severing a vital supply route for the militants through the mountains from North Waziristan.

2013

While sporadic military operational strikes continued in Khyber, Orakzai and parts of Balochistan, a *major Rangers-led operation was launched in Karachi in 2013.*

2014

Zarb-e-Azb: Pakistan's armed forces launched the long-awaited military operation in North Waziristan on June 15, 2014, with the name of the operation Zarb-e-Azb. According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), media wing of Pakistan Army, at least 2,100 terrorists were killed in this offensive until December 28, 2014 (Bashir, 2014). Some significant outcomes of the military offensive in North Waziristan were that Pakistani state reclaimed the geographical areas, i.e. North Waziristan that it had practically lost to militants and foreign militants were denied sanctuaries and shelter in North Waziristan. The operation pushed a big part of the terrorists' infrastructure to the other side of the border in Afghanistan, mainly in Kunar, Nuristan and Khost provinces. On the whole, Zarb-e-Azb helped not only to improve the security situation inside the country, but also provided room for better regional coordination to counter terrorism and promote stability in the region.

Khyber-I: After the launch of Zarb-e-Azb, another major military offensive codenamed 'Khyber-1' was launched in Khyber Agency of FATA against TTP and its local associate Lashkar-e-Islam.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

2015

Zarb-e-Azb continued and the military in June announced to take the operation to its decisive phase by taking on militants ensconced in the Shawal Valley, which separates North Waziristan from South Waziristan.

Khyber-II: The military carried out the second phase of Khyber operation. Launched in March 2015, Khyber-II was meant to clear the agency's Tirah valley, which had turned into a sanctuary of militants affiliated with the TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam, and Jamaatul Ahrar. The operation was formally concluded on the first anniversary of *Zarb-e-Azb*, in June 2015 (Khan, 2015).

Meanwhile in Karachi, too, Rangers-led operation intensified in 2015 after the National Action Plan was announced last December.

2016

In 2016, the highest number of operational strikes for any one region of Pakistan was reported from Balochistan. In the province, mainly the FC, as well as the Police and Levies, conducted 38 operations killing 140 militants of Baloch insurgent groups BLF, BLA, and BRA, etc., as well as those belonging to the TTP, and LeJ.

The third phase of Khyber Operation (*Khyber-III*) was also started in the erstwhile agency, mainly in the areas of Tirah Valley close to Pak-Afghan border. Meanwhile, Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* continued in North Waziristan.

The Karachi operation also continued targeting militants mainly belonging to Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), LeJ, Jundullah, different TTP factions as well as those inspired by or affiliated with ISIS.

2017

Raddul Fasaad: In February 2017, the Pakistan Army Chief announced the launch of

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Operation Raddul Fasaad (Counter Turmoil/Mayhem) after the terrorists perpetrated some major attacks mainly in Lahore, Sehwan Sharif, KP and FATA. The stated purpose of the operation was to eliminate the residual elements of the terrorists and their support and facilitation structures. Unlike past operations, which were usually restricted to certain area(s), Raddul Fasaad, which still continues, entails security operations across Pakistan – mainly in the form of search-and-hunt and combing actions against militants and their facilitators.

Khyber-IV: Around mid-July 2017, the Pakistan Army announced that it had launched a new military operation in Khyber Agency's Rajgal Valley, codenamed Khyber-IV, along with a similar size area in Shawal Valley, which was by then one of the pockets that remained to be cleared. Also, Rajgal Valley borders Afghanistan's Nangarhar province where ISIS has established itself, and it was feared that it may connect with terrorist groups like the TTP and the JuA that sympathize with it. On August 21, army announced the conclusion of the Operation Khyber-IV.

2018

While sporadic search and combing operations continued across Pakistan under Operation Raddul Fasaad, on the whole about 59 percent decrease from the previous year was recorded in anti-militant actions in 2018. Balochistan and KP were the main areas where limited counterterrorism operational strikes were launched, 15 and 13, respectively, in 2018.

Data on anti-militant campaign including military operations (2009-2018)²

In all, 21,839 militants were killed between Jan 2009 and Dec 2018 in military/security operations as well as their armed clashes and encounters with the security forces and law enforcement personnel mainly the CTDs of police. Another combined total of 5,783

² Data is drawn from PIPS' Pakistan [Annual] Security Reports and its digital database on security incidents: www.pakpips.com/app/database

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

militants were also killed in the same period in terrorist attacks (450), border clashes with security forces (482), drone strikes (2,646), inter-tribal/inter-militant/tribal-militant clashes (2,086), sectarian clashes (64), and recovery of dead bodies (55).

Thus, when counted together as many as 27,622 militants were killed between January 2009 and December 2018, in violent incidents of different types as cited earlier.

However this section will mainly focus on military and security operations, and clashes and encounter between security forces and militants, as well as search operations resulting in the arrest of militants.

As many as 1,650 military or security operational strikes were recorded between 2009 and 2018 that killed in all 15,896 people including 14,977 militants, 724 civilians and 195 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies.

Table 1: Anti-militant military/security operational strikes (2009-18)


Year	No. of operational strikes	Fatalities		
		Militants	Civilians	Security personnel
2009	571	5,568	525	134
2010	262	2,554	64	3
2011	143	1,007	30	0
2012	109	919	37	4
2013	90	614	49	10
2014	131	1,940	9	4
2015	143	1,545	3	12
2016	95	481	4	7
2017	75	281	1	14
2018	31	68	2	7
Total	1,650	14,977	724	195

Peaked in 2019, these military and security operations against militants and consequent fatalities have seen a gradual decline with the only exception of the years 2014-15. In

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

2014, two major military operations Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber-I were launched in North Waziristan and Khyber tribal districts, which explains this exception.

Chart 1: Trends of militants killed in military/security operations (2009-18)



These operational strikes were not concentrated in any one region but were reported from across the country as shown in the Table 2. However the main thrust has been on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including erstwhile FATA agencies), where 1,394 military operational strikes were launched, most recently under the Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber I-IV.

Meanwhile 163 anti-militant actions took place in different parts of Balochistan during the same period, another 60 in Sindh and 32 in Punjab.

Table 2: Geographical spread of Operational Attacks by security forces, against militants and insurgents (2009-18)

District	No. of Military or Security Operational Strikes	Killed	Injured
Abbottabad	1	0	6
Bajaur	107	687	417

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

District	No. of Military or Security Operational Strikes	Killed	Injured
Bannu	14	162	51
Buner	21	247	114
Charsadda	1	0	0
D.I Khan	11	29	11
Erstwhile FRs	15	114	4
Hangu	11	108	41
Khyber	221	2404	651
Kohat	21	137	48
Kohistan	1	7	2
Kurram	100	1035	519
Lakki Marwat	1	1	0
Lower Dir	30	385	138
Malakand	15	113	82
Mardan	6	3	5
Mohmand	123	679	413
North Waziristan	144	2129	298
Nowshera	1	1	0
Orakzai	267	3301	1684
Peshawar	8	14	17
Shangla	4	155	2
South Waziristan	114	1450	619
Swabi	4	19	1
Swat	137	1632	776
Tank	5	11	1
Upper Dir	11	86	37

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

District	No. of Military or Security Operational Strikes	Killed	Injured
<i>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Total</i>	<i>1,394</i>	<i>14,909</i>	<i>5,937</i>
Awaran	11	54	3
Barkhan	1	4	0
Bolan	5	12	6
Chagai	2	2	0
Gwadar	3	8	4
Dera Bugti	27	96	31
Harnai	1	10	0
Kalat	10	109	21
Kech	25	77	13
Kharan	1	16	0
Khuzdar	2	5	0
Kohlu	4	10	0
Lasbela	4	9	0
Mastung	17	55	27
Multiple districts	1	1	0
Nasirabad	4	15	3
Panjgur	10	21	4
Pishin	1	4	2
Qilla Abdullah	4	13	1
Quetta	16	47	29
Sibi	7	18	8
Washuk	1	3	0
Zhob	5	12	0

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

District	No. of Military or Security Operational Strikes	Killed	Injured
Ziarat	1	8	0
<i>Balochistan Total</i>	163	609	152
Dera Ghazi Khan	10	55	5
Bhakkar	1	1	0
Gujranwala	1	5	0
Islamabad	1	1	0
Khanewal	1	6	0
Lahore	5	16	10
Multan	1	8	0
Muzaffargarh	1	3	0
Okara	1	6	0
Rajanpur	4	23	11
Rawalpindi	2	11	3
Sheikhupura	4	24	0
<i>Punjab and Islamabad Total</i>	32	159	29
Jamshoro	1	0	1
Karachi	58	209	18
Nawabshah	1	10	0
<i>Sindh Total</i>	60	219	19
Diamir	1	0	0
<i>GB Total</i>	1	0	0
Pakistan Total	1650	15896³	6137

³ Including 14,977 militants, 724 civilians and 195 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE


In addition to the anti-militant actions or operational attacks cited earlier, security and law enforcement agencies also entered into a total of 1,518 armed clashes and encounters with militants, which killed 7,789 people including 6,862 militants, 272 civilians and 655 security personnel.

Table 3: Security Forces and Law Enforcers' clashes and encounters with militants (2009-2018)

Year	No. of Clashes and Encounters	Fatalities		
		Militants	Civilian	Security personnel
2009	212	918	82	168
2010	290	1625	12	61
2011	289	1615	90	137
2012	115	589	57	59
2013	105	414	22	79
2014	159	567	4	82
2015	153	516	3	37
2016	105	328	1	19
2017	68	243	0	8
2018	22	47	1	5
1,518		6,862	272	655

A yearly trend of militants killed in their clashes and encounters with security and law enforcement personnel is shown at the following chart.

Chart 2: Trends of militants killed in clashes and encounters with Security/Law Enforcement Agencies (2009-18)



As for military operations, major clashes between security forces and militants concentrated in KP including erstwhile tribal areas (1042 clashes and encounters killing 6,269).

Meanwhile, as many as 213 incidents of armed clashes and encounters between security forces and militants took place in Balochistan, which claimed in all 723 lives.

As many as 79 such clashes and encounters happened in Punjab and Islamabad killing 292.

Furthermore, 181 armed clashes and encounters happened in Sindh killing 498.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Table 4: Geographical spread of clashes and encounters between Security Forces and militants (2009-18)

District	No. of Clashes & Encounters	Killed	Injured
Attock	1	11	0
Bahawalpur	2	8	0
Chakwal	2	5	0
Dera Ghazi Khan	10	29	4
Faisalabad	6	11	10
Gujranwala	4	9	0
Gujrat	6	18	0
Islamabad	1	1	0
Khanewal	4	15	0
Khushab	1	1	0
Lahore	14	60	5
Layyah	2	8	0
Lodhran	1	4	0
Multan	4	6	4
Muzaffargarh	6	33	12
Nankana Sahib	2	10	0
Rahim Yar Khan	1	2	0
Rajanpur	1	5	0
Rawalpindi	2	3	0
Sahiwal	1	3	4
Sheikhupura	7	46	2
Toba Tek Singh	1	4	2
<i>Punjab, Islamabad Total</i>	79	292	43

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

District	No. of Clashes & Encounters	Killed	Injured
Awaran	17	73	14
Barkhan	3	6	0
Bolan	8	22	7
Chagai	2	5	2
Dera Bugti	25	147	53
Gwadar	4	9	4
Jafarabad	3	2	0
Kalat	9	42	12
Kech	31	114	68
Kharan	2	3	0
Khuzdar	15	27	14
Kohlu	5	16	6
Lasbela	2	3	5
Loralai	3	3	2
Mastung	3	10	10
Musakhel	1	15	0
Nasirabad	12	36	34
Nushki	3	8	4
Panjgur	9	31	6
Pishin	1	5	0
Qilla Abdullah	4	8	1
Qilla Saifullah	1	0	0
Quetta	39	78	64
Sibi	7	37	2
Zhob	3	17	10

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

District	No. of Clashes & Encounters	Killed	Injured
Ziarat	1	6	2
Balochistan Total	213	723	320
Bajaur	53	203	119
Bannu	36	64	26
Battagram	1	1	1
Buner	15	67	66
Charsadda	10	114	144
Chitral	2	21	0
D.I Khan	24	42	10
Erstwhile FRs	10	63	14
Hangu	26	147	158
Haripur	3	10	1
Karak	2	8	5
Khyber	120	703	429
Kohat	35	129	82
Kurram	58	545	268
Lakki Marwat	17	59	14
Lower Dir	21	189	34
Malakand	14	59	10
Mansehra	4	6	7
Mardan	12	37	24
Mohmand Agency	71	593	329
North Waziristan	52	318	202
Nowshera	13	17	24
Orakzai Agency	115	1511	702

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

District	No. of Clashes & Encounters	Killed	Injured
Peshawar	81	191	140
Shangla	2	4	3
South Waziristan	71	494	174
Swabi	16	28	26
Swat	135	464	124
Tank	8	17	12
Upper Dir	15	165	28
<i>KP Total</i>	<i>1042</i>	<i>6269</i>	<i>3176</i>
Hyderabad	2	4	0
Karachi	175	489	126
Khairpur	1	0	3
Shikarpur	1	1	4
Sukkur	2	4	0
<i>Sindh Total</i>	<i>181</i>	<i>498</i>	<i>133</i>
Diamir	3	7	1
<i>GB Total</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>1</i>
Pakistan Total	1518	7789⁴	3673

Meanwhile, over 12,500 alleged terrorists and members of militant groups were detained by security and law enforcement agencies in 1,997 search and combing operations conducted all over the country. These search operations do not include several other similar actions in which suspects were arrested and mostly released after preliminary investigation. Table below lists organizational association and number of different brands arrested across Pakistan by law enforcers between 2009 and 2018.

⁴ Including 6862 militants, 272 civilians and 655 security personnel.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Table 5: Suspected terrorists arrested between 2009 and 2018

Militant Organization	No. of Search Operations	Terrorist Arrested
Afghan militants including Taliban	48	391
Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat	9	120
Al-Qaeda	40	148
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent	5	12
Ansarul Shariah Pakistan	11	38
Banned militant outfit (excluding sectarian and tribal)	60	232
Banned militant outfits (inclusive of all)	71	277
Banned sectarian groups	26	166
BLA	39	123
BLF	10	52
BRA	14	91
Foreign militants (excluding Afghan)	14	70
Hafiz Pandrani Barohi group	1	3
Hizb-ul-Tahreer	6	8
Indian Intelligence Agency (RAW) operatives	14	24
ISIS, or Daesh	66	257
Jaish-e-Mohammed	6	30
Jamaatud Dawa	1	2
Jamatul Ahrar	19	51
Jundullah	2	5
Lashkar-e-Balochistan	3	18
Lashkar-e-Islam	25	46
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	130	373

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Militant Organization	No. of Search Operations	Terrorist Arrested
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami	2	3
Local Taliban / TTP	1017	6367
Nationalist insurgents	201	1598
Shia sectarian group(s)	1	1
Sindhudesh Revolution Army	2	6
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan	2	5
Suspected spies	1	1
Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi	1	1
Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB)	2	37
Tehreek-i-Jafaria Pakistan	2	2
United Baloch Army (UBA)	2	17
Unknown militants	144	1927
Total	1997	12502

2.2 Political, soft responses

In the counterterrorism discourse, the use of political or soft approaches is referred to as an effective tool of reducing the appeal of militants' ideologies as well as bringing the militants back to the mainstream by convincing them to quit violence.

It has two major functional components. One is linked to reconciling with the militants for some political settlement through dialogue or talks. The outcome of such an option is seen as militants joining the political mainstream and quitting their violent agenda and methodology of achieving their goals.

Second main component of such approaches is described by different concepts and methodologies including disengagement, de-radicalization, reintegration, and rehabilitation, etc.

Pakistan's few soft or political responses to countering terrorism and extremism – including some linked to two components cited earlier as well as legal, administrative and related measures meant to either improve security or counter extremism – can be divided into two major phases: pre- and post-APS attack in December 2014. A description of these responses is provided below:

- **Pre-APS attack phase**

- Talks and peace agreements (2002-2008)***

As cited earlier, after the US invasion of Afghanistan most militants including of Pakistani origin retreated to Pakistani-Afghan bordering areas and parts of erstwhile FATA. A new sociopolitical and security landscape emerged in Pakistani tribal areas in terms of relationship between the incoming militants, tribesmen, political administration and security agencies.

When militants started to threaten the peace and security of erstwhile FATA, political administrations and security forces opted for engaging in talks with them and reach some agreements meant to sustain peace and maintain law and order during those initial years, when the situation was quite fluid and Pakistan was not prepared to deal with it politically. (*Please see Annex-2 for 13 peace agreements made with the militants between 2002 and 2009*) That explains why those peace agreements with the Taliban militants, as some security analysts argue, were made in a security framework and thus ignored the political, sociocultural, economic, ideological and geostrategic root causes of the problem (Rana, et al., 2010). Most believe, as was indicated by their outcomes, that all these 13 peace agreements signed with militants between 2002 and 2008 proved useless in achieving their objectives (Mubashra & Shafi, 2018).

- Political and public support for Swat Operation***

One of the key security-related challenges confronting the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led coalition government (2008-2013) was to take political ownership of the war against

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

terrorism in Pakistan and get public support for military operations against the militants, mainly in erstwhile FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The major success in winning public support and creating a national-level consensus against terrorism and militants came in 2009, on the eve of Swat military operation. For the April 2009 Swat offensive against militants, the army enjoyed complete support from the country's Parliament.⁵ The government launched an effective information and awareness campaign to bring a paradigm shift in public opinion about militants. Through PEMRA, the government also issued 64 notifications prohibiting any media coverage of banned organizations or those having links to the Taliban or other terrorist groups (Mezzera & Sial, 2010). In addition, with the support of the publicity arm of Pakistan's military, the ISPR, it launched Radio Swat in February 2009, two months before the launching of the military offensive.

Few months after the Swat military operation, the then Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Qamar Zaman Kaira, said in his speech at the National Defence University, Islamabad:⁶

The democratic government has been working to put in place this conceptual alternative to reach our audiences by creating a political and societal ownership of counter-extremism and counter-terrorism. With the onset of military action in Swat and Malakand last year, we launched a range of initiatives that included: daily media briefings, establishment of Crisis Communications Centres, live PTV transmissions for IDPs, large TV screens in IDP camps, an official website, a public service message campaign across nearly 50 TV channels, 30 radio stations and 200 national and regional publications, field engagement of university students, trade unions, bar councils and intellectuals, etc, to raise awareness and garner societal support for our national cause.

⁵ Political analyst Zafrullah Khan was quoted as saying in Mezzera, Marco & Sial, Safdar. 2010. "Media and governance in Pakistan: A controversial yet essential relationship." Initiative for Peacebuilding, October. <<http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/pakistanOct.pdf>>

⁶ Excerpts of his speech were later published as a comment in *Daily Times* on January 19, 2010 with the title of "From information 'warfare' to 'welfare'."

Overtures of talks with the TTP (2013-14)

Before the launch of the military operation in North Waziristan, the government had been advocating for talks with the militants. After some lethal attacks by militants against law enforcement agencies, political leaders, polio vaccination teams, media persons, Shia pilgrims, and foreign tourists, etc., the prime minister Nawaz Sharif had held a high-level meeting on January 23, 2014 and issued a statement that hinted at the use of force against the militants. However, in his address to the National Assembly on January 29, he said the government wanted to give peace another chance. He also called on the militants to observe a ceasefire in his televised speech.

The TTP announced a conditional ceasefire on March 2, 2014, in exchange for release of prisoners captured by the government (Masood, 2014). But a few groups, such as the Jamaatul Ahrar, Punjabi Taliban and Jundullah, refused to accept the ceasefire and continued their terror campaign in the country. The TTP also backed out of the ceasefire on April 17, when the government delayed the release of a second batch of TTP prisoners. The Karachi airport attack on June 8 ended all prospects for peace talks and the political and military leadership decided to launch the military operation against the terrorists (PIPS, 2015).

National Internal Security Policy (2013-18)

The PML-N government announced its internal security policy 2013-18 on February 24, 2014. The policy had three major elements: dialogue with all stakeholders; isolating terrorists from their support bases; and enhancing deterrence through capacity-building to enable the security apparatus to neutralise threats to internal security. The policy framework to implement this policy approach was based on two components — soft and hard. The former entailed research and understanding, and winning hearts and minds. The hard component would consist of a composite deterrence plan (CDP). The National Counter-Terrorism Authority was to implement both components. However the December 2014 terrorist attack on Army Public School, Peshawar changed the orientation and substance of these two components with National Action Plan and

military operations (Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber) undertaking the soft and hard measures, respectively. In other words, the NISP in its original essence could not be fully implemented.

Deradicalization of militants

Pakistan does not have a comprehensive deradicalization or reintegration programme, except two rehabilitation centres operating under the military in KP and the Peaceful Balochistan Package, which is also running with the support from security agencies.

The centers in KP, or Swat initiative, to rehabilitate detainees in Pakistan have three main components: one called Project Sabaoon, which focuses on juveniles; Project Mishal that concentrates on adult detainees; and Project Sparlay for family members of detained persons. The rehabilitation efforts have been divided into four main modules, including an educational module comprising formal education, especially for juveniles, to enable them to continue their education. Another module includes psychological counseling and therapy for developing independent and logical thinking. The social module includes social issues and family participation and the fourth module includes vocational training, such as repairing home appliances, etc., to equip the detainees with skills that enable them to make a decent living. Through the initiative, over 400 individuals had been reintegrated into the society by late 2011 (Rana & Sial, 2012).

Though limited but outcome of these KP centers continues. A recent media report revealed that another 110 former militants had been de-radicalized under the army-led Sabawoon project. A ceremony was held at Shah Kas Levies Centre in Khyber district in which KP chief minister distributed certificates among those de-radicalized. According to details, "this was the seventh batch to complete the course during which the de-radicalized militants were taught Islamic teachings, basic schooling, psychological and psychiatric treatment." They were also trained in different useful trades to enable them to become useful and peaceful citizens (*Dawn*, 2019).

Similarly, a reintegration programme ***Peaceful Balochistan Package*** has been underway in Balochistan for many years. The programme was first realised during the

PPP-led government (2008-13) with the aim to provide incentives to Baloch insurgents to quit violence and help them reintegrate in the society. But it has been consolidated in recent years with the government claiming several hundred of Baloch insurgents have surrendered their arms under the programme. The programme is a joint initiative of security forces and political leadership and has been running uninterrupted since it was launched.

The incumbent provincial government of Balochistan has also reiterated to provide complete financial and rehabilitation support to those Baloch insurgents who quit violence, abandon militancy against the state, and join the mainstream under the Peaceful Balochistan Package. Most recently, a compensation distribution ceremony in that regard was held in Sui area of Dera Bugti on January 31, 2019, in which the Sector Commander of East, Brigadier Zulfiqar Bajwa, distributed compensation amount among 132 former militant commanders and sub commanders. A large number of people of belonging to the Bugti tribe attended the ceremony (Mangi, 2019).

Post-APS attack phase

National Action Plan (NAP)

In the aftermath of the APS attack, consultation with political parties and consensus among the civil and military leadership had resulted in the National Action Plan (NAP), the country's first comprehensive plan to counter terrorism and extremism on multiple fronts as listed in its 20 action points or clauses.

Announced early 2015, the NAP somewhat employed soft approaches, as espoused in many of its clauses such as checking religious extremism and protecting minorities; curbing the formation of violent groups (armed militias) and acting against banned groups; acting against those spreading hate speech and propaganda including on mainstream and social media; checking sectarian violence; and reforming madrassas, etc. However, judged by the tool of NAP, too, Pakistan's performance against violent extremism and terrorism has not been impressive. However the government

departments have been issuing some statistics as part of the NAP appraisal reports. (See ***Annex-3*** for government data on NAP progress by December 2017).

Pakistan Security Report 2018, prepared by an Islamabad-based think-tank, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, noted that apparently after the recent successes in the war against terrorism, the government's resolve to implement NAP has further been distracted and weakened. It noted that instead of ensuring implementation on existing NAP, the interior ministry of the incumbent PTI-led government had announced plans for preparing a new NAP; this announcement came just after the attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi, last November, which also hinted at the shortsighted approach of the government on core security issues (PIPS, 2019). Similarly, in September 2018, in a board of governors' meeting of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), its head, Khaliq Dad Lak, not only proposed to roll back NACTA but also advised abolishing the Joint Intelligence Directorate. The JID was conceived as the backbone of NACTA but it has remained nonfunctional so far. The national coordinator has now advised the prime minister to shut it down completely. The prime minister had formed a committee for reviewing the role and functioning of NACTA (*Dunya*, 2018a). However, the fate of this committee is not known yet.

Paigham-i-Pakistan

Paigham-i-Pakistan is a unanimous declaration-cum-religious decree signed by 1,800 religious scholars across the country, prepared in accordance with the injunctions of the Holy *Quran*, the *Sunnah* and the Constitution. It was prepared as a blueprint of an inclusive Pakistan and to promote a counter-narrative to violent ideologies (*Dunya*, 2018b).

The Paigham-i-Pakistan has failed to create any significant impact mainly because the religious clergy is reluctant to adopt the document as a manual for their mosques and madressahs. There is need to encourage religious clergy to adopt the declaration as a national agenda. Similarly, the government and civil society have to take the ownership of the declaration for a larger impact.

Mainstreaming of erstwhile FATA

One of the major policy initiatives in 2018 was the passage of the 25th constitutional amendment, which merged the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This was also one of the options of the FATA committee constituted by the previous government. Apparently, the committee's findings have been paid heed to.

It is assumed that the merger will pave way for installing a proper law and order mechanism, which in the long run will be able to forestall any incipient militant group, at least to some extent. Administrative vacuum had long provided militants with free space to operate, with little impunity.

Yet, while constitutional merger has been taken care of, much needs to be done to undertake "administrative integration", as envisioned by the amendment. Erstwhile FATA districts need funds, which no one seems to be partaking in. The KP government's funds are meant for the whole KP, not tribal districts in specific. FATA Committee had recommended that 3 per cent of the National Finance Commission be set aside for erstwhile FATA for a period of ten years, but that is yet to follow. It is feared that without priority development, tribal districts will fare low in development index as compared to the rest of KP.

More worryingly, erstwhile FATA has been without any proper law for months. The repeal of Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) was welcomed, but its alternate, the FATA Interim Governance Regulation, was no different: it too fuses judicial authority within the executive officers stationed there. Primarily because of this reason, the Peshawar High Court has set it aside after terming the Regulation a violation of the Constitution of Pakistan. As of now, KP government has appealed in the SC, but the current status is of abeyance, in other words, no code on paper to regulate FATA (PIPS, 2019).

Action against banned groups

The government has recently started to show keen interest in taking stern action against banned groups, also one of the 20 NAP measures. The National Security Committee in its meeting on February 21st this year decided to ban Jamaatud Dawa and its charity wing Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation, a decision that was executed with an immediate ban on the group by the Information ministry. The Interior ministry, however, notified the ban on March 5th. The NSC meeting had also decided to expedite action against banned groups. Experts believe that this campaign, if sustained over a longer period of time, will not only help in solving the country's security and extremism issues, but will also contribute in easing international pressure including the FATF conditions on Pakistan to curb terror financing.

3. The outcome of state responses

Whatever Pakistan has accomplished in its war against terrorism is largely due to extensive operations launched against militants by security and law enforcement agencies across the country. Ranging from military operations in FATA, Rangers-led surgical strikes in Karachi, and FC’s counterinsurgency raids in Balochistan to Police’s Counter Terrorism Departments’ (CTDs) intelligence-based operations in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, these operations on the whole, have contributed in improving the country’s security landscape. However, a slow implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) measures failed to complement these gains.

According to Pakistan Security Report 2018 prepared by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), a gradual decrease in the number of terrorist attacks and consequent fatalities in Pakistan can be visibly seen since 2009, or post-Swat military operation – with the only exception of 2013, when a surge in sectarian violence mainly contributed in increased number of attacks and casualties. (See Chart 3 and Table 6)

The report noted:

“The Rangers-led operation in Karachi (started 2013), military operations in North Waziristan and Khyber agencies, and counter terrorism departments’ (CTDs) ’s anti-militant actions across Pakistan including as part of the National Action Plan (NAP) and *Raddul Fasaad*, apparently helped sustain that declining trend 2013-onward, which continued in 2018 as well (PIPS, 2019)”.

Table 6: Comparison of terrorist attacks and fatalities in Pakistan (2009-18)⁷


Year	No. of Terrorist Attacks (%Change)	No. of Killed (% Change)
------	------------------------------------	--------------------------

⁷↑and↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from previous year.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Year	No. of Terrorist Attacks (%Change)	No. of Killed (% Change)
2009	Baseline year (2,586 attacks)	Baseline year (3,021 Fatalities)
2010	18%↓	4%↓
2011	7%↓	18%↓
2012	20%↓	14%↓
2013	9%↑	19%↑
2014	30%↓	30%↓
2015	48%↓	38%↓
2016	28%↓	12%↓
2017	16%↓	10%↓
2018	29%↓	27%↓

Chart 3: Trends of terrorist attacks and fatalities in Pakistan (2009-2018)



The optimism built around the statistical decline in terrorist incidents has not only

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

increased a sense of security among common people, boosted the confidence of the local investors but has also broadened the prospects for foreign investment in the country. However, these plummeting numbers do not suggest, in any way, that the threat of terrorism has been completely eliminated. Certainly, most terrorist groups have been weakened but they are still present in physical and virtual spaces. A series of terrorist attacks before and during the election month of July last year had proved that militants could still trigger a terror wave, though they were unable to sustain it. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), its splinter groups, mainly Jamaatul Ahrar, Hizbul Ahrar, and ISIS-affiliates perpetrated 171 terrorist attacks, while the nationalist insurgent groups, mainly Baloch, carried out 80 attacks in the year 2018. The numbers indicate that security forces and law enforcement agencies still have to maintain their vigilance on a high level.



4. The cost and sacrifices

Before 9/11, there had not been any major wave of terrorism in Pakistan except some sectarian tension and related violence in parts of the country. It was the post-9/11 US invasion of Afghanistan that changed the landscape and dynamics of militancy and militant groups in the region.

Most of the Afghan, Pakistani and foreign militant groups fighting inside Afghanistan, including the Soviet-Afghan war remnants (or so-called Mujahedeen), were forced to relocate to Pakistan and Pak-Afghan border areas making both Pakistan's internal security and border security vulnerable. The consolidating anti-US and anti-West narrative among religious as well as militant groups later turned against Pakistan on the claim that Pakistan was fighting the US's war by being an ally in the WoT.

An extremely complicated situation confronted Pakistan entailing diverse challenges of internal [in] security, geostrategic readjustment issues, and international diplomatic pressures. Pakistan has been fighting this war while extending its resources and capacity beyond limits. While it has been successful in the end to a great extent for achieving relative peace in the country, but it has come at a cost. Foremost of the different aspects of this cost have been human and socio-economic, which are discussed in the following pages.

4.1 Human cost⁸

For Pakistan it has been a long and strenuous journey to reach this point where its people feel relatively secure against the threat of terrorist violence. The cost has been thousands of lives of civilians and personnel of security and law enforcement personnel. Just between 2009 and 2018, over 50,000 fatalities were reported in different incidents of violence as given at the table below.

⁸Data and statistics used in this section are largely drawn from Pak Institute for Peace Studies' (PIPS) Pakistan [Annual] Security Reports as well as its digital database on security incidents: www.pakpips.com/app/dtabase

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Table7: Fatalities in violent or security incidents (2009-2018)

Type or Nature of Incidents	No. of Incidents	Fatalities
Terrorist attacks by nationalist insurgents	3678	3035
Political/election-related violence	1113	2185
Terrorist attacks by militants	8118	11652
Clashes between security forces and militants	1235	7015
Inter-tribal clashes/attacks	249	800
Pak-Afghan border	288	819
Pak-India border	534	307
Pak-Iran border	68	31
Terrorist attacks [sectarian-related]	971	2835
Operational attacks by security forces	1650	15896
Drone attacks	352	2817
Sectarian clashes	144	600
Inter-militant clashes/attacks	389	2012
Communal/faith-based violence	26	34
Encounter between security forces and militants	283	774
Militants-tribesmen clashes	19	59
Plot/foiled terror attempts	418	56
Mob violence/protests	7	4
Nature of Attack	19,542	50,931

Out of those 50,931 people killed in violent incidents, as many as 17,513 were non-combatants or civilians, 5,796 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies as well as 27,622 militants.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

**Chart4: Distribution of fatalities in violent incidents as given at Table 6
(2009-18)**




Table8: Violent incidents and fatalities caused among security personnel


Security and Law Enforcement Agency	Fatalities Caused by Different Incidents of Violence								
	Terrorist Attacks	Military or Security Operations	Clashes, encounters with militants	Political violence	Inter-tribal, militants-tribesmen clashes	Border attacks, clashes	Sectarian clashes	Foiled terror bids	Total
FC	1103	25	250			53			1431
Police (and Khassadar)	1942	10	93	35	4	22	8		2114
Unspecified paramilitaries	160	0	20			1			181
Army	1136	157	267	2		159	1	1	1723
Levies	229	0	21		1	19			270
Rangers	62	5	4	1		5			77
Total	4632	197	655	38	5	259	9	1	5796

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Most of the civilians and security forces personnel lost their lives in terrorist attacks. A distribution of fatalities among security and law enforcement viz a viz different types of incidents that caused them is given in the following Table 8 and Chart 5.

A distribution of cumulative fatalities caused by different violent incidents among security and law enforcement personnel is given at the following chart.

Chart5: Distribution of Cumulative Fatalities among Security Personnel in Different Causative Type of Incidents (2009-18)



4.2 Sociocultural cost

Pakistan has paid a heavy sociocultural cost that is not much talked about while discussing the cost of WoT. Many negative processes of social change were initiated by the mushroom growth of militants and extremist groups who developed a regressive mindset, significantly influencing people's minds and behaviours.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Militants groups, who sneaked into Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan, were not all of Pakistani origin; many Central Asian, Afghan, Arab, and others were also among them. They propagated their own religious ideologies including violent ones, such *Takfiri*. Pakistani people, mainly tribal, who are religiously sensitive, found it difficult to give an outright rejection of these ideologies, which were cloaked in religious legal rulings. Not only militants, but their supporters among the larger religious discourse including religious organizations, madrassas and clergy directly or indirectly promoted these ideologies, which were not detrimental for the country's social cohesion, and progressive understanding of Islam, but also made ground for financial resources and recruitment for the militants.

No doubt the present level of religious extremism and radicalism in Pakistan was partly and indirectly contributed by Pakistan's participation in the War on Terror, in terms of how militants used it to develop the extremist narratives of victimhood of *Ummah* and Islam, anti-Westernism, *Takfeer* and *Khurooj*, foreign aggression against Muslims, anti-state narratives for its alliance with the US, etc. Pakistan took a long road and put lots of efforts to deal with this war of narratives. The APS was a key watershed in that regard, that effectively exposed the militants and their agendas.

The spree of terrorism also damaged the cultural rubric of the society. Artists, poets, musicians and dancers and their acts/works were declared un-Islamic by militants. Even education was declared un-Islamic. Such was the onslaught of violent and extremist ideologies. People were scared to do whatever they had been doing for centuries in their homelands. Scores of artists and musicians have yet to return to their native towns, after being displaced by conflict and attacks by militants, mainly in KP. Some studies highlight how the loss of art and culture and cultural celebrations has also hardened people's minds and views, a characteristic of the extremist mindset.

Then there has been impact of major attacks on people's minds, creating a sense of insecurity and psychological distress.

There has been a massive blow to sports, after the 2009 attack on Sri Lankan team in

Lahore. The number of sports events were reduced significantly after this incident. One report noted that: “The ICC decision to shift the Cricket World Cup from Pakistan created substantial financial loss to the professional sports industry in Pakistan. Pakistan was scheduled to host 14 matches including one semi-final, adding up to a loss of \$10.5 million. Furthermore, the shifting of the ICC Champions Trophy from Pakistan to South Africa coupled with India’s refusal to play a bilateral cricket series in Pakistan, resulted in a loss of more than \$40 million, leaving the Pakistan Cricket Board in bad financial shape. Apart from heavy financial loss to the sports industry, the refusal of countries to play in Pakistan due to the security concerns has done nothing to boost the image of Pakistan abroad” (CRSS, 2014).

4.3 Economic Cost

Many of Pakistan’s current economic challenges were not as critical pre-9/11 as they have become now after being compounded by the direct and indirect influences of Pakistan’s engagement in the war on terror (WoT) as well as the fight against domestic terrorism.

There are several tangible and intangible aspects of economic losses the country has incurred in this long engagement, some of which, as some economists argue, are difficult to measure or at least to precisely quantify. The US and its allies often highlight the ‘aid’ Pakistan has been receiving, mainly from the US, since 2001. But there has been indeed little or no talk about the economic costs Pakistan has paid thus far in the war on terror. A realistic diachronic comparison to this end, building upon the US aid Pakistan received over the years and the actual economic cost it has paid in the process, would validate that fact.

In January 2018, the US President Donald Trump said that his country had given Pakistan US\$ 33 billion in aid since 2002 and that the latter had provided, in response, “little help” in assisting the war on terror. However, what he did not mention was that that the amount was provided under different heads and not all of it was aid. According to a letter written to the US Congress by Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Pakistan’s former

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

ambassador to the United Nations, “the US\$ 33 billion figure was concocted by amalgamating various heads of accounts mostly with no relation to aid.” He further noted that the aid to Pakistan during those years (2002-17) was below US\$ 10 billion, while Pakistan’s own direct and indirect costs incurred on WoT, including infrastructural, were in excess of US\$ 200 billion. Even the figure US\$ 33 billion was only 3% of the Afghan war costs borne by the US, Mr. A. Haroon had highlighted in his letter (*Herald*, 2018).

Another observer, F. S. Aijazuddin noted that the economic-related and the security-related aids were less than the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursement, made by the US after verifying and auditing the claims made by Pakistan Armed Forces for supplies, services, and logistics provided to the US-led coalition in Afghanistan (*Herald*, 2018). A statistical report prepared by the USAID in 2017 vindicates the fact. According to the report, out of the total US\$ 33.4 billion sanctioned by the US between 2002 and 2016, the US\$14.573 billion, or about 44 percent, was on account of logistics and aerial support services, while the remaining US\$ 18.8 billion covered combined civilian and security-related aid (Rana, 2017). Since 2014, US economic assistance to Pakistan – including reimbursement from the CSF that is not aid but payment for services provided by Pakistan to US-led military operations in Afghanistan – has reduced to US\$ 1.6 billion per annum, compared to an average of US\$ 2.3 billion per annum between 2002 and 2013 (Rana, 2017).

However those figures of US aid and support funds to Pakistan (US\$ 33.4 billion), provided between 2002 and 2017, form about 26.78 percent of the total direct and indirect costs Pakistan has incurred in its support to the US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan as well as in its fight against domestic terrorism during the same period.

Pakistan claims it has incurred losses of US\$ 124.72 billion in these 16 years (2002-17) – US\$ 126.79 billion if a US\$ 2.07 is also added for the first 8 months of 2018 – which mainly fall under the following organization heads, among others: exports; compensations to terrorism affectees; physical infrastructure; foreign investment; privatization; industrial sector; tax collection; cost of uncertainty; expenditure overrun;

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

and other losses (MoF, 2018). There were other negative impacts also including on earnings, consumption, economic growth, tourism, as well as security expenditures (Khan, 2013).

To be more precise, these war costs can be classified into direct and indirect costs. The former include human cost, infrastructure and property losses/damages and costs of increased security spending. The latter or indirect costs could be quite diverse and contextual. For instance, renowned economist Dr Hafiz Pasha has referred to indirect costs of WoT in one of his papers included in the Ministry of Finance's PRSP-II document (2008-09) as following: "delay in implementation of development projects in affected areas, like in the then NWFP and FATA, leading to cost overruns; (increasing uncertainty leading to capital flight and affecting FDI; slowing down of domestic economic activity; excessive increase in the country's credit risk, making borrowing very expensive; increased unemployment in affected regions; and costs of displacement of local population" (Pasha, 2008).

Some economists even argue that the figure of cumulative cost Pakistan claims it has incurred on war on terror, i.e. over US\$ 126 billion, is a somewhat under-estimation. One observer believes that the Ministry of Finance's calculated cost is substantially lower than the actual cost that has been incurred between 2001-02 and 20016-17, mainly due to a 'somewhat defective methodology' it has used in doing so. The actual cost, he thinks, is somewhat US\$ 180 billion, including both direct and indirect costs (Pasha, 2018). According to Dr Pasha:

"The methodology used [by MoF] focuses on 10 types of costs. The largest component in 2016-17 is apparently the fall in tax collection, followed by the negative impact on foreign investment. Unfortunately, this methodology does not include the two largest costs of the war on terror. The first is the substantially higher costs that the country has had to bear due to the required increases in security expenditure related to the military, paramilitary and police forces. The second is the fall in

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

investment, not just by foreign investors but also by domestic investors, in the face of heightened perceptions of risk and uncertainty” (Pasha, 2018).

A year-wise distribution of the cumulative losses Pakistan claims it has suffered in war against terrorism since 2001 is given in the following table.

Table9: Summary of year-wise losses or cost of war (2001-2018)⁹

Years	Billion US\$	Billion PKR	% Change (From Previous Year)
2001-02	2.67	163.90	-
2002-03	2.75	160.80	3.0
2003-04	2.93	168.80	6.7
2004-05	3.41	202.40	16.3
2005-06	3.99	238.60	16.9
2006-07	4.67	283.20	17.2
2007-08	6.94	434.10	48.6
2008-09	9.18	720.60	32.3
2009-10	13.56	1136.40	47.7
2010-11	23.77	2037.33	75.3
2011-12	11.98	1052.77	-49.6
2012-13	9.97	964.24	-16.8
2013-14	7.70	791.52	-22.8
2014-15	9.24	936.30	20.0
2015-16	6.49	675.76	-29.8
2016-17	5.47	572.60	-15.7
2017-18*	2.07	223.32	-62.2
Total	126.79	10,762.64	
* Estimated on the basis of 8 months data			

⁹ Statistics are taken from *Pakistan Economic Survey 2017-18*.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

A review of year-wise economic losses incurred due to war against terrorism, as shown in the Table 9, suggests a gradual but considerable rise from 2007-onward until 2011. Indeed, the year 2007 was a lethal year, which triggered militancy and terrorism in many ways. For one, the most lethal anti-Pakistan militant group TTP was formed in 2007. The siege of Red Mosque in Islamabad and eventual killing of one of the two cleric brothers in security operation gave an impetus to terrorist onslaught including suicide bombings. Led by TTP and Al-Qaeda and supported by factions of Punjab-based militant groups, the terrorists also marched on settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in subsequent years and established their control in Swat and adjoining areas. The Swat military operation of 2009 was a major operation and it took years until the militants were completely eliminated from the region.

There has not been any study to precisely assess the financial losses incurred due to damage caused by terrorism and war on terror to the educational infrastructure. However the extent of that damage can be gauged from the fact that between 2009 and 2018 militants perpetrated 717 terrorist attacks exclusively targeting educational institutions across Pakistan's 49 districts – but mainly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and erstwhile FATA. These attacks damaged infrastructure, deterred parents from sending their children to schools as well as killed at least 227 people and inflicted injuries on another 447; many of these attacks were major attacks including suicide blasts.¹⁰

About 200 schools were also attacked between 2007 and 2008 alone, including 82 in Swat; 30 other districts had also faced such sporadic attacks during this period.¹¹


Other estimates put the number of schools damaged a bit higher. According to a CRSS report, “during the terror campaign mounted by militants in Swat as many as 190 government and around 368 private schools were either totally destroyed, or partially damaged” (CRSS, 2014).

¹⁰ Data and statistics are drawn from Pak Institute for Peace Studies' (PIPS) annual security reports as well as its digital database on security incidents: www.pakpips.com/app/database.

¹¹ Ibid.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Chart6: Attacks on educational institutions in Pakistan (2009-18)



PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Lacking financial resources, the country is still struggling to rebuild, rehabilitate and make operational most of those schools destroyed by the militants. Some national and international development and nongovernmental organizations have also been contributing in that regards but the challenge will need more time and resources to be fully addressed.

Similarly huge numbers of people were displaced from Swat and erstwhile tribal areas due to militancy and security operations launched to eliminate the militants from those areas. When counted together since the first military operation was launched in erstwhile tribal areas, such displacements, known as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or temporarily displaced persons (TDPs), would total to several millions. There was not a single FATA agencies whose inhabitants were not forced to move to safer places; such was the extent of militancy and terrorism and spread of anti-militant operations. The psychological fear of drone strikes also contributed in the overall insecurity of environment leading people to leave their areas.

However the biggest displacement of people happened in Swat operation (2009) and the most recent Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and Khyber I-IV in Khyber. A significant number of IDPs also belongs to Bajaur and Mohmand.

A review of IDPs situation in 2009 alone would be enough to understand the enormity of the challenge. Nearly 3 million people from Swat and erstwhile FATA (Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand) were then displaced. According to one report, “by the end of 2009, humanitarian assistance was being provided to 1.1 million IDPs, host families as well as 1.6 million returnees” (CRSS, 2014). The government established dozens of IDPs camps in and close to conflict zones of erstwhile FATA and KP. The local and international responses were not being able to meet the challenge; the international humanitarian response was led by UN Humanitarian Coordination and assisted by a host of other agencies under the inter-agency cluster approach (PIPS, 2011). The IDPs along with the military operations and related anti-militant campaigns in 2009 had put an extra stress on the budget. According to Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11, cumulatively, “the potential GDP loss due to terrorism for the period 2008-09 ha[d]

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

been estimated as US\$ 11.7 billion. During this period, Pakistan also suffered diversion of development funds to the security budget, capital flight and brain drain” (Khan, 2013).

The discourse on impact of WoT and terrorism highlights the flight of capital and investors, but what is rarely discussed is the plummet Pakistan’s tourism has taken due to insecurity and militancy. Currently Pakistan is ranked at 124, according to the World Economic Forum Tourism and Competitive Ranking (Naveed, 2018). Pakistan’s several attractive tourist sites are located in the northern part, which was engulfed by widespread insecurity due to rising militancy and terrorism in erstwhile FATA, Swat and other adjoining areas in 2007-08 and subsequent years. According to one estimate, the indirect cost of less travel to Pakistan and downstream activities was about Rs10 billion. “Swat valley alone suffered a loss of Rs 60 billion from 2007 to 2009... In 2010, after the area was cleared from terrorists, the hotel association offered the tourists 10-day free stay in hotels in Swat” (Khan, 2013).

However an improved security situation is helping boost annual tourist arrivals in Pakistan by 300% since past few years with 1.75 million in 2017. The number of domestic travelers has also increased, by about 30per cent, according to the state-owned Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation. According to a media report, “the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) put the total contribution of tourism to Pakistan’s economy at \$19.4 billion last year or 6.9 per cent of gross domestic product. In a decade, the WTTC expects that to rise to \$36.1 billion” (Jatoi, 2018).

Loss of tourism coupled with other conflict factors indeed badly impacted the people’s employment, jobs and businesses in Swat in 2009. Swat Youth Front conducted a survey of the income of Swat households and noted significant differences in people’s incomes before and after the conflict. “Before the crisis 28 per cent of the responded had a monthly income of more than Rs. 40,000, while only 8 per cent had a monthly income of below RS. 5,000. After the crisis only 4 per cent had a monthly income of Rs. 30,000 while 35 per cent ha[d] no monthly income, these latter 35 per cent households [we]re mostly labourers, businessmen, and farmers” (Ali, 2010).

Notes and References

- Ali, Arshad. 2010. "Socioeconomic cost of terrorism: a case study of Pakistan." Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) at Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK. Brief Number 57. April 11th.
- Bashir, Altaf . 2014. "2100 terrorists killed in military operation, NA body told." *The Nation*, December 30th.
- CRSS (Centre for Research and Security Studies). 2014. "The cost of conflict in Pakistan."
<<https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/Cost-of-Conflict-in-Pakistan.pdf>>
- Dawn*. 2019. "De-radicalized militants asked to become peace-loving citizens." February 20th. <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1464910/de-radicalised-militants-asked-to-become-peace-loving-citizens>>
- Dunya*. 2018a. "7-member committee formed headed by Asad Omar to reform Nacta." October 20th. <https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2018-10-20&edition=ISL&id=4239154_46893403>
- Dunya*. 2018b. "Terrorism and suicide attacks forbidden in Islam: 1,829 Islamic scholars issue decree" (translated from Urdu). January 17th.
<https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2018-01-17&edition=ISL&id=3644898_48153406>
- Herald*. 2018. "Here is how much aid the US has given to Pakistan." February 21st.
<<https://herald.dawn.com/news/1154035>>
- Jatoi, A. Raza. 2018. "Tourism – the untapped potential of Pakistan." *Daily Times*, April 15th. <<https://dailytimes.com.pk/228069/tourism-the-untapped-potential-of-pakistan>>

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

- Khan, Ismail. 2015. "Military operation in Khyber ends successfully." *Dawn*, July 3rd.
<<http://www.dawn.com/news/1192007>>
- Khan, Tariq. 2013. "The social, political and economic effects of the war on terror: Pakistan 2009 to 2011." ISSRA Papers 2013.<https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/issra-paper/ISSRA_Papers_Vol5_IssueI_2013/04-Policy-Paper-Tariq-Khan.pdf>
- Mangi, A. Jan. 2019. "Financial help assured to militants surrendering arms in Balochistan." *Dawn*, February 1st.
- Masood, Salman. 2014. "Pakistani Taliban extend cease-fire after government releases prisoners." *New York Times*, April 4th.<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/world/asia/pakistan.html?_r=0>
- Mezzera, Marco & Sial, Safdar. 2010. "Media and governance in Pakistan: A controversial yet essential relationship." Initiative for Peacebuilding, October.<<http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/pakistanOct.pdf>>
- MOF (Ministry of Finance). 2018. "Annexure-IV: Impact of War in Afghanistan and Ensuing Terrorism on Pakistan's Economy." *Pakistan Economic Survey 2017-18*.<http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_18/Annex_IV_Impact%20of%20War.pdf>
- Mubashra, Sana and Shafi, Mariam i. 2018. "The Impact of Counter-terrorism Effectiveness on Economic Growth of Pakistan: An Econometric Analysis." Munich Personal RePEc Archive, March.<<https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84847>>
- Naveed, Hamza. 2018. "Pakistan in the global tourism industry." *The Express Tribune*, March 3rd. <<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1649475/6-pakistan-global-tourism-industry>>

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

- Pasha, Hafiz A. 2008. "Economic cost of war on terror."
<<http://www.sjbipp.org/publications/RP/researchpaper/RP-06-11.pdf>>
- Pasha, Hafiz A. 2018. "Cost of the war on terror," *Business Recorder*, February 13th. <<https://fp.brecorder.com/2018/02/20180213343355>>
- PIPS (Pak Institute for Peace Studies). 2009. *Pakistan Security Report 2008*. Islamabad: PIPS.
- PIPS (Pak Institute for Peace Studies). 2011. *Pakistan Security Report 2010*. January. Islamabad: PIPS.
- PIPS (Pak Institute for Peace Studies). 2015. *Pakistan Security Report 2014*. January. Islamabad: PIPS.
- PIPS (Pak Institute for Peace Studies). 2017. "National Strategy of Inclusive Pakistan," <<http://pakpips.com/downloads/inclusive-pakistan.pdf>>
- PIPS (Pak Institute for Peace Studies). 2019. *Pakistan Security Report 2018*. January. Islamabad: Narratives.
- Rana, M. Amir & Sial, Safdar. 2012. *Radicalization in Pakistan*. Islamabad: Narratives.
- Rana, M. Amir, et al. 2010. *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*. Islamabad: PIPS.
- Rana, Shahbaz. 2017. "War on terror aid: Pakistan received \$33.4bn from US." *The Express Tribune*, September 6th. <<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498815/war-terror-aid-pakistan-received-33-4bn-us>>

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Annexure-1: Militant leaders killed in military/security operations in Pakistan (2007-18)

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
July 24, 2007	Zhob, Balochistan	Abdullah Mehsud, a main Taliban leader from South Waziristan
June 11, 2009	Hangu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)	Maulana Amin, deputy chairman Sunni Supreme Council and reportedly having links with militants
June 16, 2009	Lower Dir (KP)	Taliban commander Abdullah
June 16, 2009	Bajaur Agency	An important foreign commander known as Gorilla
June 16, 2009	Swat (KP)	Taliban commander Shah Sultan, an expert in making suicide jackets
June 25, 2009	Swat	Shah Duran, TTP Swat chapter head Fazalullah' deputy
July 2, 2009	Tank (KP)	Maulvi Niaz, a Taliban leader and mastermind of suicide attacks
July 5, 2009	Swat	Ahsan alias Abu Jandal, a Taliban leader involved in slaughtering security personnel and making suicide jackets
July 7, 2009	Swat	Mohammad Rasool, brother of TTP commander Ibne Amin, and commander Akram
July 8, 2009	Swat	Omar Zada, a TTP commander
July 11, 2009	Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab	Then TTP head Baitullah Mehsud's close aide Abdullah
July 15, 2009	Swat	Abu Laith, a TTP leader in Swat
July 18, 2009	Swat	Abu Bakar, a TTP leader
August 26, 2009	Swat	Kamran, a TTP commander
September 5, 2009	Swat	Usman Ali, a TTP commander
September 8, 2009	Bajaur Agency	A local Taliban leader Qari Iqbal

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
October 4, 2009	Malakand (KP)	Local Taliban leaders Younus, Fazal Rabi and Noorul Amin
November 6, 2009	Swat	A local Taliban commander Fida Hussain and his four aides
December 2, 2009	Kurram Agency	Mulla Launcher, a local militant commander
December 3, 2009	Swat	M. Naseem alias Abu Faraj, a TTP leader
December 6, 2009	Swat	A local militant commander GulMula and his four aides
December 11, 2009	Swat	Taliban commander Bacha Akbar alias Hamza
December 12, 2009	Lower Dir	A local Taliban leader Bunir Khan
December 12, 2009	Kurram Agency	A Taliban commander Wali Dad
December 16, 2009	South Waziristan Agency	Gulbadin Mehsud, a TTP leader
December 29, 2009	Swat	Sadiq alias Abuzar, a TTP commander in Charbagh
December 29, 2009	Khyber Agency	SherZameen alias Labani, a Lashkar-e-Islam leader
February 3, 2010	Swat	A local Taliban leader Dilbar and his son Akhter
February 15, 2010	Bajaur Agency	A Jamaat-e-Islami leader ShahbazHaroonRasheed having links with the TTP in Bajaur
March 5, 2010	Swat	A local Taliban commander Qasim who run an FM radio station
March 17, 2010	Quetta	Abdul MajeedLangu, a Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) leader
Mar 22, 2010	Swat	A key militant commander BakhtMareen
July 5, 2010	North Waziristan Agency	A local Taliban commander Amirullah alias Mullah Gud

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
July 15, 2010	Orakzai Agency	An important Taliban commander Umer Khan
Aug 4, 2010	Islamabad	Zaheer Ahmed Awan, a high-profile terrorist involved in multiple attacks in Islamabad, Peshawar and other cities, including the suicide attack on the son of Mian Iftikhar Hussain. He also played a part in the attacks on three brigadiers of Pakistan Army in Islamabad during 2009.
March 10, 2012	Orakzai Agency	A TTP commander GulWali Khan
December 10, 2010	South Waziristan Agency	A local Taliban leader Asmatullah Bhattani having a bounty of Rs. 10 million for his arrest
July 20, 2011	Peshawar (KP)	Tariq Mansoor, a TTP leader
October 6, 2011	Khyber Agency	Wahid Shalober, a Lashkar-e-Islam commander
January 7, 2012	Karachi	TTP's Balochistan chief Yaseen Shah
June 26, 2012	Orakzai Agency	An important Taliban commander Wahid Ilyas
June 26, 2012	Peshawar	Omar Afridi, a leader of Dara Adam Khel-based Tariq Afridi group
Jul 27, 2012	Karachi	Khatib Khan Mehsud, head of TTP Karachi chapter
Aug 14, 2012	Orakzai	Two major militant commanders Abu Salman and Sher Shah
Aug 31, 2012	Orakzai	A Taliban leader Ishaq
November 14, 2012	Nushki	Haq Nawaz Bugti, son of Baloch Republican Army (BRA) leader Sher Muhammad Bugti
Mar 14, 2013	Karachi	Qari Bilal deputy chief of TTP's Manghopir chapter
Mar 22, 2013	Khyber	Lashkar-e-Islam militant leader Habib Rehman
July 10, 2013	Mastung, Balochistan	Leader of a banned outfit Jaan Jamal

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
Aug 15, 2013	Hyderabad	A central leader of the student wing of the banned Jeay Sindh MuttahidaMahaz (JSMM)
August 16, 2013	Karachi	A TTP commander Sher Khan Mehsud
Jan 10, 2014	Karachi	Amanullah Mehsud, chief of TTP in Karachi's Quaidabad area
May 3, 2014	South Waziristan	Two leaders of the TTP, IrfanMahsud – son of Azam Tariq, a member of the TTP central shura and former spokesperson for the TTP – and Wafadar Mehsud
Jun 18, 2014	Karachi	A local TTP commander identified as Zohair aka Salman
June 28, 2014	North Waziristan	A Taliban commander Omar
July 18, 2014	Karachi	Bilal Khan, the alleged mastermind of the attack on PAF Kamra Airbase
July 25, 2014	Peshawar	Taliban commander Toor Khan, an expert in making motorcycle bombs
Dec 25, 2014	Khyber	A militant leader Saddam, a key operational commander of the Tariq Gedar group of TTP who had facilitated the Taliban gunmen who had launched the attack on Army Public School in Peshawar.
December 26, 2014	South Waziristan	An Uzbek militant commander Huzaifa
Jan 9, 2015	Karachi	Sajjad alias Kargil, Al-Qaeda commander in Karachi, and his three associates Mohammed Hashim, Yasir alias Yasir Arafat and Shamim alias Commando
Jan 10, 2015	Lahore	The mastermind of the Wagah Border suicide attack, Asadullah, a commander of TTP from Bajaur, and his two accomplices
Feb 15, 2015	Quetta	A top commander of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) UsmanSaifullah Kurd
Feb 17, 2015	Buner	A senior Taliban leader Bakhti Raj
Mar 9, 2015	Karachi	The city chief of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
Jul 29, 2015	Muzaffargarh	Malik Ishaq, chief of the banned sectarian outfit Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, his two sons Usman and Haq Nawaz, and 11 other militants
Aug 2, 2015	Chagai	An important commander of Al-Qaeda for Balochistan and south Punjab, Omar Abdul Latif alias Luqman
Aug 18, 2015	Karachi	The head of Al-Qaeda's Karachi network and his accomplice
Sep 23, 2015	LakkiMarwat	A militant commander Rauf, who had escaped during the Bannu jailbreak in 2012
Oct 9, 2015	Mardan	A TTP commander carrying Rs2 million bounty on his head
Nov 25, 2015	Lahore	HaroonBhatti, one of the founding members of the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Jan 30, 2016	Mastung	Dr Manan Baloch, a senior leader of the banned Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)
Feb 22, 2016	Karachi	Sohail alias Chasmatu, an Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) commander in Karachi, and his aides Khalil, Bilal, Talha and Abdul Salaam
Feb 29, 2016	North Waziristan	A Taliban commander identified as Hezbollah
Mar 17, 2016	Karachi	A high-profile militant commander Kamran Aslam alias Kamran Gujjar, allegedly associated with the Islamic state group
Apr 9, 2016	Kalat	A United Baloch Army leader Abdul NabiBangulzai
May 28, 2016	Barkhan	A key militant commander identified as Mera
Sep 25, 2016	Nasirabad	A BRA commander ZafarBugti
Oct 19, 2016	North Waziristan	A TTP commander Akbar alias Badal, wanted in attack on GHQ
Nov 9, 2016	Karachi	Mohammad Hussain alias MistriPathan, linked with ISIS and Al-Qaeda, Salman alias Yasir, a leader of the TTP Swat, and Mohammad Salman Khan, also a TTP militant affiliated with Al-Qaeda

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
Nov 11, 2016	Lasbela	Arif alias SaqibAnjum, the chief of Jundullah Pakistan and the nominated naib emir of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Sindh
Nov 18, 2016	Rawalpindi/Murree	EhsanSatti, reportedly the emir of Daesh, or ISIS, for the Rawalpindi-Islamabad sector
Dec 5, 2016	Pishin	The mastermind of the August 8 Quetta Civil Hospital suicide attack, Jahangir Badeni alias AmeerSahab of LeJ
Feb 20, 2017	FR Tank	Son of a Taliban leader AsmatullahShaheen
Feb 22, 2017	Karachi	A former TTP city chief GulZaman
Feb 24, 2017	Kech	A commander of the banned Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) Muhammad Rafiq
Mar 6, 2017	Karachi	Dildar alias Chacha, head of a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (NaeemBukhari) cell
Mar 31, 2017	South Waziristan	MehmoodulHasan alias KhwajaMadni, a close aide of Khan Said Sajna, then deputy emir of the TTP
Apr 10, 2017	Sukkur	A high-profile Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant Kamran Bhatti, provincial chief of NaeemBukhari faction and wanted in cases of terrorism
Jun 3, 2017	Mastung	12 ISIS and Lashkar-e-Jhagnvi Al-Alami commanders were killed and some others captured including ISIS Sindh chapter chief
Sep 25, 2017	Malakand	GulKarim, deputy head of the TTP Malakand Division.
Nov 16, 2017	Kech	A BLF commander Yunus Baloch
Jan 4, 2018	DI Khan	A wanted TTP commander Zahir Shah
May 16, 2018	Quetta	A key LeJ leader Salman Badini, allegedly involved in target killing of over 100 Hazara Shias and policemen
Jul 20, 2018	Kalat	Hidayatullah Mufti, the mastermind of the Mastung suicide bombing on political gathering of SirajRaisani
Sep 4, 2018	Karachi	Zubair, alias Waqas, the Karachi chief of the TTP's Swat chapter

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Date	Location	Militant leaders killed
Sep 13, 2018	North Waziristan	A top militant commander Zarrar alias [Aftab] Parrakay
Sep 22, 2018	Bajaur	Deputy operational 'commander' of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Bajaur chapter
Oct 24, 2018	DI Khan	Muhammad Abid, the most wanted terrorist leader involved in the Dera Ismail Khan jailbreak

Annex-2: Major peace agreements between Government and other actors, mainly militants

Agreement 1

Date: June 27, 2002
Area: South Waziristan
Parties: Pakistan Army and local tribes
Terms: It was agreed that the house and other property of any person found harboring a foreigner would be destroyed.

Agreement 2

Name: Shakai Agreement
Date: March 27, 2004
Area: Shakai, South Waziristan
Parties: Militants led by Nek Muhammad and Pakistan government
Guarantors: Tribal elders
Terms: It was agreed that the security forces would leave the area immediately after the announcement of the agreement. The government would pay compensation for deaths and loss of property suffered by the tribes during the security forces operation. The government would release all innocent people arrested during the operation and would minimize its interference in the tribal areas. The government would give a one-month deadline to foreign elements to voluntarily surrender to the government or announce to start leading a life in accordance with the law after registration with the authorities. The tribes would vouch for their peaceful conduct. The Peshawar Corps Commander would visit Wana along with the FATA secretary and the ISI director as a goodwill gesture to local tribes. The tribesmen would not conduct any violent activity in Pakistan, nor allow the use of their area against any other country.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Agreement 3

Date: February, 2005
Area: South Waziristan
Parties: Government and Baitullah Mehsud
Points of dispute: The government tried to get an assurance that foreign militants would not attack Pakistani troops and would live peacefully in the area after registration even under fake names. The government offered that it would not hand them over to any other country. The militants were required to surrender their weapons. The foreign militants were to register with the authorities but the negotiations came to an abrupt halt before an agreement could be reached. Maulana Merajuddin and Maulana Abdul Malik, pro-MMA tribal parliamentarians from South Waziristan, mediated the agreement.

Agreement 4

Date: October 04, 2004
Area: South Waziristan
Parties: Government and AhmedzaiWazir militants
Terms: Tribal militants demanded that if economic sanction imposed on Waziristan were lifted and all detained tribesmen released, they would guarantee not to attack Pakistanis forces in the future. The AhmedzaiWazirs agreed to cooperate in tracking down the militants. The government ended the check post from AngoorAdda, a border area near Wana. The situation suddenly changed when the militants resumed attacks on army camps and accused the army of violating the agreement by repositioning its troops.

Agreement 5

Date: November 2004
Area: South Waziristan

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Parties: Government and Ahmedzai tribes

Terms: The Ahmedzais committed to hand over six wanted militants to the government. The tribesmen agreed not to attack government installations and forces, and not to use Pakistani territory to attack any foreign force. The government vowed to stop attacks on international forces in Afghanistan from the tribal area.

Agreement 6

Date: February 22, 2005

Name: Sararoga Agreement

Area: North Waziristan

Parties: Government and Mehsud tribe

Terms: Baitullah Mehsud agreed that he would not cooperate with foreign militants and would help the Pakistani forces apprehend tribal militants.

Agreement 7

Date: September 5, 2006

Area: Miranshah, North Waziristan Agency

Parties: Government and local Taliban commanders

Terms: Before entering into an agreement the agreement, the government agreed to virtually all the demands by the militants. Detained militants were released, their weapons returned, tribal privileges restored, 12 check posts abolished and troops stationed there recalled. The militants said that the jirgahad assured them that the government would pay them Rs 10 million if it failed to return their weapons and vehicles, seized during various military operations.

Guarantors: Maulvi Nek Zaman, a parliamentarian from the tribal area, and tribal elders.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Agreement 8

Date: February 17, 2008
Area: Miranshah, North Waziristan Agency
Parties: Government and Dawar and Wazir sub-tribes of Utmanzai tribe
Terms: This accord was meant to revive the September 5, 2006 peace agreement. The terms of that agreement were extended to the whole of North Waziristan, including Miranshah and Mirali.

Agreement 9

Date: May 9, 2008
Area: Swat
Parties: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government and militants led by Mullah Fazlullah
Terms: Both sides agreed to stop violence and armed action in the Swat valley. The militants agreed to stop attacks on security personnel and government installations, while the government agreed to stop search operation and arrests. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government had signed an earlier agreement on the same terms with the defunct Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-Muhammadi on April 21, 2007.

Agreement 10

Date: February 8, 2008
Area: South Waziristan
Parties: Security forces and Baitullah Mehsud-led militants
Terms and outcome: The agreement was aimed at consolidating the unofficial ceasefire in place since February 05, 2008 with the release of around a dozen detained tribesmen. The fragile truce between security forces and Baitullah Mehsud collapsed in May 2008 after security forces came under attack in South Waziristan.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Agreement 11

Date: February 23, 2009
Area: Bajaur Agency
Parties: Government and Taliban militants
Terms: The government promised to compensate the militants and tribesmen for the loss of life and property during the military operation. All government employees sacked during the operation on charges of having links with the Taliban were reinstated. The Taliban also agreed to quit their previous stance on pullout of the army from Bajaur. They agreed not to create any hindrance in the movement and deployment of troops in Bajaur.
Negotiators: Bajaur Agency Political Agent Shafeerullah Khan and Malakand Commissioner Syed Muhammad Javed represented the government, while militant commander Faqir Muhammad and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan spokesperson Maulvi Omar represented the militants. Local businessmen Haji Sarzamin Khan, Haji Muhammad and a tribal elder Saz Muhammad acted as mediators.

Agreement 12

Date: March 11, 2009
Area: Bajaur Agency
Parties: Political administrators and Khar, Salarzai, Utmanzai tribes of Bajaur Agency
Terms: All the militant organizations would stand abolished and all their members would surrender to the tribes and the government. The Taliban would lay down their weapons and would be registered in their respective tribes and the elders would furnish a surety bond for their good behavior. Parallel courts would not be set up nor the government's writ challenged in any other manner. Foreign elements including Afghan nationals would not be provided shelter, shops or houses would not be rented to them. Government officials and security forces personnel would not be targeted or abducted; government installations, including buildings of schools, collages, hospitals and check posts would not be attacked. The security forces would have the freedom to move freely in the agency and if

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

attacked would be entitled to retaliate. Terrorists would not be allowed to use the area for sabotage activities. The tribesmen would be bound to restrict cross-border movement, infiltration in or interference with the affairs of other countries. The government would carry out development work in the area after restoration of peace.

Agreement 13

Date: February 16, 2009

Area: Swat / Malakand Division

Parties: Government and TNSM chief Sufi Muhammad

Terms: It was agreed that government would not launch a military operation in the area and Shariah would be implemented in Malakand. The TNSM agreed not to conduct any activity against the military or the government.

Annex-3: Progress on National Action Plan – Government of Pakistan Data (by December 2017)¹²

Various actions by the federal and provincial governments fall under different points of NAP. Data of these actions are documented at central level and marked against different points of NAP. Below are the summaries of the progress on each point of NAP as documented by the government. This has been compiled by the office of National Security Advisor:

1: Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism

Total cases considered: 621	621
Total cases approved: 465	465
Cases approved in 2017	135

2: Special trial courts under the supervision of army

Special Trial Courts notified	11
-------------------------------	-----------

3: Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	ICT	GB	AJK	FATA	Total
Combing	108,180	60,807	38,413	1698	926	1136	498	602	212,260
Stop and Search	3821324	116600	2887	16760	12276	4671	4006	166	3978690
Arrests	21632	77218	184538	9200	4448	690	1667	1551	300944
IBOs	2062	239	1164	8979	280	22	43	71	12860
Helpline	2911	211	296	57	196	4	18	8	3701
Intelligence Shared	407	989	1279	609	184	171	163	1276	5078

¹² Source: PIPS. 2018. *Pakistan Security Report 2017*. Islamabad: Narratives.

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

4: NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution, will be strengthened

Tasks	Progress
Office Space	Buildings allotted/hired, renovation in progress
Budget 2016/17	Demanded: PKR 1559.0 million Released: PKR 1545.5 million
Budget 2017/18	Demanded: PKR 1643.019 million Released: PKR 530.839 million

5: Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	ICT	GB	AJK	Total
Hate speech	958	106	210	51	13	241	11	1373
Arrests	2042	64	364	48	4	35	9	2566
Misuse of loud speaker	10379	1027	6952	113	106	7	103	18687
Arrests	10987	803	7257	97	28	21	229	19422
Premises sealed	41	-	-	25	-	1	3	70
Material/equipment confiscated	1085	15	6256	1200 books, 383 items	-	13	110	7479

- NACTA is developing an application for reporting against hate speech/content
- NACTA has launched a social media campaign “Surf Safe” for reporting and profile TUI (Terrorist Use of Internet)
- Registration of complaint from the general public against hate speeches on NACTA helpline 1717

6: Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations

Activity initiative	Status
Choking Financing for Terrorism (CTF) Units in provincial CTDs	Established (Need for strengthening)
Task force on CFT to coordinate efforts of all stakeholders	Established at NACTA, 3 monthly meetings held

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

Activity initiative	Status
Model law for regulation and facilitation of charities	Shared with provinces for implementation
Asia Pacific Group (APG) Mutual Evaluation 2018	Preparations in progress with federal and provincial stakeholders
Curbing collection of donation by illegal entities	Meeting with stakeholders scheduled to discuss "Alternatives for disposal of animal hides"
Policy on branchless banking	Prepared, shared with SBP for implementation
Obligatory Money Declaration	Implemented
HawalaHundi	Cases: 919 Arrests: 1209 Recovery: 1489.918 million
Anti-money laundering	Cases: 426 Arrests: 574
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR)	STRs received from FMU: 207 Converted into cases: 49 Closed: 48 Under process: 110

7: Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations

- 4th schedule total activists: 8374
- Number of accounts frozen: 5089
- Amount frozen: Rs. 157 million
- Following actions have been taken against proscribed persons:
 - Passport/Travel embargo
 - Freezing of bank accounts
 - Ban on financial support and services by financial institutions
 - Arms license embargo
 - Provincial governments to enforce legal action under ATA 1997

PAKISTAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN WAR ON TERROR BUT AT WHAT COST:
A SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DECADE

8: Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	ICT	GB	AJK
Sanctioned strength	5000	1000	2206	2000	970	-	500
Present	4300	728	2080	1000	378	168	260

9: Taking effective steps against religious persecution

- Data of all cases of religious persecution being collected from provinces by NACTA

10: Registration and regulation of religious seminaries

- Registration and data forms finalized in consultation with Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), federal and provincial stakeholders
- It has been shared with provinces for implementation

11: Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media

- Strict implementation of ban on electronic media of activists of proscribed organizations.
- Any violation is instantly reported to concerned quarters and action taken.
- Visible improvement noticed.
- NACTA has identified periodicals/ books containing hate content. List is being shared with the provinces with the request for taking legal action against publishers/printing progress.

12: Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPS

- Federal Cabinet has approved in principle recommendations of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) reforms committee. Implementation in progress.

13: Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely

- 291.1 million Sims issued.
- 78 million Sims blocked.
- Biometric verification system in place.
- Loopholes in the system identified by NACTA. PTA has been requested to address the issue.

14: Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism

- 1,447 URLs with extremist content have been blocked by PTA.
- NACTA/FIA coordinating on the issue. Three meetings have been held.
- Tat'heer (literal meaning "to sanitize") is a multi-pronged Cyber Counter-Terrorism (Cyber CT) drive by NACTA which includes mapping of radical content available on internet/ social media and their countering.

15: Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab

- Due to massive operations 278 militants/ terrorists killed and 898 arrested, resulting in improvement of security situation.

16: Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end

Area	Status
Target killing	97 % down
Murder	87 % down
Terrorism	98 % down
Robberies	52 % down
Weapons recovered	33,378

17: Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders

- Surrender and reconciliation/ rehabilitation of "Farraris/ outlaw in progress.
- Initiation of dialogue with exiled Baloch leaders.

18: Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists

- Drastic decline in sectarian terrorism

19: Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees

- Total registered Afghan refugees= 1,386,985.
- Total estimated un-registered refugees (approx.) = 600,000.
- Total Afghan refugees repatriated under UNHCR plan voluntary= 4,360,187.
- The Federal Cabinet approved the repatriation and management policy.
- POR cards valid upto 31-12-2017, visa forms developed.
- Tripartite agreement for voluntary repatriation has been extended for one more year.
- The ministry of SAFRON in consultation with NADRA has finalized an operational plan for documentation of unregistered Afghan refugees.
- Draft National Refugee Law has been prepared by SAFRON and shared with stakeholders.

20: Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system

- Recommendations of NACTA on Criminal justice System along with implementation plan in consultation with all stakeholders now submitted to competent authority.
- NACTA has requested PM Office to extend timeline of the Criminal Justice System Improvement Committee (CJSIC) and NACTA to be made part of it.



Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is an independent think-tank committed to provide an in-depth understanding and objective analyses of regional and global issues. PIPS provides international strategic thinkers a forum to play an active role in understanding and researching real and perceived threats to regional and global peace and security. The objective is to engage leading regional and international strategic thinkers, academicians and media persons in pursuance and production of knowledge of national, regional and global security issues and to promote awareness about the importance of peace and democracy. The goal will be achieved through independent policy analysis, and collection, processing, interpretation and dissemination of information and skills/training.

PIPS carries out and disseminates policy analyses and research studies on the regional and global strategic issues such as conflict and development, political violence, religious extremism, ethnic strife, terrorism (including state terrorism), economics, governance and democracy, foreign relations, and cultural learning of policy-making processes. It also conducts dialogues, trainings and other educational programs for strengthening partnerships and resolving inter-state conflicts, and clashes between the government and the public. At the national level, the institute is dedicated to build a knowledge base for peace and enlightenment of the society. PIPS is building one of the largest database on peace and security issues at the regional level.

PIPS has also developed a vast regional and global network for information sharing and research on some of the key security issues facing Pakistan, which also have a profound impact on regional and global security.



PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS)
