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PAKISTAN  
SECURITY  
REPORT

**2021**



# PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT



**PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES(PIPS)**

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## **PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT 2021**

**PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS)**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>AJK:</b>	Azad Jammu and Kashmir	<b>ISPR:</b>	Inter-Services Public Relations
<b>AML:</b>	Anti Money Laundering	<b>JI:</b>	Jamaat-e-Islami
<b>AQIS:</b>	Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent	<b>JID:</b>	Joint Intelligence Directorate
<b>Arm:</b>	Army	<b>JM:</b>	Jaish-e-Muhammad
<b>ATC:</b>	Anti-Terrorism Courts	<b>JuA:</b>	Jamaatul Ahrar
<b>BH:</b>	Beheading	<b>JuD:</b>	Jamaatud Dawa
<b>BLA:</b>	Balochistan Liberation Army	<b>JUI-F:</b>	Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl
<b>BLF:</b>	Balochistan Liberation Front	<b>Kid:</b>	Kidnapping
<b>BNP-M:</b>	Balochistan National Party-Mengal Group	<b>KP:</b>	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
<b>BRA:</b>	Baloch Republican Army	<b>LeJ:</b>	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
<b>BRG:</b>	Baloch Republican Guard	<b>LI:</b>	Lashkar-e-Islam
<b>BSF:</b>	[Indian] Border Security Force	<b>LM:</b>	Landmine Blast
<b>BT:</b>	Bomb Blast	<b>LoC:</b>	Line of Control
<b>CE:</b>	Counter-Extremism	<b>Lvs:</b>	Levies Force
<b>Civ:</b>	Civilians	<b>Mil:</b>	Militant
<b>CPEC:</b>	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor	<b>MWM:</b>	Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen
<b>CFT:</b>	Combating Financing of Terrorism	<b>NACTA:</b>	National Counter-Terrorism Authority
<b>CTDs:</b>	Counter Terrorism Departments [of police]	<b>NADRA:</b>	National Database and Registration Authority
<b>CVE:</b>	Counter Violent Extremism	<b>NAP:</b>	National Action Plan
<b>DGMOs:</b>	Director Generals of Military Operations	<b>NATO:</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>DSP:</b>	Deputy Superintendent Police	<b>NSA:</b>	National Security Advisor
<b>ETIM:</b>	East Turkistan Islamic Party	<b>NSP:</b>	National Security Policy
<b>FATF:</b>	Financial Action Task Force	<b>OIC:</b>	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
<b>FC:</b>	Frontier Corps	<b>P-ml:</b>	Paramilitary Forces
<b>FIA:</b>	Federal Investigative Agency	<b>PML-N:</b>	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
<b>Fr:</b>	Firing	<b>Pol:</b>	Police
<b>HG:</b>	Hand Grenade	<b>PPP:</b>	Pakistan People's Party
<b>HRCP:</b>	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan	<b>PTI:</b>	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
<b>HuA:</b>	Hizbul Ahrar	<b>PTM:</b>	Pakhtun Tahafuz Movement
<b>IDP:</b>	Internally Displaced Persons	<b>QWP:</b>	Qaumi Watan Party
<b>IED:</b>	Improvised Explosive Device	<b>RA:</b>	Rocket Attack
<b>ISI:</b>	Inter-Services Intelligence	<b>RCB:</b>	Remote-controlled Bomb
<b>ISIS:</b>	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria	<b>Rng:</b>	Rangers
<b>IS-K:</b>	Islamic State Khorasan	<b>SA:</b>	Suicide Attack
<b>IPCM:</b>	Inter-Provincial Coordination Ministry	<b>Sab:</b>	Sabotage
		<b>SRA:</b>	Sindhudesh Revolution Army
		<b>SECP:</b>	Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
		<b>Sect:</b>	Sectarian

**SM:** Sipah-e-Muhammad  
**SP:** Superintendent of Police  
**SSP:** Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan  
**ST:** Sunni Tehreek  
**TA:** Terrorist Attack  
**TLP:** Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan

**TTP:** Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan  
**UBA:** United Baloch Army  
**UN:** United Nations  
**WB:** Working Boundary

## METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES

The PIPS conflict/security database and archives are the basic sources relied upon for this report. The archives and the database are the outcome of a meticulous monitoring process on every relevant incident in the country on a daily basis. A regular follow up is conducted in liaison with PIPS correspondents in the regions in order to keep track of daily developments on such incidents. PIPS compiles data from sources including newspapers, magazines, journals, field sources and screening of official record. More than 30 English and Urdu dailies, magazines, and journals, and various television news channels are monitored to update the database and archives. Regional daily newspapers and weeklies from Peshawar, Quetta, Gilgit and Karachi are also monitored for details of incidents reported in the local media. Correspondents in provincial capitals are the primary source for PIPS to verify the media reports. In case of a major incident, PIPS teams consult the local administration and journalists for further details. In cases where PIPS finds it difficult to verify facts of a particular incident, it gives preference to the official statements in that regard.

PIPS security reports utilize eight major variables with their respective set of sub-variables for analysis of the security situation in Pakistan. The security landscape is mapped through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative methods are used, based on PIPS Conflict and Security Database, to measure the scale and level of violence. Meanwhile, the qualitative approach dilates upon changes and developments on the militants' front, state responses to these developments and projections of future scenarios. The following eight major variables with their sub-sets of variables are used in the PIPS Security Reports:

- 1. Attacks:** This major variable has a sub-set of five sub-variables i.e. (i) terrorist attacks including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks; (ii) incidents of ethno-political violence; (iii) cross-border attacks; (iv) drone attacks; and (v) operational attacks by security forces against militants. Since Pakistan's security landscape is very complicated with a diverse array of insecurity indicators in different parts of the country, the type of violence in one geographical unit is often different in its nature and dynamics from security landscape in other parts of the country. For this purpose, the mentioned sub-set of variables is carefully monitored and analyzed in the security report with a view to suggest specific counter-strategy for each type of attack in these areas.
- 2. Clash:** Another variable used is of clashes which include four sub-variables, i.e., (i) inter-tribal; (ii) sectarian; (iii) clashes between security forces and militants; and (iv) militants' infightings. The number of such clashes and their geographic location is taken as an indicator of parallel trends unfolding simultaneously with major trends and patterns of security in different areas of the country.
- 3. State Responses:** It has two sub-variables: (i) security measures, and (ii) political and administrative responses. The first takes into account the security forces' operational attacks and clashes with militants, search and hunt operations and terrorists' arrests, etc. The second variable entails the government's political and administrative measures to maintain law and order and reduce insecurity and violence.
- 4. Casualties:** Casualties include both the number of people killed and injured. Casualties among civilians, militants and security forces are treated as another indicator to measure the levels and trends of security in the country.

5. **Attack Tactics:** This head takes a comprehensive account of various tactics used by different actors including suicide attacks, missile attacks, hand grenade attacks, kidnappings, rocket attacks, beheadings, landmine blasts, firing, sabotage, target killings, and bomb and improvised explosive devices blasts.
6. **Development on Militants' Front:** This variable analyzes statements, activities, internal divisions and other activities of militants to determine their strength and the dynamics of their strategies.
7. **Opportunities and Challenges** include political measures and military responses to different security issues along with highlighting constraints and challenges encountered by the state.
8. **Claim of Responsibility:** It provides insight into militants' targets, tactics, areas of operation, and agendas.

## **GLOSSARY**

**Military Operation:** Large-scale operations launched by military and paramilitary forces against Islamist militants and separatist insurgents mainly in KP and Balochistan to preserve law and order and the writ of the state.

**Operational Attack:** Pre-emptive attacks launched by military and paramilitary troops to purge an area of militants.

**Clashes between Security Forces and Militants:** Armed clashes between security forces and militants, triggered by militants' attack on security check posts/ convoys and confrontation during search operations.

**Terrorist Attacks:** Include militant, nationalist, insurgent and sectarian attacks. Indiscriminate use of violence by militant outfits such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) etc., manifested through suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video shops, etc.

**Nationalist Insurgent Attacks:** Attacks by separatists/nationalist insurgents mainly in Balochistan and interior parts of Sindh.

**Sectarian Attacks:** Indiscriminate use of violence rooted in differences among various Islamic schools of thought over interpretation of religious commands. Incidents involving indiscriminate use of violence perpetrated by banned sectarian outfits such as LeJ, Tehreek-e-Jafria, Imamia Student Organization (ISO), Sipah-e-Muhammad, etc., against rival schools of religious thought.

**Ethno-political Violence:** The threat or use of violence, often against the civilian population, to achieve political or social ends, to intimidate opponents, or to publicize grievances.

**Inter-tribal Clash:** Clashes or feuds reported between tribes, mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, rural areas of Punjab and parts of interior Sindh.

**Search and Hunt Operation:** Launched by law enforcement agencies on intelligence to capture militants or to purge a particular locality of suspected militants and their hideouts.

**Sectarian Clashes:** Violent clashes between armed factions of banned sectarian outfits or between followers of rival sects such as Sunni-Shia, Deobandi-Barelvi strife. Sectarian clashes also include tribal feuds between followers of Sunni and Shia schools of thought as in Kurram, where once the Sunni Turi tribesmen frequently clashed with members of the Shia Bangash tribe.

**Overall Number of Attacks:** The sum of militant and counter-militant attacks by the security forces, besides drone attacks, incidents of ethno-political violence, and attacks with sectarian motives or by nationalist insurgents.

**Plot/Unsuccessful Attempts:** These include attempts at terrorist attacks that were either foiled by security forces and bomb disposal squads, or explosives went off by accident before militants or suicide bombers reached their intended target.



## **FOREWORD**

While the political and security situation in neighboring Afghanistan is still fluid, concerns are growing inside Pakistan about the possible fallout including in terms of increased insecurity, border tensions, and militant violence. For one, the developments in Afghanistan had already started influencing Pakistan's militant landscape in 2021 as the year witnessed not only an increase in terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but also an intensified terrorist violence by Baloch insurgent groups mainly in Balochistan. Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province also emerged as one of the key actors of violence and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the year.

While the Afghan Taliban find it difficult to convince the world to recognize their government and activate/unfreeze financial channels, they are also finding it increasingly hard to address the domestic challenges mainly those linked to governance, security, and intra-Afghan reconciliation. Despite their repeated promises to not allow anyone to use the Afghan soil against Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have yet not seriously considered to act against the TTP; except having facilitated the talks between Pakistani government and the TTP which have also not shown any successes so far. Nonetheless, there have been critical statements about Pakistan from some Taliban officials on multiple occasions about Pakistan's democratic political system as well as fencing of the border by Pakistani security forces. Pakistan has eventually conveyed its concerns to the Afghan interim government about Afghan officials' repeated efforts to damage the border fencing saying it was observing maximum restraint.

As hinted earlier, the Afghan situation has implications for Pakistan in many ways. First, a protracted conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan's border security as well as militant landscape in its bordering areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. Secondly, the IS-K-Taliban fight has already entered Pakistan where IS-K has carried out multiple attacks in recent years on alleged Afghan Taliban members and linked religious scholars in Balochistan and KP. Thirdly, the Afghan situation is weighing heavily on Pakistan's efforts of pursuing 'economic diplomacy' and connecting in the emerging regional geo-economics. Fourthly, as things stand in Afghanistan now these are not helping in any way Pakistan's efforts to deal with the militant groups threatening its security such as the TTP. Some even say that the TTP is Afghan Taliban's strategic asset that they employ to neutralize Pakistani pressure.

Pakistan is confident that it can deal with the possible fallout of the Afghan situation in terms of insecurity and violence. While the government and security forces have their reasons to dwell on that confidence, independent observers believe that this is based on a weak threat assessment. For one, while kinetic actions against the militants have weakened them in Pakistan, factors and dynamics of religious extremism and radicalism – which feed into terrorism – persist. The reported upsurge in terrorist violence by the violent extremist groups, growing incidents of faith-based mob violence, reported episodes of protests by the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) workers and their clashes with security forces are just a few indicators from the year 2021. Secondly, despite military operations, networks of militant groups have not been fully eliminated from Pakistan, which is evident from continuing terrorist attacks (although less frequent) mainly in Balochistan and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and sporadically in Karachi and Punjab. These groups could be emboldened by the Taliban regime in one way or another to step up their violence.

On the other hand, despite its tall claims to reach out to the Baloch insurgent leaders with a view to end ongoing conflict in the province, the government has done little to act on that promise, which constitutes a clause of both original and revised drafts of National Action Plan. Apparently, instead of initiating an effective reconciliation process, the government's exclusive focus appears set on Peaceful Balochistan Program, which entails providing financial and rehabilitation support to the Baloch insurgents surrendering before the authorities and quitting violence.

In 2021, the government revised the 20-point NAP to an abridged version of 14 points. While many clauses have been retained as such from the original draft, some have been amended, and a couple of new ones have been included in the revised plan. The government has also approved the country's so-called first-ever National Security Policy (2022-26) putting economic security at the core, which will bolster military and human securities. The overall framework of the new policy, as stated by the NSA Moeed Yusuf, is safety, security, and dignity of citizens. The National Security Division would review progress in collaboration with relevant ministries and departments. The opposition parties in the Senate called into question the NSP which they said was framed without taking parliament on board.

PIPS hopes that this 16th edition of its annual security report would help the policymakers, academics, media, and civil society understand the gravity of the security situation in Pakistan with a view to moving towards sustainable solutions. This year too, the report includes the comprehensive data on violent incidents, comparative analysis of various security variables, the changing targets and tactics of militants and nature of state responses. The report also contains comprehensive review of militant landscape of Pakistan, and a review of Afghan situation and its implications for Pakistan.

**Safdar Sial**  
January 4, 2022

## **Chapter 1**

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# **Overview of Security in 2021: Critical Challenges and Recommendations**

Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial \*

- 1.1 Overview of Security Situation in 2021
- 1.2 Critical Challenges and Recommendations

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Safdar Hussain, nom de plume Safdar Sial, is Joint Director at PIPS and Associate Editor of Conflict and Peace Studies journal. He has also co-authored "Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA" and "Radicalization in Pakistan".




## **1.1 Overview of Security Situation in 2021**

Up 42 percent from the year before, a total of 207 terrorist attacks took place in Pakistan in the year 2021, which also included five suicide blasts. Perpetrated by different nationalist insurgent, religiously inspired militant and violent sectarian groups, these attacks claimed in all 335 lives – an increase of 52 percent from those killed in such attacks in 2020 – and injured another 555 people.

The religiously inspired militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), local Taliban groups, and Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), etc., perpetrated a combined total of 128 terrorist attacks – compared to 95 in previous year – which killed 236 people and injured 278 others. Different Balochi and Sindhi nationalist insurgent groups carried out 77 attacks – as compared to 44 such attacks in 2020 – which claimed 97 lives and wounded another 255 people. Meanwhile, compared to seven in 2020, two sectarian-related terrorist attacks were recorded in 2021 claiming as many lives as possible and inflicting injuries on another 22 people.

Personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies suffered significant casualties in terrorist attacks in 2021 including 177 dead and 218 injured; among those 177 dead were 65 army officials; 53 policemen; 48 FC men; 6 Levies; 4 unspecified paramilitary soldiers; and one Rangers official. Similarly, 126 civilians lost their lives and another 328 were wounded in these attacks. Meanwhile 32 militants were killed and another nine were injured, either in suicide blasts or security forces' retaliatory fire following some attacks.

**Chart 1: Classification of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2021**



Compared to 17 in the year before, the terrorists hit diverse targets of over 22 types in their attacks in 2021. However, they targeted security forces quite frequently. Out of the total 207 terrorist attacks recorded in 2021, as many as 137, or over 66 percent, targeted personnel, vehicles and posts of security and law enforcement agencies. Civilians were apparently hit in 16 attacks. Meanwhile, the terrorists targeted pro-government tribesmen and peace committees' members in nine attacks; political leaders/workers in seven attacks; government officials, institutions, and state symbols in another seven attacks; polio vaccination workers and their security escorts in six attacks; and non-Baloch workers and settlers in Balochistan in five attacks. CPEC/Chinese workers were also targeted in four attacks. A combined total of three attacks targeted Shia and Sunni community members. Other sporadic targets hit by the terrorists in 2021 are given at Table 1.

**Table 1: Targets Hit in Terrorist Attacks in 2021**

Targets	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts)	137	213	341
Education/institutions/teachers	2	0	0
Non-Baloch settlers/workers	5	12	11
Govt. officials/institutions/symbols	7	6	42
Power pylons/cell phone towers	1	0	0
Civilians	16	38	78
Shia religious scholars/community	2	13	21
Worship places/shrines/madrassas	1	0	1
Sunni religious leaders/community	1	0	1
Haqqani Network	1	1	0
Political leaders/workers	7	11	20
NGO / civil society members	1	4	1
Sikh community	1	1	0
Alleged spy	1	1	0

Health/polio workers, security escorts	6	5	2
Pro-govt tribesmen/peace committee members	9	10	3
Afghan Taliban/Others	1	1	0
CPEC/workers/Chinese	4	17	34
Former militants	1	1	0
Railway tracks / trains	1	0	0
Development, exploration projects, companies, workers	2	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>555</b>

The terrorists mainly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct infantry fire as primary attack tactics. Besides carrying out five suicide blasts, they employed IEDs of various types in 80 attacks and direct firing/shootout in 102 attacks. Meanwhile as many as 15 terrorist attacks were incidents of hand grenade blasts. The terrorists also used other attack tactics, though less frequently, including three (3) rocket attacks, one coordinated gun-and-bomb attack, and one act of abduction.

As in the previous year, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa witnessed the highest number of terrorist attacks for any one region of Pakistan. A total of 111 such attacks happened in the province (including 53 in the twin Waziristan tribal districts alone) which in all claimed 169 lives and inflicted injuries on another 122 people. Indeed, North Waziristan has been a major flashpoint of insecurity and militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the past few years. Compared to 31 in 2020, as many as 37 terrorist attacks took place in the district in 2021, or over 33 percent of the total reported attacks from KP, which killed 50 people and injured 27 others. Meanwhile 16 terrorist attacks happened in South Waziristan and another 12 in Bajaur tribal district claiming a combined total of 48 lives. Eight attacks took place in the provincial capital Peshawar killing nine people. Other KP districts where three or more attacks took place in the year included Bannu, DI Khan, Lakki Marwat, Lower Dir, Mardan, Orakzai, and Tank. Meanwhile a single attack targeting a bus carrying Chinese workers in Kohistan claimed 14 lives.

While over 71 percent of the reported attacks from KP targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel, another six attacks hit either polio vaccination teams or their police escorts. Pro-government tribal elders and political leaders were other prime targets, which were hit by the terrorists in a total of 12 attacks. The TTP and affiliated local Taliban groups perpetrated most of the attacks in KP, while Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province also claimed few attacks reported from South Waziristan, Peshawar, Kurram and Bajaur districts including a suicide blast.

Balochistan was the second most affected region by terrorism after KP where 136 people were killed and 345 others were injured in 81 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Baloch insurgents as well as religiously inspired militant groups. Different Baloch insurgent groups remained active in the province including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), BRAS – an alliance of Baloch insurgent groups mainly including BLA, BLF and Baloch Republican Guard (BRG) – Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Baloch Republican Army (BRA), and United Baloch Army (UBA) etc. These Baloch groups perpetrated 71 attacks in Balochistan killing 95 people and wounding 234 others. The attacks by Baloch insurgent groups concentrated in 17 districts of the province but most of them were recorded in Kech (19 attacks), Quetta (18), Sibi (7) and Panjgur (6 attacks). Similarly, most attacks by Baloch

insurgents targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel (47 attacks, or 66 percent); these included at least six major attacks in each of which at least four or more security personnel, mainly FC officials, lost their lives. Other targets frequently hit by Baloch insurgents included civilians (7 attacks), government officials, institutions, and state symbols (6 attacks) and non-Baloch settlers and workers (5 attacks).

Meanwhile, religiously inspired militant groups such as the TTP and the Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K) and some other similar unknown militants were reportedly involved in as many as 10 attacks in Balochistan. These attacks caused death to 41 people and injuries to another 111 people. Most attacks by religiously inspired militants were high-impact ones including two suicide blasts in Quetta by the TTP which killed a combined total of 10 people and injured 50 others. A single attack by the Islamic State group killed 11 coal miners in Bolan district. Out of the total 10 attacks carried out by so-called religiously inspired militants in the province, six happened in Quetta, another three in Qilla Abdullah and one in Bolan. Four of these attacks hit security forces, another three civilians, while one attack each targeted Hazara Shias, a madrassa, and an event organized by a religious-political party.

In all, eight terrorist attacks took place in Sindh province including five in Karachi and 3 in interior Sindh (one attack each in Khairpur, Naushahro Firoze, and Qambar-Shahdadkot). These attacks killed a total of 13 people and injured 35 others. Six of the reported attacks from Sindh in 2021 were perpetrated by Bloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents – mainly BLA, BLF and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) – which claimed two lives and wounded 21 people. In Karachi, the banned Baloch group BLF carried out two attacks against Chinese nationals while BLA perpetrated one attack targeting Rangers. The Sindhi insurgent group SRA carried out three attacks including one in each of three districts of interior Sindh cited earlier targeting security forces, a railways track, and political leaders. Apart from nationalist insurgents, some unknown militant group as well as a Shia sectarian group, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), also carried out one attack each in Karachi; while the attack by the former targeted a mini truck carrying family members of a Jamaat-e-Islami leader hailing from Swat, the SMP militants shot and injured a renowned Sunni scholar Mufti Saleemullah Khan, belonging to the Binnori Town seminary.

As many as five (5) terrorist attacks took place in Punjab which claimed 14 lives and injured 51 people. Two of these attacks were perpetrated by the TTP in Rawalpindi, which killed two and injured five policemen. Some unknown militants carried out an IED blast near the residence of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed in Lahore killing three people. Meanwhile, six people were murdered while five others sustained injuries by the firing of a religiously inspired extremist individual in DG Khan. In a sectarian-related terrorist attack reported from Bahawalnagar, two persons were killed, and 24 others injured in a grenade attack on an Ashura procession.

Two terrorist attacks were recorded in Islamabad in which the banned TTP killed three policemen and injured two others. (*See Table 2*)

**Table 2: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2021**

Region	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	111	169	122
Balochistan	81	136	345

<b>Region</b>	<b>No. of Attacks</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
Punjab	5	14	51
Karachi	5	12	31
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	3	1	4
Islamabad	2	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>555</b>

### **1.1.1 Comparison**


On the whole, 326 incidents of violence of different types – as listed in Table 3 – were recorded across Pakistan. Apart from 207 terrorist attacks cited earlier, these violent incidents also included 63 anti-militant operational strikes carried out by security forces and their six (6) armed clashes/encounters with militants; a combined total of 23 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, India and Iran; seven (7) incidents of communal/faith-based violence; six (6) thwarted/failed terror plots; six (6) clashes between security forces and TLP protestors; five (5) incidents of ethno-political violence; one inter-tribal clash; one inter-militant clash/attack; and one targeted attack, whose motivation was not clear (*See Table 3*). These overall incidents of violence killed a total of 609 people and injured 1,045 others.

**Table 3: Nature of Overall Incidents of Violence**

<b>Nature of Incident</b>	<b>No. of Incidents</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
Terrorist attacks	207	335	555
Political/ethnic violence	5	7	12
Clashes & encounters between security forces & militants	6	15	1
Cross-border clashes/attacks	23	16	26
Operational attacks by security forces	63	197	13
Inter-tribal clashes/attacks	1	11	15
Inter-militant clashes/attacks	1	1	0
Communal/faith-based violence	7	2	8
Plot/foiled terror attempts	6	0	0
Targeted attacks [not clear if by terrorists]	1	1	0
Protests/clashes with security forces	6	24	415
<b>Total</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>609</b>	<b>1,045</b>


Despite an increase in the number of terrorist attacks from the year before, the overall incidents of violence plummeted from 373 in 2020 to 326 in 2021. That decrease in overall violent incidents was largely contributed by a significant decrease in the number of cross-border attacks from the year before. However, the overall number of people killed in these violent incidents increased by over 21 percent; from 503 in 2020 to 609 in 2021. Similarly, the number of people injured in all such incidents of violence also increased from 851 in 2020 to 1,045 in 2021. (*See Chart 2*)

**Chart 2: Comparison of Overall Incidents of Violence & Casualties (2015-21)**



For the second time since the year 2009, the number of terrorist attacks posted an upsurge in the year 2021; the first such exception happened in 2013. Otherwise there has been a gradual decline in the incidence of terrorist violence and consequent casualties since 2009. (*See Chart 3 and Table 4*) The continuous operational and surveillance campaigns by security forces and police's counter terrorism departments (CTDs) and some counter-extremism actions taken under the National Action Plan (NAP) had apparently been contributing to the declining trend in the terrorist violence. But the reversal of this declining trend in 2021 suggests the militants have once again increased their presence and activities in Pakistan.

**Chart 3: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities in Pakistan (2015-2021)**



**Table 4: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities in Pakistan (2009-21)<sup>1</sup>**

Year	No. of Terrorist Attacks (%Change)	No. of Killed (% Change)
2009	Baseline year (2,586 attacks)	Baseline year (3,021 Fatalities)
2010	18%↓	4% ↓
2011	7%↓	18%↓
2012	20%↓	14%↓
<b>2013</b>	<b>9%↑</b>	<b>19%↑</b>
2014	30%↓	30%↓
2015	48%↓	38%↓
2016	28%↓	12%↓
2017	16%↓	10%↓
2018	29%↓	27%↓
2019	13%↓	40%↓
2020	36%↓	38%↓
<b>2021</b>	<b>42%↑</b>	<b>52%↑</b>

While for the past many years, much of the militant violence in Pakistan has visibly remained concentrated in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, the reported upsurge in terrorist violence in 2021 in Pakistan has also been greatly caused by an increased number of attacks in these two regions. A total of 192 terrorist attacks took

<sup>1</sup> ↑and↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from previous year.

place in KP and Balochistan (compared to 121 in 2020), which combined were also about 93 percent of the total terrorist attacks reported from across Pakistan. The number of terrorist attacks in Sindh and Punjab in 2021 however posted a relative decline from the previous year.

On the whole, compared to 2020, the number of terrorist attacks upsurged in Balochistan by 93 percent and the number of people killed in these attacks in the province also increased by 43 percent. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the frequency of terrorist incidents increased by 40 percent and the number of those killed in these attacks also increased by 69 percent.

While in Punjab, the number of terrorist attacks posted a decline of 28 percent from the year before, the number of people killed in these attacks surged by phenomenal 180 percent. In Karachi, the incidence of terrorist violence fell by 67 percent and that of fatalities by 29 percent. In interior Sindh, the number of reported attacks remained unchanged from the previous year, but the number of people killed in these attacks posted a decline of 67 percent.

In Islamabad, two attacks happened in 2021 compared to none in 2020, which claimed three lives. (*See Table 5*)

**Table 5: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks & Casualties (2020 vs. 2021)<sup>2</sup>**

Province / Region	Number of Attacks (% Change)	Killed (% Change)	Injured (% Change)
KP	40%↑	69%↑	41%↓
Balochistan	93%↑	43%↑	60%↑
Punjab	28%↓	180%↑	14%↓
Karachi	67%↓	29%↓	52%↓
Sindh (Excluding Karachi)	Unchanged	67%↓	300%↑
Islamabad	2 compared to 0 in 2020	3 compared to 0 in 2020	2 compared to 0 in 2020
<b>Total</b>	<b>42%↑</b>	<b>52%↑</b>	<b>1%↑</b>

One more than the year before, as many as five (5) suicide attacks happened in 2021 – three in Balochistan and two in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These attacks claimed 30 lives – compared to 26 in 2020 – and injured 85 others. The TTP was involved in three of these attacks, which targeted security forces in Serena Hotel, Quetta, an FC check-post on Quetta-Mastung Road, and a bus of Chinese workers in Kohistan district of KP. Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K) claimed a suicide blast reported from Bajaur tribal district targeting a bus carrying voters. Similarly, Baloch insurgent group BLA perpetrated a suicide

<sup>2</sup> ↑and↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from 2020 to 2021.

attack near Gwadar targeting a convoy of Chinese workers.

While sectarian violence has been on the wane since 2013, in the year under review it further posted a decline of over 71 percent from the year before. In all, two sectarian-related terrorist attacks took place in 2021, compared to seven in 2020, which killed two people, compared to nine in previous year, and injured another 22 people. One of these attacks targeted and injured a Sunni religious scholar Mufti Saleemullah Khan in Karachi, while the other was a hand grenade blast that targeted an Ashura procession in Bahawalnagar (Punjab) killing two and wounding 21 people.

Clashes between the **Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)** protestors and security forces were recorded in mostly Punjab's major cities on at least six occasions in which 24 people lost their lives including 10 police officials and hundreds of others were injured. These clashes mainly took place in Lahore, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, among other cities. In the second wave of such protests, in October, the TLP workers and supporters rallied on streets to urge the government to release their leader Rizvi as well as honor its agreement made with the group. The protests and rallies continued until the government released the TLP leader on November 18. Before that Pakistani government had already lifted a ban on the TLP as per the new agreement it made with the group leaders, whose details still remain shrouded in mystery.

Posting a phenomenal decline of about 82 percent from the year before, as many as 23 cross-border attacks took place in Pakistan from across its borders with Afghanistan (14 attacks), India (8) and Iran (one attack). As many as 16 people lost their lives in these attacks, compared to 62 in the year before; another 26 were also injured. Those 16 Pakistani citizens killed in cross-border attacks included nine security forces personnel and three civilians. The reported decline in such incidents was mainly contributed by a significant decline in Indian violations of the Line of Control (LoC) ceasefire in 2021. In February, Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement at the Line of Control and agreed to address the 'core issues' that could undermine peace and stability. Only two out of the reported eight cross-border attacks from Indian side in 2021 happened after February 2021. Out of these eight attacks perpetrated by Indian BSF – which killed one civilian and one army soldier besides wounding six civilians – seven concentrated along the LoC in AJK (mainly in Bhimber, Kotli and Muzaffarabad districts) while one attack happened in Sialkot along the Working Boundary with India.

Meanwhile compared to 11 cross-border attacks reported from Afghanistan in 2020, as many as 14 such attacks took place in 2021 including 12 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including 5 in Bajaur, 4 in North Waziristan, and one attack each in Kurram, Lower Dir, and Mohmand) and two in Qilla Abdullah and Zhob districts of Balochistan. Bajaur and neighboring Lower Dir lie in the east and south of Kunar province of Afghanistan where reportedly TTP has established long concentrations and influence in recent years. Similarly, North Waziristan lies to south of Khost province of Afghanistan, which also has significant presence of the Pakistani Taliban militants. With the exception of two attacks reportedly launched by the Afghan security forces, all other attacks cross-border attacks from Afghan side were perpetrated by the TTP and affiliates, killing in all 11 security personnel and two civilians. One cross-border attack also took place from across the Pak-Iran border in which terrorists targeted an FC border post from Iranian territory killing one FC man and injuring another one.

Compared to 47 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted 63 anti-militant operational strikes in 2021 in 22 districts and regions of

Pakistan. These actions killed a total of 197 people, as compared to 146 in 2020, and injured 13 others. Among those 197 killed were 177 militants, 17 Pakistan Army soldiers and three FC men. Out of the total 63 operational strikes recorded in 2021, as many as 43 were conducted in KP, 16 in Balochistan, three in Sindh and one in Punjab. There were 11 districts where more than one anti-militant operation happened in the year including North Waziristan (22 operational strikes), South Waziristan (8), DI Khan (3), Bajaur (2), Peshawar (2), Tank (2) and Lower Dir (2 strikes) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Mastung (4 strikes), Quetta (3) and Bolan and Kharan (2 strikes each) in Balochistan. However, North and South Waziristan in KP as well as Mastung in Balochistan drew prime attention of security forces where they killed a combined total of 97 militants (14 army soldiers and 2 FC men were also martyred) in 34 operations they conducted in these three districts.

Security and law enforcement agencies also entered into a total of six armed clashes and encounters with militants – compared to 15 such incidents in previous year – in six districts of the country. These armed clashes and encounters claimed 15 lives (9 militants and 6 army soldiers) and injured one militant. As many as three of these clashes and encounters (or 50 percent) took place in the twin Waziristan and DI Khan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (between the security forces and the TTP militants), another two (2) happened in Awaran and Kech districts of Balochistan (between security forces and the militants of BLA and BLF), while one such incident of armed clash took place in Attock district of Punjab between security forces and TTP militants.

As many as seven (7) incidents of communal or faith-based violence were recorded in Pakistan in 2021, which claimed the lives of a Sri Lankan national and a member of Ahmedvi community and injured eight others including seven policemen and one blasphemy-accused. While in the year before, most of such attacks took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, during the year under review five incidents of faith-based violence happened in Punjab (one each in Sialkot, Multan, Rahim Yar Khan, Rawalpindi and Sheikhupura districts) and one incident each took place in Islamabad and Charsadda (KP). In four of the reported seven incidents of faith-based violence, enraged mobs hit or intended to hit blasphemy-accused individuals (which also included a highly ill-famed killing by mobs of a Sri Lankan manager at a factory in Sialkot). In another two such incidents, two Hindu temples were vandalized, while in one such violent incident a member of Ahmedvi community was shot dead.

Five (5) incidents of ethno-political violence, mostly election-related, also took place in 2021, which claimed seven lives and wounded 12 others. While one of these incidents was recorded in Sialkot on the polling day for NA-75 by-election, other four such violent incidents happened in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Karak, Kohat, Tank and Haripur districts on the polling day of first phase of local body elections in the province.

The number of people killed in overall violent incidents in 2021 (609) represented an increase of over 21 percent from those killed in such incidents in the year before (503). The reported increase in fatalities was marked by the death of 227 personnel of security forces in overall violent incidents, compared to 151 in 2020, thus representing an increase of over 66 percent. Fatalities among civilians in 2021 (163) were nonetheless about five percent less from the previous year's fatalities among them (171). There was also an increased number of militants killed (219), in these violent incidents, compared to 2020 when 181 militants were reported killed. (*See Table 6*)

**Table 6: Casualties in Overall Violent Incidents in 2021**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
FC	57	82
Militants	219	12
Civilian	163	470
Police	64	389
Paramilitaries [unspecified]	5	1
Army	94	76
Levies	6	9
Rangers	1	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>609</b>	<b>1,045</b>

## 1.2 Critical Challenges and Recommendations

### 1.2.1 The Afghan Situation & Pakistan's Concerns

Peace in Afghanistan is fundamental to Pakistan's internal security and geostrategic and geo-economic priorities in the region. While the political and security situation in Afghanistan is still fluid, concerns are growing inside Pakistan about the possible fallout including in terms of insecurity and militancy, cross-border terrorism, border insecurity or conflict, refugees' influx, and economic instability. That is what makes it imperative for Pakistan to continue supporting the Afghan peace and reconciliation including through influencing the Taliban to initiate intra-Afghan negotiations and work towards the establishment of an inclusive government.

While the Afghan Taliban find it difficult to convince the world to recognize their government and activate/unfreeze financial channels, they are also finding it increasingly hard to address the domestic challenges mainly those linked to governance, security, and intra-Afghan reconciliation. Insecurity and violence are also gradually increasing with groups like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK-P) directly challenging the Taliban regime and its claims of ensuring security in the country. The group perpetrated 339 attacks in Afghanistan in 2021 compared to 82 such attacks it claimed in the country in 2020; it also claimed to have carried out 19 attacks inside Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province;<sup>3</sup> as per PIPS database on conflict and security, the group had perpetrated 8 attacks in Pakistan in the year. After the US-Taliban Doha deal, ISK-P intensified attacks and has indeed "announced a new long war" against the Taliban. Secondly, the group started developing and strengthening its networks in Urban areas by recruiting disgruntled, battle-hardened members of other groups as well as self-radicalized educated youths mainly adhering to Salafism. Some experts claimed that the ISK-P's Kabul network, in particular, had "also

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<sup>3</sup> <https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1476827070307127298>

absorbed splinters and defectors from the Taliban's radical Haqqani network.<sup>4</sup> Thirdly, ISK-P has waged an extensive propaganda war against the Taliban declaring them as allies and puppets of the US, who have 'deviated from their jihadist purpose'; this is how the Taliban used to propagate against previous Afghan governments.

Indeed, the Taliban's great challenge will come from a multitude of militant groups present on Afghan soil including those who are in sync with their ideology (such as Al-Qaeda, TTP, ETIM, etc) and also those who are ideological rival, mainly ISK-P. That challenge will be largely in terms of the Taliban's ideological constraints to progressively connect and respond to the world's expectations of them. Becoming or pretending to be moderate and connecting to the international system of governance and political order will only add to ideological problems for the Taliban where even its allied militant groups could be annoyed. Some analysts even saw Al-Qaeda chief's recent video statement in the same context where he criticized the United Nations, apparently warning the Taliban regime about the threat he thought the UN posed.

Across the border in Pakistan, since July, when the Taliban started to march towards Afghan provincial capitals, the number of terrorist attacks has posted a significant upsurge. In three months from July to September, as many as 66 terrorist attacks happened in Pakistan – about 86 percent of the combined total attacks that took place in the country during the entire first six months of the year – claiming 102 lives and injuring 208 others.<sup>5</sup> Apparently, the TTP as well as Baloch insurgent groups have intensified their terrorist onslaught against security forces in second half of 2021. Indeed, the dawn of August 15th has opened a pandora box of strategic and security concerns for Pakistan and its first and foremost concern about militant blowback inside its own borders has grown. Afghan Taliban's rise to power is bound to embolden the TTP and religious extremists' narratives jeopardizing the security of the country. Noor Wali Mehsud in his July interview with the CNN said that Afghan Taliban and their relationship was based on brotherhood, sympathy, and Islamic principles, and that TTP was at war with Pakistan's forces and firmly hoped to take control of Pakistan tribal border regions and make them independent.<sup>6</sup>

Another key factor will be the **Afghan Taliban's response** towards Pakistani demands for acting against anti-Pakistan groups and ensuring border security. Despite their repeated promises to not allow anyone to use the Afghan soil against Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have yet not seriously considered to act against or influence the TTP in support of Pakistani concerns, except having facilitated talks between Pakistani government and the TTP which have also not shown any successes so far. Nonetheless, there have been critical statements about Pakistan from some Taliban officials on multiple occasions. While a spokesman of the Afghan Taliban termed the TTP as Pakistan's internal problem, Afghanistan's cultural minister called the Pakistani government model as un-Islamic; Zabeeh Ullah Mujahid also issued a similar statement. Most recently, spokesman of Afghan Ministry of Defense said Pakistan had no right to erect barbed wire along the Durand Line and separate the tribes on both sides of the line.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Abdul Sayed, "ISIS-K is ready to fight the Taliban," *The Washington Post*, August 29, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/29/abdul-sayed-isis-k-taliban-afghanistan-threat/>

<sup>5</sup> Data and statistics are derived from Pak Institute for Peace Studies' digital databases on conflict and security: <[www.pakpips.com/app/database](http://www.pakpips.com/app/database)>

<sup>6</sup> Noor Wali Mehsud (leader of Pakistan's Tehrik-i-Taliban), interview with CNN, July 26, 2021.

<sup>7</sup> <https://twitter.com/AbdulhaqOmeri/status/1477682063402848257>

Indeed, tensions have been rising along the Durand Line where, in multiple incidences, the Afghan Taliban either damaged or tried to damage the border fencing that the Pakistani security forces have been erecting to prevent cross-border infiltration of militants. For instance, one such incident happened on December 18th, a day before Pakistan hosted a conference of the foreign ministers of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Afghanistan's humanitarian situation. A video made rounds on social media showing the Taliban soldiers seizing spools of barbed wire and one senior official warning Pakistani soldiers stationed at security posts not to try to fence the border again. Eventually, Pakistan has conveyed its concerns at the highest level to the Afghan interim government saying Pakistan was observing maximum restraint.<sup>8</sup>

As cited earlier, the Afghan situation has implications for Pakistan in many ways. First, a protracted conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan, as being projected by many, will affect Pakistan's border security as well as militant landscape in its bordering areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. Secondly, the ISK-P-Taliban fight has already entered Pakistan where ISK-P has carried out multiple attacks in recent years on alleged Afghan Taliban members and 'linked' religious scholars in Balochistan and KP. Thirdly, the Afghan situation is weighing heavily on Pakistan's efforts of pursuing 'economic diplomacy' in the world; it is also affecting Pakistan's efforts to connect in the emerging regional geo-economics, mainly due to persisting insecurity and political volatility caused by the Afghan situation. Fourthly, as things stand in Afghanistan now these are not helping in any way Pakistan's efforts to deal with the militant groups threatening its security such as the TTP. Although the Afghan Taliban are helping Pakistan to make peace with the TTP, but a positive outcome of these efforts is also contested by most experts. Some even say that the TTP is Afghan Taliban's strategic asset that they employ to neutralize Pakistani pressure.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's options to deal with a possible fallout of the Afghan situation could be:

- To increase vigilance and surveillance at the border and conflict-prone areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
- To try not to be seen as fully aligned with the Taliban because the Taliban don't have the sort of political clout in the international community that Pakistan needs to pursue economic diplomacy.
- To activate the parliamentary and political action to step up implementation of National Action Plan, mainly those clauses that deal with countering extremism and extremist narratives.
- To establish friendly relations with its neighbors including, China, Iran, and India to avoid any proxy war in Afghanistan, which will certainly hurt Pakistan the most.
- To try to evolve a joint border security mechanism with the Afghan government.

### **1.2.2 The FATF Challenge**

Although Pakistan has adopted a range of legislative, institutional, and administrative measures to combating financing of terrorism (CFT) in recent years, it still remains on the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) grey list, which not only puts stress on Pakistan's economy but also negatively bears upon the country's foreign policy. After its October

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<sup>8</sup> *The Express Tribune*, January 3, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2336852/concerns-conveyed-to-afghan-taliban-on-fencing-incidents>

plenary meeting held in Paris, FATF announced to keep Pakistan on its grey list asking it to "investigate and prosecute commanders and leaders of UN-designated persons in its resolutions."<sup>9</sup> The international financial watchdog, nevertheless, commended Pakistan's CFT efforts saying "[it has] progressed well as it largely complied on 30 points out of 34;" eventually there was no discussion on blacklisting the country. According to a media report, the FATF had given Pakistan a new 6-point plan after the completion of Mutual Evaluation Report while the country was already implementing a 27-point action plan and had complied on 26 points, which meant a single point remained. But the second plan, cited earlier, was placed before Pakistan in July 2021 plenary meeting of FATF. Pakistani officials have expressed concerns about pursuing two action plans simultaneously as no other jurisdiction could be cited on this front.<sup>10</sup>

The option to blacklist Pakistan was also ruled out in the FATF February (2021) plenary that announced to keep Pakistan on its grey or increased monitoring list for another four months, i.e., until June 2021, to [swiftly] complete the remaining three actions. These included: "demonstrating that [terrorism financing] investigations and prosecutions target persons and entities acting on behalf or at the directive of the designated persons or entities; demonstrating that [terrorism financing] prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; and demonstrating effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions against all 1,267 and 1,373 designated terrorists, and those acting for them or on their behalf."<sup>11</sup>

The June (2021) review by the FATF, however, provided Pakistan another one year to complete the remaining one of the 27 mutually agreed targets and implement seven new parallel action points to address deficiencies in its Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The remaining key item were linked to investigations and prosecutions targeting senior leaders and commanders of UN-designated terrorist groups. However, the added 6-point work plan was given by the Asia Pacific Group, regional affiliate of the FATF, under a parallel mutual evaluation mechanism under which Islamabad had largely completed 75 out of 82 action points. Minister for Industries and Production Hammad Azhar said after the FATF announcement that Pakistan will complete all actions within a year, although the task required at least two years. Only after ensuring showing full compliance with all the action points Pakistan will be delisted from the grey list.<sup>12</sup>

In the year 2021, Pakistan took some important measures to comply with the FATF action plan. For one, in January an anti-terrorism court convicted three leaders of banned Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) in two more cases of terror financing registered by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD). The ATC judge announced the verdict against cases lodged during 2019 in Lahore and Sargodha, respectively, handing down 14-year imprisonment each to Zafar Iqbal and Yahya Mujahid, while six-month sentences to Abdul Rehman Makki in each case. Several leaders of the JuD, including its chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, have been convicted in many FIRs registered by the CTD on charges of terror financing, while trial proceedings in others are still pending. The CTD had registered as many as 41 FIRs against the JuD leaders in different cities. The trial courts had by January 2021 decided 36 of the cases. In a related verdict, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi of defunct Lashkar-i-Taiba was

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<sup>9</sup> Mehtab Haider, "Pakistan stays on FATF grey list," *The News*, October 22, 2021, <https://e.thenews.com.pk/detail?id=16325>

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Khaleeq Kiani, "Pakistan to stay on FATF grey list till June," *Dawn*, February 26, 2021.

<sup>12</sup> Khaleeq Kiani, "Pakistan to stay on FATF grey list for another year," *Dawn*, June 26, 2021.

convicted with five-year imprisonment on three counts in a case of terror financing.<sup>13</sup>

In March, in a meeting of the National Executive Committee on Anti-Money Laundering, Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) and chairman of the FATF Coordination Committee were asked to immediately finalize the timelines for additional legislation in consultation with agencies of the federal government and the armed forces which will mainly “cover some weaknesses in the existing framework that limited the authorities from taking action, including imposing sanction or apprehending those acting for or on behalf of designated terrorist entities or individuals and prosecuting targeted persons and entities or those working for them, within certain deadlines.”<sup>14</sup>

Later in August, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) chairman Dr Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed held a meeting with representatives of real estate associations and reportedly sought the latter’s cooperation “to meet requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in relation to non-financial businesses and professions to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism.” FBR director general of Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFPs) Mohammad Iqbal assured the association members that bureau would continue facilitating the DNFPs for compliance. In that regard, he said, FBR teams would visit offices of real estate associations for assistance in filling out the questionnaires. It was also decided in the meeting that FBR will issue a brief of guidelines and also a simplified Customer Due Diligence (CDD) in English and Urdu languages.

The government has also formed a 12-member National Coordination Committee on the FATF. “The members of the committee include the federal finance minister and the federal secretaries of finance, foreign affairs, and interior, besides the heads of all the institutions and regulators concerned with money laundering and terror financing. Though the committee is not functional yet, it has brought security institutions’ oversight into the implementation process.”<sup>15</sup>

Experts argue that Pakistan’s ‘serious efforts to address the deficiencies in its CFT/AML regime’ have come largely because of the FATF pressure. Secondly, a comprehensive institutional response mechanism is still missing which will take time to evolve and become fully functional following the strengthening of regulatory frameworks and bodies and effective coordination among institutions dealing with CFT and AML. A zero-tolerance policy against all radical and violent religious groups will remain an overarching factor in the state’s resolve and policy action to curb terrorism and its financing. Apparently, banned outfits like the Jamaatud Dawa and Jaish-e-Mohammad have disappeared from the scene, but many experts believe “[t]hese groups are in hibernation and will become active whenever they find a conducive environment. [Meanwhile], the TLP has emerged as a new challenge, which is making Pakistan’s task to get out of the grey list a difficult one.”<sup>16</sup>

### **1.2.3 The Need for De-Radicalization Programs**

Religious extremism and ideological radicalization are enormous challenges in Pakistan, yet there is no formal de-radicalization policy or framework in place in the country. De-radicalizing and reintegrating former militants into society is inherently a long-term process

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<sup>13</sup> “Three JuD leaders convicted for terror financing,” *Dawn*, January 19, 2021.

<sup>14</sup> Khaleeq Kiani, “Legislation still needed to meet FATF benchmarks,” *Dawn*, March 2, 2021.

<sup>15</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, “FATF compliance,” *Dawn*, June 13, 2021.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

which cannot be achieved in a few months or even years. Secondly, the success of such processes always remains uncertain and prone to incidence of recidivism among those de-radicalized, mainly because the militant ideologies may yet continue to nurture. However, there is still a need for developing and implementing a Pakistan-specific, comprehensive de-radicalization and reintegration model, which takes into account Pakistan's specific needs, especially its democratic ethos.

The de-radicalization programs initiated following the Swat operation in 2009 are extremely limited, often confined to individuals in post-conflict scenarios. Indeed, such programs are very costly, and the government may be lacking in financial capacity to expand their scope and outreach. Experts believe this gap can be bridged through increased partnership between the public and non-government sector where Pakistani state and civil society can join hands in developing de-radicalization and reintegration roadmap for former members of the banned organizations. Such measures could also help boost the international community's confidence in Pakistan's efforts to counter extremism and terrorism. For one, the world is receptive to such initiatives, which are also endorsed by UNSC Resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017). The 'Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism' presented by the UNSC to the UN General Assembly entailed more than 70 recommendations including a call to introduce disengagement and rehabilitation programs.<sup>17</sup>

An ICSR 2012 study on de-radicalization programs in Muslim-majority states noted the roles of civil society, families, and religious scholars as the key factors, among others, which can be considered as conducive to success of these programs.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, civil society organizations have been part of de-radicalization and reintegration programs in many Muslim-majority countries mainly including Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt, and Bangladesh, etc. And there should be no reason why lessons learnt from those countries cannot be applied in similar programs in Pakistan. For instance, the role of civil society in Algerian experience is an important source of 'soft power'. Similarly, many appreciate Bangladesh's strategy of involving and exploiting the extensive influence and reach of its civil society organizations in the country's de-radicalization efforts.<sup>19</sup> Also, Egyptian authorities in particular encouraged former member and leaders of militant groups, IG and IJ, to contribute in de-radicalization endeavors including through publishing articles in the main newspapers, which "explained their new thinking and included their renunciation of violence."<sup>20</sup> In Indonesia, too, "some civil society organizations are engaged in facilitating the disengagement and eventual reintegration of ex-offenders" including through skills

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<sup>17</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "The counterterrorism challenge," *Dawn*, July 14, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1493998/the-counterterrorism-challenge>

<sup>18</sup> H. El-Said, "De-radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their impact in Muslim states," ICSR, January 2012, <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/1328200569ElSaidDeradicalisation1.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> For instance, see Jane Harrigan, "The rise of religious-based radicalism and the deradicalization programme in Bangladesh," in H. El-Said & J. Harrigan, *Deradicalizing Violent Extremists* (London: Routledge, 2013).

<sup>20</sup> See J. Harrigan and H. El. Said, "Group deradicalisation in Egypt: the unfinished agenda," in H. El. Said and J. Harrigan, *De-radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their impact in Muslim states* (Routledge, 2011)

training and employment placing such as "employ[ing] former extremists as chefs and waiters in restaurants."<sup>21</sup>

In Pakistan, nonetheless, the de-radicalization initiative is largely headed by the security forces with only sporadic and limited involvement of civil society organizations despite the latter's potential for addressing the conflict's political, economic, and social drivers by facilitating employments for former militants and providing social services to those interested in disengaging from terrorism.<sup>22</sup> Overall, Pakistan's de-radicalization efforts lack the 'whole of society' approach, and no policy framework has been devised in this regard even in the latest National Security Policy. The need for supporting de-radicalization and reintegration of former members of militant groups has increased manifold in recent times, mainly since the government has started to show keen interest in taking stern action against banned groups.

The PIPS recommends the following points for developing and improving the de-radicalization programs in Pakistan:

- The efficacy of de-radicalization programs has been proven both locally and in other countries. Therefore, there is need to initiate briefings by experts to the Parliament on this subject.
- The state is suggested to approach de-radicalization in a holistic manner with involvement of multiple stakeholders. The subject must not be an exclusive domain of the security agencies.
- A platform, such as commission, shall be constituted to review the criteria of banned outfits.
  - The purpose of this commission should be to review the basic ingredients of banned outfits. The terms of references of such a platform, such as commission, may be evolved by a parliamentary group; the parliament should also give statutory cover to such a platform.
  - Members of this platform/commission may include parliamentarians, social scientists, and other experts.
  - NACTA can serve as secretariat of this platform.
- De-radicalization process/exercise need to be be institutionalized and wide-spread.
  - The key authority to look after the centers shall be with civilian law enforcement agencies, preferably police.
  - Professionals including psychologists, clerics, and others shall be engaged in the rehabilitation centers.
  - Moderate scholars must be engaged in rehabilitation programs.
  - The process of de-radicalization needs to kickstart by profiling different layers of radicals: Those imprisoned should be specifically targeted; it is in the prison cells that many get more radicalized.
- No reintegration, rehabilitation and mainstreaming beyond the frameworks of the Constitution will be accepted.

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<sup>21</sup> Christina Nemr and Rafia Bhulai, 'Civil Society's Role in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Related to Violent Extremism,' The Global Observatory, June 25, 2018, <<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/06/civil-societys-role-rehabilitation-reintegration-violent-extremism>>

<sup>22</sup> Shehzad H. Qazi, "A war without bombs: Civil society initiatives against radicalization in Pakistan," ISPU, February 2013, [https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2013\\_-Policy-Brief\\_A-War-without-Bombs.pdf](https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2013_-Policy-Brief_A-War-without-Bombs.pdf)

- The education system in general and de-radicalization programs in particular should inculcate critical thinking, empathy, and compassion in children so that they learn to see the consequences of their actions.
- Evidence shows monetary benefit has been a significant factor in attracting young people to terrorism. Thus, any de-radicalization program must offer alternatives to the individuals in terms of career or occupation so as to prevent them from falling back into terrorism or extremism.
- The prison system needs a major overhaul as it often serves as breeding grounds for radicalization.

#### **1.2.4 Countering Violent & Nonviolent Extremism (CVE/CE)**

Violent and non-violent shades of religious extremism present a critical challenge to Pakistan's efforts to countering terrorism and achieving security and social harmony in the country. Besides, these also challenge any effort on the level of state and society to end faith-based persecution and violence such as by reforming the blasphemy laws. Secondly, there are also some fundamental issues in Pakistan's counter-extremism response such as continuing lack of clarity on the definition of extremism, weak political resolve, policy inconsistency, failure to check misuse of religion in politics, and overemphasis on hard or kinetic approaches with little or no emphasis on soft approaches of countering violent and non-violent extremism. Countering violent and non-violent forms of extremism has barely been a priority for a state that has traditionally focused more on the acts of terrorism and less on the drivers of it.

In 2021, multiple events and developments indicated that a persisting challenge of religious extremism and intolerance confronted the country. First, a 46 percent reported increase in the incidence of terrorist violence in the country, from previous year, suggested that religiously and ethnically inspired violent extremist groups had increased their presence and activities in the country. The emerging situation in Afghanistan, where a religious-ideological group has taken power, is also bearing upon the militant and extremism landscape of Pakistan. Secondly, as many as seven (7) incidents of communal or faith-based mob violence were recorded in Pakistan in 2021, which included the lynching of a Sri Lankan national in Sialkot as well as attacks on members of Ahmedi community, the individuals accused of blasphemy, and Hindu temples. Thirdly, the country witnessed two worst episodes of protests by the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) workers and their clashes with security forces in mostly Punjab's major cities. At least, 24 people lost their lives including 10 police officials and hundreds of others were injured. The way the government succumbed to the pressure of the group and released its leader Saad Rizvi and lifted the previously put ban on the TLP tells a lot about the threat such extremist groups continue to pose to the country.

Pak Institute for Peace Studies has advocated diverse recommendations for Pakistan's Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) framework and reconstruction of national narratives through various publications. The Institute believes these documents would be a useful source a policy initiative on CVE. Some highlights of those recommendations are listed below:

- For the state to develop effective CVE/CE policies and strategies, it is recommended to first develop a clear and functional definition of extremism and clarify its thinking and stance on the challenges posed by religious extremism in the country.

- Extremism is a highly complex problem that cannot be tackled by the state alone. Both the state and society have roles to play in countering extremism. The gulf between the state and society must be bridged, and the state may take the public into confidence while developing CE policies or narratives.
- Bodies like the Council of Islamic Ideology may have been active in developing CE responses such as the Code of Conduct, but ultimately it is the parliament that must take the lead in the fight against extremism by debating the issue and making relevant laws. Extremism inherent in the constitutional provisions and laws needs to be identified and rectified.
- The message of the Paigham-e-Pakistan (PeP) needs to be disseminated on a wide scale so that it reaches the public. In addition, it must also be incorporated into the educational curricula of public schools as well as madrassas.
- Religionizing politics have had devastating consequences for the country. Pakistan as a state and society has little option but to refrain from exploiting religion for political purposes.
- There is a need for establishing a national dialogue forum (NDF). It can serve as a platform for the scholars, academicians, political and religious leaders, and policymakers to bring all the key challenges on the discussion table and to understand each other's viewpoints. The NDF cannot only help to connect diverse ideological, social, and political segments of the society, but it can also create an environment to discuss critical issues. Such an important initiative must come from the chief executive of the country, with the support of the parliament.
  - The NDF secretariat can have support from a counter-extremism research centre comprising experts from the relevant fields of social sciences and religious studies. This centre can also establish a desk to monitor the extremist narratives and hate speech.
- The government shall devise policies for reducing socio-economic disparities in the society as these factors have relationships with problems of extremism and terrorism in the country. People suffering from social injustices are vulnerable to extreme ideologies.
- Pakistan sees a progressive decline of governance. This is extremely worrying in the context of growing extremism in the country. The government must, therefore, prioritize improving governance and ensuring better service delivery to the public. Improved governance and the rule of law would steer people away from extremist ideas and ideologies.
- Pakistan needs an intellectual infrastructure for countering extremism. This ranges from promoting a stable education framework to ensuring there is freedom of expression and speech to enable the expression and sharing of alternative ideas. Therefore, the government needs to improve the fundamental freedom of speech for all citizens.
- Some experts see a proportionate relationship between extremism and misogyny in Pakistan. This phenomenon must be investigated. In addition, women (constituting 50% of population) should be engaged in the CE process.

### **1.2.5 Negotiating with the Militants**

The early 2021 spike in terrorist violence in Pakistan, which was largely claimed by the TTP, reportedly followed failed negotiations between the terrorist group and the Pakistani government. The 'secret' negotiations happened in 2020 and eventually collapsed in late

2020 or early 2021 with no indication that they might resume.<sup>23</sup> The Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban had apparently facilitated the talks, which was also instrumental for the government's renewed negotiations with the TTP later in the year 2021. In an exclusive interview to TRT World on October 1st, the prime minister said that his government was in talks with TTP groups seeking a reconciliation.<sup>24</sup> Earlier in September, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had said in an interview that the government would be "open to giving" a pardon to members of the TTP if they promised not to get involved in terrorist activities and submit to the Pakistani Constitution. On November 8th, Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said that the government had reached an agreement with the TTP for a month-long "compete ceasefire" as part of an ongoing negotiations process.<sup>25</sup> Later, TTP spokesperson Mohammad Khorasani also confirmed the ceasefire beginning from November 9th; it ended on December 8th and was followed by heightened terrorist violence by the TTP. The TTP also shared details of its 6-point agreement reached with the government on October 25th with the support and mediation of the Afghan Taliban. According to the agreement shared by the group, both sides were to form 5-member committees each to discuss the next course of action and demands of each side. It also said that the government would release 102 "imprisoned mujahideen." The TTP also accused the government of violating the ceasefire by conducting raids in Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, Swat, Bajaur, Swabi and North Waziristan and killing and detaining militants.<sup>26</sup>

Political parties in the opposition were not convinced with the government unilaterally pursuing talks with the TTP and asserted that the parliament be given the responsibility to decide about that. Many also questioned, in the first place, the government's decision of talking with the TTP, which had killed thousands of Pakistani people including security forces personnel and children of Army Public School.<sup>27</sup> On November 10, the Supreme Court summoned Prime Minister Imran Khan for questioning on the implementation of court orders regarding the 2014 Army Public School attack and the government's talks with the TTP. The court ordered the government to submit a report [on the implementation of the court orders] within four weeks. During the hearing, Justice Amin questioned the PM whether the government was "bringing them [TTP] back to the negotiating table instead of taking action against them" thus surrendering once again? Meanwhile Justice Ahsan remarked that "the satisfaction of the parents [who lost their children in the APS attack] [wa]s necessary."<sup>28</sup>

Experts argue that while the TTP is already emboldened by the Afghan Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, it may take such messages of reconciliation from the government as the latter's weakness. Talking to the terrorist groups like TTP will also be tantamount to squander the successes achieved through the military operations in ex-FATA and elsewhere in the country. Secondly, while the TTP will not be willing to compromise on its basic objective of Sharia enforcement it would also ask for the release of its members from Pakistani prisons. Thirdly, no one can guarantee that the TTP will fulfil its commitments if

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<sup>23</sup> Franz J. Marty, "Spike in violence follows failed negotiations between the Pakistani Taliban and Islamabad," *The Diplomat*, April 3, 2021.

<sup>24</sup> "Govt in talks with TTP groups for reconciliation process," *Dawn*, October 1, 2021.

<sup>25</sup> Rizwan Shehzad, "Govt, TTP agree to cease fire," *The Express Tribune*, November 8, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2328439/govt-ttp-agree-on-a-complete-ceasefire-fawad>

<sup>26</sup> Ismail Khan, "TTP declares end to ceasefire," *Dawn*, December 10, 2021.

<sup>27</sup> A total of 147 people, 132 of them children, were martyred when TTP militants stormed the APS-Warsak School, in Peshawar, in 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Haseeb Bhatti, "APS carnage: SC grills PM Imran.....," *Dawn*, November 10, 2021.

a conciliation agreement is reached with it. In the past, the government had made about a dozen peace agreements with the Pakistani Taliban and none of them proved successful. Fourthly, there is not some comprehensive deradicalization program in place in Pakistan that may engage and help those quitting violence in the process of their reintegration into society. Mere renunciation of violence by an individual or group does not make their disengagement from militant cause or network sustainable.

Pakistan is indeed caught in a dilemma as on the one hand it cannot push the Afghan Taliban around to act against the TTP and on the other hand it cannot afford the TTP's resurgence either in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Perhaps that was why Pakistani government sought the Afghan Taliban's help in reaching out to and reconciling with the TTP, a plan that is apparently not working. At the same time, the Afghan Taliban are also seemingly pushing Pakistan by adding to its border insecurity and not acting against the TTP with a purpose to extract concessions in bilateral and multilateral perspectives. All this does not bode well for Pakistan's internal and border securities. Experts argue that Pakistan's security and foreign policy challenges are only to compound in coming weeks and months.

### **1.2.6 Persisting Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan**

The cold-blooded killing of 11 Hazara coalminers by Daesh affiliates early 2021 once again brought to fore the diverse challenges facing Balochistan's security and peace. The TTP also perpetrated five major attacks in the province including two suicide bombings in the year. The group's suicide attack in the parking area of Quetta's Serena Hotel on April 21st attracted international attention because the Chinese ambassador was staying at the same hotel although he was not present there at the time of explosion. Meanwhile, different Baloch insurgent groups have apparently also increased the number of attacks in Balochistan, mainly targeting security forces and alleged supporters as well as non-Baloch workers, among other targets. Indeed, Balochistan was the second most affected region by terrorism in 2021 after KP where 136 people were killed and 345 others were injured in 81 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Baloch insurgents as well as religiously inspired militant groups. On the whole, compared to 2020, the number of terrorist attacks upsurged in Balochistan in 2021 by 93 percent and the number of people killed in these attacks in the province also increased by 43 percent.

While it is still early to establish a link of this growing terrorist violence in the province to the Afghan situation, but some experts argue that the increasing pressure on Baloch leaders/militants sheltered in Afghanistan is forcing them to relocate to Balochistan and that could be one of the causes. Experts also underscore that the Baloch insurgents will certainly draw inspiration from the changing environment in the region and will further increase and intensify their attacks.

On the other hand, despite its tall claims to reach out to the Baloch insurgent leaders with a view to end ongoing conflict in the province, the government has done little to act on that promise that also forms a clause of both original and revised drafts of National Action Plan. During his visit to Gwadar on July 5th, Prime Minister said he was considering holding talks with insurgents in Balochistan, adding that he had always planned that whenever his party came to power, it would pay attention to the province. Later, on July 7th a media report claimed that the federal cabinet had given a go-ahead to hold talks with annoyed Baloch tribes having no links with India to address their grievances and achieve permanent peace and progress in the province.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa said on July

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<sup>29</sup> Syed Irfan Raza, "Second biggest Indian terrorist network unearthed: govt," *Dawn*, July 7, 2021.

6th that peace and prosperity in Balochistan formed “the bedrock of Pakistan’s progress.”<sup>30</sup> Prime Minister Imran Khan later also appointed Jamhoori Watan Party MNA Shahzain Bugti as his special assistant on reconciliation and harmony in the province.

However, experts contended the appointment of Mr Bugti on the premise that he does not enjoy the trust of Baloch nationalists. They also complain that the nationalist leadership has not been taken on board such as the nationalist leaders such as Dr Malik and BNP-M’s Akhtar Mengal, among others. Some even suggested the formation of a broader committee for this purpose comprising members of the treasury benches and political stakeholders in parliament. “Such a committee should also have a clear mandate and the authority to make and honour commitments with angry Baloch leaders,” one op-ed in an English daily argued.<sup>31</sup>

In November, Balochistan’s new Chief Minister Mir Abdul Qudoos Bizenjo said that the government was in talks with angry Baloch leaders living abroad in exile. He talked about his government’s resolve to address the grievances of all disgruntled Baloch leaders. “We will take towering tribal personalities of the province on board, visit the angry Baloch leaders along with them and will bring them back to the country,” he vowed.<sup>32</sup> Federal Minister for Planning and Development Asad Umar claimed that the federal government would extend all help and support in this regard.<sup>33</sup> Later, the chief minister Bizenjo reiterated in his interview with the Arab News that his government was in indirect contact with the leaders of Baloch insurgent groups including BLF. However, a statement by BLF spokesperson Gohram Baloch, which was quoted by some posts on social media, denied the claim.

Apparently, instead of initiating an effective reconciliation process the government’s exclusive focus remains on Peaceful Balochistan Program, which entails providing financial and rehabilitation support to the Baloch insurgents surrendering before the authorities and quitting violence. Such surrenders keep appearing on media sporadically and according to one account, since February 2017, over one thousand insurgents belonging to banned Baloch organizations had surrendered before security forces and provincial authorities.<sup>34</sup>

### **1.2.7 Reforming Education & Engaging Youth**

Pakistan’s national narratives and initiatives on countering extremism and promoting peace and harmony place a minimal focus on education and youth engagement. While education was among the ruling PTI’s top agenda items on its election manifesto, it has been one of the most ignored sectors including in terms of funding, policy, and reform. The incumbent government is introducing the single national curriculum, which is already contested by many. For one, the SNC is premised on the idea that teaching more religion would produce better citizens, though Pakistan’s experience shows that such a practice has only produced divisive narratives in the society, which are largely less tolerant towards people of other faiths. That contributes to the development of exclusive, intolerant, and unscientific

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<sup>30</sup> Dawn, July 6, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1633563/balochistans-peace-and-prosperity-the-bedrock-of-pakistans-progress-army-chief>

<sup>31</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, “Reconciliation in Balochistan,” Dawn, July 11, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1634362/reconciliation-in-balochistan>

<sup>32</sup> Saleem Shahid, “Govt in contact with angry Baloch leaders, says Bizenjo,” Dawn, November 6, 2021.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> “Several members of banned outfits surrender in Balochistan’s Kohlu,” Dawn, October 30, 2021.

minds.<sup>35</sup> The SNC is also in conflict with the 18th Constitutional Amendment that relegates the subject of education to provinces. Every province has the right to have its own educational curricula based on its unique history, culture, and folklores.

Similarly, aggravating economic situation and budgetary constraints have perhaps also contributed to the government's dwindling focus on education and youth policies, which could have negative ramifications for the education sector and its inherent link to peace, social inclusion, and harmony.

The education system has been integral to the state's nation-building project. The policy to create a nation with particular qualities through education overlooks the basic fact that nations cannot be created; you can create a state, but you cannot create a nation. Through education, attempts have been made to whitewash the many ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic diversities in the name of national integration. As things stand now, many believe that regular public education is no less a cause of religious extremism than madrassas. Discriminatory contents against non-Muslim faiths are taught to students from early on, starting at primary levels. Secondly, the existence of thousands of madrassas in the country and their continuing growth are an indication of state's failure to provide regular education to the population.

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) engaged hundreds of university and college teachers as well as students from across the country in several training workshops and closed roundtables in past three to four years on issues linked to religious extremism, diversity, and harmony, etc., in the country. Some of the key recommendations that emerged in these events for reforming education and effectively engaging youths are listed below:

- Education needs to be used as a tool to develop the state in terms of economy, democracy, rule of law, etc. In addition, it shall be redesigned to instill in students a sense of citizenship based on the fundamental rights provided in the constitution.
- Teaching of constitution be introduced at high school levels, and the youth may be taught key articles such as those explaining the core duties and responsibilities of the state, and also the ones relating to fundamental rights and freedoms on the citizens.
- The parliament needs to take lead and initiate a debate on national identity in order to alleviate the chronic identity crisis in the country and bring in at least some degree of clarity on the subject. Similarly, the modern concepts of shared identity and citizenship based on democratic values need to be taught at educational institutions.
- The origin and brief histories of native religions like the Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism etc. may be incorporated into the curricula so as to enable the students to learn about the ancient history of their region, and the different faiths that thrived in it for millennia. Religiously inclusive textbooks would help broaden the youth's perspective and worldviews and make them more accepting of diversity and inclusion.
- Pakistan's sociocultural landscape is diverse, but most indigenous cultures in the faraway corners remain shrouded in mystery as knowledge about them is scarce in the public domain. This cultural diversity may be promoted as national heritage through education and mass media in order to sensitize the youth about the rich cultural mosaic of their country.
- Critical thinking be included in the curricula as well as made part of pedagogy. The students need to be trained to develop critical thinking and reasoning skills from early

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<sup>35</sup> Pak Institute for Peace Studies, "Pakistan's Counter- Extremism Challenge and Policy Recourse," a 2021 report of a series of webinars on counter-extremism organized by PIPS, [https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Full-webinar-report\\_for-website.pdf](https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Full-webinar-report_for-website.pdf)

- on so that by the time they reach universities they are well versed in the application of these skills.
- Educational institutions need to be given more academic freedom and space because restrictions on free thinking on grounds of religious sensitivity etc. check intellectual growth among the youth. Inquisitiveness and questioning should be encouraged and promoted.
  - While the educational curricula play lead role in shaping the youth's worldviews, the role of teachers in influencing the students' thinking is no less critical. Therefore, the teachers may be trained to identify and overcome their social biases, improve their thinking, and expand their worldviews. Well trained and educated teacher tend to inculcate better thinking in their students.
  - Infrastructure of education be improved in conflict-affected areas.
    - Enabling conditions shall be provided in militancy-affected areas like ex-FATA and Balochistan; and
    - Enabling conditions shall be provided for girls' education, which face a variety of constraints, including from militants and cultural conservatism.
  - The mission of any youth engagement program should be to empower them politically, socially, and economically.
  - Government's initiatives for youth be expanded and disseminated widely. The scope of government initiatives with youth, be increased, in both numbers and backgrounds.
  - Bridge communication gap with youth.
    - Regular interaction be made with them.
    - Career counseling be provided to students; counseling department be encouraged at school level.
    - Youth-adult partnership be undertaken.
    - Parliament-youth interactions be increased and explored.
  - Enabling environment be provided for youth to engage with diversity and/or diverse opinions, by reviving dialogues, student unions, parks, playgrounds, public places, youth clubs, online communities, campus magazines.

### ***The Madrassa Challenge***

Successive governments have toyed with the idea of madrassa reforms, yet no significant progress has been made so far. The great majority of madrassas continues to operate beyond the radar of the state. Experts link the governments' failure to 'act' to fear of a backlash and a reluctance or limitations to allocate resources. Taking advantage of this persisting confusion, those at the helm of madrassas have continued to strengthen their roots and support among the people.<sup>36</sup> While the government has even failed to complete the registration of growing number of madrassas in the country (although Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training has opened Directorate General of Religious Education in Islamabad to regulate and register madrassas; several regional offices of DGRE have also been established), some reforms or modernizing measures have been introduced by madrassa administrators themselves such as provision of science education and availability of modern computer labs. But there are only few such madrassas, and on the whole the religious elites controlling the madrassas are not yet ready to revisit madrassa education system because these institutions of religious education are catering to their financial and political needs.

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<sup>36</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "The madressah riddle," *Dawn*, November 28, 2021.

Meanwhile madrassas remain a main source of religious extremism and sectarian divide in the country. While in "recent decades, the state has made all-out efforts to make campuses apolitical, the madrassa students remain politically and ideologically charged and vulnerable to be exploited for street protests and recruitment for military purposes."<sup>37</sup> Madrassa graduates not only form the bulk of imams, or prayer leaders, of mosque across the country, who only preach their sectarian version of Islam, they are now increasingly joining public education institutions as teachers and are influencing young minds in a variety of ways. Eventually, the "madrassa mindset is at its full play in society and is responsible for promoting two major sociopolitical conflicts, which certainly have security implications: first, the sectarian divide, and second, ideological radicalism."<sup>38</sup> Therefore, sociocultural, political, and ideological inferences of these religious educational institutions will continue to structure and lead sectarian, divisive narratives in the country unless the state fully realises the threat and shows the resolve to reform the sector.

### **1.2.8 National Action Plan & Security Policy**

The government has revised the 20-point NAP to an abridged version of 14 points. While many clauses have been retained as such from the original draft, some have been amended, and a couple of new ones have been included in the revised plan. However, experts see it as a very vague plan that can be interpreted and thus misused in several ways. "For example, the fourth clause talks about acting against the spread of terrorism through media (electronic, print, and social media), communication, and cyber networks. One can imagine how such clauses could be used to further restrict the freedom of press and media."<sup>39</sup> Similarly, the clause 12 of the revised NAP creates more ambiguity when it mentions legislative/ legal oversight for espionage/ subversion without providing any auxiliary context or scope; it could easily be misused against sub-nationalist groups. Similarly, it is not even clear "why the fourteenth clause was included in the plan, which talks about putting curbs on increasing trends of the illegal spectrum when Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) is a concerned body and is already acting against the illegal frequency users with the help of the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA)."<sup>40</sup>

While there have been frequent demands from civil society and others to revise and strengthen NAP, apparently the government has failed to properly scrutinize and evaluate the NAP clauses and, in the process, has largely ruined the essence of even original NAP. NAP was implemented after taking political parties and parliament on board, but it has been revised without any such exercise. Similarly, experts argue that the "focus of the new NAP has been reverted to 'externalizing' the internal security threats, where the security apparatus will once again start employing the pre-APS lens to see all the security-related problems."<sup>41</sup> In that context, peace talks with the arch enemy TTP should not surprise us anymore, as the new threat perception focuses more on curtailing the external links of the terrorists.

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<sup>37</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "The madressah riddle," *Dawn*, November 28, 2021.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Security policy impasse," *Dawn*, December 26, 2021.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Security policy impasse," *Dawn*, December 26, 2021.

The government has also approved the country's so-called first-ever **National Security Policy** (2022-26) putting economic security at the core, which is envisaged to bolster military and human securities in return. The overall framework of the new policy, as stated by the National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf, is safety, security, and dignity of citizens. As far as the implementation framework is concerned, the National Security Division would review progress in collaboration with relevant ministries and departments. The opposition parties in the Senate called into question the NSP which they said was framed without taking parliament on board. Even the treasury did not show a keen interest in the briefing held for the new policy. Experts see the difference of policymakers in the context that the NSP is the result of a bureaucratic exercise, and political parties, civil society, and parliament were not taken on board. According to a few media reports that quoted the participants of the meeting, the NSP offers nothing new, rather it is just a jugglery of the words, and has documented merely existing practices.

In December 2020, Pak Institute for Peace Studies published the outcome of a comprehensive study it conducted with collaboration of FES Pakistan to assess the NAP implementation and progress mainly in terms of countering terrorism and extremism in the country. The recommendations provided in the report for the government are summarized below:<sup>42</sup>

- Civilianize NAP and counterterrorism regime giving leading role to the parliament.
- Modernize and reform police, strengthen its investigation branches, reform the Evidence Act and enhance police's operational autonomy.
- Devise well-defined, realistic, and achievable plans/objectives with effective monitoring and evaluation systems against individual NAP goals/clauses. Monitoring and evaluation be done using clearly defined and concrete performance indicators, otherwise NAP would continue to be judged subjectively on the basis of varying perceptions.
- Strengthen NACTA; the prime minister may take ownership of NAP and use the NACTA platform to regularly review the status of and progress on NAP provisions.
  - Inter-Provincial Coordination Ministry (IPCM) be activated to work along with NACTA for better coordination and results.
- Reform the criminal justice system with much greater urgency and focus as this particular NAP action has practically remained a nonstarter so far.
  - The government shall review and refine key definitions in the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 in consultation with relevant stakeholders, which will also contribute to avoiding delays in prosecution.
  - Afford rigorous training and sensitization to the ATC judges in handling terrorism cases.
  - Strengthen ATCs through infrastructural uplift and capacity building.
- Develop and run an effective de-radicalization and rehabilitation program, led by civilians that also engages or partner with civil society organizations.
- Build and promote counter-narratives.
  - The Paigham-e-Pakistan can be a significant ideological response to the extremist ideologies; the message be disseminated widely and transformed into national narrative.
  - Categorization of militants into pro-state and anti-state must end.

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<sup>42</sup> The report can be downloaded here: <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NAP-Final-from-Hamayun.pdf>

- Curb the access of militant/jihadist and sectarian groups to cyberspace and other means of communications without misuse of related laws, with a view to evade loss of public trust and confidence in state institutions.
- Heal and rehabilitate the citizens of ex-FATA.
  - Enhance the economic and infrastructure development of this strategically critical area.
  - Bring back the internally displaced persons and rehabilitate them.
  - Speed up the process of political, administrative, and judicial reform in tribal districts.
- Introduce critical shifts in foreign policy pursuits. For one, peace with the immediate neighbors including India would enable the government in Pakistan to invest more in basic social services like health and education and improve governance.
- The government may ensure that while dealing with suspected insurgents, fundamental rights and legal frameworks are not violated, because otherwise the state tends to lose legitimacy in the eyes of public. For instance, high-handed policies in Balochistan including an emphasis on military solutions has tended to further aggravate the sense of alienation among the Baloch. The issue of missing persons has become a point of reference in the center-Baloch relations.

### **1.2.9 Reforms in Ex-FATA**

The revised NAP also places emphasis on introducing reforms in merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa including ensuring an adequate share in NFC, capacity building of law enforcement agencies and introduction of political-administrative structures like local government elections and land reforms. During first phase of local bodies election held in KP on December 19, polls were also held for the first time in Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur tribal districts; in remaining tribal districts local body polls will be held in second phase of elections. That is a significant achievement for the residents of ex-FATA. Yet many reforms and measures are still needed.

There is a need to rehabilitate the internally displaced persons from ex-FATA and develop educational, road and other infrastructure in these areas.

The establishment of police stations and training of law enforcement agencies also needs to be stepped up. Although the process is underway, but it is quite slow, according to local accounts. First police training school for the merged tribal districts was approved and notified during February 2021 for Khyber district. The school will reportedly train 1,000 policemen and will have the capacity to train a total of 2,000 policemen. Such police training schools are also operating in Swat, Swabi, Mansehra, Kohat and Khyber.<sup>43</sup>

Similarly, a media report in July 2021 said that over 2,000 Khasadar and 1,300 Levies Force personnel in tribal or merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had been absorbed in the police force since the merger of ex-FATA with the KP province three years ago. The statistics were revealed in the meeting of the provincial task force held on July 29th under the chair of Chief Minister Mahmood Khan. According to an official statement, the participants discussed security situation, progress on development projects, administrative measures and matters related to the Fata-KP merger in Hassankhel, Darra Adamkhel, Bhatani, Jandola, Wazir and Darrazanda tribal subdivisions. The task force also decided about the up-gradation of educational and health facilities and making necessary

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<sup>43</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 10, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202102100306>

arrangements to manage basic health units in those areas as 24/7 facilities.<sup>44</sup> Education and health infrastructure was affected the most during the Taliban militancy and conflict-induced violence.

Demands to speed up the post-merger reforms in ex-FATA are getting louder with tribesmen expressing their disappointment about the ongoing snail-paced process. Many are also linking the growing land disputes in the merged tribal districts to either missing or very slow process of police, land, and judicial reforms. For one, member of the KP provincial assembly from South Waziristan Naseerullah Khan said in a presser in Sadda area in March that the slow reform process and transition was the main cause of increasing land disputes and enmities among the tribesmen. For instance, he highlighted, while in the past traditional Jirga served as alternative dispute resolution system, in the new system tribesmen are discouraged to have the Jirga but they have not yet gotten the judicial and police system.<sup>45</sup>

Similarly, large swathes of land in parts of ex-FATA or tribal districts have yet to be cleared of unexploded landmines, which keep playing havoc with the lives of local people including children and shepherds. For instance, a media report in June claimed that about 80 square kilometer area of twin Waziristan districts had yet to be demined. So far, security forces had cleared Malakand and Bajaur districts of landmines and other unexploded ordnances. According to official sources, 37 personnel had embraced martyrdom in the landmine blasts and 17 suffered fatal injuries since 2018. Also, 45 civilians had lost lives in landmine-related incidents and 85 suffered injuries.<sup>46</sup> Local accounts however put the number of casualties higher. Like landmines, unexploded mortar shells and IEDs also keep claiming lives of KP people, especially in areas which were once hotbeds of militant violence. Khyber is one of those areas that needed a series of military operations (Khyber I-IV) to eliminate the militants of local groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam as well as the TTP. In June 2021, a tragic incident happened in Zakhakel area of tribal district that claimed five lives and wounded four others. Reportedly, some kids found three mortar shells in the fields and brought them home. The family members were examining the shells when one of them exploded killing five and wounding four people. Later, people of the area protested against the presence of unexploded and un-defused shells and bombs in their areas.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> "Over 2,000 Khasadar, 1,300 Levies personnel absorbed in police," *Dawn*, July 30, 2021.

<sup>45</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), Peshawar, March 25, 2021,  
<https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202103250413>

<sup>46</sup> "Large area in ex-FATA yet to be de-mined," *Dawn*, June 12, 2021.

<sup>47</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), June 30, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202106300101>

## **Chapter 2**

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# **Security Landscape of Pakistan in 2021**

**Safdar Sial**

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- 2.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- 2.2 Balochistan
- 2.3 Sindh
- 2.4 Punjab & Islamabad
- 2.5 Protests and Clashes with Security Forces
- 2.6 Suicide Attacks
- 2.7 Faith-based Violence
- 2.8 Border Attacks



## **2.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

As in the previous year, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa witnessed the highest number of terrorist attacks for any one region of Pakistan. A total of 111 such attacks happened in the province (including 53 in the twin Waziristan tribal districts alone) which in all claimed 169 lives and inflicted injuries on another 122 people.

The TTP and affiliated local Taliban groups perpetrated most of the attacks in KP, while Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province also claimed few attacks reported from South Waziristan, Peshawar, Kurram and Bajaur districts including a suicide blast.

Indeed, North Waziristan has been a major flashpoint of insecurity and militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the past few years. Compared to 31 in 2020, as many as 37 terrorist attacks took place in the district in 2021, or over 33 percent of the total reported attacks from KP, which killed 50 people and injured 27 others. Meanwhile 16 terrorist attacks happened in South Waziristan and another 12 in Bajaur tribal district claiming a combined total of 48 lives. Eight attacks took place in the provincial capital Peshawar killing nine people. Other KP districts where three or more attacks took place in the year included Bannu, DI Khan, Lakki Marwat, Lower Dir, Mardan, Orakzai, and Tank. Meanwhile a single attack targeting a bus carrying Chinese workers in Kohistan claimed 14 lives.

**Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in KP in 2021**

<b>District</b>	<b>Attacks</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
Bajaur	12	18	9
Bannu	3	3	0
D.I Khan	5	5	0
Hangu	1	1	0
Haripur	1	1	0
Karak	1	1	0
Khyber	2	4	0
Kohat	1	1	0
Kohistan	1	14	28
Kurram	1	1	0
Lakki Marwat	4	9	1
Lower Dir	4	1	9
Mardan	4	7	2
Mohmand	2	2	2
North Waziristan	37	50	27
Orakzai	3	4	7
Peshawar	8	9	0
South Waziristan	16	30	35
Swat	1	3	1
Tank	4	5	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>122</b>

The militants apparently increased the number of intensive or high-impact terrorist attacks in the province in 2021, compared to previous year. There were recorded at least eight

major attacks in the province,<sup>48</sup> which caused a combined total of 50 deaths including 28 among personnel of security and law enforcement agencies and injured 38 others. These attacks included: three separate attacks in South Waziristan district in February targeting a check-post in the Makeen area, an army vehicle in Wana Bypass road, and an FC check-post in Sara Rogha area; an attack on vehicle of women vocational trainers working for an NGO in North Waziristan in February; a suicide blast hitting the bus carrying about 30 Chinese workers in Kohistan in July; a targeted attack on security forces' vehicle in Spinwam area of North Waziristan in October; a roadside blast in Pir Bandagai targeting policemen and Bajaur Scouts in October; and an attack on army officials in Mirali tehsil of North Waziristan in December.

As in the year before, militants relied more on direct shootout or firing, employing this particular tactic in 69 attacks, besides carrying out 33 IED blasts, two suicide bombings, three rocket attacks, two hand grenade blasts, one act of sabotage, and one kidnapping.

While over 71 percent of the reported attacks from KP targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel, another six attacks hit either polio vaccination teams or their police escorts. Pro-government tribal elders and political leaders were other prime targets, which were hit by the terrorists in a total of 12 attacks. (*See Table 1a*)

**Table 1a: Targets Hit by Militants in KP in 2021**

Targets	No. of attacks	Killed	Injured
Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts)	79	118	80
Education/institutions/teachers	2	0	0
Govt. officials/institutions/symbols	1	3	0
Civilians	4	7	3
Haqqani Network	1	1	0
Political leaders/workers	5	6	5
NGO / civil society members	1	4	1
Sikh community	1	1	0
Alleged spy	1	1	0
Health/polio workers, security escorts	6	5	2
Pro-govt tribesmen/peace committee members	7	7	3
Afghan Taliban/Others	1	1	0
CPEC/workers/Chinese	1	14	28
Development, exploration projects, companies, workers	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>122</b>

An inter-tribal clash in Kurram also claimed 11 lives. The armed clashes continued for about 3 days between the tribesmen of Piwar and Giddo near Afghan border. Clashes had erupted between the rival tribes over the ownership of forest in the upper subdivision of Kurram.

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<sup>48</sup> Four or more people were killed in each of these attacks.

Some frequently hit targets in KP in 2021 are described below.

### **2.1.1 Attacks on Security Forces/Law Enforcement Agencies**

Apparently, the militants intensified their attacks against security forces in 2021 when, compared to 50 such attacks in 2020, a total of 79 terrorist attacks hit personnel, vehicles and posts of security and law enforcement agencies in 2021, including 45 in twin Waziristan districts alone. These attacks claimed the lives of 118 people (97 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, six civilians as well as 15 militants) and wounded 80 others including 79 security personnel and one militant.

With the exception of targeting killing of two policemen by Islamic State (IS-K) militants in Peshawar in November, all other attacks targeting security forces in KP in 2021 were perpetrated by the TTP and its affiliated or other local Taliban groups.

After the twin Waziristan districts, some other districts where security forces were targeted relatively more frequently included Peshawar (6 attacks), Bajaur and Lakki Marwat (4 attacks each), and Bannu, DI Khan, Lower Dir, and Mardan (3 attacks each). Out of the total 79 reported attacks against security forces in KP, as many as 52 were either incidents of targeted killing or direct [targeted] shootout.

Some of the attacks against security forces and law enforcers reported from KP in 2021 are narrated below:

- February 12: A group of 10 terrorists attacked a check-post in the Makeen area of South Waziristan dominated by the Mehsud tribe. The attackers used both heavy and light weapons in the attack, which resulted in the martyrdom of four soldiers. Four terrorists were also killed when security personnel retaliated, who were later identified as TTP affiliates.<sup>49</sup>
- February 15: A vehicle of security forces was targeted with a remote controlled IED blast on Wana Bypass road in South Waziristan, which claimed the lives of four security personnel including soldiers Shamas, Nadeem and Siraj and the driver. Another 8 soldiers were injured including three with critical wounds.<sup>50</sup>
- February 19: In a major attack on security forces, five FC soldiers were martyred, and another was injured when terrorists attacked a security check-post in the Sara Rogha area of South Waziristan. The banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed the attack in a statement released to local media.<sup>51</sup>
- June 30: The TTP terrorists attacked security forces at New Qala in Tiarza tehsil of South Waziristan tribal district. Three soldiers were martyred in the attack and as many suffered injuries. Assailants used rockets and light machineguns in the attack.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Daily *Dunya* (Urdu), February 13, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-13&edition=ISL&id=5513846\\_27861443](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-13&edition=ISL&id=5513846_27861443)

<sup>50</sup> Daily *Jang* (Urdu), February 16, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/02-16-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=443.png>

<sup>51</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 20, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202102200120>

<sup>52</sup> Dawn, July 1, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1632436/5-soldiers-martyred-5-others-injured-in-two-attacks>

- July 5: Three soldiers were martyred and another one got injuries in a terrorist attack on a check-post in the Hasan Khel area of North Waziristan adjacent to the Afghan border. Terrorists used heavy weapons in the attack.<sup>53</sup>
- August 3: A police constable and his driver were martyred when their car was ambushed by militants in the Teddi bazaar area of Jamrud in Khyber district.<sup>54</sup> Next day, two personnel of Frontier Constabulary, who were posted at Durbi Khel-Ziyarat hillock overlooking parts of Tirah valley both on Khyber and Orakzai sides, went to a nearby spring to fetch water for their trench when the gunmen opened fire, killing both on the spot.<sup>55</sup>
- October 2: As many as four soldiers of Frontier Corps (FC) and a Levies Sub-Inspector embraced martyrdom while thwarting terrorists' targeted attack on security forces' vehicle in Spinwam area of North Waziristan.<sup>56</sup>
- October 20: Two people were injured in a roadside blast in Pir Bandagai area of Bajaur. Two policemen and as many Bajaur Scouts were sent to inspect the site, who were also targeted with a roadside IED explosion; all four lost their lives in the blast.<sup>57</sup>
- October 27: A police party in a mobile van was on a routine patrol when militants opened fire on it in the Wanda Mir Alami area of Lakki Marwat. At least four police personnel, including an assistant sub-inspector, were martyred in the attack.<sup>58</sup> On the same day, two army soldiers were martyred and another one was injured in three separate attacks reported from North Waziristan. Sepoy Shaukat was martyred in a roadside explosion in Degan area of Dattakhel tehsil, near the Afghan border. Another soldier, identified as Rohail, embraced martyrdom in an explosion that occurred in the Garyum area of Razmak tehsil. In the third IED attack of the day in North Waziristan, a soldier Naik Qamar sustained injuries in the Tapesi Adda near Mirali.<sup>59</sup>
- November 25: Police officials were conducting an operation to arrest suspects in the Hayatabad area of Peshawar. When an official knocked the door of suspicious house, a person came out and opened fire on the police party. Assistant sub-inspector Muhammad Riaz and constable Jafar Ali lost their lives on the spot. The attacker Hamza was detained. The Islamic State (IS) central media arm Amaq claimed the attack.<sup>60</sup>
- December 30: Militants ambushed and fired at security officials in Mirali tehsil of North Waziristan. Four personnel of security forces were martyred in the ensuing exchange of fire. The TTP claimed the attack.<sup>61</sup>

### **2.1.2 Attacks on Civilians**

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<sup>53</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), July 5, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/latest/152978>

<sup>54</sup> *Dawn*, August 5, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1639055/two-soldiers-martyred-in-separate-attacks-in-khyber-south-waziristan>

<sup>55</sup> *Dawn*, August 5, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1639055/two-soldiers-martyred-in-separate-attacks-in-khyber-south-waziristan>

<sup>56</sup> *The Express Tribune*, October 3, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2323004/four-fc-soldiers-one-levies-official-martyred-in-nw>

<sup>57</sup> *The Express Tribune*, October 21, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/epaper/news/Karachi/2021-10-21/NTc3ZGE3MTgzMjAwYTkzM2NIMmM3MmI5MjgxMTlkNzuanBlZw%3D%3D>

<sup>58</sup> *The News*, October 27, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/903546-four-policemen-shot-dead-in-kps-lakki-marwat>

<sup>59</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), October 28, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202110280102>

<sup>60</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), November 25, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202111250104>

<sup>61</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), December 31, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202112310105>

Terrorist attacks against civilians in KP fell significantly indicating militants' changing tactics and targets; they preferred to hit security forces, pro-government tribal elders and political leaders, etc., more frequently, apparently thinking that targeting civilians could earn them more public wrath. Only four terrorist attacks in KP in 2021 targeted civilians in Bajaur, South Waziristan and Tank districts, compared to eight such attacks in the year before. These attacks claimed the lives of seven civilians and inflicted injuries on three others. Local Taliban and some unknown militants were involved in these attacks.

Two of these attacks were remote controlled IED blasts and another two were caused by toy IEDs; the latter killed a total of six children. On June 1st, three children were killed, and two others suffered injuries when a toy bomb, they found and were playing with it, went off in Ladha tehsil of South Waziristan tribal district.<sup>62</sup> Next month, a similar tragic incident was reported from Tank where three minor brothers were killed when a toy bomb they had found in a pond went off in the Mehsud Koroona area of Tank.<sup>63</sup> Police said that the boys, aged between five and 13 years, were taking a bath in a pond to beat the heat when they found a toy-like device. They brought it to their father's shop and started playing with it.

Meanwhile two attacks targeted civilians in Bajaur, in February and May, respectively, killing one person and injuring another one.

### **2.1.3 Attacks on Tribal Elders and Political Leaders/Workers**

Compared to eight in the year before, a combined total of 12 attacks in KP targeted tribal elders and political leaders and workers, which claimed 13 lives and injured four others. So-called pro-government tribal elders and members of peace committees came under seven attacks in North Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai districts causing seven fatalities. Political leaders and workers were targeted in five terrorist attacks (including a suicide bombing) in Bajaur, South Waziristan and Lower Dir districts causing six deaths. The TTP, Islamic State terrorist group and some unknown militants perpetrated these attacks.

#### ***Attacks on political leaders:***

Out of five reported such attacks, two targeted leaders of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam. First, on February 22, JUI ex-FATA chief Maulana Abdul Salam Haqqani was critically injured in a remote-controlled blast in Damadola area of Bajaur; he later died at the Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar, on April 4th.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, on November 22, militants shot dead JUI-F activist and party nominee for the local government elections Mohammad Ilyas in Bajaur tribal district. He was younger brother of JUI-F slain leader Mufti Sultan Mohammad, who had been killed by unidentified attackers on October 29, 2019.<sup>65</sup> Reportedly, the Islamic State terrorist group's Khorasan chapter (IS-K) was involved in these attacks.

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<sup>62</sup> *Dawn*, June 2, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1626964/three-kids-die-as-toy-bomb-explosion>

<sup>63</sup> *Dawn*, July 3, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1632930/three-little-brothers-die-in-tank-bomb-blast>

<sup>64</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), Peshawar, March 26, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202103260107>; *Dawn*, April 5, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1616404/injured-jui-f-leader-dies>

<sup>65</sup> *Dawn*, November 23, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1659643/murder-of-jui-f-activist-sparks-protest-in-bajaur>

The IS-K claimed another attack on political workers that happened in Bajaur on December 19th. Reportedly, two persons were martyred, and six others sustained injuries in a suicide bomb blast in Kamarsar area in Loy Mamond tehsil of the tribal district. The vehicle was carrying voters to the polling station to cast votes in the first-ever local government elections in ex-FATA.<sup>66</sup>

In the third attack, a roadside bomb blast targeted a Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf local worker travelling in car, causing him injuries in Kolal Dherai area of Maidan in Lower Dir district.<sup>67</sup> Similarly, on December 25th, unknown attackers shot dead PPP leader Najeeb Mehsud Jan in Sharif Khel area of Sararogha in South Waziristan district and managed to escape.

***Attacks on tribal elders and peace committee members:***

In February, two attacks targeted tribal elders in Bajaur tribal district. First, a renowned tribal elder Malik Laal Said Jan was heading his home through a bazaar when a remote-controlled IED blast targeted him killing him on the spot. The incident happened in Aseel Targhao area of Barang tehsil in Bajaur district.<sup>68</sup> Few days later, a tribal elder Malik Yar accompanied by a policeman, said to be his relative and guard, was heading home when a remote-controlled bomb went off on a roadside in Barang tehsil of the Bajaur tribal district. The elder and the policeman were injured in the blast.<sup>69</sup> The banned TTP was reportedly involved in both attacks.

In July, the TTP carried out three terrorist attacks in North Waziristan targeting tribal elders and peace committees' members. First, on July 4, masked militants shot dead a tribal elder near Mirali area of North Waziristan tribal district. The deceased Malik Salahuddin had served as head of a local peace committee tasked with maintaining peace and checking movement of miscreants in the area.<sup>70</sup> Later, on July 8, militants shot dead a tribal elder Malik Abdur Rehman near Miramshah. Rehman had served as head of the peace committee during Taliban militancy.<sup>71</sup> Later in the month, two tribal elders, Malik Sahib Rehman, and Malik Khairullah, were shot dead apparently in an act of targeted killing in Miranshah.<sup>72</sup>

On August 22, two tribal elders, Malik Fazal Hussain, and Malik Mohammad Ameen, were killed and an eight-year-old boy was injured in Orakzai when they were attacked by terrorists while going to their home. Next day, protesting tribesmen blocked the Kohat-Hangu highway for several hours, saying TTP terrorists roamed the district freely.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> *The News*, December 20, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/918253-two-killed-as-suicide-bomber-hits-anp-vehicle-in-bajaur>

<sup>67</sup> *Dawn*, October 17, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1652537/pti-worker-injured-in-dir-bomb-blast>

<sup>68</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 23, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202102230108>

<sup>69</sup> *Dawn*, February 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1609842/tribal-elder-police-guard-wounded-in-bajaur-blast>

<sup>70</sup> *Dawn*, July 5, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1633303/tribal-elder-shot-dead-in-north-waziristan>

<sup>71</sup> *Dawn*, July 9, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1633960/another-elder-shot-dead-in-n-waziristan>

<sup>72</sup> *Dawn*, July 29, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1637465/two-tribal-elders-shot-dead-in-north-waziristan>

<sup>73</sup> *Dawn*, August 23, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1642142/killing-of-two-elders-in-orakzai-protested>

Similarly, on September 21, a tribal elder, Malik Ramdad Khan, was on way to his home when an explosive device placed along a link road went off in Bajaur. The elder however remained unhurt in the blast.<sup>74</sup>

#### **2.1.4 Attacks on Polio/Health Workers & Police Escorts**

As many as five policemen lost their lives, and one policeman and one FC man were injured in six reported terrorist attacks from KP that targeted polio vaccinators and their security escorts. Two of these attacks were reported from Tank and one attack took place in each of DI Khan, Karak, Kohat and South Waziristan districts. The TTP and local Taliban groups were allegedly involved in these attacks, which are described below:

- January 12: A polio vaccination team came under attack in the Latamber area of Karak district resulting in the death of a police constable Junaidullah Khan while the health workers remained unhurt.<sup>75</sup>
- In August, two attacks in KP targeted polio vaccination teams and their escorts: On August 1, a policeman belonging to the Frontier Reserve Police who was returning from polio duty was targeted by militants in the Daudzai area on the outskirts of Peshawar. The cop, identified as Asif, died on the spot.<sup>76</sup> Next day, unknown militants shot dead a policeman Dilawar Khan near Atal Sharif. Khan was going to perform his official duty of providing security to a polio vaccination team.<sup>77</sup>
- September 19: A policeman deployed to provide security to a polio vaccination team was shot dead by unknown militants in Kohat. The attackers managed to escape on their motorcycle.<sup>78</sup>
- In August, militants hit security escorts of polio teams in Tank in two attacks killing two policemen and injuring one FC man. On December 11, police and FC personnel were guarding polio vaccination teams in the Chadra area when gunmen on a motorbike opened fire. A policeman was martyred, and an officer of frontier constabulary injured in the attack, which was claimed by the TTP.<sup>79</sup> Next day, Militants attacked a polio vaccine team and its security escort in Shadagrah area of Tank killing police constable Nazir Ahmed.<sup>80</sup>

#### **2.1.5 Other Sporadic Targets Hit in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

Militants perpetrated a high-impact attack hitting Chinese nationals working on a dam. Reportedly, a blast hit the bus carrying about 30 Chinese workers from the workers' camp

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<sup>74</sup> Dawn, September 22, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1647641/bajaur-elder-escapes-roadside-blast>

<sup>75</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), January 13, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-01-13&edition=ISL&id=5476473\\_19445519](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-01-13&edition=ISL&id=5476473_19445519)

<sup>76</sup> Dawn, August 2, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1638211/policeman-soldier-martyred-in-peshawar-south-waziristan>

<sup>77</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), August 3, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/08-03-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=437.png>

<sup>78</sup> Daily Mashriq (Urdu), September 20, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202109200115>

<sup>79</sup> Dawn, December 11, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1663203/policeman-martyred-fc-officer-injured-in-gun-attack-on-polio-team-in-kps-tank-district>

<sup>80</sup> Daily Mashriq (Urdu), December 12, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/latest/198093/>

to the under-construction tunnel site of the 4,300-megawatt Dasu hydropower project in Upper Kohistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The bus fell into the ravine after the blast claiming 13 lives including 9 Chinese and injuring 28 others. The government initially said it could be an accident but later confirmed that traces of explosives had been detected on the wreckage of the bus and at the blast site.<sup>81</sup> Some media reports suggested East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM) and the TTP could be involved, although none of them claimed the attack. Others suggested some local group could be involved.

In another related attack targeting development project/workers, on July 13, a group of militants kidnapped five workers of a cellular company in Zaimokhet area of Kurram. The bullet-riddled body of a worker was later found in the same area. A militant commander who had joined the so-called Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province was reportedly involved in the kidnapping.<sup>82</sup>

The IS-K claimed few other attacks as well in KP (apart from the ones it conducted against security forces and political leaders as described in previous sections) hitting Afghan Taliban and a member of Sikh community. Details are given below:

- On April 19, IS-K militants gunned down an Afghan national and injured two others on GT Road, Peshawar. Some social media posts by journalists and experts claimed the deceased Nek Muhammad Rahbar, an Afghan Taliban commander, was in Peshawar to receive medical treatment.<sup>83</sup>
- In September, IS-K militants shot dead a member of the Sikh community Satnam Singh, 45, in Peshawar and fled the scene. Singh, an herbalist, had lived in the city for the past 20 years and ran a small clinic selling herbal medicine.<sup>84</sup> Police claimed it had killed the three perpetrators of the killing in an intelligence-based operation conducted in Peshawar on December 20.<sup>85</sup>
- In October, a militant, Noor Zaman, stated to be affiliated with the Haqqani Network of the Afghan Taliban was gunned down by IS-K attackers travelling in a car near Wana, the headquarters of the in South Waziristan tribal district.<sup>86</sup>

Meanwhile, a major attack targeted women members working for an NGO in North Waziristan. Reportedly, on February 22, masked terrorists shot dead four women vocational trainers working for an NGO and injured their driver near Mirali in North Waziristan tribal district. The women had proceeded from Bannu to Eppi village to give vocational training to the local women as part of a women skill development project. The

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<sup>81</sup> Dawn, July 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1635301/traces-of-explosives-found-on-dasu-bus-blast-site-govt>

<sup>82</sup> Dawn, July 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1634888/two-security-men-martyred-in-kurram-operation>

<sup>83</sup> Dawn, April 20, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1619177/afghan-shot-dead>

<sup>84</sup> Dawn, October 3, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1649777/is-claims-responsibility-for-killing-sikh-in-peshawar>

<sup>85</sup> Dawn, December 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1664927/is-commander-among-three-terrorists-killed-in-peshawar>

<sup>86</sup> Dawn, October 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1652295/militant-gunned-down-in-south-waziristan>

security forces reportedly killed the key suspect, Hassan alias Sajna of TTP Gul Bahadur group, a day later.<sup>87</sup>

## 2.2 Balochistan

Balochistan was the second most affected region by terrorism after KP where 136 people were killed and 345 others were injured in 81 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Baloch insurgents as well as religiously inspired militant groups.

Different Baloch insurgent groups remained active in the province including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), BRAS – an alliance of Baloch insurgent groups mainly including BLA, BLF and Baloch Republican Guard (BRG) – Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Baloch Republican Army (BRA), and United Baloch Army (UBA) etc. These Baloch groups perpetrated 71 attacks in Balochistan killing 95 people and wounding 234 others. The attacks by Baloch insurgent groups concentrated in 17 districts of the province but most of them were recorded in Kech (19 attacks), Quetta (18), Sibi (7) and Panjgur (6 attacks). Similarly, most attacks by Baloch insurgents targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel (47 attacks, or 66 percent); these included at least six major attacks in each of which at least four or more security personnel, mainly FC officials, lost their lives. Other targets frequently hit by Baloch insurgents included civilians (7 attacks), government officials, institutions, and state symbols (6 attacks) and non-Baloch settlers and workers (5 attacks).

Meanwhile, religiously inspired militant groups such as the TTP and the Islamic State terrorist group and some other similar unknown militants were reportedly involved in as many as 10 attacks in Balochistan. These attacks caused death to 41 people and injuries to another 111 people. Most attacks by religiously inspired militants were high-impact ones including two suicide blasts in Quetta by the TTP which killed a combined total of 10 people and injured 50 others. A single attack by the Islamic State group killed 11 coal miners in Bolan district. Out of the total 10 attacks carried out by so-called religiously inspired militants in the province, six happened in Quetta, another three in Qilla Abdullah and one in Bolan. Four of these attacks hit security forces, another three civilians, while one attack each targeted Hazara Shias, a madrassa, and an event organized by a religious-political party.

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<sup>87</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 23, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202102230101>; *Dawn*, February 24, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1609115/forces-kill-militant-involved-in-murder-of-women-vocational-trainers>

**Table 2: Terrorist Attacks in Balochistan in 2021**

<b>District</b>	<b>Attacks</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
Awaran	1	2	2
Bolan	4	15	3
Gwadar	3	7	7
Harnai	2	7	2
Kalat	2	0	4
Kech	19	18	22
Kharan	1	0	13
Khuzdar	1	0	4
Kohlu	1	1	1
Lasbela	3	1	17
Loralai	1	4	1
Mastung	1	2	1
Nushki	1	0	2
Panjgur	6	6	10
Qilla Abdullah	3	12	34
Quetta	24	42	179
Sibi	7	16	40
Ziarat	1	3	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>345</b>

As many as 51 of the reported 81 terrorist attacks in Balochistan (or about 63 percent) targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies. As many as 10 attacks apparently targeted civilians, six hit government officials/institutions and state symbols, and another five targeted non-Baloch workers and settlers. Other targets sporadically hit by terrorists in Balochistan are given at Table 2a.

**Table 2a: Targets Hit by Terrorists in Balochistan in 2021**

<b>Targets</b>	<b>No. of attacks</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts)	51	86	217
Non-Baloch settlers/workers	5	12	11
Govt. officials/institutions/symbols	6	3	42
Power pylons/cell phone towers	1		
Civilians	10	13	57
Shia religious scholars/community	1	11	0
Worship places/shrines/madrassas	1	0	1
Political leaders/workers	1	4	14
Pro-govt tribesmen/peace committee members	2	3	0
CPEC/workers/Chinese	1	3	3
Former militants	1	1	0
Development, exploration projects, companies, workers	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>345</b>

### **2.2.1 Attacks by Baloch Insurgents**

The Baloch insurgents increased frequency as well as intensity of terrorist attacks in Balochistan in 2021. Compared to 32 in the year before, different Baloch insurgent groups perpetrated 71 terrorist attacks in 17 districts of the province including 18 in provincial capital Quetta, and 19 in southwestern Kech district. The attacks by Baloch insurgents killed 95 people – compared to 59 in 2020 – and injured 234 others; those killed included 61 security personnel (33 FC men, 18 army soldiers, 5 policemen and as many Levies) and 24 civilians, besides 10 militants.

Apart from Quetta and Kech, where they launched a combined total of 37 attacks, Baloch insurgents carried out seven attacks in Sibi, six in Panjgur, and three attacks each in Gwadar, Bolan and Lasbela districts. Baloch nationalist insurgents carried out a total of 33 attacks in six southern districts including Gwadar, Kech, Lasbela, Awaran, Panjgur and Khuzdar. Other districts where Baloch insurgents perpetrated at least one attack in the year included: Awaran (1 attack), Harnai (2), Kalat (2), Kharan (1), Kohlu (1), Loralai (1), Mastung (1), Nushki (1), and Ziarat (1 attack).

Baloch insurgents employed multiple attack tactics that mainly included one suicide blast, 37 IEDs blasts, 23 incidents of firing or targeted killing, and 10 hand grenade attacks.

As noted earlier, the attacks by Baloch insurgents caused significant fatalities among security forces and law enforcement personnel (61 deaths). That was mainly since out of total 71 attacks perpetrated by Baloch insurgents in the province, as many as 47, or over 66 percent, targeted **security and law-enforcement personnel, their convoys, and check-posts**. These attacks (against security forces) were reported from 14 districts of Balochistan with 16 such attacks from Kech and another 10 from Quetta, alone.

Some relatively more intense attacks by the Baloch insurgents (mainly BLF and BLA) against security forces in the year 2021 are listed below:

- January 21: Four members of Sibi Scouts, a wing of the Frontier Corps' North Wing, were martyred and five others injured when their vehicle hit a landmine in Sangaan area of Sibi district.<sup>88</sup>
- March 7: In the coastal Gwadar district, two Pakistan Navy men were martyred, and another was injured in an attack on their vehicle in the Ganz area. The Associated Press reported that a BLA's spokesman Azad Baloch sent messages to reporters claiming the group had perpetrated the attack.<sup>89</sup>
- May 8: May 8: Militants opened fire at an FC check-post in a coalmine filed area of Margat in Bolan district with automatic weapons. As a result, three personnel lost their lives, and another suffered injuries.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Dawn, January 22, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1602816/four-soldiers-martyred-five-injured-in-sibi-landmine-blast>

<sup>89</sup> Dawn, March 8, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1611135/two-martyred-in-attack-on-pakistan-navy-vehicle-in-gwadar>; ABC News, March 7, 2021, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/gunmen-ambush-pakistan-navy-vehicle-killing-wounding-76304857>

<sup>90</sup> Dawn, May 10, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1622963/three-fc-soldiers-martyred-in-attack-on-bolan-post>

- May 31: Terrorists attacked an FC post near Pir Ismail Ziarat in Quetta leading to an exchange of fire. Five terrorists were killed while 8 were injured. Meanwhile, four FC soldiers embraced martyrdom while another 6 soldiers got injured.<sup>91</sup>
- June 14: Four soldiers from Frontier Corps, Balochistan, including a junior commissioned officer, embraced martyrdom in an IED blast on the Marget-Quetta Road. The targeted FC troops were employed on the road for security of Marget mines.<sup>92</sup>
- June 24: Five Balochistan Frontier Corps personnel were martyred after terrorists targeted a patrolling party in Sibi district's Sangan area. The FC men were deployed in the mountainous area of Sangan, some 70km between Sibi and Harnai districts.<sup>93</sup>
- July 14: Terrorists targeted a patrolling vehicle of security forces using an IED in Khuda Bakhsh Bazaar near Pasni. An officer Capt. Affan Masood and Sepoy Babar Zaman embraced martyrdom, while three others were injured.<sup>94</sup>
- August 8: Two policemen were martyred and 21 others, including 12 policemen, suffered injuries in a motorcycle bomb blast at Hali Road roundabout, near Balochistan Assembly and High Court, in Quetta. The blast targeted a police van heading to Police Lines.<sup>95</sup> The BLA was reportedly involved in the attack.
- August 26: Militants carried out a bomb attack blowing up a vehicle of security forces in Ziarat. Three Levies personnel were killed and as many others were injured in the blast.<sup>96</sup>
- September 25: Four security personnel were martyred, and two others injured in a bomb attack on a vehicle of the Frontier Corps in the Khosat area of Harnai district. The banned Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>97</sup>
- October 18: An IED blast in front of Balochistan University martyred one police official and injured 19 others including 14 policemen. The target of the blast was believed to be a police truck carrying personnel for change of security duty at the site of a students' demonstration against the Hoshab killing.<sup>98</sup>

As many as seven attacks by Baloch insurgents were apparently targeted against **civilians**, which claimed two lives and wounded 31 others. These were mostly low-scale IED blasts including two landmine blasts, which were carried out by BLF and BRA and unspecified national insurgents in Kech, Kohlu, Lasbela, Nushki, Quetta and Sibi districts. Only two of these attacks, which were landmine blasts caused deaths and the rest inflicted only injuries on the civilian victims. The reported landmine blasts happened in Sibi and Kohlu districts.

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<sup>91</sup> Dawn, June 1, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1626901/4-soldiers-martyred-8-injured-in-terrorist-attacks-in-balochistan>

<sup>92</sup> Dawn, June 15, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1629411/four-fc-men-martyred-in-ied-blast>

<sup>93</sup> Dawn, June 26, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1631496/five-fc-personnel-martyred-in-sibi-attack>

<sup>94</sup> Dawn, July 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1635299/two-security-men-martyred-in-pasni-attack>

<sup>95</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), August 8, 2021, [https://dunya.com.pk/index.php/dunya-headline/HeadLineRoznama/614008\\_1](https://dunya.com.pk/index.php/dunya-headline/HeadLineRoznama/614008_1); Dawn, August 9, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1639508/two-police-martyred-in-quetta-bike-bomb-blast>

<sup>96</sup> Express Tribune, August 26, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2317235/four-security-personnel-martyred-in-balochistan-attacks>

<sup>97</sup> Dawn, September 26, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1648430/four-soldiers-martyred-in-bomb-attack>

<sup>98</sup> Daily Mashriq (Urdu), October 19, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202110190120>; Dawn, October 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1652821/constable-martyred-in-motorcycle-blast-near-varsity>

In Sibi, on February 7, an anti-personnel mine planted in the Ghori area of Lehri went off when a woman stepped over it killing her. Two girls also received serious injuries in the blast.<sup>99</sup> Later in the year, on December 13, one person was killed, and his brother injured when their motorcycle hit a landmine and was blown up in Kahan tehsil of Kohlu district.<sup>100</sup> Separately in Hub town, an IED was placed near boundary wall of a football ground in Allabad area, which exploded when two teams were playing a match as part of the Shuhada Police Football Tournament. As many as 14 people watching the football match suffered injuries in the blast.<sup>101</sup>

Baloch insurgent groups BLF, BLA and Baloch Republican Guard targeted ***non-Baloch settlers/workers*** in five attacks claiming 12 lives and wounding 11 others. Two of these attacks took place in Sibi and one attack each happened in Khuzdar, Quetta and Harnai. Three of these attacks that caused deaths are narrated below; the other two attacks, recorded in in Khuzdar and Sibi, caused injuries to a total of six workers hailing from Punjab and KP.

- March 5: Five labourers were killed near Sibi town when the pick-up carrying them was hit with a roadside bomb blast. Five others in another vehicle were injured including 2 FC men. Laborers belonged to Punjab.<sup>102</sup>
- August 24: BLA militants gunned down four coal miners in the Marwar coalfield area, some 70 kilometres from Quetta. Three of the victims were identified as Abdul Wakeel, Hidayatur Rehman, and Gul Hakeem, who belonged to Shangla (KP province).<sup>103</sup>
- November 21: Three workers were shot dead at a coal mine in the Shahrag area of Harnai district. All the three victims were Afghan nationals and residents of Kandahar.<sup>104</sup>

Meanwhile, as many as six attacks by Baloch insurgents targeted ***government officials/institutions and/or state symbols*** causing three deaths and injuries to another 42 people.

- Two of these attacks targeted rallies taken out in Quetta and Sibi to express solidarity with the people of Occupied Kashmir on February 5. In Quetta, a ***Kashmir Solidarity Day rally***, led by former MNA Sardar Kamal Khan Bangulzai and tribal and religious leaders was targeted with an IED blast near the Deputy Commissioner's Office. The blast killed two people and injured 5 others. The IED used for the blast was planted under the truck.<sup>105</sup> In Sibi town, over 24 people, including three policemen and two

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<sup>99</sup> Dawn, February 8, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1606138/woman-killed-in-landmine-blast>

<sup>100</sup> Dawn, December 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1663647/man-killed-in-kohlu-landmine-blast>

<sup>101</sup> Dawn, April 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1618055/blast-during-football-match-leaves-14-injured-in-hub>

<sup>102</sup> Daily Azadi (Quetta), March 6, 2021; Dawn, March 6, 2021,  
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1610931/five-workers-dead-in-sibi-bomb-explosion>

<sup>103</sup> Samaa TV News, August 24, 2021, <https://www.samaa.tv/news/2021/08/four-coal-miners-killed-in-balochistans-marwar/>

<sup>104</sup> Dawn, November 22, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1659484/three-miners-gunned-down>

<sup>105</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), February 6, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-06&edition=ISL&id=5505436\\_88340601](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-06&edition=ISL&id=5505436_88340601)

- children, were injured when militants threw grenades on the observers of a similar rally at the Luni Road area.<sup>106</sup>
- Meanwhile, a total of four attacks by the Baloch insurgents targeted ***shops, stalls and pushcarts selling Pakistani flags*** for Independence Day (14th of August) in Quetta. On August 10, armed men hurled a grenade at a pushcart selling the national flags in the Sirki Road area, which exploded at the roadside. However, no loss of human life was reported. Windowpanes of shops and buildings were damaged.<sup>107</sup> On the same day, five people were injured in a grenade attack at a small shop where the national flags were hoisted in the Eastern Bypass area of Quetta. One of the injured later died in a hospital.<sup>108</sup> One day after, on August 11 to be precise, one person was injured in the third grenade attack in the Sariab Road area when motorcyclists targeted a pushcart selling the national flags.<sup>109</sup> Later on the Independence Day of Pakistan, militants threw a hand grenade at stalls on Samungli Road where Pakistani flags were being sold. Eight people were injured in the blast.<sup>110</sup>

Separately, on August 20, a convoy of ***Chinese engineers and workers*** was targeted by a suicide bomber killing two children and injuring three others including a Chinese national. Due to firing by the soldiers in plainclothes deployed as hang around security rushed to intercept the bomber, a young boy, he exploded himself about 15-20 metres away from the convoy. BLA claimed the attack.<sup>111</sup>

Baloch insurgents killed three so-called ***pro-government tribal elders*** in two attacks recorded in Kech and Lasbela. On April 25, some unidentified nationalist insurgents gunned down two supporters of a pro-government group, Syed Waris Zamrani and Dad Jan, in the Aabsar area of Turbat town in Kech district.<sup>112</sup> Later in November, a prominent political leader and government-backed tribal elder of Awaran district was killed and two other people were injured in a bomb blast in the industrial town of Hub. The banned BLA claimed the attack.<sup>113</sup>

In Kech, a ***former militant leader*** of a banned outfit was shot dead in the Balgater area in January. Identified as Mirza, son of Bakhtiar Khan, the deceased had recently surrendered to security forces after abandoning his armed struggle against the government.<sup>114</sup> On December 7, a ***mobile phone tower of Ufone*** Pakistan was

<sup>106</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), February 6, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-06&edition=ISL&id=5505436\\_88340601](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-06&edition=ISL&id=5505436_88340601)

<sup>107</sup> Dawn, August 11, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1639933/3-grenade-attacks-in-quetta-leave-1-dead-5-injured>

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), August 15, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-08-15&edition=ISL&id=5731927\\_44750528](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-08-15&edition=ISL&id=5731927_44750528)

<sup>111</sup> The News, August 21, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/880897-gwadar-suicide-attack-two-children-killed-three-injured>; Aljazeera, August 20, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/20/at-least-two-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-southwest-pakistan>

<sup>112</sup> Dawn, April 26, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1620421/two-government-supporters-gunned-down-in-turbat>

<sup>113</sup> Dawn, November 2, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1655391/tribal-elder-killed-in-bomb-blast-in-hub>

<sup>114</sup> Dawn, January 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1604042/former-militant-leader-gunned-down>

destroyed with an explosive device in Kalat. The machinery in the station was also burnt. The banned BRA had claimed the attack, according to some social media posts.<sup>115</sup>

## 2.2.2 Attacks by Religiously Inspired Militants in Balochistan

As in the year before, the TTP, IS-K, and some other militants with similar objectives carried out a total of 10 attacks in Balochistan in 2021. These attacks were mostly high-impact attacks including two suicide blasts and three vehicle-borne blasts, which in all killed 41 people and injured 111 others. Attacks by so-called religiously inspired groups largely concentrated in areas with larger Pashtun populations including six attacks in Quetta and three in Qilla Abdullah's Chaman area bordering on Afghanistan; one attack happened in Bolan district.

The year 2021 did not start well for Balochistan as on January 3rd, eleven (11) coal miners were killed by militants who kidnapped and later slaughtered them at the Mach coalfield of Bolan district, around 80km away from Quetta. All the victims belonged to **Hazara Community** of Quetta. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province later claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>116</sup>

Meanwhile, four of these attacks by religiously inspired militants targeted **security forces and law enforcement agencies** in Quetta and Qilla Abdullah, another three attacks targeted civilians again in Quetta and Qilla Abdullah, while one attack each hit a madrassa (in Quetta), coal miners belonging to Hazara Shias community (in Bolan) and workers of JUI in Quetta. As cited earlier, attacks against security and law enforcement personnel were reported from Qilla Abdullah and Quetta districts, which are narrated below:

- March 23: The TTP launched an attack in the Chaman town bordering Afghanistan. Reportedly, an IED attached to a motorcycle was detonated using a remote control targeting a police vehicle carrying the SHO of Saddar police station near the Levies Lines. Three people were killed, and 13 others injured in the blast.<sup>117</sup>
- In April, the TTP claimed two attacks in Balochistan's Quetta and Qilla Abdullah districts. In Quetta, at least five people, including the bomber, were killed and 13 others injured in a vehicle-borne suicide blast in the parking lot of Serena Hotel; the injured also included two assistant commissioners. The TTP claimed the attack saying police and law enforcement officers were the target. A previous statement by the group had claimed that local and foreign officials were the target. Reportedly Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan was staying in the hotel.<sup>118</sup> In the second attack perpetrated by the TTP, two policemen were martyred and seven others, including two policemen, were injured in a motorcycle bomb blast in Qila Abdullah. According to the police, the

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<sup>115</sup> Daily *Intekhab* (Urdu) Quetta, December 8, 2021, <https://epaper.dailyintekhab.pk/today/st/2/8/12-08-21> (page 8).

<sup>116</sup> *The Express Tribune*, January 4, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2278470/daish-claims-responsibility-for-killing-11-coal-miners-in-machh>

<sup>117</sup> *Dawn*, March 24, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1614191/three-killed-13-injured-in-chaman-bomb-blast>

<sup>118</sup> Daily *Jang* (Urdu), April 22, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/04-22-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=511.png>

- bomb strapped to the motorcycle parked at the roadside exploded when a police patrol vehicle passed by it.<sup>119</sup>
- September 5: A suicide bomber on motorcycle exploded himself near an FC check-post on Quetta-Mastung Road where over 20 FC personnel had gathered to head to Hazarganj market to provide security to Hazara vendors. Four FC men were martyred, and 18 others were injured in the blast including 16 FC personnel. The TTP claimed the attack.<sup>120</sup>

The TTP and some unknown militants with similar objectives targeted **civilians** in three attacks in Balochistan. First, at least seven people were killed, and 14 others were injured in a bomb blast in Chaman on May 21. The explosion took place during a Palestine solidarity rally taken out by the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam - Nazaryati (JUI) in Chaman's Murghi Bazaar.<sup>121</sup> On June 3, three teenage boys died, and two others suffered injuries in a hand-grenade explosion near a seminary in the Kharotabad area of Quetta. The boys, aged between 13 and 18 years, found the grenade near a graveyard and mistakenly took it as a toy and started playing with it.<sup>122</sup> Later, on December 18, a person was killed and 10 others, including women and children, were injured in a bomb blast in Quetta's busy Masjid Road area. Militants attached an explosive device to a motorcycle and parked it in the area near the Kandahar Bazaar crossing.

Separately, on June 16, unknown militants parked a motorcycle rigged with an improvised explosive device in the Ishaqabad area and detonated the IED with remote control. A passerby was injured in the blast. **Madressah Darul Uloom Sharia** was the likely target of the blast, police said.<sup>123</sup>

A major bomb explosion took place near the Science College at Jinnah Road, Quetta as soon as an event organised by **a JUI faction** ended. Four people died while 14 others sustained injuries. No one had claimed the attack until the writing of this report.

### 2.3 Sindh

In all, eight terrorist attacks took place in Sindh province including five in Karachi and 3 in interior Sindh (one attack each in Khairpur, Naushahro Firoze, and Qambar-Shahdadkot). These attacks killed a total of 13 people and injured 35 others.

Six of the reported attacks from Sindh in 2021 were perpetrated by Bloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents – mainly BLA, BLF and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) – which

<sup>119</sup> Daily Azadi (Urdu), April 29, 2021, <https://dailyazadiquetta.com/dailyazadiquetta/epaper/m/194556/608a441d8cace>; Dawn, April 29, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1620977/policeman-martyred-in-bike-bomb-blast-in-quetta>

<sup>120</sup> Daily Azadi (Urdu), September 6, 2021, <https://dailyazadiquetta.com/dailyazadiquetta/epaper/m/198056/6135966e3143c>

<sup>121</sup> Dunya (Urdu), May 22, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-05-22&edition=ISL&id=5632097\\_96120778](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-05-22&edition=ISL&id=5632097_96120778); Dawn, May 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1624892/at-least-6-killed-in-blast-at-palestine-solidarity-rally-in-chaman>

<sup>122</sup> Dawn, June 4, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1627426/toy-grenade-blast-leaves-three-teenage-boys-dead>

<sup>123</sup> Dawn, June 17, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1629760/man-injured-in-blast-near-seminary-in-quetta>

claimed two lives and wounded 21 people. In Karachi, the banned Baloch group BLF carried out two attacks against Chinese nationals while BLA perpetrated one attack targeting Rangers. The Sindhi insurgent group SRA carried out three attacks including one in each of three districts of interior Sindh cited earlier targeting security forces, a railways track, and political leaders.

Apart from nationalist insurgents, some unknown militant group as well as a Shia sectarian group, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), also carried out one attack each in Karachi; while the attack by the former targeted a mini truck carrying family members of a Jamaat-e-Islami leader hailing from Swat, the SMP militants shot and injured a renowned Sunni scholar Mufti Saleemullah Khan, belonging to the Binnori Town seminary.

**Table 3: Terrorist Attacks in Sindh in 2021**

Types of Attacks	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
By nationalist insurgents	6	2	21
By Taliban and similar militants	1	11	13
Terrorist attacks [sectarian-related]	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>35</b>

Regional distribution of terrorist attacks in Sindh in the year 2021 is given at Table 3a.

**Table 3a: Regional Distribution of Terrorist Attacks in Sindh**

Location	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Karachi	5	12	31
Khairpur	1	0	3
Naushahro Firoze	1	0	0
Qambar-Shahdadkot	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>35</b>

### 2.3.1 Karachi

**Baloch nationalist insurgents** carried out three terrorist attacks in Karachi in 2021; the banned BLF perpetrated two targeted attacks against Chinese nationals/engineers, and the BLA hit a vehicle of security forces with a vehicle-borne blast. The violent Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan was reportedly involved in a single reported sectarian-related terrorist attack. Meanwhile, some unknown militants threw hand grenades in a mini truck carrying family members of a Jamaat-e-Islami causing 11 deaths.

The attacks by the Baloch insurgents caused one death and injuries to another 17 people. On March 9, a Chinese man survived an armed attack on his car and a passer-by was shot at and wounded in Lyari. Jason Yahoo, 26, worked for a Chinese firm associated with the Sindh Solid Waste Management Board and visited Lyari reportedly to assess the cleanliness

situation and disposal of waste along with two locals in a car.<sup>124</sup> The banned BLF was believed to be involved in the attack. A week later, a bomb planted in a motorcycle went off when a Rangers vehicle passed through Orangi Town area of Karachi. One Rangers man was martyred and 14 others including 4 Rangers were injured in the blast. Responsibility for the blast was claimed by the banned Baloch Liberation Army.<sup>125</sup> Later in July, a Chinese engineer was shot at and wounded in a moving car by gunmen riding a motorbike in the SITE area where he was supposed to repair imported machinery. A Baloch insurgent group, BLF, claimed the attack.<sup>126</sup>

Meanwhile one **sectarian-related attack** took place in Karachi. A religious scholar, Mufti Saleemullah Khan, 40, belonging to the Binnori Town seminary in the Gurumandir area was shot at and wounded in a suspected sectarian attack in Orangi Town, Karachi.<sup>127</sup>

A high-impact attack took place in Karachi on August 14. As many as 11 people, including children and women, were killed, and several others wounded when some unknown motorcyclists reportedly threw a grenade or cracker in a mini truck. The victim family belonged to a Jamaat-e-Islami leader hailing from Swat. The bomb disposal squad said that they had found pieces of a "Russian-manufactured grenade – RGD-1".<sup>128</sup>

### 2.3.2 Interior Sindh

Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army perpetrated three attacks in interior Sindh, including one attack in each of Khairpur, Naushahro Firoze and Qambar-Shahdadkot districts. In all one person was killed and four others were wounded in these attacks. Details are as under:

- March 23: In Khairpur district of interior Sindh three persons, including Rangers personnel, were critically wounded in a cracker attack on a paramilitary force vehicle in the city. Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army claimed the attack.<sup>129</sup>
- October 6: An IED blast damaged more than 2 feet railway track near Padidan area of Noushahro Firoze. The blast, caused by a remote controlled 1kg IED, happened just after two trains had crossed the targeted track.<sup>130</sup>
- November 27: PTI's Qambar Shahdadkot senior vice president Sakhawat Rajput was shot dead, and his nephew Zubair Rajput was wounded, in an attack near Lalurounk town, some 30 kilometres from Qambar Shahdadkot.<sup>131</sup> The banned Sindhudesh

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<sup>124</sup> Dawn, March 10, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1611605/passer-by-hurt-chinese-man-escapes-assassination-bid-in-lyari>

<sup>125</sup> Dawn, March 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1612735/rangers-man-martyred-in-orangi-blast>

<sup>126</sup> Dawn, July 29, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1637510/chinese-engineer-wounded-in-gun-attack-on-car-in-karachi-blf-claims-responsibility>

<sup>127</sup> Dawn, April 1, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1615764/religious-scholar-shot-at-wounded-in-sectarian-attack-in-karachi>

<sup>128</sup> The News, August 15, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/878600-11-killed-in-karachi-grenade-attack>

<sup>129</sup> Dawn, March 24, 2021, [https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailNews.php?StoryText=24\\_03\\_2021\\_115\\_009](https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailNews.php?StoryText=24_03_2021_115_009)

<sup>130</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), October 7, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-10-07&edition=ISL&id=5798233\\_49179264](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-10-07&edition=ISL&id=5798233_49179264)

<sup>131</sup> Dawn, November 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1660625/senior-pti-activist-in-qambar-shahdadkot-shot-dead>

Liberation Army (SRA) claimed the attack saying the victim was a Punjabi settler spying for security agencies.

## 2.4 Punjab & Islamabad

As many as five (5) terrorist attacks took place in Punjab which claimed 14 lives and injured 51 people. Two of these attacks were perpetrated by the TTP in Rawalpindi, which killed two and injured five policemen. Some unknown militants carried out an IED blast near the residence of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed in Lahore killing three people. Meanwhile, six people were murdered while five others sustained injuries by the firing of a religiously inspired extremist individual in DG Khan. In a sectarian-related terrorist attack reported from Bahawalnagar, two persons were killed, and 24 others injured in a grenade attack on an Ashura procession.

Two terrorist attacks were recorded in Islamabad in which the banned TTP killed three policemen and injured two others. (*See Table 2*)

**Table 4: Terrorist Attacks in Punjab in 2021**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Bahawalnagar	1	2	21
Dera Ghazi Khan	1	7	5
Lahore	1	3	20
Rawalpindi	2	2	5
<b>Punjab Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>51</b>
Islamabad	2	3	2
<b>Total Islamabad &amp; Punjab</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>53</b>

In what was described as Pakistan's lone-wolf attack, six people were murdered while five others sustained injuries by the firing of a man in Sheikhani Bridge area of **DG Khan** on February 20. The attacker was also later killed in a police encounter near Shah Sadar Din; some said his relatives killed him.<sup>132</sup> According to local accounts, the attacker, identified as Ghulam Fareed, was a violent radical. A video was also making rounds on social media in which he can be seen pronouncing Allah-o-Akbar while resorting to firing in the bazaar.

Meanwhile the TTP claimed two attacks reported from **Rawalpindi**. On March 7, the Racecourse Station House Officer (SHO) Inspector Mian Imran was martyred in a targeted attack in Rawalpindi. The SHO along with his wife and two children was heading home in his car when some motorcycle riders opened fire on him on the main road opposite to the gymkhana.<sup>133</sup> In December, a policeman died and two others were injured when militants on a motorcycle opened fire at a patrolling party in the Pirwadhai area of Rawalpindi. Later

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<sup>132</sup> *The News*, February 21, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/amp/793450-six-die-five-injured-in-dg-khan-firing>

<sup>133</sup> *Dawn*, March 8, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1611221/racecourse-sho-martyred-in-gun-attack>

on, daily *Jang* claimed 5 officials were injured in the targeted attack. Some social media posts said the TTP had claimed the attack; other said IS-K had also claimed the attack.

A sectarian-related attack was recorded in **Bahawalnagar**, South Punjab during the month of Moharram. Two persons were killed, and 24 others injured in a grenade attack on an Ashura procession at Jinnah Colony, Bahawalnagar. The explosion took place near the Jamia Masjid of Jinnah Colony, Jail Road and it led to a stampede.<sup>134</sup>

In **Lahore**, at least three people were killed, and 20 others injured in an IED blast near the residence of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed in Johar Town, Lahore. Police said the explosive device was planted in a vehicle to target a police post.<sup>135</sup> Later, investigators said intelligence agencies of some hostile countries were believed to be behind the attack, with an implied reference to India and Afghanistan. The tactic and explosives used in the attack also hinted at the same.

Similarly, militants on a motorcycle opened fire on a police patrolling party in G-13 sector of **Islamabad**. Head constable Qasim was martyred while two other policemen, sub-inspector Jameel and constable Qaisar, were injured. The TTP claimed this attack, too, whose sub-groups Jamaautul Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar have operational presence in twin cities of Islamabad-Rawalpindi and also Punjab.<sup>136</sup> In another attack reported from the federal capital, two policemen were shot dead in Shams Colony area of the federal capital. The victims, members of Eagle Squad, were on a routine patrol when militants opened fire on them and managed to escape. The TTP claimed the attack.<sup>137</sup>

## 2.5 Protests and Clashes with Security Forces

Clashes between the **Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)** protestors and security forces were recorded in mostly Punjab's major cities on at least six occasions in which 24 people lost their lives including 10 police officials and hundreds of others were injured. These clashes mainly took place in Lahore, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, among other cities.

First these clashes erupted in April following the arrest of the TLP leader Saad Hussain Rizvi. Rizvi along with his supporters had called on the government to fulfil its commitment made in February to his party to expel the French envoy before April 20 over the publication in France of depictions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The government however said it had only committed to discuss the matter in Parliament.

On April 12, at least two people were killed and several others, including policemen, injured when violence erupted in major cities of the country following the arrest of Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) chief Allama Saad Hussain Rizvi, a day after he demanded that the federal government expel the ambassador of France over blasphemous caricatures.<sup>138</sup> The protests continued on the following day when six more people lost their lives including

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<sup>134</sup> *Dawn*, August 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1641688/dsp-other-officers-suspended-after-bahawalnagar-grenade-attack>

<sup>135</sup> *The News*, June 24, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/854290-3-martyred-in-blast-near-hafiz-saeed-s-house>

<sup>136</sup> *Daily Express (Urdu)*, March 7, 2021, <https://www.express.pk/story/2151922/1/?a>

<sup>137</sup> *Dawn*, June 4, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1627422/late-night-attack-leaves-2-cops-dead-in-islamabad>

<sup>138</sup> *Dawn*, April 13, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1617910/two-killed-as-violence-erupts-after-tlp-chiefs-arrest>

three policemen in fierce clashes which broke out in different parts of the country, mainly Punjab, between charged activists of the TLP and law enforcement agencies. Over 300 policemen in Punjab, including 97 in Lahore, had sustained injuries, many of them seriously. One injured policeman Dilbar Hussain died on May 4 in a hospital in Hafizabad.<sup>139</sup> Later, on April 18, three people were killed and hundreds of others, including 15 policemen, injured in a clash between workers of the banned TLP and police at Yateem Khana Chowk, Lahore. According to police, TLP activists attacked the Nawan Kot Police Station and took over dozen policemen hostage which led to the clash.<sup>140</sup>

In October, the TLP workers and supporters again started protesting to urge the government to release their leader Rizvi as well as honor its agreement made with the group. The protests and rallies continued until the government released the TLP leader on November 18. Before that Pakistani government had already lifted a ban on the TLP as per the new agreement it made with the group leaders, whose details still remain shrouded in mystery.

In October and November, three armed clashes between TLP protestors and police claimed 12 lives including of six policemen. On October 22, two policemen and two workers of the banned Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) were killed and several others injured after fierce clashes erupted between the TLP protesters and law enforcement agencies at Chauburji Chowk, Lahore.<sup>141</sup> Few days later, police claimed the TLP protesters opened straight firing at policemen, leaving at least four dead and 263 injured; independent sources put the number at 2; another injured policeman died later on November 1 raising the death toll to 3. Meanwhile, a TLP MPA from Sindh Assembly claimed that four of their members died due to police torture and firing.<sup>142</sup> Later, on November 2, Wazirabad police found the dead body of a policeman Adnan Ahsan Butt lying in a field near Wadala Cheema village who was allegedly kidnapped and tortured to death by workers of the proscribed Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan, reportedly on October 31st.<sup>143</sup>

## 2.6 Suicide Attacks

One more than the year before, as many as five (5) suicide attacks happened in 2021 – three in Balochistan and two in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These attacks claimed 30 lives – compared to 26 in 2020 – and injured 85 others.

The TTP was involved in three of these attacks, which targeted security forces in Serena Hotel, Quetta, an FC check-post on Quetta-Mastung Road, and a bus of Chinese workers in Kohistan district of KP. Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K) claimed a suicide blast

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<sup>139</sup> Dawn, April 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1618066/4-die-as-tlp-activists-clash-with-police>; Dawn, May 5, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1622072/constable-injured-in-tlp-clash-dies>

<sup>140</sup> Dawn, April 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1619055/tlp-storms-lahore-police-station-takes-dsp-four-cops-hostage>

<sup>141</sup> Reuters, October 22, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/three-pakistani-police-killed-clashes-with-banned-islamists-2021-10-22>; Dawn, October 23,

2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1653515/two-cops-as-many-tlp-workers-die-in-lahore-clashes>

<sup>142</sup> The Express Tribune, October 28, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2326623/four-police-men-martyred-as-tlp-resumes-march-on-islamabad>; Dawn, November 2,

2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1655360/another-police-man-injured-in-tlp-attack-dies>

<sup>143</sup> Dawn, November 3, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1655628/wazirabad-police-find-body-of-constable-kidnapped-tortured-by-tlp-protesters>

reported from Bajaur tribal district targeting a bus carrying voters. Similarly, Baloch insurgent group BLA perpetrated a suicide attack near Gwadar targeting a convoy of Chinese workers.

Those killed in suicide attacks in 2021 included 19 civilians, six security personnel, as well as five suicide bombers. Those injured included 69 civilians, and 16 FC soldiers.

**Table 5: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2021**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Gwadar	1	3	3
Quetta	2	10	50
<b>Balochistan Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>53</b>
Kohistan	1	14	28
Bajaur	1	3	4
<b>KP Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Pakistan Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>85</b>

These suicide blasts are re-narrated below, despite their description in respective sections on regional security landscapes.

- April 21: At least five people, including the bomber, were killed and 13 others suffered injuries in a vehicle-borne suicide blast in the parking lot of Serena Hotel, Quetta. The injured also included two assistant commissioners. The banned TTP claimed the attack saying police and law enforcement officers were the target.<sup>144</sup>
- July 14: A blast hit the bus carrying about 30 Chinese workers from the workers' camp to the under-construction tunnel site of the 4,300-megawatt Dasu hydropower project in Upper Kohistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The bus fell into the ravine after the blast claiming 13 lives including 9 Chinese and injuring 28 others. The government initially said it could be an accident but later confirmed that traces of explosives had been detected on the wreckage of the bus and at the blast site. Later investigation revealed it was a suicide attack perpetrated by the TTP and ETIM militants.<sup>145</sup>
- August 20: A convoy of Chinese engineers and workers was targeted by a suicide bomber killing two children and injuring three others including a Chinese national. Due to firing by the soldiers in plainclothes deployed as hang around security rushed to intercept the bomber, a young boy, he exploded himself about 15-20 metres away from the convoy. BLA claimed the attack.<sup>146</sup>
- September 5: A suicide bomber on motorcycle exploded himself near an FC check-post on Quetta-Mastung Road where over 20 FC personnel had gathered to head to

<sup>144</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), April 22, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/04-22-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=511.png>

<sup>145</sup> Dawn, July 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1635301/traces-of-explosives-found-on-dasu-bus-blast-site-govt>

<sup>146</sup> The News, August 21, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/880897-gwadar-suicide-attack-two-children-killed-three-injured>; Aljazeera, August 20, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/20/at-least-two-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-southwest-pakistan>

- Hazarganji market to provide security to Hazara vendors. Four FC men were martyred, and 18 others were injured in the blast including 16 FC personnel. The TTP claimed the attack.<sup>147</sup>
- December 19: Two persons were martyred, and six others sustained injuries in a suicide bomb blast in Kamarsar area in Loy Mamond tehsil in Bajaur tribal district. The vehicle was carrying voters to the polling station to cast votes in the first-ever local government elections in ex-FATA. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) claimed the responsibility.<sup>148</sup>

## 2.7 Faith-based Violence

Compared to eight (8) in 2020, as many as seven (7) incidents of communal or faith-based violence were recorded in Pakistan in 2021, claiming the lives of a Sri Lankan national and a member of Ahmedvi community and injuring eight others including seven policemen and one blasphemy-accused.

While in the year before, most of such attacks took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, during the year under review five incidents of faith-based violence happened in Punjab (one each in Sialkot, Multan, Rahim Yar Khan, Rawalpindi and Sheikhupura districts) and one incident each took place in Islamabad and Charsadda (KP). In four of the reported seven incidents of faith-based violence, enraged mobs hit or intended to hit blasphemy-accused individuals (which also included a highly ill-famed killing by mobs of a Sri Lankan manager at a factory in Sialkot). In another two such incidents, two Hindu temples were vandalized, while in one such violent incident a member of Ahmedvi community was shot dead.

**Table 6: Incidents of Faith-based Violence in Pakistan in 2021**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Charsadda	1	0	0
Islamabad	1	0	7
Multan	1	0	1
Rahim Yar Khan	1	0	0
Rawalpindi	1	0	0
Sheikhupura	1	1	0
Sialkot	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>

Details on these incidents are narrated below in chronological order:

- March 28: An incident of faith-based violence was also recorded in Rawalpindi. As reported in media, a group of unidentified people attacked an over 100-year-old **Hindu temple** at Purana Qila area of the city causing damage to its ongoing renovation work,

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<sup>147</sup> Daily Azadi (Urdu), September 6, 2021, <https://dailyazadiquetta.com/dailyazadiquetta/epaper/m/198056/6135966e3143c>

<sup>148</sup> The News, December 20, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/918253-two-killed-as-suicide-bomber-hits-anp-vehicle-in-bajaur>

- stairs, and doors. A renovation work was recently started after the temple was cleared of encroachments.<sup>149</sup>
- May 18: However, in an incident of faith-based mob violence, tens of people armed with batons, weapons and stones attacked the Golra police station (Islamabad) and asked the police to hand over an alleged **blasphemy suspect** to them. The mob pelted the police with stones and fired straight shots at them. A constable sustained bullet injury while seven other policemen were injured after being hit by stones.<sup>150</sup>
  - July 13: A man **accused of blasphemy** was injured after the brother of the complainant allegedly opened fire on him while he was going to attend the hearing of the case lodged against him.<sup>151</sup>
  - August 4: Hundreds of people reportedly vandalized a **Hindu temple** in Bhong town (60km from Rahim Yar Khan) and blocked the Sukkur-Multan Motorway (M-5) after a nine-year old Hindu boy, who allegedly urinated in a local seminary, was granted bail by a local court.
  - November 28: An incident of faith-based violence also took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during the month under review. Reportedly, riots broke out in Tangi tehsil of the district after alleged burning of the Holy Quran at a mosque as protesters destroyed the area's main police station, four posts and several residential quarters of police besides multiple vehicles. The protesters were demanding handing over of the **blasphemy accused** whom the police shifted to some safe place.<sup>152</sup>
  - December 3: **A Sri Lankan manager** at a factory in Sialkot was beaten and lynched to death by a mob over allegations of blasphemy. The deceased allegedly removed some posters with religious content from a wall and put them into a dustbin. The Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan, which was linked to the gory incident by social media users, distanced itself from the lynching.<sup>153</sup>

## 2.8 Border Attacks

Posting a phenomenal decline of about 82 percent from the year before, as many as 23 cross-border attacks took place in Pakistan from across its borders with Afghanistan (14 attacks), India (8) and Iran (one attack). As many as 16 people lost their lives in these attacks, compared to 62 in the year before; another 26 were also injured. Those 16 Pakistani citizens killed in cross-border attacks included nine security forces personnel and three civilians.

The reported decline in such incidents was mainly contributed by a significant decline in Indian violations of the Line of Control (LoC) ceasefire in 2021. In February, Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement at the Line of Control and agreed to address the 'core issues' that could undermine peace and stability. Only two

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<sup>149</sup> Dawn, March 29, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1615228/100-year-old-temple-attacked-in-rawalpindi>

<sup>150</sup> Dawn, May 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1624407/rangers-deployed-in-golra-after-mob-attack-on-police-station>

<sup>151</sup> Dawn, July 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1634983/blasphemy-suspect-injured-in-firing-en-route-to-court-in-multan>

<sup>152</sup> Dawn, November 29, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1660814/riots-erupt-in-charsadda-amid-allegation-of-quran-desecration>

<sup>153</sup> The News, December 4, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/913862-religious-sacrilege-charge-sri-lankan-beaten-to-death-body-burnt>; Dawn, December 3, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1661878/ghastly-murder-of-lankan-man-in-sialkot-shames-nation>

out of the reported eight cross-border attacks from Indian side happened after February 2021. Out of these eight attacks perpetrated by Indian BSF – which killed one civilian and one army soldier besides wounding six civilians – seven concentrated along the LoC in AJK (mainly in Bhimber, Kotli and Muzaffarabad districts) while one attack happened in Sialkot along the Working Boundary with India.

Meanwhile compared to 11 cross-border attacks reported from Afghanistan in 2020, as many as 14 such attacks took place in 2021 including 12 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including 5 in Bajaur, 4 in North Waziristan, and one attack each in Kurram, Lower Dir, and Mohmand) and two in Qilla Abdullah and Zhob districts of Balochistan. With the exception of two attacks reportedly launched by the Afghan security forces, all other attacks cross-border attacks from Afghan side were perpetrated by the TTP and affiliates, killing in all 11 security personnel and two civilians. One cross-border attack also took place from across the Pak-Iran border in which terrorists targeted an FC border post from Iranian territory killing one FC man and injuring another one.

**Table 7: Border Attacks/Clashes in 2021**

Nature of Attack	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Pak-Afghan border	14	13	19
Pak-India border	8	2	6
Pak-Iran border	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>26</b>

### 2.8.1 Pak-Afghan

As cited earlier, 14 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan took place inside Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (12 attacks) and Balochistan (2 attacks) provinces. These attacks claimed 13 lives – 5 FC men, 5 army soldiers, one paramilitary soldier and 2 civilians – and injured 19 others including eight civilians and 11 security officials. Most of these cross-border attacks happened in Bajaur and North Waziristan districts. Bajaur and neighboring Lower Dir lie in the east and south of Kunar province of Afghanistan where reportedly TTP has established long concentrations and influence in recent years. Similarly, North Waziristan lies to south of Khost province of Afghanistan, which also has significant presence of the Pakistani Taliban militants.

In **January**, two cross-border attacks from Afghanistan happened in Bajaur and Mohmand tribal districts. An FC soldier Fazal Wahid embraced martyrdom in Mohmand in an exchange of fire with terrorists based across the border in Afghanistan on January 6.<sup>154</sup> Separately, two shops were destroyed when mortar shells fired from Afghanistan's Kunar province landed in two border localities of Mamond tehsil in Bajaur tribal district.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Dawn, January 7, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1600111/fc-man-martyred-in-terrorist-firing>

<sup>155</sup> Dawn, January 20, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1602449/two-bajaur-shops-destroyed-in-mortar-attack>

The TTP militants continued cross-border attacks in Bajaur perpetrating at least one such attack in each of the months of February and March. In **February**, a seven-year-old child was killed, and seven other children were wounded when several mortar shells fired from Afghanistan's Kunar province landed in three border localities of Mamond region. In **March**, a man was injured after two mortars fired from Afghanistan landed in a border locality of Mamond tehsil of Bajaur.<sup>156</sup> The authorities termed it an act of aggression committed from the Afghanistan side suggesting that unlike most of such attacks in past this time there was no involvement of militants in the reported cross-border attack. Similarly, in **April**, too, a single cross-border attack took place from across the Afghan border but this time in Balochistan. Reportedly, Pakistani security forces were fencing the border at Killay Lucman area of Chaman when Afghan security forces tried to disrupt the fencing process that led to exchange of fire that continued for one hour. But no loss of life was reported.<sup>157</sup>

In **May**, Pakistani Taliban militants, mainly the TTP, carried out three cross-border attacks from Afghanistan in Bajaur and North Waziristan districts of KP and Zhob district of Balochistan, claiming the lives of five security personnel of Pakistan army and paramilitary FC. The reported cross-border attacks from Afghanistan in May 2021 are narrated below:

- May 5: The TTP terrorists ambushed FC troops from Afghanistan when they were moving to carry out fencing at the Pak-Afghan border in Manzakai sector of Zhob district. Four soldiers of Frontier Corps embraced Shahadat while six others got injured in the ambush, the ISPR said.<sup>158</sup>
- May 7: Pakistani Taliban militants sheltered in Afghanistan opened fire on Pakistani security forces patrolling bordering region in Bajaur. An army soldier was injured in the ensuing exchange of fire.<sup>159</sup>
- May 22: Pakistani Taliban militants sheltered in Afghanistan opened fire on a security check post in border area of North Waziristan. A 32-year-old soldier Omar Daraz was martyred.<sup>160</sup>

A single such attack happened in **June** in which the TTP militants sheltered in Afghanistan's Paktika province opened fire on a military post in the Dwatoi area of North Waziristan. Two soldiers, Havaldar Saleem and Lance Naik Pervaiz, embraced martyrdom in the ensuing exchange of fire. Two more soldiers were injured.<sup>161</sup> In **July**, However, in wake of the volatile situation across the border in Afghanistan, Pakistan moved the Frontier Constabulary, Levies Force and other militias from the frontline positions and deployed **regular army troops to man the border.**

In **August**, four cross-border attacks took place from across the Afghan border claiming

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<sup>156</sup> Dawn, March 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1615089/man-hurt-in-bajaur-mortar-attack>

<sup>157</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), April 27, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/04-27-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=946.png>

<sup>158</sup> Dawn, May 6, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1622309/four-fc-men-martyred-in-firing-by-afghan-based-gunned>

<sup>159</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), May 8, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/05-08-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=538.png>

<sup>160</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), May 23, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-05-23&edition=ISL&id=5633665\\_22534502](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-05-23&edition=ISL&id=5633665_22534502)

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

two lives and injuring as many others in parts of KP. The proscribed TTP carried out all these attacks, which targeted security forces and civilians in bordering regions of Lower Dir, Bajaur and North Waziristan districts. On August 8, terrorists from inside Afghanistan opened fire on a Pakistan military post in Dewagar, North Waziristan district. The army responded and during the ensuing exchange of fire, one soldier got injured.<sup>162</sup> Later in the month, a villager Bahadur Khan was killed after the TTP terrorists opened fire on the border locality of Mamond tehsil of Bajaur tribal district from across the Afghan border.<sup>163</sup> On August 26, one paramilitary soldier, Havaldar Gul Ameer of Dir Scouts, embraced martyrdom when terrorists attacked a check-post from across the Afghan border in Lower Dir.<sup>164</sup> One day after, militants from across the border attacked a security check post in Dattakhel injuring a soldier Asif Jehanzeb.<sup>165</sup>

In **October**, one cross-border terrorist attack happened in Kurram. Reportedly, terrorists from Afghanistan attempted to cross the fence along the Pak-Afghan border in Kurram tribal district. Troops engaged the attackers and thwarted their attempt; however, during intense exchange of fire Lance Naik Asad Ali and Sepoy Asif embraced martyrdom.<sup>166</sup>

Meanwhile, **early November** Pakistan opened the Chaman border crossing with Afghanistan after keeping it closed for about a month. Both countries have apparently sorted out things to put an end to the standoff that also caused heavy losses to traders besides keeping thousands stranded. Pakistani authorities had originally closed the borders due to security threats, but disputes over issues ranging from COVID-19 to the validity of Afghan travel documents prevented reopening for weeks, despite pledges of action.<sup>167</sup>

### 2.8.2 Pak-India

Compared to 114 in the year before, Indian BSF carried out eight (8) attacks across the LoC and Sialkot Working Boundary. These attacks claimed two lives – compared to 45 in 2020 – and inflicted injuries on another six people. Most of these attacks happened in January 2021. In February, Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement that significantly contributed in the reduction of cross-border violence. (*See Chart 4*)

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<sup>162</sup> Daily *Dunya* (Urdu), August 9, 2021, <https://dunya.com.pk/index.php/pakistan/2021-08-09/1865359>

<sup>163</sup> *Dawn*, August 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1641745/villager-killed-in-firing-from-across-afghan-border>


<sup>164</sup> *Dawn*, August 27, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1642848/dir-scouts-man-martyred-in-attack>

<sup>165</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), August 28, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202108280118>

<sup>166</sup> *Dawn*, October 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1654445/eight-embrace-martyrdom-as-terrorist-attacks-rise-in-kp>

<sup>167</sup> "Pakistan reopens Chaman border crossing to Afghanistan," Reuters, November 2, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-reopens-chaman-border-crossing-afghanistan-2021-11-02/>

**Chart 4: Trends of Cross-border Attacks from India in 2021**



As cited earlier, over 75 percent of the reported cross-border attacks from Indian side happened before the two countries' February declaration to observe the 2003 ceasefire agreement. The cross-border attacks reported from India in January 2021 are given below in chronological order:

- January 2: Indian border security force resorted to firing and shelling in bordering villages of Khuiratta sector of Kotli district but no loss of life or damage to property was reported.<sup>168</sup>
- January 2: The ISPR said Pakistan Army troops shot down an Indian spying quadcopter in Chakothi Sector along LOC. Another Indian quadcopter was shot down by Pakistan Army in Nausherri Sector along LOC.<sup>169</sup>
- January 10: Indian troops resorted to ceasefire violation in Baroh and Khanjar sectors along the LoC in Bhimber district. Mohammad Khalil, 65, and his spouse Faryad Bibi, 58, were wounded in the shelling in Khaitar Baroh village.<sup>170</sup>
- January 14: One soldier of Pakistan Army, Sepoy Nabeel Liaquat, was martyred as Indian troops initiated unprovoked ceasefire violation along LoC in Dewa Sector.<sup>171</sup>
- January 23: Indian BSF resorted to shelling in multiple villages in Khuriratta sector damaging several houses and killing cattle heads.<sup>172</sup>

In **February** 2021, a single cross-border attack wounded four people in Kotli district along

<sup>168</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), January 3, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/01-03-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=429.png>

<sup>169</sup> Dawn, January 3, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1599334>

<sup>170</sup> Dawn, January 11, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1600884/couple-wounded-in-indian-shelling>

<sup>171</sup> The News, January 15, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/774519-waziristan-locfour-soldiers-martyred>

<sup>172</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), January 24, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/01-24-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=622.png>

the LoC. In a surprisingly pleasant development, Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the **2003 ceasefire arrangement** at the Line of Control and agreed to address the 'core issues' that could undermine peace and stability. An announcement in that regard was made in a joint statement by the militaries of the two countries on a 'hotline contact' between their directors general military operations (DGMOs). The statement said the two sides had concurred on reviving the existing mechanisms — hotline contact and flag meetings — for dealing with "any unforeseen situation or misunderstanding".<sup>173</sup> While Pakistan's foreign minister termed the agreement a positive development, India said it desired normal neighborly relations with Pakistan. The statement also talked about the commitment to addressing core issues bedeviling the ties, which many see as a glimmer of hope for both countries reengaging in bilateral talks. Nonetheless, experts counted multiple factors that contributed in influencing India for the agreement including Covid-induced financial crisis, growing tension with China, and the US pressure, etc.

In **March**, Pakistan army chief stated that it was time that the two countries buried the past and moved on. With regard to border security, in particular, a brigade command level flagstaff meeting was also held in March between the military officers of Pakistan and India at the Rawalakot - Poonch border crossing point. The meeting was held to review the implementation of the points of the ceasefire agreement that was reached between the directors-general of military operations (DGMOs) of the two countries earlier in February.<sup>174</sup>

In **May**, Indian border security force reportedly violated the ceasefire agreement first time since February when both sides had agreed to observe restraint. The reported incident of cross-border attack happened in Sialkot, along the Working Boundary. Reportedly, 15 Indian BSF troops with three tractors crossed Sialkot Working Boundary and started ploughing on Pakistani side. When Pakistani Rangers Punjab troops tried to persuade BSF troops to return through loud hailer and whistles, Indian BSF troops responded by firing small arms and mortars at Pakistani post without any provocation.<sup>175</sup>

In **August**, *The Hindu* quoted a senior Indian security official to claim that "around 140 terrorists [we]re waiting at launch pads to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir and the terror infrastructure across the Line of Control (LoC) remain[ed] in place even though India and Pakistan agreed in February to a ceasefire." The report also said that the ceasefire agreement was more important for Pakistan to get off the FATF grey list and questioned Pakistan's sincerity in that regard.<sup>176</sup> Pakistan issued a categorial rejection of the report. Foreign Office spokesperson Zahid Hafeez Chaudhri said: "We categorically reject the baseless allegations that Pakistan wanted to infiltrate so-called 'terrorists' via the Line of Control (LoC)," adding that India's "smear campaign against Pakistan is well-known and was fully exposed" by EU DisinfoLab last year in its investigation titled Indian Chronicles. He also stated that the ceasefire agreement of 2003, to which both countries had

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<sup>173</sup> Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Pakistan, India agrees on LoC ceasefire," *Dawn*, February 26, 2021.

<sup>174</sup> "Pakistan, India brigade commanders hold meeting at LoC," *The Express Tribune*, March 26, 2021.

<sup>175</sup> Daily *Jang* (Urdu), May 5, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/05-05-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=51.png>

<sup>176</sup> "Around 140 terrorists waiting at launch pads across LoC despite ceasefire: official," *The Hindu*, August 6, 2021, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/around-140-terrorists-waiting-at-launch-pads-across-loc-despite-ceasefire-official/article35756152.ece>

committed early this year, was [done] "in the interest of regional peace and security and to save Kashmiri lives".<sup>177</sup>

### 2.8.3 Pak-Iran

A single cross-border attack was recorded inside Pakistan in 2021 from Iranian side of the Pakistani border. Terrorists targeted an FC border post from Iranian territory with small arms fire in Chukab area of Balochistan. Sepoy Maqbool Shah embraced martyrdom while another soldier was injured in the firing. The Iranian authorities had been informed of the incident.<sup>178</sup>

Situation at the Pakistani-Iranian border **remained tense in February**. There were conflicting accounts of the killing of two Iranian nationals at the border with Pakistan. While Iran said the shooting happened in Pakistan, the Pakistani border officials said Iranian forces fired at people involved in the illegal oil trade. The killings led to protests that spread across the southeastern Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan.<sup>179</sup> Apart from operations against smugglers and illegal traders, Iranian forces usually also target the Iranian Baluch insurgents, who it claims crosses into Pakistan after launching attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan. Meanwhile Pakistan also often raises concerns about the Pakistani Baloch insurgents' finding shelter across the border in Iran and planning attacks against Pakistani security forces. Pakistan is also fencing its borders with Afghanistan and Iran.

In June, Pakistani and Iranian border authorities held a **joint meeting at Raahdari Gate in Taftan**. The officials discussed border-related issues and it was decided that security would be further beefed up on the Pak-Iran border between Taftan and Mir Javeh. They also discussed the issue of the prolonged closure of Zero Point Gate, which is used for local tax-free trade between Pakistan and Iran.<sup>180</sup>

Meanwhile border security was also among the top agenda items of the **11th session of the Pak-Iran Bilateral Political Consultations** held at the Foreign Office, Islamabad, early October. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Dr Ali Bagheri Kani and Foreign Secretary Sohail Mahmood led their respective sides at the talks. The media reported Mr Kani as saying that the "two neighbouring countries were having a continued engagement on border security." About the recent incidents on Pak-Iran border, he said there were "minor issues" that too were discussed in the meeting.<sup>181</sup> Terrorists had on September 28 attacked a Pakistani border post from Iranian territory in which a border guard was martyred. Pakistan had then lodged a protest with Iranian authorities.

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<sup>177</sup> Naveed Siddiqui, "Pakistan rejects 'baseless Indian allegations of infiltration' across Line of Control," *Dawn*, August 8, 2021.

<sup>178</sup> *Dawn*, September 29, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1649024/fc-soldier-martyred-in-balochistans-chukab-area-in-firing-by-terrorists>

<sup>179</sup> "Iran probes border shooting deaths that sparked protests," Reuters, February 26, 2021.

<sup>180</sup> Ali Raza Rind, "Pakistan, Iran officials discuss border security," *Dawn*, June 15, 2021.

<sup>181</sup> *Dawn*, "Pakistan, Iran discuss border security, regional peace, other issues," October 6, 2021.

**Table 8: Regional Distribution of Cross-border Attacks**

Border	District	Attac ks	Kille d	Injure d
Pak – Afghan	Bajaur (KP)	5	2	9
	Kurram (KP)	1	2	0
	Lower Dir (KP)	1	1	0
	Mohmand (KP)	1	1	0
	North Waziristan (KP)	4	3	4
	Qilla Abdullah (Balochistan)	1	0	0
	Zhob (Balochistan)	1	4	6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>19</b>
Pak – India	Bhimber (LoC)	2	1	2
	Kotli (LoC)	3	0	4
	LoC (Unspecified)	1	1	0
	Muzaffarabad (LoC)	1	0	0
	Sialkot (WB)	1	0	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>
Pak - Iran	Kech (Balochistan)	1	1	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total from 3 borders</b>		<b>23</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>26</b>



## **Chapter 3**

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# **Militant Landscape of Pakistan in 2021**

**Safdar Sial**

### **Contents**

- 3.1 Major Actors of Violence in 2021
- 3.2 Targets and Attack Tactics of Militants



The developments in neighboring Afghanistan greatly influenced Pakistan's militant landscape in 2021 and continue to do so. The year witnessed not only an increase in terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but also an intensified terrorist violence by Baloch insurgent groups mainly in Balochistan. Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province also emerged as one of the key actors of violence and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the year; in Pakistan the group claimed multiple attacks including against religious minorities as well as the members and supporters of the Afghan Taliban.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliates have been constantly increasing their presence and activities in the erstwhile FATA and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) from beginning of the year. For instance, at least 32 officials of security and law enforcement agencies lost their lives in the first two months of the year in multiple violent incidents reported mainly from twin Waziristan and Bajaur districts; security forces also killed over two dozen militants in parts of KP during these two months including some Taliban leaders and commanders, which indicated the extent to which militants had already regrouped there. The political leadership and security agencies were not unaware of the mounting threat. For one, in February Pakistan's National Assembly condemned the killing of four female NGO workers in a brazen attack in North Waziristan; members also raised concerns about the regrouping of the militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In the same month, the office of the district police officer in Miranshah (North Waziristan) issued a one-page 'advisory threat alert notice' about the operations of local militant groups in parts of North Waziristan and asked residents to restrict their activities and change their travel routes and timings.

Indeed, after being rooted out from its bases in ex-FATA in 2014, the **TTP** has gradually made a strong comeback in Pakistan and now poses a significant threat to the country. The final phase of its comeback was initiated when in 2020 the group started to bring many new groups and former splinters into its fold adding to its operational strength and ability as well as geographical outreach. A media report in March 2021 claimed that while the TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was instrumental in bringing various groups under the TTP umbrella, he also "moved the TTP headquarters from eastern Afghanistan – Kunar and Nangarhar provinces – to the southeast in Paktika province, where the remote Bermal district provide[ed] his men easy access across the border into the former TTP stronghold of South Waziristan."<sup>182</sup> That also highlighted the security implications of the evolving Afghan situation for Pakistan and the wider region.

In July 2021, when the Afghan Taliban emerged as a more critical component in the Afghan power calculus by reportedly extending their control "roughly [over] a third of all 421 districts and district centres in Afghanistan,"<sup>183</sup> the TTP also started intensifying attacks against Pakistani security and law enforcement personnel. Pak Institute for Peace Studies' (PIPS) monthly security reports for July and August noted that the TTP and affiliates had perpetrated 33 attacks mainly against police and army personnel in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa causing 47 deaths. However, the TTP's Omer media claimed the group had carried out 58 terrorist attacks in KP districts in these two months, causing 56 deaths in such attacks in July alone. A July 2021 report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team,

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<sup>182</sup> Daud Khattak, "The Pakistani Taliban is back," *The Diplomat*, March 9, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-pakistani-taliban-is-back/>

<sup>183</sup> Aljazeera, July 5, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/4/taliban-seizes-key-districts-in-afghanistan-as-govt-forces-flee>

established under a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, also warned that the TTP "continue[d] to pose a threat to the region with the unification of splinter groups and increasing cross-border attacks."<sup>184</sup> The report further said that while being based in Afghanistan, the TTP had increased its financial resources from extortion, smuggling and taxes. It validated the concerns expressed by many in Pakistan that as the Afghan Taliban gained ground in Afghanistan, the terrorist threat by the Pakistani Taliban would only grow. A month later, in August to be precise, the TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud said in his reported interview with the CNN that the TTP had the ability to take [back] control of Pakistani tribal areas if forced to leave Afghanistan. He also categorically said that Pakistan was their major enemy, and they would continue fighting its security forces.<sup>185</sup>

From July-onward the TTP and affiliates further increased the frequency and intensity of their attacks with the exception of one-month long duration of ceasefire that they announced on November 9th, and which ended on December 8th. Some reports in October said the TTP had released pictures and videos related to its emir's claimed visit to Pakistani tribal areas and about training camp and activities of the group. Similarly, according to a tweet by Abdul Sayed, a Sweden-based researcher, the TTP had also released a 38-minute video of dozens of recruits graduated from 'Al-Farooq' training camp which the group terms as the first-ever central training facility for all TTP members. Worryingly, a TTP commander addressing the recruits vowed a similar 'jihadist' victory in Pakistan like the Afghan Taliban had in Afghanistan. The video was reportedly released in August as part of a series titled "Those who prepare for battles".

Another worrisome development of the past year was TTP's increasing focus on Balochistan, especially Quetta, where Islamic State affiliates and Baloch nationalist insurgents are already active. The TTP claimed responsibility for two suicide attacks in Balochistan in 2021 including the suicide bombing in the parking lot of the city's Serena Hotel on April 21; the attack attracted international attention because the Chinese ambassador was staying at the same hotel though he was not present there at the time of explosion. Not only Quetta but other Pashtun-populated areas Balochistan, mainly the areas along the Afghan border including Zhob and Chaman, are also becoming a new hub of the Taliban militants. Apparently, that is largely linked to the evolving Afghan situation and its fallout for the security of bordering areas of ex-FATA and Balochistan. A media report in September claimed by quoting intelligence sources that militants of anti-Pakistan terror outfits including the TTP, Baloch insurgent groups and IS-K were already entering Pakistan and many of them were regrouping in Balochistan. Even before the Afghan Taliban's takeover of Kabul on August 15, the TTP men were fleeing from Afghanistan and entering Balochistan. For one, the report claimed that a group of TTP fighters led by Ainuzaman Akhunzada fleeing from Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, had been regrouping and recruiting for quite some time now in Zhob and Loralai districts of Balochistan.<sup>186</sup>

Not only the TTP, but the militant ***Islamic State group's so-called Khorasan chapter*** or province (IS-K) has also become active in Pakistan, where it carried out multiple attacks

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<sup>184</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Al-Qaeda present in 5 Afghan provinces," *Dawn*, July 26, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1636932/al-qaeda-present-in-15-afghan-provinces-un>

<sup>185</sup> Umair Jamal, "The TTP has redefined its goals: Should Pakistan be worried," *The Diplomat*, August 11, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/the-ttp-has-redefined-its-goals-should-pakistan-be-worried>

<sup>186</sup> Amjad Bashir Siddiqi, "After escape from Afghanistan: Anti-Pakistan terror outfits regrouping in Balochistan," *The News*, September 27, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/895710-after-escape-from-afghanistan-anti-pakistan-terror-outfits-regrouping-in-balochistan>

in the year under review on Hazara Shias, alleged Afghan Taliban members and associated religious scholars, as well as political leaders/workers in Balochistan and KP; several of its associates were also arrested from parts of Sindh and Punjab in multiple search operations conducted by law enforcers during the year. For one, the CTD arrested Hafiz Mohammed Omar bin Khalid in January 2021 in Karachi, who was a final-year student at the NED University of Engineering and Technology and “[he] was involved in sending money to families of militants linked with the militant Islamic State group in Syria.”<sup>187</sup> The group claimed the Peshawar killing of an Afghan Taliban commander Nek Muhammad Rahbar in the first issue of its Urdu-language magazine *Yalghar* (Invasion) published a few months before; it also claimed the killing of Hazara coalminers in Bolan (Balochistan) in the magazine. Apart from terrorist attacks perpetrated by the group, security forces also kept entering into sporadic armed clashes with its militants mainly in Balochistan. For instance, in April security forces killed four IS-K militants in an intelligence-based operation carried out in the mountainous Aab-i-Gum area of Bolan district. According to police, the operation foiled a major joint terrorist plot by the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and IS-K. Meanwhile, across the border in Afghanistan, IS-K has increased its attacks significantly. The terrorist group has claimed over 100 attacks inside Afghanistan since mid September, including some major ones, and most of these attacks have been targeted against the Afghan Taliban. According to the latest UNSC assessment report of Afghanistan, over 2,000 Daesh militants are present in Afghanistan who could pose a serious security threat to Pakistan also through their associates. In a country like Pakistan, where sectarian discord is rife and a multitude of extremist groups exists, groups like IS-K or Daesh can easily find associates and operative to their targets. For one, former members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jamaatud Dawa were in past found affiliated with the group in Pakistan.

Although **Al-Qaeda** has not been found involved in terrorist violence in Pakistan in recent years, yet it has its presence and affiliations with local groups in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. It has maintained ties with the Afghan Taliban and has reportedly also helped the Pakistani Taliban group TTP in recovering and regrouping in recent years; some AQ-aligned Pakistani groups even joined TTP.<sup>188</sup> In April 2021, the CNN media group claimed based on its interviews with two Al-Qaeda operatives that the group would step up its operations and fighting in the region after the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. The report claimed that the group was planning a comeback by relying on its enduring partnership with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.<sup>189</sup>

**Baloch insurgent groups** have apparently also increased the number of attacks in Balochistan, mainly targeting security forces and alleged supporters as well as non-Baloch workers. As many as five (5) Baloch insurgent groups (BLA, BLF, BRA, UBA, and BRG), were on the forefront in claiming responsibility of different terrorist attacks reported from the province in 2021. While it is still early to establish a link of this growing insurgent violence in the province to the Afghan situation, but some experts argue that the increasing pressure on Baloch leaders/militants sheltered in Afghanistan is forcing them to relocate to Balochistan and that could be one of the causes. Experts also underscore that the Baloch

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<sup>187</sup> Imtiaz Ali, “Varsity student held for sending funds to IS-linked families in Syria,” *Dawn*, January 19, 2021.

<sup>188</sup> Asfandyar Mir, “Afghanistan’s terrorism challenge: the political trajectories of Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic State,” Middle East Institute, October 2020, <https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-10/Afghanistan%27s%20Terrorism%20Challenge.pdf>

<sup>189</sup> Nic Robertson and Saleem Mehsud, “Al-Qaeda promises ‘war on all fronts’ against America as Biden pulls out Afghanistan.” CNN, April 30, 2021.

insurgents will certainly draw inspiration from the changing environment and will further increase and intensify their attacks. Others assert that Baloch insurgent leaders have established good ties with Iran, and they could relocate there thus avoiding any negative consequence of post-US withdrawal scenario in Afghanistan. There is a third argument as well that contends both ideas cited earlier and asserts that Baloch insurgency is mainly being led by the Baloch insurgent commanders and fighters who are not living in exile but are present largely inside Balochistan. Subscribers of this view believe that insecurity in Afghanistan and Pakistan will only encourage the Baloch insurgents to exploit the situation to their advantage. PIPS data for 2021 suggested, as cited earlier, that Baloch insurgents had intensified attacks against diverse targets including security forces, non-Baloch workers, shops/stalls selling Pakistani flags, government officials, civilians as well as Chinese engineers and workers. They also carried out few high impact attacks including against security forces, Chinese engineers, and non-Baloch workers/settlers. The suicide blast perpetrated by BLA against the convoy of Chinese engineers near Gwadar was a prime example of Baloch insurgents' growing reliance on high-profile and high-impact attacks.

Meanwhile, a **Sindhi nationalist insurgent group**, Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army, perpetrated three attacks in interior Sindh. Few statements and reports released during 2021 by law enforcement agencies hinted at growing nexus between Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents, at least at operational level.

Some of the major actors of violence from past years such as **Jamaatul Ahrar, Hizbul Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Khyber-based Lashkar-e-Islam** were not found involved in terrorist violence during 2021. While the former two rejoined their parent group TTP in 2020, the other two have been significantly weakened mainly due to killing and arrests of their key leaders. Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) was a key ally of the TTP until 2014 when military operations started in North Waziristan and Khyber tribal districts. After relocating to Afghanistan, the group gradually lost its strength and its members also splintered to the Islamic State group. The head of LI group Mangal Bagh was killed in a bomb explosion in Afghanistan's Kunar province in January 2021.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> *The News*, "Mangal Bagh killed in Afghanistan," January 29, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/781669-mangal-bagh-killed-in-afghanistan>

### **3.1 Major Actors of Violence in 2021**

#### **3.1.1 Religiously-inspired Militant Groups**

- Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**

As in past several years, the TTP remained the major actor of violence in 2021. The group was believed to be involved in 87 terrorist attacks in 2021, which is an increase of about 84 percent from the attacks it perpetrated across Pakistan in the year before. These attacks by the TTP claimed 158 lives, compared to 56 in the TTP-orchestrated attacks in the previous year, and left 200 others injured. (*See Tables 1 & 2*) Out of the total 87 attacks perpetrated by the TTP in Pakistan during the year under observation, as many as 78 concentrated in KP province alone, while five happened in Balochistan and another four in Punjab and Islamabad.

Apart from these terrorist attacks, most of the cross-border attacks from Afghanistan in 2021 (12 out of the 14) were also perpetrated by the TTP; these attacks claimed the lives of 11 security personnel and two civilians. (*Details are provided in Section 2.8 of Chapter 2*)

Geographical spread and statistics of the attacks perpetrated by the TTP in 2021 indicate that while the group had carried out most of the attacks in the tribal districts or former FATA, it was also successful in showing its presence in northern Balochistan, and twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

The TTP also remained engaged in negotiations with Pakistani government, which proved futile. First, the early 2021 spike in terrorist violence in Pakistan, which was largely claimed by the TTP, reportedly followed failed negotiations between the terrorist group and the Pakistani government. The 'secret' negotiations happened in 2020 and eventually collapsed in late 2020 or early 2021 with no indication that they might resume.<sup>191</sup> The Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban had apparently facilitated the talks, which was also instrumental for the government's renewed negotiations with the TTP later in the year 2021. In an exclusive interview to TRT World on October 1st, the prime minister said that his government was in talks with TTP groups seeking a reconciliation.<sup>192</sup> Earlier, on September 15th, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had said in an interview that the government would be "open to giving" a pardon to members of the TTP if they promised not to get involved in terrorist activities and submit to the Pakistani Constitution. On November 8th, Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said that the government had reached an agreement with the TTP for a month-long "compete ceasefire" as part of an ongoing negotiations process.<sup>193</sup> Later, TTP spokesperson Mohammad Khorasani also confirmed the ceasefire beginning from November 9th. Both sides also acknowledged the facilitation role played by the Afghan Taliban, mainly Sirajuddin Haqqani, in the ongoing negotiations.

However, political parties in the opposition were not convinced with the government unilaterally pursuing talks with the TTP and asserted that the parliament be given the

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<sup>191</sup> Franz J. Marty, "Spike in violence follows failed negotiations between the Pakistani Taliban and Islamabad," *The Diplomat*, April 3, 2021.

<sup>192</sup> "Govt in talks with TTP groups for reconciliation process," *Dawn*, October 1, 2021.

<sup>193</sup> Rizwan Shehzad, "Govt, TTP agree to cease fire," *The Express Tribune*, November 8, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2328439/govt-ttp-agree-on-a-complete-ceasefire-fawad>

responsibility to decide about that. On November 10th, the Supreme Court also summoned Prime Minister Imran Khan for questioning on the implementation of court orders regarding the 2014 Army Public School attack and the government's talks with the TTP.<sup>194</sup>

The TTP on December 9th announced the end of its month-long ceasefire that was followed by a renewal of attacks by the group largely on police and security forces.

- ***Local Taliban***

These are small militant groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa including its tribal districts, which may share the ideology with other Pakistani Taliban groups part of the TTP but mostly operate independently as small cells or groups. Compared to 14 in the year before, these local Taliban groups carried out 22 terrorist attacks in 2021, which claimed 24 lives. Reported attacks by local Taliban groups suggest that small radical groups in KP province are still active and have attraction in their cause as most of such attacks are religiously motivated and targeted against polio workers, security forces, political leaders, and tribesmen. In 2021, attacks by these local Taliban groups were reported from 13 districts of KP including three in each of Bajaur and North Waziristan districts; two attacks each in Bannu, Lower Dir, Mardan, Peshawar, and South Waziristan; and one attack in each of DI Khan, Karak, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Mohmand, and Tank districts.

**Table 1: Terrorist Attacks Claimed/Perpetrated by Terrorist Groups**

Organization	Balochistan	KP	Punjab & Islamabad	Sindh (excluding Karachi)	Karachi	Total
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	5	78	4	-		<b>87</b>
Local Taliban	-	22	-	-	-	<b>22</b>
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	37	-	-	-	1	<b>38</b>
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	23	-	-	-	2	<b>25</b>
Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	4	-	-	-	-	<b>4</b>
United Baloch Army (UBA)	1	-	-	-	-	<b>1</b>
Baloch Republican Guard	1	-	-	-	-	<b>1</b>
Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA)	-	-	-	3	-	<b>3</b>
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan	-	-	-	-	1	<b>1</b>
Rival Sectarian group	-	-	1	-	-	<b>1</b>
Nationalist insurgents [unspecified]	5	-	-	-	-	<b>5</b>
Unknown militants	4	4	2	-	1	<b>11</b>
ISIS affiliates/supporters	1	7	-	-	-	<b>8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>207</b>

<sup>194</sup> Haseeb Bhatti, "APS carnage: SC grills PM Imran.....," *Dawn*, November 10, 2021.

- ***Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province***

The Islamic State affiliates in Pakistan stepped up terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2021. Compared to two major attacks in 2020 in Quetta and Peshawar, IS-K affiliates perpetrated a total of eight terrorist attacks during the year under review including seven (7) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in Balochistan. In all, 21 people lost their lives and another four were injured in these attacks.

In the single attack perpetrated by IS-K in Balochistan, eleven (11) coal miners were killed by militants who kidnapped and later slaughtered them at the Mach coalfield of Bolan district, around 80km away from Quetta. All the victims belong to Hazara Community of Quetta.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, IS-K perpetrated three attacks in Peshawar, two in Bajaur and one attack each in Kurram and South Waziristan districts targeting Afghan Taliban leaders, a Sikh herbalist Satnam Singh, police officials, political leaders, a religious leader belonging to JUI-F, and workers of a cellular company.

Security forces and law enforcement agencies also detained about 18 suspected IS-K militants in 10 search operations in Karachi, Shikarpur, and Sukkur in Sindh; Peshawar and Malakand in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and Sialkot, Chiniot, Khoshab and Lahore in Punjab. Several IS-K affiliated were also killed in counterterrorism operations in multiple districts (*For details see Chapter 4*)

- ***Violent Sectarian Groups***

A total of two sectarian-related attacks were recorded in 2021, one of which was perpetrated by members of some unidentified Sunni group in Bahawalnagar and second by Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, a violent Shia sectarian group, in Karachi.

On January 7th, a CTD team had arrested Amir Baz, Shahid, Musharraf Abbas, Bawaji and Adeel Abbas and two others linked with Sipah-i-Muhammad from Girot district of Khushab in Punjab.<sup>195</sup>

Later, on January 27th, a joint team of the CTD and a federal institution carried out an action in Khuda Ki Basti in Surjani Town of Karachi and detained a suspect identified as Abbas Jafri, affiliated with Shia sectarian group Zainabiyoun Brigade.<sup>196</sup> Specialized in automatic weapons, the arrested Abbas Jafri was allegedly involved in completing reconnaissance for militants to carry out terrorist activities in Karachi. During interrogation, it transpired that he had "brainwashed" several people and sent them to a neighboring country for militancy training. The CTD in a press release said the held suspect was also involved in using foreign-trained militants for terror activities.<sup>197</sup> On February 2nd, the Sindh counterterrorism police, and a federal intelligence agency arrested Syed Zakir Raza alias Nadeem, a militant linked with Zainabiyoun Brigade, from Karachi; he was a close associate of Abbas Jafri. A media report claimed that at

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<sup>195</sup> Dawn, January 8, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1600255/seven-terrorists-held-in-khushab-with-arms-explosives>

<sup>196</sup> Dawn, January 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1604005/zainabiyoun-militant-held-in-surjani>

<sup>197</sup> "Zainabiyoun militant' held in Surjani," Dawn, January 28, 2021.

least two other Zainabiyoun associates were also arrested in the city during first quarter of the year 2021. The report further said that in Karachi alone, Shia groups complain, "over 200 Shia youths have allegedly been picked by Pakistan's law enforcement agencies on their return from Syria, Iran, and Iraq and their whereabouts are unknown."<sup>198</sup> Experts assert that the return of Shia fighters from Syria and elsewhere and their involvement in sectarian violence (even if only few of them chose to engage in such activities), could have serious implication for sectarian harmony of the country mainly Karachi that has remained a sectarian flashpoint for long until 2013 Karachi operation eliminated the violent sectarian groups.

**Table 2: Casualties in Terrorist Attacks by Different Groups**

<b>Group Responsible</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
<b>TTP</b>	Balochistan: 22 KP: 131 Punjab &Islamabad: 5 <b>Total: 158</b>	Balochistan: 84 KP: 109 Punjab &Islamabad: 7 <b>Total: 200</b>
<b>Local Taliban</b>	KP: 24 <b>Total: 24</b>	KP: 9 <b>Total: 9</b>
<b>BLA</b>	Balochistan: 71 Karachi: 1 <b>Total: 72</b>	Balochistan: 163 Karachi: 14 <b>Total: 177</b>
<b>BLF</b>	Balochistan: 18 <b>Total: 18</b>	Balochistan: 51 Karachi: 3 <b>Total: 54</b>
<b>BRA</b>	Balochistan: 3 <b>Total: 3</b>	Balochistan: 1 <b>Total: 1</b>
<b>United Baloch Army (UBA)</b>	-	Balochistan: 6 <b>Total: 6</b>
<b>Baloch Republican Guard</b>	-	Balochistan: 2 <b>Total: 2</b>
<b>Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA)</b>	Sindh: 1 <b>Total: 1</b>	Sindh: 4 <b>Total: 4</b>
<b>Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan</b>	-	Karachi: 1 <b>Total: 1</b>
<b>Rival sectarian group</b>	Punjab: 2 <b>Total: 2</b>	Punjab: 21 <b>Total: 21</b>
<b>Nationalist insurgents [unspecified]</b>	Balochistan: 3 <b>Total: 3</b>	Balochistan: 11 <b>Total: 11</b>
<b>Unknown militants</b>	Balochistan: 8 KP: 4 Punjab: 10 Karachi: 11 <b>Total: 33</b>	Balochistan: 27 KP: 0 Punjab: 25 Karachi: 13 <b>Total: 65</b>

<sup>198</sup> Zia Ur Rehman, "Pakistan's Shia mercenaries return from Syria, posing a security threat," TRT World, March 3, 2021, [https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/pakistan-s-shia-mercenaries-return-from-syria-posing-a-security-threat-44655/amp?\\_\\_twitter\\_impression=true](https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/pakistan-s-shia-mercenaries-return-from-syria-posing-a-security-threat-44655/amp?__twitter_impression=true)

<b>Group Responsible</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
<b>ISIS affiliates/supporters</b>	Balochistan: 11 KP: 10 <i>Total: 21</i>	Balochistan: 0 KP: 4 <i>Total: 4</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>335 Killed</b>	<b>555 Injured</b>

### **3.1.2 Nationalist Insurgent Groups**

- ***Baloch Insurgent Groups***

While five Baloch insurgent groups as well as some unspecified insurgents were believed to be involved in the reported terrorist violence in Balochistan in 2021 but the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) were the two major groups which carried out most of the reported attacks from the province. The two groups even carried out three attacks outside Balochistan, i.e., in Karachi.

Compared to 24 in the year before, the BLA and BLF perpetrated a combined total of 63 terrorist attacks in 2021 – 60 in Balochistan and three in Karachi. These attacks formed over 85 percent of the total attacks perpetrated by the Baloch insurgent groups in the year.

Compared to 19 in the previous year, the **BLA** carried out 38 terrorist attacks in 2021 – including 37 in Balochistan, and one in Karachi. These attacks killed 72 people – including 43 security and law enforcement personnel and 20 civilians; 9 militants also die in these attacks – and injured 177 people. (*See Table 1 and 2*)

Attacks by BLA spread over 15 districts of Balochistan, with more frequent attacks reported from Quetta (15 attacks), Sibi (5), Bolan (3), and Gwadar, Harnai and Panjgur (2 attacks each). Over 68 percent of attacks perpetrated by BLA targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies; other main targets included government officials/state symbols, non-Baloch settlers and workers, and CPEC/workers/Chinese nationals.

Compared to five in the year before, the **BLF** carried out 25 terrorist attacks in 2021, including 23 in Balochistan and two in Karachi. In these attacks 18 people were killed including 17 security officials and one militant, and 54 others got injured. Most of the attacks by BLF (19) targeted security forces; others hit CPEC/Chinese workers, non-Baloch settlers, civilians, and former insurgents. In Balochistan, attacks by BLF largely concentrated in southern districts of the province including 16 in Kech, three in Panjgur, two in Lasbela and one attack in each of Gwadar, and Khuzdar districts.

**Baloch Republican Army** (BRA), also known as Bugti Militia, perpetrated four terrorist attacks in 2021 comparing three terrorist attacks in 2020. These included two low-intensity landmine blasts and two incidents of firing, which in all claimed three lives and injured one person. Attacks by BRA took place in Kalat, Kech, Kohlu and Panjgur and targeted security forces (2 attacks), a mobile phone tower, and one civilian who became victim of a landmine blast.

**United Baloch Army** (UBA) claimed one attack that targeted a police van in Quetta in November and injured six people including two policemen. Similarly, another Baloch insurgent group **Baloch Republican Guard** (BRG) claimed an attack on non-Baloch workers in Sibi. **Unspecified Baloch insurgents** were also believed to be involved in five

terrorist attacks reported from Kech, Nushki, Quetta and Sibi districts of Balochistan killing three and injuring 11 people.

- ***Sindhi Nationalist Insurgent Groups***

***Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA)*** was the only Sindhi insurgent group that perpetrated terrorist violence in Sindh in 2021. The group carried out three attacks in interior Sindh, including one attack in each of Khairpur, Naushahro Firoze and Qambar-Shahdadkot districts targeting security forces, railways track, and a so-called Punjabi settler. In all one person was killed and four others were wounded in these attacks. Some reports also hinted at a growing operational nexus between Balochi and Sindhi nationalist insurgents, mainly the SRA's growing links with Baloch groups BLA and BRAS. Some major attacks in Karachi in recent past were attributed to this growing nexus. For instance, Sindh police's counterterrorism department claimed to have detained two SRA militants from Karachi on March 16th who were reportedly provided weapons by the BLA to carry out attacks against security forces. According to police sources the detained suspects, Sadiq and Mukhtiar, were involved in attacks on law enforcement and security officials including the killing of a constable in Kandhkot.<sup>199</sup>

### **3.1.2 'Unidentified' Militants**

The religiously motivated militants, whose group identities and organizational affiliations were not defined or reported by media and law enforcement and security officials, were involved in 11 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2021 that claimed 33 lives and injured 65 others.

## **3.2 Targets and Attack Tactics of Militants**

Compared to 17 in the year before, the terrorists hit diverse targets of over 22 types in their attacks in 2021. However, they targeted security forces quite frequently. Out of the total 207 terrorist attacks recorded in 2021, as many as 137, or over 66 percent, targeted personnel, vehicles and posts of security and law enforcement agencies. Civilians were apparently hit in 16 attacks. Meanwhile, the terrorists targeted pro-government tribesmen and peace committees' members in nine attacks; political leaders/workers in seven attacks; government officials, institutions, and state symbols in another seven attacks; polio vaccination workers and their security escorts in six attacks; and non-Baloch workers and settlers in Balochistan in five attacks. CPEC/Chinese workers were also targeted in four attacks. A combined total of three attacks targeted Shia and Sunni community members.

The terrorists mainly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct infantry fire as primary attack tactics. Besides carrying out five suicide blasts, they employed IEDs of various types in 80 attacks and direct firing/shootout in 102 attacks. Meanwhile as many as 15 terrorist attacks were incidents of hand grenade blasts. The terrorists also used other attack tactics, though less frequently, including three (3) rocket attacks, one coordinated gun-and-bomb attack, and one act of abduction.

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<sup>199</sup> "Two 'Sindhudesh' militants held in Rangers attack case," *Dawn*, March 17, 2021.

## **Chapter 4**

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### **State Responses**

**Safdar Sial**



## **4.1 Operational Front**

Compared to 158 in the previous year, as many as 186 suspected militants were killed in security forces and law enforcement agencies' kinetic actions as well as clashes and encounters between security forces and militants in the year 2021. These operations and clashes/encounters were not confined to a particular area or region but were reported from across all regions of Pakistan, as given at Tables 1 & 2, respectively.

Security and law enforcement agencies also arrested 156 suspected terrorists and members of militant groups in as many as 70 search and combing operations conducted in 2021 all over the country. These search operations do not include several other similar actions in which suspects were arrested and mostly released after preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, security forces foiled at least six major terror bids or plots, either independently or in collaboration with Bomb Disposal Squads, mainly by recovering and defusing IEDs planted by militants.

### **4.1.1 Military/Security Operations**

Compared to 47 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted 63 anti-militant operational strikes in 2021 in 22 districts and regions of Pakistan. These actions killed a total of 197 people, as compared to 146 in 2020, and injured 13 others. Among those 197 killed were 177 militants, 17 Pakistan Army soldiers and three FC men.

Out of the total 63 operational strikes recorded in 2021, as many as 43 were conducted in KP, 16 in Balochistan, three in Sindh and one in Punjab. There were 11 districts where more than one anti-militant operation happened in the year including North Waziristan (22 operational strikes), South Waziristan (8), DI Khan (3), Bajaur (2), Peshawar (2), Tank (2) and Lower Dir (2 strikes) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Mastung (4 strikes), Quetta (3) and Bolan and Kharan (2 strikes each) in Balochistan.

However, North and South Waziristan in KP as well as Mastung in Balochistan drew prime attention of security forces where they killed a combined total of 97 militants (14 army soldiers and 2 FC men were also martyred) in 34 operations they conducted in these three districts.

**Table 1: Operational Attacks by Security Forces, against Militants and Insurgents**

Region	District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Balochistan	Bolan	2	8	0
	Harnai	1	6	0
	Kech	1	7	0
	Kharan	2	9	0
	Lasbela	1	2	0
	Loralai	1	7	0
	Mastung	4	26	0
	Quetta	3	11	0
	Sibi	1	1	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>0</b>
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Bajaur	2	3	0
	DI Khan	3	4	0
	Kurram	1	5	3
	Lakki Marwat	1	1	0
	Lower Dir	2	4	0
	North Waziristan	22	55	6
	Peshawar	2	6	0
	South Waziristan	8	32	2
	Tank	2	4	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>13</b>
Punjab	Lahore	1	3	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
Sindh	Jamshoro	1	0	0
	Karachi	1	1	0
	Sukkur	1	2	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Pakistan</b>		<b>63</b>	<b>197 (177 militants)<sup>200</sup></b>	<b>13 (2 militants)<sup>201</sup></b>

<sup>200</sup> Others among those killed included 17 army soldiers and 3 FC men.

<sup>201</sup> Other injured included 7 soldiers, 4 FC men.

Some major security or counterterrorism operations, or in which some important militants were killed, are listed below:

- January 14: Security forces conducted intelligence-based operations in **North Waziristan** killing two wanted terrorists, including an IED expert. In the exchange of fire, three security personnel embraced martyrdom including Sepoy Azaib Ahmed, a resident of Karak; Sepoy Zia Ul Islam.<sup>202</sup> Few days later, Security forces killed two terrorists Usman Ali and Waheed alias Lashtai of the banned TTP's Sajna Group in South Waziristan, who were involved in 14 October (2020) attack that had killed Captain Omar Cheema and 5 others.<sup>203</sup>
- January 24: Security forces conducted intelligence-based operations in Khaisur and Mirali localities of **North Waziristan**. During the operations, militant leaders Saifullah Noor of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan Gohar group and Syed Raheem alias Abid of the TTP AKK Group and three other terrorists were reportedly killed.<sup>204</sup>
- February 3: Four alleged terrorists belonging to the TTP and Gul Bahadur Group were killed during an exchange of fire with security forces in the Mir Ali area of **North Waziristan** tribal district. Two security officials were also martyred in the exchange of fire, who were identified as Naib Subedar Amin Ullah and sepoy Sher Zamin.<sup>205</sup>
- February 23: The Pakistan Army's media wing, ISPR, said Hassan alias Sajna, a commander of TTP-Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group, was killed during an intelligence-based operation in Mirali area of **North Waziristan**. He was the key suspect over the murder of four women vocational trainers in the tribal district. He was also involved in terrorist activities against security forces and tribesmen, including IEDs attacks, kidnapping for ransom and recruitment of terrorists.<sup>206</sup> Few days later, the security forces killed another high value target, terrorist commander (TTP) Nooristan alias Hasan Baba in **South Waziristan**. An IEDs-making expert and master trainer, Baba was involved in the killing of over 50 security personnel since 2007.<sup>207</sup>
- March 7: Security forces conducted two operations in twin Waziristan tribal districts. In the Boya and Dosalli areas of **North Waziristan** tribal district, security forces killed eight terrorists including three terrorist commanders Abdul Aneer alias Adil of the TTP Tufan Group, Junaid of the TTP Tariq group, and Khalid Shah Din alias Rehan of the TTP Sadiq Noor Group.<sup>208</sup> Similarly, during an intense exchange of fire in **South**

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<sup>202</sup> *The News*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/774519-waziristan-locfour-soldiers-martyred>

<sup>203</sup> *Daily Dunya* (Urdu), January 19, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-01-19&edition=ISL&id=5483315\\_69554799](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-01-19&edition=ISL&id=5483315_69554799)

<sup>204</sup> *Dawn*, January 25, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1603496/two-militant-leaders-among-five-killed-in-n-waziristan>

<sup>205</sup> *Daily Jang* (Urdu), February 4, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/02-04-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=514.png>

<sup>206</sup> *Dawn*, February 24, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1609115/forces-kill-militant-involved-in-murder-of-women-vocational-trainers>

<sup>207</sup> *Dawn*, February 27, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1609610/ttp-commander-killed-in-s-waziristan-operation>

<sup>208</sup> *Daily Dunya* (Urdu), March 8, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-03-07&edition=ISL&id=5540550\\_35839623](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-03-07&edition=ISL&id=5540550_35839623)

**Waziristan**, four militants were killed including terrorist commander Abdul Adam Zeb alias Dung of the TTP Bismillah group, and terrorist commanders Molvi Mehboob alias Molvi and Mir Salam alias Anas, who were associated with the TTP Sajna group.<sup>209</sup>

- March 8: The CTD personnel raided a hideout of the militants in the Spinji area of **Mastung** district. Five suspected militants belonging to BLA were killed in the action and a large quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives had been seized.<sup>210</sup>
- April 13: Four suspected militants were killed in an intelligence-based operation carried out in the mountainous area of Aab-i-Gum of **Bolan** (Balochistan) district. According to police, the operation foiled a major terrorism plot prepared by the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and militant Islamic State group. The slain terrorists were identified as Akram Zehri, Ahmedullah, Sikandar and Shadi Khan.<sup>211</sup>
- June 17: Security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation in Marwar coalmine area of **Bolan** against BLA militants. At least four militants were killed whereas six others managed to escape.<sup>212</sup>
- June 21: The CTD Balochistan conducted an operation in **Quetta** to arrest a top level Daesh terrorist Fazal ur Rehman Alias Shaan but he was killed in the ensuing fire exchange. Shaan was allegedly directly involved in the tragic Mach massacre of the Hazara tribesmen on January 21, 2021.<sup>213</sup>
- July 5: Five suspected militants were killed during an operation conducted by the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) in the Hazar Ganji area of **Quetta**. The CTD said those killed belonged to the banned BLA. Three others managed to escape.<sup>214</sup>
- July 13: Three militants were killed during an operation conducted by security forces in Zewa area of **Kurram** tribal district. Two security personnel, including an officer Basit Ali, embraced martyrdom while three others received injuries during exchange of fire with militants.<sup>215</sup>
- August 9: The police and security forces shot dead an alleged commander of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, Sheikh Waqas alias Khalid, carrying a head money of Rs3 million during a joint operation on Dera-Daraban road in **DI Khan**.<sup>216</sup>
- August: Three major anti-militant kinetic actions were recorded in Balochistan. First, on August 11, five suspected terrorists of banned Baloch Liberation Army were killed in a gun battle with the personnel of Counter Terrorism Department and security forces

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<sup>209</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), March 8, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202103080130>

<sup>210</sup> Dawn, March 9, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1611519/five-militants-killed-in-mastung-operation>

<sup>211</sup> Dawn, April 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1618058/four-terrorists-killed-in-bolan>

<sup>212</sup> Daily *Dunya* (Urdu), June 18, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-06-18&edition=ISL&id=5665540\\_83685057](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-06-18&edition=ISL&id=5665540_83685057)

<sup>213</sup> The News, June 23, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/853826-terrorist-wanted-in-machh-massacre-killed>

<sup>214</sup> Dawn, July 6, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1633449/5-militants-killed-in-ctd-operation-in-quetta>

<sup>215</sup> Dawn, July 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1634888/two-security-men-martyred-in-kurram-operation>

<sup>216</sup> Dawn, August 10, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1639707/three-customs-officials-shot-dead-in-di-khan>

in New Marri Camp area near Hazarganj suburb of **Quetta**.<sup>217</sup> On August 25, the CTD and other security forces killed seven suspected militants in an operation in **Loralai**.<sup>218</sup> On August 30, the CTD men conducted an operation in the **Mastung** area on the intelligence provided by member of a banned group Abdul Hayee. A heavy gun battle started after militants opened fire on the police in which 11 alleged IS-K, or Daesh terrorists were found dead in the compound, which they were using as their hideout.<sup>219</sup>

- September 15: Security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation in Asman Manza area of **South Waziristan**. Five terrorists were killed in the operation; seven soldiers were also martyred during the intense exchange of fire. The banned Tehreek Taliban Pakistan claimed that they had attacked the security forces.<sup>220</sup>
- September 24: Security forces raided a hideout of militants near **Kharan** in Balochistan. The terrorists opened fire in their attempt to flee the hideout. During an intense exchange of fire, six terrorists including two commanders, Gul Mir alias Pullen and Kaleemullah Bolani, were killed.<sup>221</sup>
- September 28: At least 10 militants were killed including 4 top Taliban commanders in an intelligence-based operation conducted by security forces in **South Waziristan**. The security forces also seized huge cache of weapons and explosives.<sup>222</sup>
- October 20: Three members of the banned militant Islamic State group were killed in an intelligence-based operation conducted by the Counter-Terrorism Department in the Shahpur area, on the outskirts of **Peshawar**.<sup>223</sup>
- October 23: Two major operational strikes were reported from Balochistan. First, security forces conducted intelligence-based operation targeting a hideout of terrorists near Jamboro, **Harnai**. A heavy exchange of fire between security forces and terrorists resulted in killing six alleged terrorists including BLA Commander Tariq Alias Nasir. A large cache of arms and ammunition was recovered from the hideout.<sup>224</sup> In the second strike, at least nine terrorists were killed in **Mastung** district by the CTD, which claimed the operation was conducted in the Roshi mountain range and those killed belonged to the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).<sup>225</sup>
- December 18: According to ISPR, a terrorist named Ghafoor alias Jaleel, a close aide of the TTP leader Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, was killed during an operation in **Bajaur**.<sup>226</sup>
- December 20: Three terrorists of the Islamic State group including a senior commander were killed in an intelligence-based operation in Faqirabad area of **Peshawar**. According to police, the slain terrorists, Abdullah, Suliman and Hayat, were involved in

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<sup>217</sup> Dawn, August 12, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1640207/five-militants-killed-in-encounter>

<sup>218</sup> Dawn, August 26, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1642631/seven-suspected-militants-killed-in-loralai>

<sup>219</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), August 31, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/08-31-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=433.png>

<sup>220</sup> Dawn, September 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1646645/seven-soldiers-martyred-in-s-waziristan-gunfight-with-terrorists>

<sup>221</sup> Dawn, September 25, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1648266/six-terrorists-killed-in-kharan-operation-ispr>

<sup>222</sup> Daily Mashriq (Urdu), September 29, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202109290109>

<sup>223</sup> Dawn, October 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1653102/three-is-men-killed-near-peshawar>

<sup>224</sup> The News, October 24, 2021, <https://e.thenews.com.pk/detail?id=16967>

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), December 19, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/15913>

- several targeted killings and acts of terrorism including the murder of Sikh hakim Satnam Singh in September.<sup>227</sup>
- December 27: Security forces and law enforcement personnel conducted an intelligence-based operation in Turbat, **Kech**. Reportedly seven militants were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire.<sup>228</sup>

#### **4.1.2 Security Forces' Clashes and Encounters with Militants**

Security and law enforcement agencies also entered into in a total of six armed clashes and encounters with militants – compared to 15 such incidents in previous year – in six districts of the country. These armed clashes and encounters claimed 15 lives (9 militants and 6 army soldiers) and injured one militant.

As many as three of these clashes and encounters (or 50 percent) took place in the twin Waziristan and DI Khan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (between the security forces and the TTP militants), another two (2) happened in Awaran and Kech districts of Balochistan (between security forces and the militants of BLA and BLF), while one such incident of armed clash took place in Attock district of Punjab between security forces and TTP militants.

**Table 2: Clashes and Encounters between Security Forces and Militants**

<b>Regions</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Attacks</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
Balochistan	Awaran	1	4	0
	Kech	1	2	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	DI Khan	1	1	1
	North Waziristan	1	5	0
	South Waziristan	1	2	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>
Punjab	Attock	1	1	0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Pakistan Total</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>15</b> (9 militants; 6 soldiers)	<b>1</b> militant

<sup>227</sup> Dawn, December 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1664927/is-commander-among-three-terrorists-killed-in-peshawar>

<sup>228</sup> Daily Jang (Urdu), December 28, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/21088>

Details of the these reported clashes and encounters between security, law enforcement agencies and militants are given below.

- February 16: An armed encounter happened between police and suspected terrorists near Zafarabad Colony of **DI Khan**. According to police, during the exchange of fire, one of the terrorists died after he detonated his suicide vest while another was also reported injured.<sup>229</sup>
- April 10: Rawalpindi police received intelligence that two wanted TTP terrorists, Qari Sohail and Niaz, were present in an area of **Attock** along with two aides and preparing to travel to Rawalpindi to attack the office of an intelligence agency. The police confronted them at Marri Raod. One militant was killed in the ensuing exchange of fire and three others managed to escape.<sup>230</sup>
- May 5: Security forces were conducting an intelligence-based operation in Dosalli area of **North Waziristan**, when militants opened fire on them. Three soldiers Captain Faheem, sepoy Shafi and sepoy Naseem embraced martyrdom; two militants were also killed in exchange of fire.<sup>231</sup> The ISPR spokesperson said that the IBO was conducted on the reported presence of terrorists in the area where two of them were killed by the security forces.
- August 19: One soldier was martyred, and a terrorist was killed, in the said exchange of fire in Kanniguram area of **South Waziristan** tribal district.<sup>232</sup>
- October 9: The FC personnel were conducting a search operation in **Awaran** when militants hiding in a house opened fire on them. The FC personnel returned fire and the exchange of fire between them continued for some time before the four militants were killed.<sup>233</sup>
- November 13: Security forces conducted a search operation in Hoshab, in the surroundings of **Turbat (Kech)**. On being surrounded by the security forces, terrorists opened fire. During the clash, two soldiers — Sepoy Ramzan from district Sargodha and Lance Naik Liaqat Iqbal from district Swabi — were martyred.<sup>234</sup>

#### 4.1.3 Terrorists Arrested

Security and law enforcement agencies also arrested 156 suspected terrorists and members of militant groups in as many as 70 search and combing operations conducted all over the country as part of *Raddul Fasaad*. Highest arrests for any one militant group were made of the TTP and local Taliban militants (74). As many as 20 members of a Sindhi nationalist insurgent group, Sindhudesh Revolution Army, were detained during different

<sup>229</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), February 17, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-17&edition=ISL&id=5519133\\_79163436](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-02-17&edition=ISL&id=5519133_79163436)

<sup>230</sup> Dawn, April 11, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/04-11-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=616.png>

<sup>231</sup> Dawn, May 6, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1622312/three-soldiers-martyred-in-fight-with-terrorists-in-north-waziristan>

<sup>232</sup> Dawn, August 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1641507/soldier-martyred-in-fight-with-terrorists>

<sup>233</sup> Dawn, October 10, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1651157/4-militants-killed-in-clash-near-awarean-ispr>

<sup>234</sup> The Express Tribune, November 13, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2329286/three-soldiers-martyred-in-two-terrorist-attacks-in-balochistan>

operations conducted by law enforcers in Sindh. Similarly, security forces and law enforcement agencies arrested as many as 18 members and affiliates of Islamic State terrorist group and six operatives of Al-Qaeda from different parts of the country. A total of 17 suspected militants linked to different Baloch nationalist groups including 10 BLA militants were also detained during the year. As many as 7 among those detained were reportedly affiliated with Sipah-e-Muhammad. (*See Table 3*)

Table 3 lists organizational association and number of different brands of suspected militants arrested across Pakistan by law enforcers in 2021.

**Table 3: Suspected Terrorists Arrested in 2021**

Militant Organization	Operations	Terrorist Arrested
Afghan nationals	1	1
Al-Qaeda	2	6
Banned militant outfits (unspecified)	4	9
BLA	4	10
BLF	1	1
ISIS, or IS-K	8	18
Jaish-e-Muhammad	1	1
TTP and affiliates	34	74
Nationalist insurgents [unspecified]	3	6
Sindhudesh Revolution Army	9	20
Sipah-e-Muhammad	1	7
Unknown Militants	1	2
Zainabiyoun	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>156</b>

Some of the arrests made by security and law enforcement agencies in 2021 are narrated below:

- January 7: The CTD team arrested Amir Baz, Shahid, Musharraf Abbas, Bawaji and Adeel Abbas and two others linked with Sipah-i-Muhammad, a violent Shia sectarian group, from Girot district of **Khushab** in Punjab.<sup>235</sup>
- January 27: A joint team of the CTD and a federal institution carried out an action in Khuda Ki Basti in Surjani Town, **Karachi**, and detained a suspect identified as Abbas Jafri, affiliated with Zainabiyoun Brigade.<sup>236</sup>
- February 5: Five suspected militants were arrested during a raid by security forces in Shah Latif sector of **Karachi**. A would-be suicide bomber was also reportedly killed in

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<sup>235</sup> Dawn, January 8, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1600255/seven-terrorists-held-in-khushab-with-arms-explosives>

<sup>236</sup> Dawn, January 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1604005/zainabiyoun-militant-held-in-surjani>

- the ensuing exchange of firing between security forces and militants. A huge cache of weapons and explosives was also seized.<sup>237</sup>
- February 9: The **Peshawar** police claimed to have arrested a wanted terrorist who had blown up a government community girls' school Achini Bala, Peshawar in 2011. Belonging to Khyber, the wanted militant Yousuf had been on the run for 10 years.<sup>238</sup> Educational institutions, mainly girls' schools were one of the prime targets of the militants when militancy and terrorist violence were rife in ex-FATA as well as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
  - March 8: The **Kohat** police arrested a TTP commander Amir Jalal alias Colonel carrying Rs2 million head money.<sup>239</sup>
  - March 11: Police arrested Khalilullah alias Qari in **Karachi**, who is an active member of TTP Swat group and was planning suicide attack on a police training centre.<sup>240</sup>
  - March 13: Pakistan Rangers Sindh and police conducted an intelligence-based action in Ittehad Town, **Karachi** and arrested three suspects who were linked with IS-K.<sup>241</sup>
  - March 31: In an IBO conducted in **Rawalpindi**, four suspects allegedly involved in a grenade blast and installing an IED in Rawalpindi in 2020-21 were arrested.<sup>242</sup>
  - April 5: The CTD arrested 5 alleged terrorists in an operation near Bhatta Chowk, **Lahore**. The arrested terrorists include Zia-ur-Rehman, Ishtiaq, Abdul Rehman, Malik Kashif and Nazifullah.<sup>243</sup>
  - April 13: The Counter Terrorism Department claimed to have arrested two suspected militants of the banned SRA in **Karachi**, including a key commander Mumtaz Soomro, for their alleged involvement in terrorism activities.<sup>244</sup>
  - April 19: Police and Rangers arrested 5 suspected TTP militants, including two would-be suicide bombers, in an intelligence-based action in **Jamshoro**.<sup>245</sup>
  - April 20: Police said a key BLA member, Asif Brohi alias Don, was arrested in a raid on his hideout in Saeedabad near Northern Bypass, **Karachi**.<sup>246</sup>
  - April 23: police claimed to have arrested four alleged terrorists in a joint operation with commandos of counter-terrorism department in the mountains of **Lakki Marwat**. One of the arrested Tariq is a key militant leader of TTP Shah Hasankhel group and wanted in many terrorism cases.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Daily *Jang* (Urdu), February 9, 2021, <https://e.jang.com.pk/02-09-2021/pindi/pic.asp?picname=420.png>

<sup>238</sup> Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 10, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story?story=202102100204>

<sup>239</sup> *Dawn*, March 9, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1611432/ttp-commander-arrested-in-kohat-raid>

<sup>240</sup> *Dawn*, March 12, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1611940/ttp-militant-involved-in-terror-cases-arrested-in-karachi>

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> *Dawn*, April 1, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1615751/ctd-arrests-six-militants-in-lahore-rawalpindi>

<sup>243</sup> Dunya News, April 5, 2021, <https://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/595899-Five-terrorists-arrested-Lahore-successful-CTD-operation>

<sup>244</sup> *Dawn*, April 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1618132/ctd-arrests-two-sra-militants-in-city>

<sup>245</sup> *Dawn*, April 20, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1619234/two-would-be-bombers-among-five-ttp-militants-nabbed-from-jamshoro>

<sup>246</sup> *Dawn*, April 21, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1619430/key-bla-man-held-in-saeedabad-ak-47-recovered>

<sup>247</sup> *Dawn*, April 24, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1619944/four-terrorists-arrested-in-lakki>

- May 3: Police arrested 3 suspected IS-K affiliates in **Shikarpur** (Sindh) and recovered explosives and weapons from their possession. According to police, the detainees were wanted to police in attacks on Shia Muslims and worship places.<sup>248</sup>
- May 18: Officials of the KP police's counterterrorism department (CTD) claimed to have arrested two suspected terrorists in **Mardan**, including the mastermind of a suicide blast that took place at the entrance gate of the Mardan courts in 2016. The CTD personnel also recovered explosives, a hand grenade and a 30-bore pistol from the hideout. The officials said preliminary investigations revealed that the terrorists belonged to foreign spy agencies namely Indian RAW and Afghan NDS. They said cases had been registered against the arrested persons under the Anti-Terrorism Act.<sup>249</sup>
- July 11: The CTD **Sialkot** arrested one suspected militant Abdul Samad Mehsud who later acknowledged his links to the Islamic State terrorist group.<sup>250</sup>
- July 13: Police claimed to have arrested Ramesh Kumar in **Karachi** for his alleged association with Shafi Burfat group of the proscribed Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz.<sup>251</sup> Police said he had masterminded 38 cracker attacks between 2010 and 2015.
- August 17: The CTD arrested two alleged members of Al-Qaeda, Abdul Manan and Imran Akhtar, at Jallo Pind, **Lahore** and recovered from them 1,650g explosive material, prima card, detonator, safety fuse, a 30-bore pistol 3 and ammunition.<sup>252</sup>
- September 25: Three BLA militants were detained in **Kech** who were allegedly involved in August suicide attack in Gwadar.<sup>253</sup>
- September 27: Sindh police and an intelligence agency jointly carried out a raid in Mauripur area of **Karachi** and arrested two alleged IS-K militants Naseemullah alias Naseem and Mohammed Isa alias Molvi Idris.<sup>254</sup>
- October 26: The CTD of **Islamabad** police arrested three suspected TTP militants who had demanded Rs300 million through 10 letters sent to businessmen and owners of educational institutions.<sup>255</sup>
- November 7: **Karachi** police arrested 4 suspected militants belonging to the banned group BLA and TTP, who were hiding in a graveyard.<sup>256</sup>
- November 15: During an encounter with the police, a wanted Sindhi insurgent Kamran Chandio was overpowered and arrested in **Larkana**, but his two companions managed to escape.<sup>257</sup>

<sup>248</sup> BBC Urdu, May 3, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/urdu/pakistan-56964650>

<sup>249</sup> Dawn, May 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1624440/two-suspected-terrorists-held-in-mardan>

<sup>250</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), July 12, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-07-12&edition=ISL&id=5694073\\_79109070](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-07-12&edition=ISL&id=5694073_79109070)

<sup>251</sup> Dawn, July 14, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1634949/jsmm-militant-held-for-38-cracker-attacks>

<sup>252</sup> Dawn, August 18, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1641223/ctd-arrests-two-al-qaeda-militants-in-lahore>

<sup>253</sup> Dawn, September 26, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1648426/three-suspects-held-for-gwadar-suicide-attack>

<sup>254</sup> Dawn, September 28, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1648907/two-is-militants-held-in-mauripur>

<sup>255</sup> Dawn, October 27, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1654230/three-ttp-terrorists-arrested-in-islamabad>

<sup>256</sup> Daily Dunya (Urdu), November 8, 2021, [https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-11-08&edition=ISL&id=5835482\\_67257827](https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2021-11-08&edition=ISL&id=5835482_67257827)

<sup>257</sup> Dawn, November 16, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1658385/sra-militant-arrested-after-encounter-in-larkana>

- November 23: Two suspected TTP militants were nabbed by the counter terrorism department personnel with hand grenades, explosive device and arms, near Zaman Park area, **Okara** in Punjab province.<sup>258</sup>

#### **4.1.4 Failed/Foiled Terror Bids**

Security forces foiled at least six major terror bids or plots, either independently or in collaboration with Bomb Disposal Squads, mainly by recovering and defusing IEDs planted by militants. (*See Table 4*)

**Table 4: Failed/Foiled Terror Bids in 2021**

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Bajaur	1	0	0
Bannu	1	0	0
Gwadar	1	0	0
Karachi	1	0	0
Peshawar	1	0	0
Washuk	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Details are listed below:

- January 12: Members of security forces defused an improvised explosive device (IED) planted by the roadside in Basima area of Washuk district in Balochistan.<sup>259</sup>
- April 12: Separately, Police's Bomb Disposal Squad defused a bomb that had been attached to a bike parked near Liberty Chowk on Tariq Road, Karachi. It weighed around two kilogrammes and was a magnetic bomb, police said.<sup>260</sup>
- In September, two terror plots were foiled by law enforcement and security agencies in KP. First, on September 28th, police defused five hand grenades that were wrapped in a big plastic bag and placed along the roadside in Bakakhel area of Bannu.<sup>261</sup> One day later, the police's bomb disposal squad defused two anti-tank mines during a search operation carried out in Markhanoo Kamar area of Khar tehsil and Tangai area Nawagai tehsil in Bajaur.<sup>262</sup>
- October 18: The Bomb Disposal Unit personnel defused an explosive device weighing about two kilogrammes near a car bargain centre. The centre was the apparent target as the owner had received calls from Afghan numbers demanding extortion.<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> Dawn, November 24, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1659826/two-ttp-militants-held-with-explosives>

<sup>259</sup> Dawn, January 13, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1601222/explosive-device-defused>

<sup>260</sup> Dawn, April 13, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1617949/bomb-defused-at-tariq-road>

<sup>261</sup> Daily Mashriq (Urdu), September 29, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202109290104>

<sup>262</sup> Daily Mashriq (Urdu), September 30, 2021, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202109300333>

<sup>263</sup> Dawn, October 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1652877/bomb-defused-in-peshawar>

- December 6: A bomb was recovered in the port city of Gwadar which was planted in a motorcycle. The bike was parked in front of the Gwadar deputy commissioner office. Security personnel detected the bomb and defused it.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Dawn, December 7, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1662320/two-policemen-injured-in-grenade-attack-in-quetta>

## **Chapter 5**

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### **Changes in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Security Concerns**

**Najam U Din\***

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Pakistan and Afghanistan may not have been the most cordial of neighbors for decades, but each country is affected by developments in the other. With regard to Afghanistan, security and countering terrorism have been the main areas of focus and concern for Pakistan in recent decades.

The August 2021 takeover of Kabul handed Taliban control of all of Afghanistan. That outcome was received with alarm and concern by not just Afghanistan's neighbours but near neighbours and countries further afield. In contrast, senior government leaders in Pakistan welcomed the development with considerable cheer.

The most immediate concern for neighbours and several western countries seemed to be another wave of refugees from Afghanistan. It was instantly obvious that unless foreign assistance urgently materialized Afghanistan was headed for a serious humanitarian crisis. That assistance has appeared firmly linked to the Taliban forming an inclusive government and ensuring respect for human rights.


The lingering situation is increasing the likelihood of cross-border movement of Afghans, due to a general lack of security, a plunging economy, human rights concerns, treatment of women and religious, sectarian, and ethnic minorities.

### **Growing Displacement, Slowing Repatriation**

Unsurprisingly, with the changing situation in Afghanistan, the UNHCR-assisted repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan came to a near halt in 2021.

In July, the UN refugee agency was warning of an impending humanitarian crisis as around 270,000 Afghans had been displaced inside the country since January 2021, bringing the total uprooted population to over 3.5 million. Large populations had fled their homes, mainly ahead of a Taliban onslaught for control of various Afghan provinces. Even otherwise, it had already been a difficult 2021, with large numbers of Afghans facing serious food insecurity, drought, growing poverty, loss of livelihoods and the coronavirus pandemic.

The UNHCR-assisted repatriation of Afghans registered in Pakistan, which had been had on a steady decline for three years, slowed down to a trickle in 2021. The fall in the number of Afghans in Iran returning under the voluntary repatriation program told a similar story.



*Source: UNHCR*

### **Not Welcome**

Amid law and order, terrorism, economic, political, and social concerns, there is very little appetite in Pakistan or the wider region to accept substantial displaced populations.

Several neighboring and other countries have hinted at a preference to offer any form of assistance to displaced Afghans either inside Afghanistan or as close to that country's border as possible.

In late August, the deputy UN High Commissioner for Refugees spoke of the refugee agency's contingency planning for outflow of half a million Afghans from their country by the end of 2021. This was cited as a "worst case scenario".<sup>265</sup> The UNHCR appealed to all neighboring countries to keep their borders open for those seeking safety.

At the time, the UNHCR did note a recent "small uptick" in the outflow to Pakistan but added that it had not seen large outflows of Afghans until then.<sup>266</sup>

In September, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees asked Pakistan to accept the new influx of refugees from Afghanistan, indicated that those sent back due to lack of documentation might be at risk.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Half a million Afghans could flee across borders - UNHCR, August 27, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/half-million-afghans-could-flee-across-borders-unhcr-2021-08-27/>

<sup>266</sup> Half a million Afghans could flee across borders - UNHCR, August 27, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/half-million-afghans-could-flee-across-borders-unhcr-2021-08-27/>

<sup>267</sup> "UNHCR urges Pakistan to accept new Afghan refugees," *Dawn*, September 18, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1646942/unhcr-urges-pakistan-to-accept-new-afghan-refugees>

Pakistan had made its position known on the subject of refugees even before the UNHCR chief's plea. The Pakistan ambassador to the US is reported to have said: "We are already overburdened by the refugees, and it is beyond our capacity to host any more refugees."<sup>268</sup>

As per a displacement trends analysis for Pakistan by the UNHCR,<sup>269</sup> in 2021 at least 2,428 households (10,816 individuals) arrived in Pakistan from Afghanistan between April 1 and September 20. General or specific security threats were cited as the main reasons for flight by 82% of these households.

While the UNHCR analysis noted that 47% of the household were Pashtun, 41% were Hazara with smaller numbers of Tajik (9%) and Turkmen (1%). As many as 81% of the households did not have any family links in Pakistan and 59% reported having no documentation.

Among the new arrivals in Pakistan, the high proportion of Hazaras—who constitute around nine percent of Afghanistan's population, compared to Pashtuns who comprise 42 percent of the population—fleeing to Pakistan hinted at greater apprehensions among members of that ethnic group over safety under the Taliban rule. As per the UNHCR, all 100% of the households interviewed indicated that they did not intend to return.

### **Outflow Prospects and Other Apprehensions**

Although some cross-border movement of Afghans into Pakistan has already been reported, there have not been any large outflows so far.

Despite the change of rulers, the situation in Afghanistan continues to have a significant bearing on peace and security in Pakistan. Islamabad has long looked at the presence in Pakistan of nearly three million Afghans (1.4 million registered Afghans and an estimated 1.5 million unregistered ones) from a security-centric perspective. One of the 2014 National Action Plan's key points specifically called for "formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees".

Although large-scale outflows have not been reported so far, that might change if at least some improvements do not occur in Afghanistan before the spring arrives. Cross-border movement historically slows down in the harsh winters.

Pakistan and Afghanistan may not be conjoined twins but whatever happens on one side of the border usually has an effect on the other side too. That has been evidenced in the last 40 years in the shape of changes in Pakistani society. The fallout of the Afghanistan situation amid the US-led invasion has seen loss of lives of 80,000 Pakistanis and a \$150 billion loss to the economy.

This situation will continue to have an impact on terrorism and extremism. Perhaps most concerning is the fear of further spread of extremism in Pakistan. That is something that

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<sup>268</sup> "Afghanistan: How many refugees are there and where will they go?", BBC, August 31, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58283177>

<sup>269</sup> Pakistan Displacement Trends Analysis, UNHCR: New Arrivals from Afghanistan (As of September 20, 2021). [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2021-09-20%20Displacement%20trends\\_Final.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2021-09-20%20Displacement%20trends_Final.pdf)

Pakistan's nearly complete border fence cannot stop. It seems certain that what Pakistan faces in Afghanistan is not just for 2022. It is going to be a long haul.

## **Annexures**

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- Annex 1: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2021
- Annex 2: Cross Border Attacks and Clashes in 2021
- Annex 3: Terrorist Attacks on Security and Law Enforcement Agencies in 2021
- Annex 4: Attacks on Political Leaders in 2021
- Annex 5: Attacks on Tribal Elders
- Annex-6: Attacks on Health/Polio Workers, Security Escorts
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### **Annex 1: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2021**

<b>Date</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
21 Apr, 2021	Quetta	Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts)	Civ (13)	Mil (1) Civ (4)	TTP
14 Jul, 2021	Kohistan	CPEC/workers/Chinese	Civ (28)	Mil (1) FC (2) Civ (11)	TTP
20 Aug, 2021	Gwadar	CPEC/workers/Chinese	Civ (3)	Civ (2) Mil (1)	BLA
05 Sep, 2021	Quetta	Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts)	Civ (21) FC (16)	Mil (1) FC (4)	TTP
19 Dec, 2021	Bajaur	Political leaders/workers	Civ (4)	Mil (1) Civ (2)	ISIS affiliates/supporters
5 attacks			85 Injured	30 Killed	

### **Annex 2: Cross Border Attacks and Clashes in 2021**

#### **Pak-Afghan Border**

<b>Date</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Perpetrator</b>
06 Jan, 2021	Mohmand		FC (1)	TTP
19 Jan, 2021	Bajaur			Unknown/unknown militants
11 Feb, 2021	Bajaur	Civ (7)	Civ (1)	TTP
27 Mar, 2021	Bajaur	Civ (1)		ANA
26 Apr, 2021	Qilla Abdullah			ANA
05 May, 2021	Zhob	FC (6)	FC (4)	TTP
07 May, 2021	Bajaur	Arm (1)		TTP
22 May, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
30 Jun, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)	Arm (2)	TTP
08 Aug, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)		TTP
20 Aug, 2021	Bajaur		Civ (1)	TTP
26 Aug, 2021	Lower Dir		P-ml (1)	TTP
27 Aug, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)		TTP
27 Oct, 2021	Kurram		Arm (2)	TTP
<b>14 attacks</b>		<b>19 Injured</b>	<b>13 Killed</b>	

### Pak-India Border

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
02 Jan, 2021	Kotli			Indian BSF
02 Jan, 2021	Muzaffarabad			Indian BSF
10 Jan, 2021	Bhimber	Civ (2)		Indian BSF
14 Jan, 2021	Bhimber		Arm (1)	Indian BSF
23 Jan, 2021	Kotli			Indian BSF
01 Feb, 2021	Kotli	Civ (4)		Indian BSF
03 May, 2021	Sialkot			Indian BSF
13 Dec, 2021	Loc		Civ (1)	Indian BSF
<b>8 attacks</b>		<b>6 injured</b>	<b>2 Killed</b>	

### Pak-Iran Border

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
28 Sep, 2021	Kech	FC (1)	FC (1)	Nationalist insurgents
<b>1 attack</b>		<b>1 injured</b>	<b>1 killed</b>	

### Annex 3: Terrorist Attacks on Security and Law Enforcement Agencies in 2021

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
10 Jan, 2021	Kech	Civ (5)		BLF
12 Jan, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)	Arm (1)	TTP
13 Jan, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (3)	Arm (2)	TTP
15 Jan, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
17 Jan, 2021	North Waziristan			Local Taliban
21 Jan, 2021	Sibi	FC (5)	FC (4)	BLA
23 Jan, 2021	Kech	FC (2)		BLF
31 Jan, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)		TTP
12 Feb, 2021	South Waziristan		Arm (4) Mil (4)	TTP
12 Feb, 2021	North Waziristan			TTP
15 Feb, 2021	Kech		FC (1)	BLF
15 Feb, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (8)	Arm (4)	TTP
18 Feb, 2021	Quetta	Civ (1) FC (1)	FC (1)	BLA
19 Feb, 2021	South Waziristan	FC (1)	FC (5)	TTP
23 Feb, 2021	D.I Khan			Local Taliban
07 Mar, 2021	Gwadar	Arm (1)	Arm (2)	BLA
07 Mar, 2021	Rawalpindi		Pol (1)	TTP
07 Mar, 2021	Islamabad	Pol (2)	Pol (1)	TTP
15 Mar, 2021	Karachi	Rng (4) Civ (10)	Rng (1)	BLA
17 Mar, 2021	Swat	Mil (1)	Civ (2) Mil (1)	TTP

23 Mar, 2021	Qilla Abdullah	Pol (1) Civ (8) Lvs (4)	Civ (3)	TTP
23 Mar, 2021	Khairpur	Civ (1) Rng (2)		Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army
05 Apr, 2021	Bannu		Pol (1)	TTP
14 Apr, 2021	Lasbela	Civ (3)		BLF
15 Apr, 2021	Bajaur		Pol (1)	TTP
21 Apr, 2021	Quetta	Civ (13)	Mil (1) Civ (4)	TTP
25 Apr, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
27 Apr, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)		TTP
28 Apr, 2021	Qilla Abdullah	Pol (2) Civ (5)	Pol (2)	TTP
03 May, 2021	Awaran	Lvs (2)	Lvs (2)	BLA
04 May, 2021	Bajaur	Arm (2)	Arm (2)	TTP
06 May, 2021	Kech	FC (3)		BLF
08 May, 2021	Bolan	FC (1)	FC (3)	BLA
09 May, 2021	Kech	FC (4)		BLF
09 May, 2021	Lakki Marwat	Pol (1)	Pol (1) Mil (2)	TTP
10 May, 2021	Quetta	FC (2)		BLA
10 May, 2021	Mastung	Pol (1)	Pol (2)	BLA
12 May, 2021	Lakki Marwat		Arm (1)	TTP
29 May, 2021	Mardan	Pol (2)	Civ (1) Mil (1) Pol (1)	Local Taliban
31 May, 2021	Quetta	Mil (8) FC (6)	Mil (5) FC (4)	BLA
31 May, 2021	Kech	FC (2)		BLF
01 Jun, 2021	North Waziristan	Pol (3)	Pol (1) Civ (1)	TTP
03 Jun, 2021	Islamabad		Pol (2)	TTP
09 Jun, 2021	Mardan		Pol (2)	TTP
14 Jun, 2021	Quetta		FC (4)	BLA
17 Jun, 2021	Kech		Arm (1)	BLF
23 Jun, 2021	Lahore	Pol (1) Civ (19)	Civ (3)	Unknown/unknown militants
24 Jun, 2021	Sibi		FC (5)	BLA
27 Jun, 2021	Kech		FC (1)	BLF
30 Jun, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (3)	Arm (3)	TTP
01 Jul, 2021	Quetta	Arm (6)		BLA
05 Jul, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)	Arm (3)	TTP
08 Jul, 2021	Lower Dir		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
14 Jul, 2021	Gwadar	Arm (3)	Arm (2)	BLF
17 Jul, 2021	D.I Khan			TTP
18 Jul, 2021	Peshawar		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
18 Jul, 2021	Mardan		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
18 Jul, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (2)		TTP

25 Jul, 2021	Haripur		Pol (1)	Unknown/unknown militants
26 Jul, 2021	Quetta	Civ (4)		BLA
31 Jul, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)	Arm (1)	TTP
31 Jul, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (5)	Arm (1)	TTP
01 Aug, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (2)		TTP
01 Aug, 2021	Peshawar		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
01 Aug, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (1)	Arm (1)	TTP
02 Aug, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
03 Aug, 2021	Khyber		Pol (2)	TTP
04 Aug, 2021	Khyber		P-ml (2)	TTP
04 Aug, 2021	South Waziristan	FC (4)		TTP
07 Aug, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
08 Aug, 2021	Quetta	Pol (12) Civ (9)	Pol (2)	BLA
08 Aug, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (2)		TTP
14 Aug, 2021	Loralai	FC (1)	FC (1) Mil (3)	BLA
15 Aug, 2021	Lower Dir	Pol (4)		TTP
21 Aug, 2021	Bannu		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
22 Aug, 2021	Panjgur	Arm (2)	Arm (1)	BLF
26 Aug, 2021	Ziarat	Lvs (3)	Lvs (3)	BLA
26 Aug, 2021	Panjgur	FC (3)	FC (1)	BLF
30 Aug, 2021	South Waziristan		Arm (1) Mil (1)	TTP
31 Aug, 2021	North Waziristan			TTP
31 Aug, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)		TTP
05 Sep, 2021	Quetta	Civ (21) FC (16)	Mil (1) FC (4)	TTP
07 Sep, 2021	North Waziristan		Mil (1) Arm (2)	TTP
08 Sep, 2021	Mohmand	Pol (1) FC (1)		Local Taliban
10 Sep, 2021	Kech	FC (1)	FC (2)	BLF
10 Sep, 2021	Kalat	Pol (2) Civ (2)		BLA
10 Sep, 2021	Mohmand		Pol (2)	TTP
13 Sep, 2021	South Waziristan	Arm (4)	Arm (1)	TTP
16 Sep, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)	Mil (2)	TTP
25 Sep, 2021	Harnai	FC (2)	FC (4)	BLA
26 Sep, 2021	Bolan	FC (2)	FC (1)	BLA
02 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan		Lvs (1) FC (4)	TTP
04 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
06 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)	Arm (1)	TTP
13 Oct, 2021	Peshawar		Pol (1)	Unknown/unknown militants
17 Oct, 2021	Lower Dir	Pol (4)		TTP
17 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)		TTP

18 Oct, 2021	Quetta	Pol (14) Civ (5)	Pol (1)	BLA
18 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)	Arm (1)	TTP
20 Oct, 2021	Hangu		Arm (1)	TTP
20 Oct, 2021	Bajaur		P-ml (2) Pol (2) Civ (2)	TTP
20 Oct, 2021	Kech		Arm (1)	BLF
21 Oct, 2021	Peshawar		Pol (1)	TTP
22 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (2)	Mil (1) Arm (2)	TTP
22 Oct, 2021	Panjgur	Arm (2)	Arm (1)	BLA
24 Oct, 2021	D.I Khan		Pol (1)	TTP
26 Oct, 2021	Bannu		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
27 Oct, 2021	Lakki Marwat		Pol (4)	TTP
27 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
27 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
27 Oct, 2021	North Waziristan	Arm (1)		TTP
30 Oct, 2021	Orakzai	FC (6)	Mil (2)	TTP
31 Oct, 2021	Panjgur	FC (3)	Civ (2)	BLA
01 Nov, 2021	Peshawar		Pol (1)	TTP
02 Nov, 2021	Kharan	Civ (13)		BLA
09 Nov, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
13 Nov, 2021	Quetta	Pol (2) Civ (4)		UBA
13 Nov, 2021	Bajaur		Pol (2)	Local Taliban
13 Nov, 2021	Kech		Arm (1)	BLF
21 Nov, 2021	North Waziristan		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
22 Nov, 2021	Panjgur		Arm (1)	BRA
24 Nov, 2021	Peshawar		Pol (2)	ISIS affiliates/supporters
24 Nov, 2021	Kech		Arm (2)	BLF
24 Nov, 2021	Sibi	FC (2)	FC (1)	BLA
27 Nov, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (2)	Local Taliban
06 Dec, 2021	Quetta	Pol (3)		BLA
13 Dec, 2021	Rawalpindi	Pol (5)	Pol (1)	TTP
14 Dec, 2021	Kech		Arm (1)	BRA
16 Dec, 2021	North Waziristan	Pol (2)	Pol (1)	TTP
16 Dec, 2021	Lakki Marwat		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
18 Dec, 2021	Kech		Arm (1)	BLA
20 Dec, 2021	Panjgur			BLF
24 Dec, 2021	Kech		Arm (2)	BLF
25 Dec, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (1)	TTP
29 Dec, 2021	North Waziristan		Pol (1)	TTP
29 Dec, 2021	Kech		Arm (2)	BLF
30 Dec, 2021	North Waziristan		Arm (4)	TTP
<b>137 Attacks</b>		<b>341 Injured</b>	<b>213 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex 4: Attacks on Political Leaders/Workers in 2021**

<b>Date</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
25 Mar, 2021	Bajaur	Political leaders/workers		Civ (1)	Unknown/unknown militants
16 Oct, 2021	Lower Dir	Political leaders/workers	Civ (1)		Local Taliban
22 Nov, 2021	Bajaur	Political leaders/workers		Civ (1)	ISIS affiliates/supporters
27 Nov, 2021	Qambar Shahdadkot	Political leaders/workers	Civ (1)	Civ (1)	Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army
19 Dec, 2021	Bajaur	Political leaders/workers	Civ (4)	Mil (1) Civ (2)	ISIS affiliates/supporters
25 Dec, 2021	South Waziristan	Political leaders/workers		Civ (1)	Unknown/unknown militants
30 Dec, 2021	Quetta	Political leaders/workers	Civ (14)	Civ (4)	Unknown/unknown militants
<b>7 attacks</b>			<b>20 injured</b>	<b>11 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex 5: Attacks on Tribal Elders**

<b>Date</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
22 Feb, 2021	Bajaur		Civ (1)	TTP
27 Feb, 2021	Bajaur	Pol (1) Civ (1)		TTP
25 Apr, 2021	Kech		Civ (2)	Nationalist insurgents
04 Jul, 2021	North Waziristan		Civ (1)	TTP
08 Jul, 2021	North Waziristan		Civ (1)	TTP
28 Jul, 2021	North Waziristan		Civ (2)	TTP
21 Aug, 2021	Orakzai	Civ (1)	Civ (2)	TTP
21 Sep, 2021	Bajaur			TTP
01 Nov, 2021	Lasbela		Civ (1)	BLA
<b>9 attacks</b>		<b>3 Injured</b>	<b>10 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex-6: Attacks on Health/Polio Workers, Security Escorts**

<b>Date</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Injured</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
12 Jan, 2021	Karak		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
01 Aug, 2021	South Waziristan	Pol (1)		Local Taliban
02 Aug, 2021	D.I Khan		Pol (1)	TTP
19 Sep, 2021	Kohat		Pol (1)	Local Taliban
11 Dec, 2021	Tank	FC (1)	Pol (1)	TTP

12 Dec, 2021	Tank		Pol (1)	TTP
<b>6 attacks</b>		<b>2 Injured</b>	<b>5 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex-7: Attacks on Non-Baloch Settlers/Workers**

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
25 Feb, 2021	Khuzdar	Civ (4)		BLF
05 Mar, 2021	Sibi	Civ (3) FC (2)	Civ (5)	BLA
24 Aug, 2021	Quetta		Civ (4)	BLA
21 Nov, 2021	Harnai		Civ (3)	BLA
24 Nov, 2021	Sibi	Civ (2)		Baloch Republican Guard
<b>5 attacks</b>		<b>11 injured</b>	<b>12 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex-8: Attacks on CPEC/Workers/Chinese**

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
09 Mar, 2021	Karachi	Civ (2)		BLF
14 Jul, 2021	Kohistan	Civ (28)	Mil (1) FC (2) Civ (11)	TTP
28 Jul, 2021	Karachi	Civ (1)		BLF
20 Aug, 2021	Gwadar	Civ (3)	Civ (2) Mil (1)	BLA
<b>4 attacks</b>		<b>34 Killed</b>	<b>17 killed</b>	

#### **Annex 9: Terrorist Attacks on Civilians**

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
16 Jan, 2021	Quetta	Civ (2)		Nationalist insurgents
01 Feb, 2021	Bajaur	Civ (1)		Local Taliban
07 Feb, 2021	Sibi	Civ (2)	Civ (1)	Nationalist insurgents
20 Feb, 2021	Dera Ghazi Khan	Civ (5)	Civ (6) Mil (1)	Religiously inspired extremist individual(s)
13 Apr, 2021	Lasbela	Civ (14)		BLF
21 May, 2021	Qilla Abdullah	Civ (14)	Civ (7)	TTP
22 May, 2021	Bajaur		Civ (1)	Local Taliban
24 May, 2021	Quetta	P-ml (1) Civ (4)		Nationalist insurgents
01 Jun, 2021	South Waziristan	Civ (2)	Civ (3)	Local Taliban
03 Jun, 2021	Quetta	Civ (2)	Civ (3)	Unknown/unknown militants
02 Jul, 2021	Tank		Civ (3)	Local Taliban
08 Jul, 2021	Nushki	Civ (2)		Nationalist insurgents

13 Aug, 2021	Kech	Civ (5)		BLF
14 Aug, 2021	Karachi	Civ (13)	Civ (11)	Unknown/unknown militants
13 Dec, 2021	Kohlu	Civ (1)	Civ (1)	BRA
18 Dec, 2021	Quetta	Civ (10)	Civ (1)	Unknown/unknown militants
<b>16 Attacks</b>		<b>78 Injured</b>	<b>38 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex 10: Breakdown of Attacks by Province**

##### **Balochistan**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
January	6	16	14
February	6	5	37
March	3	10	19
April	5	9	37
May	10	23	48
June	6	14	3
July	4	2	15
August	12	19	51
September	5	12	46
October	4	5	24
November	9	9	23
December	11	12	28
		<b>136</b>	<b>345</b>

##### **Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
January	6	5	7
February	9	22	13
March	2	4	1
April	6	5	2
May	5	10	5
June	4	10	8
July	15	31	38
Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
August	18	17	16
September	9	10	7
October	21	31	18
November	7	10	0
December	9	14	7
	<b>111</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>122</b>

##### **Punjab**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Injured</b>
February	1	7	5
March	1	1	0

June	1	3	20
August	1	2	21
December	1	1	5
	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>51</b>

### Karachi

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	0	0	0
February	0	0	0
March	3	1	17
April	0	0	0
May	0	0	0
June	0	0	0
July	1	0	1
August	1	11	13
September	0	0	0
October	0	0	0
November	0	0	0
December	0	0	0
	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>31</b>

### Sindh (Excluding Karachi)

Month	Frequency	Killed	Injured
January	0	0	0
February	0	0	0
March	1	0	3
April	0	0	0
May	0	0	0
June	0	0	0
July	0	0	0
August	0	0	0
September	0	0	0
October	1	0	0
November	1	1	1
December	0	0	0
	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>

### Annex 11: Incidents of Ethnic and Political Violence in 2021

Province	Location	Attacks	Injured	Killed
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	Karak	1	0	2
	Kohat	1	2	1
	Tank	1	0	1
	Haripur	1	4	1
Punjab	Sialkot	1	6	2

Total		<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>
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#### **Annex 12: Target of Terrorists Attacks in 2021**

Targets	No. of attacks	Killed	Injured
Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts)	137	213	341
Education/institutions/teachers	2		
Non-Bloch settlers/workers	5	12	11
Govt. officials/institutions/symbols	7	6	42
Power pylons/cell phone towers	1		
Civilians	16	38	78
Shia religious scholars/community	2	13	21
Worship places/shrines/madrassas	1	0	1
Sunni religious leaders/community	1	0	1
Haqqani Network	1	1	0
Political leaders/workers	7	11	20
NGO / civil society members	1	4	1
Sikh community	1	1	0
Alleged spy	1	1	0
Health/polio workers, security escorts	6	5	2
Pro-govt tribesmen/peace committee members	9	10	3
Afghan Taliban/Others	1	1	0
CPEC/workers/Chinese	4	17	34
Former militants	1	1	0
Railway tracks / trains	1		
Development, exploration projects, companies, workers	2	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>555</b>

#### **Annex 13: Terrorist Attacks' Tactics in 2021**

Tactics	Attacks
Hand grenades	15
IEDs	80
Suicide attacks	5
Rocket attacks	3
Gun and bomb attack	1
Kidnapping	1
Firing	102
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>

#### **Annex 14: Operational Attacks by Security Forces in 2021**

Province	Location	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Punjab	Lahore	1	3	0
Balochistan	Bolan	2	8	0

	Harnai	1	6	0
	Kech	1	7	0
	Kharan	2	9	0
	Lasbela	1	2	0
	Loralai	1	7	0
	Mastung	4	26	0
	Quetta	3	11	0
	Sibi	1	1	0
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	Bajaur	2	3	0
	D.I Khan	3	4	0
	Kurram	1	5	3
	Lakki Marwat	1	1	0
	Lower Dir	2	4	0
	North Waziristan	22	55	6
	Peshawar	2	6	0
	South Waziristan	8	32	2
	Tank	2	4	2
Sindh	Jamshoro	1	0	0
	Karachi	1	1	0
	Sukkur	1	2	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>63</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>13</b>

#### **Annex-15: Protests and Clashes with Security Forces**

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
12 Apr, 2021	Multiple Districts		Civ (2)	TLP
13 Apr, 2021	Multiple Districts	Pol (300)	Pol (4) Civ (3)	TLP
18 Apr, 2021	Lahore	Pol (15) Civ (100)	Civ (3)	TLP
22 Oct, 2021	Lahore		Pol (2) Civ (2)	TLP
27 Oct, 2021	Lahore		Pol (3) Civ (4)	TLP
02 Nov, 2021	Gujranwala		Pol (1)	TLP
<b>6 attacks</b>		<b>415 injured</b>	<b>24 Killed</b>	

#### **Annex-16: Incidents of Faith-based Violence in 2021**

Date	District	Injured	Killed	Responsibility
28 Mar, 2021	Rawalpindi			Mobs/individual
18 May, 2021	Islamabad	Pol (7)		Mobs/individual

13 Jul, 2021	Multan	Civ (1)		Mobs/individual
04 Aug, 2021	Rahim Yar Khan			Mobs/individual
02 Sep, 2021	Sheikhupura		Civ (1)	Unknown/unknown militants
28 Nov, 2021	Charsadda			Mobs/individual
03 Dec, 2021	Sialkot		Civ (1)	Mobs/individual
	<b>7 Incidents</b>	<b>8 Injured</b>	<b>2 Killed</b>	

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