AFGHAN PEACE AND RECONCILIATION:
Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options

Report of PIPS Consultation-3
held on March 27, 2022 in Islamabad
AFGHAN PEACE AND RECONCILIATION: PAKISTAN’S INTERESTS AND POLICY OPTIONS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) expresses gratitude to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad for its generous support to this programme, helping the organisation to conduct policy-driven experts’ consultations on Pakistan’s role in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Likewise, PIPS is thankful to all the learned resource persons who participated in this third quarterly consultation and shared their expert knowledge on the subject. PIPS hopes to benefit from their knowledge and insights in the future too.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Taliban captured Kabul on 15th August 2021 and announced their government three weeks later. Pakistan viewed the event as cleaning up of the unwanted externalities in its neighborhood i.e., a complete pullback of Indian and Western presence and influence. However, the initial exhilaration has morphed into disappointment over the past months. Not only has the Taliban regime adopted traditional approach to Durand line, they are also believed to be turning a blind eye to the safe havens of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups on their soil. Pakistan in the current situation requires an all-encompassing parliament-led policy that focuses on provision of humanitarian assistance and on winning hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Along with humanitarian assistance, Pakistan’s present Afghan policy must address its bilateral equation with Afghanistan and counter-terrorism mechanisms.

Unfortunately, despite their proximity, Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal agreement regarding refugees, trade or border. So, the government must avail this opportunity and focus on sketching a bilateral strategic agreement because unlike previous governments in Kabul, the current government is keen to make formal agreements with neighbouring Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan needs to exhibit a balanced approach, neither being apologetic about the amicable equation it shares with the Afghan Taliban, nor become an advocate of the Taliban. This will allow Pakistan to be pragmatic and shape its actions and reactions accordingly.

Here it may be noted that a key factor that is limiting Pakistan’s policy choices is the enhanced threats to Pakistan’s internal security as well its western borders since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Cross border movements of militants have increased, leading to a spike in attacks on Pakistan security personnel. As far as TTP is concerned, between September 2021 and March 2022, it claimed to have carried out 197 attacks. Apparently, the Taliban have reneged on their promises made in Doha as well as earlier that they would prevent Afghan soil from becoming a staging point for attacks inside Pakistan. This inaction is fundamentally due to the Afghan Taliban’s long affiliation with the TTP which fought side by side with
them against foreign forces. Against this backdrop, the Afghan Taliban are averse to the idea of cracking down on the TTP in a meaningful way. Currently, the Taliban are limiting their efforts to being a mediator between the Pakistani government and TTP kingpins.

On the question of Afghanistan's humanitarian and economic crisis, there are contrasting opinions. While some advocate that Pakistan must be at the front foot, others maintain that Afghanistan's humanitarian and economic issues are majorly a concern of the international community and Pakistan must conduct low-key. Through Pakistan's weakened economy does not allow it to help Afghanistan single-handedly, still it can facilitate international engagement which certainly is the remedy for Afghanistan's humanitarian and economic crises. Socio-economic stability in Afghanistan is crucial for Pakistan's internal security because if Afghanistan does not stabilise macroeconomically, no politics or diplomacy will save Pakistan from fallout of the crisis in Afghanistan. Pakistan must focus its efforts towards assuring that international engagement and assistance is not conditioned with the provision of women rights – at least in the immediate term - particularly because Afghanistan has a specific cultural orientation which does not fully align with the Western concepts of human rights.

Pakistan has so far exhibited a stern strategy towards refugees. Though it is fundamentally an attempt to keep the international community from denying its responsibility towards war ravaged Afghanistan, it is also motivated by Pakistan's economic fragility. Not only has Pakistan given a cold response to the idea of more refugees pouring into Pakistan, it has also stopped UNHCR from using the terms “new arrivals” or “new refugees”. However, this approach will have negative impacts because when refugees are abandoned by states and a vacuum is created, other forces and elements start interfering. It is argued that such policies have led to recruitments in ISKP. So, with the situation in hand, the right roadmap will be to sketch inclusive measures in order to deal with the matter of refugees; refugees living in Pakistan for the last many decades should be considered for granting right to Pakistani citizenship

Over the years the dynamics of Afghanistan have transformed, its challenges today
Executive Summary

are different from the challenges it faced during Soviet invasion or after 9/11, so the solutions must be different too. The perception-shift which is an indispensable need of the hour is treating Afghanistan as an independent country and managing its condition like a regional crisis. While the regional players must acknowledge that Afghanistan’s emerging situation is a threat to regional stability, economy and diplomacy, Pakistan must accept that the Taliban can vocalise their challenges. Meanwhile, Pakistan should focus on formulating a prudent comprehensive national policy giving priority to Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the direct affectees of the Afghan situation. This policy should be in public domain and must be the impression of consultation with politically representative bodies, parliament, and provincial assemblies.
EXPLORING
PAKISTAN’S POSITION,
INTERESTS &
POLICY OPTIONS

Sanaullah Baloch, political leader, Balochistan National Party-Mengal

Before saying something about Afghanistan, I would like to present some hard facts about Balochistan. Amidst the abysmal socio-economic state of the province, poverty is skyrocketing in the province. According to the multidimensional poverty index, FATA which has now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is at 72%, whereas Balochistan is at 78%. Furthermore, not only is the 60% population of Balochistan still unaware of electricity, but the province also lacks road infrastructure, industrialization and understanding of digital revolution. While there is development in other sections of Pakistan, Balochistan is facing poverty and impoverishment. Talking about insurgency in Balochistan, Baloch youth have not been attracted by circumstances in Afghanistan, rather they believe to be fighting for peace. This is the first time that the crisis of insurgency has transferred
to the second generation as the crisis has been there for the last 21 years.

Previously, Islamabad willingly or unwillingly used to settle matters of insurgencies by negotiating with the leadership. However unfortunately this time the insurgency has prolonged because there has been no negotiated settlement, and no mechanisms of conflict resolution have been demonstrated by the centre. This insurgency could have been controlled through negotiated settlement, had there been no trust deficit. Now even if the Baloch insurgents are suppressed, the situation is only going to worsen in Balochistan because the Afghan crisis is not only threatening agriculture in the province, but also putting immense pressure on Balochistan’s health, education and employment. For one, due to increased poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, urea fertiliser is being smuggled from Balochistan to Afghanistan, increasing the price of the fertiliser and decreasing its availability for Baloch farmers, thereby reducing the agricultural production of Balochistan by 30-40%.
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The social pressure on Balochistan has escalated because refugees coming from Afghanistan are mainly coming to urban centres like Quetta. Meanwhile, the security threat is increasing too because weapons left by American forces are sold at much cheaper prices now. Hence, complex challenges of Afghanistan need to be properly analysed and discussed and a national policy needs to be sketched by political leadership and the security establishment. Unfortunately, the two institutions are lagging behind in this task and Afghanistan crisis’ fallout has spiralled out in Balochistan. However, a policy should not be shaped by a high impact event; 60-70 years of Balochistan’s relations with Afghanistan, its political challenges and economic shortfalls are to be examined for forging a policy for Balochistan.

Maulana Abdul Qadir Luni, head of JUI-Nazariyati Balochistan

In Taliban’s era, Afghanistan has always been controlled by leadership in Kandahar and the situation is the same in this regime as well. As far as the sentiments of the populace are concerned, apart from the people who were associated with previous governments and availed benefits from previous forces, no one is unhappy. However, these individuals currently are not in Afghanistan, and they are busy criticising [the new government] while sitting in Pakistan, Iran or Tajikistan. I recently visited 14-15 provinces of Afghanistan, and as an unbiased spectator I saw that the Taliban and Afghan citizenry have finally had the sigh of relief after the Taliban took power.

Moderator: Do you see any cooperation of the Taliban regime with Pakistan amidst emboldening of TTP and increasing border incursions by TTP and Daesh?

As far as TTP and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) are concerned, the latter is mostly present in those areas of Afghanistan that are adjacent to Balochistan.

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Shahzain Bugti, Special Assistant to Pakistan’s Prime Minister on Reconciliation and Harmony in Balochistan, when visited my house to inquire about my well-being after the attack on me, he asked me about the status of Baloch people especially Bugtis residing in Kandahar. I then contacted Kandahar and inquired about the situation of the Baloch there and found out that be it Baloch or Pathans, the Taliban have unanimously decided that they will not allow anyone to keep weapons. I also realised that the Taliban have adopted the same decision for TTP. Mullah Yaqoob Akhund, defence minister of Afghanistan is himself supervising Afghan border adjacent to Balochistan while making sure that even a Talib in these areas does not possess weapons. If a Talib is caught with weapons, there is designated punishment and penalty for the guilty. Moreover, the members of the defence ministry have been given identity cards to make sure that only they possess weapons.

So the question now is, from where exactly do they launch these attacks? I think they are in border areas including inside Pakistan. Secondly, amongst the political parties in Balochistan, I have been the main target [of the terrorists], having faced a number of attacks in recent times. Who exactly is attacking me? It cannot be the Taliban because they consider me their supporter, nor can it be BLA because none of these attacks have taken place in Baloch areas. Hence, Afghanistan is not...
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responsible for the current security situation; entities like Daesh and others have been made and bred by different countries. Under the Taliban’s regime, it is not even possible that these entities receive any support from Afghanistan. As far as girls’ education is concerned, I condemn the Taliban’s decision and I believe that the decision will soon be revoked. It is mainly linked to and delayed by regional considerations of administering the dress code for schoolgirls, which will be soon sorted out.

Ilyas Khan, senior journalist

When the Taliban were in control in the 1990s, the security situation was more or less the same. Accepting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and reordering our policy towards it in this light is a fundamental requirement of our age. But in order to achieve this aim, Pakistan also needs to reassess its policy towards India. Pakistan’s Afghan policy is largely shaped by its narrative of India as a fatal enemy, and its push for achieving a ‘strategic depth’ against it across Afghan territory. This is a flawed narrative. As India still continues to be an archenemy according to Pakistan’s policy narrative, any effort at rationalizing Pakistan’s official policy towards Afghanistan will largely depend on a similar rationalisation of its policy towards India.

Rifat Ullah Orakzai, journalist & security analyst

Taliban had captured Kabul on 15th of August and on 7th of September they announced their government. Pakistan’s security establishment and political leadership demonstrated happiness and relief primarily because the rule of Taliban

Moderator: Kindly share the unfolding situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s policy options.

Moderator: Kindly highlight the border fencing situation and resultant insecurity and also discuss internal security situation particularly due to increasing attacks of TTP and Daesh.

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meant no RAW in Afghanistan and an end to America’s control and European influence. But reality seems quite opposite to the expectations; in fact, a negative impact has been observed since the start of 2022. Though there was never a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, the resistance against fencing shown by Ghani’s government was much lesser than the resistance exhibited by the incumbent Taliban government. The Taliban, I believe, are criticising fencing to fan nationalistic sentiments and win public support. As far as TTP is concerned, between September 2021 and March 2022, it has claimed to have carried out 197 attacks. So, Afghan Taliban has failed to fulfil its commitment that it will not allow any group to use Afghan soil against any state. In November 2021, talks [with the TTP] had started in full swing but with time the efforts diffused.

Moderator: In last quarterly consultation, you had argued that Pakistan has the required security infrastructure and experience to take on the groups like the TTP and counter their terrorist threat. You had also rightly held that the policy of negotiating with the TTP is a failed policy as it will only embolden the group. Now we see that after the regime change in Afghanistan the group is back and attacking Pakistan with an increased frequency and intensity. How would you analyse the emerging developments in Afghanistan and their implications for Pakistan?

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Professor at the School of Politics & International Relations, QAU, Islamabad

Not country in the region wants to see or can afford instability in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s concerns are more cumbersome [due to growing border insecurity and terrorist violence]. If the economic and governance situation in Afghanistan does not improve, it will add to internal conflict lines thus giving way to external actors to become part of a new great game. The economic and governance situation in Afghanistan does not improve, it will add to internal conflict lines thus giving way to external actors to become part of a new great game.
militant groups will then not operate in isolation from external influences. Therefore, I believe, as long as the war economy in Afghanistan is not replaced with another one, the problem will remain there. No practical steps have so far been taken by the international community and even OIC to revive the Afghan economy. As far as the issue of the women and their rights is concerned, Afghanistan has a specific cultural orientation which does not fully agree with the international picture of human rights and changing the culture of any society takes at least a decade.

**Moderator:** How do you see the cross-border incursions as well as relocation of the militant leadership and fighters [including the Baloch insurgent groups] from Afghanistan since August last year? What does that mean for Balochistan and how the government is trying to tackle the fallout?

**Shahzada Zulfiqar, Quetta based senior journalist, President PFUJ**

The situation in Afghanistan has been impacting Pakistan and also Balochistan in many ways. First, the number of terrorist attacks has increased in Balochistan. Although it is difficult to establish its link to Afghan situation but there is evidence that not only have the militants been crossing over to Pakistan since August last year but they were also found in possession of more sophisticated weapons as was observed in Nushki and Panjgur attacks by the BLA militants. So, we can say with certainty that there are enhanced security threats. Secondly, though the Taliban government has reportedly directed the TTP to stop attacks against Pakistan, the latter has continued attacks in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, thereby rejecting those directions. That cross-border threat is not confined to the TTP alone, but other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, such as Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), are also growing in strength and posing threat not only to the security of Pakistan but of the whole region. Thirdly, as I said earlier, the leaders and members of the Baloch insurgent groups have also been relocating to Balochistan in recent months. Others have also relocated to Iran or other [presumably safe] regions within Afghanistan. Many reports also indicated growing attacks on Baloch leaders in Afghanistan, which may have prompted their relocation post-Taliban takeover, although such attacks [on Baloch insurgent...
On the other hand, there has been a lack of consistency in the responses of the state institutions to deal with Baloch and TTP leaderships. For instance, as we have seen recently, the state institutions sometimes want to engage with the [Pakistani] Taliban and sometimes choose to remain completely silent on matters of grave concern. Similarly, the discourse on political reconciliation/talks with Baloch insurgent leaders has also remained inconsistent and puzzled. Similarly, Pakistan has not yet started to fully engage [officially] with the Afghan Taliban to discuss its matters of concerns and evolve some joint bilateral mechanisms on border security/coordination and counterterrorism cooperation. Temporary relief is no solution, and instead there is a need of constructive engagement with the Taliban administration and targeted efforts for socio-economic uplift of Afghanistan.

**Moderator:** The other day I heard you talking about the issue of Afghan refugees. How do you see the impending humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and how could it impact Pakistan?

**Dr. Simbal Khan, political & security analyst**

As long as governance and economic issues remain unresolved in Afghanistan, the problems of security and violence would increase there manifold and this would have a fallout on Pakistan. Pakistan can use its level of trust with the Taliban representation to slowly improve the situation as currently the political scenario of the Taliban does not facilitate them to solely focus on the security concerns. Moreover, the ban on education and travel of Afghan women needs to be reversed to keep Afghanistan from further political and economic isolation. Pakistan’s economy does not have capacity to help
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Afghanistan in these humanitarian crises, the crisis can only be overcome through international engagement so the country should focus on facilitating international engagement. As far as refugee’s influx is concerned, there is a severe need to look upon new arrivals from the war-ravaged neighbour. Pakistan has been pursuing a restrictive [refugee] policy so far that is not good as it could lead to recruitment [by militants] also.

Ihsan Ullah Tipu Mehsud, journalist & analyst

There is an increasing security threat for Pakistan under the Taliban rule. After Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the threat had actually shifted to Afghanistan, but since August 15th a new shift [in the threat] has been observed. Worsening the situation are cross border movements of militants, who cross border and attack Pakistan security personnel. The government of Pakistan should engage religious leaders from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to talk on the matter of TTP with Afghan Taliban as cross border attacks significantly rose after the withdrawal of US forces. This upsurge in militant attacks is mainly due to ideological transformation of TTP towards nationalism. They have become very specific in their targets and...
largely hit security forces and tribal elders who they think are supporting security forces and the government; they hardly target civilians now. Moreover, Al-Qaeda is leading the TTP in a new recruitment and regrouping process.

Moderator: The [Afghan] Taliban are caught between their ideological sensitivities and goals, and the promises they have made to the international community [on human rights and acting against militant groups most of which have been their allies, among other things]. So how will they balance between the two and sustain their government?

Haroon Rashid, managing editor of the Independent Urdu

Maybe they have a trick up their sleeve which they might demonstrate in some time, but I do not think they will be able to do that anytime soon. So jumping to conclusions is no way. Generally, if we observe from here, I do not see that happening because a lot of their members have been part of TTP. So even though they have set up a separate organization now, how can one expect that they will take any step against them or conduct any violent operation? We must also keep this context in mind that they established a government just 6-7 months back, so they have a long journey ahead. This has neither happened in the past, nor does it seem to be happening in the near future. Yes, they have already tried to solve problems through negotiation [between Pakistan and the TTP] but there seems to be no flexibility in the stated positions of Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban have twice shown to the world that through ideology and violence one can achieve one’s goal, so how would they negate this formula in case of Pakistani Taliban. Perhaps they could be silenced ideologically for some time, and they might terminate attacks temporarily. Hence, I believe that the Afghan Taliban would try to sketch a way through table talks, or at least try to showcase to the world that they have outlined a formula for them.

The most important commitment America had taken in the Doha agreement was that the Taliban would not allow Afghan land to be used by any terrorist group.
Un fortunately, a blind eye to this commitment has so far had an adverse effect on Pakistan. Be it Daesh or TTP, Pakistan is suffering such as in the case of Peshawar Shiite mosque attack.

I do not think this is a simple issue and can be solved that easily, it will take time. I have set up 2 criteria to gauge whether Pakistan has been benefited or impacted worst in the last 6-7 months. First is peace. Post Taliban takeover of Kabul, peace has not been achieved in Pakistan so far, as the attacks have continued and the border issue has not improved. Second is the financial benefit that Pakistan aimed to gain through the new regime in Afghanistan. Since 2011, exports from Pakistan to Afghanistan have drastically declined, and in the last 7 months due to Afghanistan having no buying power, there has been no export. Currently, when Afghanistan does not have resources to fulfill its own needs, what benefit will it give to Pakistan. The new regime in Afghanistan is of the opinion that they will raise taxes and through increased tax collection will fulfill their needs, but this seems unrealistic owing to the undocumented state of Afghan economy. Another stumbling block is that unless the Taliban government is given legal position, how can any state make any agreement with them; international governments make agreements with recognized governments only. Lastly, talking about the internal state of Afghanistan, if circumstances were as good as portrayed by some of the participants, why are over 2 million Afghans residing in Pakistan not returning back to Afghanistan. It has been observed that in the last 7 months, the educated faction of Afghan society has left, be it journalists or skilled class. The question now is how are Afghan Taliban going to fill this vacuum? Media which plays an indispensable role in every country is completely absent in Afghanistan; 70 or more media organisations have been shut down and approximately 131 journalists have left the country. Moreover, even within the Taliban’s cabinet there is zero acceptance for difference of opinion, so how are journalists with their varying opinions supposed to survive there? 

It has been observed that in the last 7 months, the educated faction of Afghan society has left, be it journalists or skilled class.
Maulana Yousaf Shah, President of JUI-S Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

The issue we are discussing [militancy and terrorism] is not even our issue, our main concern should be to strengthen the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Army being nuclearly equipped is capable of responding to attacks on them, so the fight with TTP or Daesh should be the last of our [common people’s] worries. Meanwhile, TTP and Taliban are negotiating with Pakistan, it now depends on our leadership when these negotiations take final shape.

From the first day, the Taliban declared that they will not intervene in any other state. So, why are they held accountable for attacks, especially when their regime is not recognized, and they are concerned about the running of state affairs due to lack of resources? As far as the restrictions on girls’ education are concerned, the matter will soon be resolved. For all such matters to be amicably resolved, the world needs to recognize the Taliban government. Likewise, as far as TTP is concerned, these were the same Pakistani Taliban who helped [the Afghan Taliban] fight the USA for twenty years. So, Afghan Taliban cannot take a strict action against them, they can only bring them to table talks.

Afrasiab Khattak, political analyst & expert on Afghan affairs

Pakistan faced loss because it was in denial of any equation it shared with the Taliban. However, the reality is that Taliban are a liability for Pakistan, and Pakistan is left with no other option but to deal with them. So, the term ‘Af-Pak’ that came into existence in 2009 will be revived now. The situation is a liability for Pakistan as well as for the Taliban. General Hameed Gul had [once] said that Hekamat Yar and Jalaluddin [Haqqani] were much better ‘Pakistani’ than him. So, if they are great Pakistanis, how can they be good Afghan, which is a bone of contention for Haqqanis. Due to such apprehensions and to prove their loyalty to Afghanistan, Taliban have not stepped back from the

Taliban are a liability for Pakistan, and Pakistan is left with no other option but to deal with them.
traditional approach on border issues. Moreover, the terrorist syndicate is intact in Afghanistan and Taliban have adopted the same narrative that they had in the 1990s, which was that extremist factions reside on Afghan land, but they will not be allowed to be miscreants.

Another area of concern is that regional competition has increased. Though Pakistan believes to be playing the role of gatekeepers for Afghanistan, the reality is Afghanistan cannot exist without Iranian influence. Afghanistan’s increasing closeness to Pakistan estranges Iran, causing security problems for Afghanistan. Likewise, Russia has also been playing ‘good cop and bad cop’ with Afghanistan. While, Tajikistan is its bad cop, Turkmenistan is its good cop for Afghanistan. So, Russia will demonstrate carrot and stick policy towards Afghanistan, if carrot reaps no fruits, stick will definitely come into play.

Pakistan believes to be playing the role of gatekeepers for Afghanistan, the reality is Afghanistan cannot exist without Iranian influence.
Initially, the prime agenda of Russia, Iran and China was that the USA must leave Afghanistan, and now new priorities have come to surface. China’s paramount concern has been about terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, but now the grave worry of neighbouring states are ethnic earthquakes that will be centred in Afghanistan. Last time the Taliban came into power, the main concern of regional states in my opinion was the state breeding more terrorists, however this time the prime worry is of ethnic earthquakes. These earthquakes will be triggered by Tajiks as some of the Tajiks want to be free from Pashtun influence. Such fault lines could break Afghanistan, consequently demarcating the whole region.

As far as Pakistan’s Afghan policy is concerned, there is hardly any Pashtun representation in the policy making process. Though Sadiq Khan is Pakistan’s special envoy to Afghanistan, time and again Taliban are asked to reach out to Moeed Yousaf’s office who hardly knows Pashto, Hazarvi, Persian or Uzbeki. Currently, Pakistan’s main issue is militarization of Afghan policy. The threats that this militarization has invited are Daesh and ISIS. Moreover, another threat for Pakistan is a shift in extremists’ approach, mainly in the form of their adoption of linguistic tools. For instance, the provocative books being published in Pashto, or their online [Urdu-language] magazine called Yalghar sensitise young minds. The question here is why is the intelligence apparatus turning a blind eye to these books and magazines? How is one supposed to believe that this literature is getting hyped without any support from within the Pakistani system?

Hence, Pakistan should seriously analyse all dimensions of the impact it has faced in the last seven months since the Taliban came into power.

**Moderator:** I will now ask all speakers to briefly give their opinions and suggestions on how Pakistan can effectively support the Afghan peace and reconciliation as well as humanitarian situation? Especially, how should Pakistan shape its diplomatic relations with the Afghan Taliban to address its internal security, border security and refugees concern?
We should neither be apologetic about the relation we share with the Taliban, nor become their advocate. Humanitarian issues are not solely the worry of Pakistan, then why is Pakistan taking the whole responsibility? In my opinion, instead of too much focussing humanitarian issues, Pakistan needs to bilaterally engage and talk with Afghanistan on the issues of countering terrorism, enhancing trade, and evolving mechanism on border and water securities, etc. Though under-the-table negotiations are being carried out with the current dispensation, we must aim for a bilateral approach something similar to the strategic partnership agreement that India and Iran had signed with the previous [Afghan] government in 2011. Right now, we can formulate such agreements under the table, and once the Taliban government is organised, these can be made formal. Surprisingly, despite their proximity Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal agreement regarding refugees, trade or border. So, the government must avail this opportunity and focus on sketching a bilateral strategic agreement because unlike previous governments in Kabul, the current government is motivated to make formal agreements with neighbouring Pakistan.

Secondly, as far as TTP is concerned, I believe the Afghan Taliban should not be pushed too much because they also have limitations. Moreover, the process of negotiations should not be made public because too many cooks spoil the broth. Also, we must not equate the Afghan Taliban with the TTP. The Afghan Taliban were fighting for the sovereignty of Afghanistan from foreign forces, whereas in Pakistan TTP is fighting for their own fellow members.

Thirdly, this is not the right time to raise the refugee issue and in my opinion Afghans who have lived for decades in Pakistan must be considered for citizenship as suggested in the constitution and citizenship act. Similarly, the government should focus on what happened in erstwhile FATA.

Furthermore, why do we seek public acknowledgement on the border from the
Afghan side? Border is an understood phenomenon and it is an international border, so our attempts to secure the border should be on our side without any infringement on their side.

Lastly, Pakistan should refrain from over optimism. Firstly so because the Taliban’s power in Kabul does not indicate zero Indian presence in Afghanistan; Taliban have become pragmatic and are seeking good relations with India. Secondly, the Taliban is struggling with governance issues so Pakistan must negotiate a bilateral framework under the table that focuses on TTP, border issues and water sharing. As far as the recognition [of the Taliban government] is concerned, there already is de facto recognition which is why they participated on Antalya and Oslo platforms. Hence, Pakistan must also not be worried about raising the issue of recognition repeatedly, and instead place focus on evolving joint counter-terrorism efforts including China, Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia. Similarly, on the matter of ethnic earthquakes raised by Afrasiab Khattak, I believe it is not a major worry, instead the prime worry is transnational terrorist elements taking advantage of the current situation in Afghanistan.
Yes, Pakistan must not be the only stakeholder of Afghanistan’s humanitarian issue, but one cannot ignore that if Afghanistan does not stabilise macroeconomically, no politics or diplomacy will save Pakistan from fallout of the emerging situation there. Another angle of humanitarian assistance is related to international engagement. The Taliban do not share a good equation with the international community, so Pakistan ought to play the role of mediator because Pakistan is not fully equipped to help the war-torn Afghanistan, thereby help from the international community is needed. So, Pakistan must guide the Taliban to improve their relationship with the international community.

The approach adopted by Pakistan on refugees is mainly to keep the international community from denying its responsibility towards war ravaged Afghanistan. Pakistan has strictly demonstrated this approach and stopped UNHCR from even using the terms “new arrivals” or “new refugees”. I believe this approach will have negative impacts because when refugees are abandoned by states and a vacuum is created, other forces and elements start interfering. To say the least, such policies have led to recruitments for IS-K. So, whether one accepts it or not, the state cannot turn a blind eye to pouring in refugees.

Hassan Khan, senior journalist & anchorperson

Any policy that we want to formulate for Afghanistan is mostly closed doors and is not disclosed in public domain. As suggested by Afrasiab Khattak, Afghanistan has become albatross for Pakistan, so the need is to take the policy in public domain at least in parliament and senate. As a journalist and an observer, I can say that common Afghans are scared of the Taliban. So, Pakistan’s policy of image building of the Taliban has not been fruitful. To overcome our biases we need to rely on reports of Afghan intelligence agencies on the perception of the
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Taliban in Afghanistan. Serious policy making thus is the need of the hour especially because Balochistan and KP are hugely exposed to circumstances in Afghanistan. Moreover, some aspects need to be de-linked from political insecurities such as trade because both sides suffer economically due to this.

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, journalist & analyst

We need to understand that the Taliban unlike a conventional diplomatic and political entity or power is a hardcore “Jihadi” movement. In the cabinet meeting in Kandahar, presided by Haibatullah Akhundzada, only two of the members raised the issue of schools, leading towards a complete ban of schools for girls. The key decision makers in the Taliban’s government are a certain group of members (clerics), while Haibatullah Akhundzada, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Abdul Ghani Baradar have to comply with their decisions. Those who appear on media or moderate between states despite their disagreements with the decisions have more or less zero say in front of this group. To make the engagement with the Taliban effective, apart from officials like Moeed Yousaf, Sadiq khan and members of ISI, Pakistan must take on board its religious scholars like Maulana Yusaf Shah, Maulana Luni and Mufti Taqi Usmani because majority of the Taliban group members respect these religious scholars.

Due to border issues, Waziristan has suffered a lot in the last twenty years. It has been conveyed time and again that the Operation Zarb-e- Azab was one of the major triumphs as TTP was eliminated, but no one talks about the vast humanitarian destruction that took place due to an outrageous war where every possible conventional weaponry was used to counter terrorism. Although it was announced and celebrated that TTP has been eliminated, but the top [TTP] leadership was majorly targeted by American drones. However, in 2017, TTP instigated regrouping, along with an ideological transformation leading towards nationalism. The TTP has announced not to target civilians but rather the security forces, as it is evident from the recent events that took place. Similarly, the ratio
of suicide attacks has reduced immensely and may be the TTP has opted for “winning hearts and minds” strategy which appears to be lethal for us. Al-Qaeda is responsible for the regrouping, resurgence and reunification strategy of the TTP. Lastly, the tribal population is suffering the most due to these border issues. Being IDPs, restrictions were imposed on us even for commuting towards Punjab and Sindh. The number of border crossings should be raised and policies must be adopted, in order to ease trade and to reduce the possibilities of corruption.

Shahzada Zulfiqar, Quetta based senior journalist & president PFUJ

We cherished the presence of Taliban in Afghanistan, as they aimed to reduce India’s influence. Sadiq Khan, who in 2013 developed relations with Brahamdagh Bugti, was the first ambassador who valued Ahmed Shah Massoud. He told the media that all Afghans are equal for us and he was willing to develop relations with Afghanistan. Hence, these soft policies have much more fruitful results.

At nine places [along the Pak-Afghan border], the fencing was removed which not only indicates our incompatibilities with them, but also the increasing agitation of the relations between two neighbours. Policy makers need to reconsider options as the outcomes have not come as per the expectations. We need not to look at Afghanistan as our own territory, rather the Afghan Taliban has to be treated as a sovereign nation. Hence, we must focus on our problems first.

In short, we need to resolve our border issues through the development of a cordial relationship with Afghanistan. Pashtuns consider the Pakistan government accountable for the problems of Balochistan, Chaman border is not entirely sealed as people do enter Pakistan for health facilities, yet the problems due to border obstruction cannot be ignored.

Sanaullah Baloch, political leader, Balochistan National Party-Mengal

The dynamics of Afghanistan have transformed. It is different from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, during 2001 or after 9/11, as the generations have changed and new challenges have emerged. So, the problem appears to be the deficiency of a comprehensive policy on Afghanistan, which demands Afghanistan to be considered as an independent region or a separate territory, instead of a province [of Pakistan]. We have to consider it as a crisis in the
region, because it has impacts on trade, economy, diplomatic relations, resulting in exacerbation of socio-economic challenges. Durand Line needs to be valued as a life line, as it is a source of our economy, trade, tribal interaction and socio-economic linkages, which Pakistan is trying to impede. People around it have been living here for decades and are interacting with each other. Therefore, the Durand Line must be considered as a lifeline and a passage for social and cultural integration, instead of being considered it a strategic or border line.

Secondly, Pakistan needs to let the Taliban be vocal about their own challenges, and we can only try to facilitate direct diplomatic relations between Taliban and the West, rather than being a representative or a mediator for them. We should focus on removal of West-imposed sanctions, open humanitarian corridors, and encourage repatriation of refugees in our comprehensive policy. We should constitutionalize our two provinces, attached to Durand Line, through our national policy, and Parliament must give priority to Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa while framing a policy on Afghanistan. Balochistan has suffered psychologically, socially and economically, which will be exacerbated further. So, we need a prudent comprehensive national policy on Afghanistan and politically representative bodies, parliament and provincial assemblies or federating units must play the role in framing the policy. However, brief policy input or feedback can be taken from National Security institutions.

Ilyas Khan, senior journalist

I endorse that the Afghan policy should be in public domain, and must be debated among political representatives objectively, in order to lay forward the realities along with the dynamics of threats of India. During the Soviet Union invasion, the US was certain about the policies it had to adopt (where Afghans will be assisted to counter the USSR under Zahir Shah’s presidency). Contrarily, Pakistan was not in the favour of Zahir Shah and had always adopted certain bewildered policies.
Maulana Abdul Qadir Luni, President of JUI-Nazariyati Balochistan

According to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa narrative, I can argue that we face different dynamics in Balochistan. I can surely state through my observation that I explicitly am in favor of the Taliban and we will not compromise through any means. In 2008, I received twenty two thousand votes and my opponent had eleven thousand, yet the one who had less number of votes became the member of provincial assembly and successfully completed his term, despite my appeal to the Court.

I am stating that Pakistan has never established a relationship with the Taliban, although many of them are settled in Balochistan and commute across the border. Hence, our interaction with Afghanistan can never terminate, as Pakistan is certainly affected by the regressing circumstances of Afghanistan.

As far as fencing is concerned, it appears to be the bone of contention; Afghan Taliban do not accept the fencing, even when Pakistan was erecting the fence from Chaman to Nushki it was not acknowledged by Taliban. If Pakistan is serious about Taliban, we need to align with them and I can willingly play the role of mediator. They believe that the hundred years of Durand Line agreement is over, and another treaty needs to take place. Being a Pakistani national, I believe Pakistan has taken over a territory in contradiction to the Durand Line agreement. Pakistan has confiscated several miles of territory by taking leverage from the USSR invasion.

Another problem is that I am unable to decipher the policies and intentions of Islamabad, Taliban understand and listen to others. Keeping in view my experiences, I believe, Pakistan has been unreasonable to Afghanistan which needs to be questioned and talked about. The border crossing has highly hindered the trade that has resulted in economic deterioration. I have constantly stated that the problems cannot be resolved through Punjabis, as [the Afghans] consider them as the military officers.

Moderator: How can we establish cooperation and cordial relations with the Taliban regime that can bring about peace on either side of the border?
I suggest that Pakistan should mediate with the Taliban through concerned members so they have no intention to take moves against Pakistan. My party has close connections with the Afghan Taliban, which are far better than the relations between TTP and Afghan Taliban. We have always supported the Taliban, and our twelve hundred members have sacrificed themselves.

Rifatullah Orakzai, journalist & security analyst

I personally may not support the Taliban's government, but if we try to seek an alternative, four to five hundred thousand lives will be lost as an outcome. We have to carry on with the prevalent circumstances, but cautiously, not repeating the miscalculations previously made. We have to negotiate with the Taliban as representatives or officials of the government of Afghanistan.

Secondly, as far as TTP is concerned, we have often taken ad hoc measures without formulating any policy. Negotiations with TTP in November, when the ceasefire was highly effective, was an important opportunity to frame a policy with TTP, but it was not availed. Although negotiations are still ongoing, political parties are not taken into confidence. All the political groups criticised the policy of negotiating with TTP, mainly Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) adopted a hard stance and outrightly condemned the initiative. If the parliament could approve the Swat Operation in 2008, then why is it not involved in the policy formation process now? If parliament is not considered, the negotiations and policies will not be effective. The political infrastructure is required, which must be considered to unravel and resolve the issue.

Yar Muhammad Badini, Balochistan-based writer & journalist

We have always considered Afghanistan as our fifth province. Had we played a role of neighbour and discussed the core problems and not repeated our mistakes, Afghanistan and Pakistan, both, would have suffered less. Similarly, Afghan refugees were trying their best to escape, as seen struggling on runways and airports. Millions have entered Pakistan, mainly Balochistan and KP, which will result in demographic changes which can cause problems for Baloch people.
domiciles are easily created (on one call), and many are later elected as MNAs and MPAs as well. I believe fencing is nothing more than a lesser earning, because people will always commute from Kandahar to Chaman and Nushki, as nomads cannot be immobilised through fencing. People of Afghanistan have to suffer a lot due to the fencing itself along with the demand for levies. If they somehow enter Balochistan, residents of Pakistan continuously exploit them.

To conclude, if we want to frame an Afghan policy it must be allied with the preference of the people of Afghanistan. It must be considered as a neighbour country and policies must be framed accordingly.

**Maulana Yusuf Shah, President of JUI-S Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

Firstly, migrants [Afghan refugees] never preferred to enter back to Afghanistan during the governments of Karzai or Ghani as well. They have facilities, businesses and families settled in Pakistan. The US has not contributed to the infrastructure development of Afghanistan, although it has worked on the construction and transformation of mindsets. The generations are inculcated with hatred for Pakistan and secularism. Yet, Taliban has arisen as popular and determined forces as much of the population has adopted their attires and policies (determinants of acceptance). There is nothing to be concerned about, as Pakistan, Turkey and China will ultimately have to recognize the Taliban’s government. Afghanistan will not stabilise until and unless, it bears its own burden and propels on its own. Although states have to recognize them sooner or later, it is essential that states recognize them as soon as possible, if they want to resolve the Afghan crisis.

Secondly, our [Peshawar] Corps Commander is serious about negotiations, and he invited almost sixty five of the individuals of all tribal groups. He claimed that he wanted tribes’ cooperation to solve the problems arising out of the Afghan situation. I do not believe that the government has the capacity to control the situation, as it was not controlled by JUI-F or specifically TTP.

**Haroon Rashid, Managing editor of the Independent Urdu**

I want to highlight that Pakistan’s Afghan policy has always centred upon the groups, warlords, and politicians, instead of citizens of Afghanistan. We have never worked on a policy that focused on drawing the attention of the local public,
which remains the significant setback in the foreign policy on Afghanistan. If Pakistan hopes to adopt an efficacious foreign policy, it has to undergo a paradigm shift while embracing initiatives that can facilitate the growth and development of Afghans instead of the warlords and politicians of Afghanistan.

In 2001, when all the states were providing humanitarian aid to Hamid Karzai’s government, our former Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani announced approximately five million dollars to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the procedure and utilisation of assistance was not evident in the development of Afghanistan, and, on contrary, India provided Afghanistan with four hundred transport vehicles that substantially facilitated the public.

We have always considered Afghan refugees as an encumbrance rather than as an opportunity or manpower. We ‘attached’ the refugees with drugs, Kalashnikov and terrorism, and we did not provide the opportunities for the upper class to invest in Pakistan (all fled to West). Thus, we received the uneducated and destitute class, who adopted illegal means for survival.

To conclude, in our national Afghan policy we need to inculcate the interests of Afghans along with our own interests. When the interests of citizens of Afghanistan are given priority only then the public opinion and mindsets will alter. Policy decision makers are adamant on their one-dimensional foreign policy approaches, that only they believe is in accordance with their and state’s interests. Many in Pakistan are unaware of the development in Afghanistan, we have constructed myths that are attached with drugs, underdevelopment, and ferocity. Until and unless, we do not change our own perceptions of Afghanistan, we will never succeed in altering the perspectives of Afghans. Lastly, we need to collectively decide an Afghan policy while shifting a paradigm.

**Ali Baba Taj, educationist & social scientist, Quetta**

The problem of Afghanistan dates back to the British Raj, but we need to accept all the problems and Taliban government as well or else the despair will aggravate. Those who facilitated the Taliban in Moscow and Qatar, must work
to improve the international outlook of Taliban so that citizens of Afghanistan do not suffer. Trade with Balochistan, India and Chabahar is highly disturbed, and Pakistan has essentially remained relevant in the recent developments.

When we talk about the upper class flying to the West or other countries, we need to discuss the role of Pakistan in educating the young generation of Afghanistan. We need to provide humanitarian aid to those who failed to leave Afghanistan due to lack of resources, and introduce a tangible and visible Afghan policy with a multidimensional approach in the public domain.

**Sami Yusafzai, senior journalist and analyst**

I believe Afghanistan will not endorse the ‘strategic partnership’ with Pakistan, as they believe strategic policies with Pakistan are unachievable. Pakistan has an appalling perception in Afghanistan, and in such an emergency situation Pakistan must provide visa ease to Afghanistan, because they have to suffer immensely in order to reach Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan can hinder their entrance, but it cannot altogether halt their commute to Pakistan. If the imposed hindrances caused any calamity, it will rather reverse the efforts of altering perceptions.

So, I believe we need to focus on and review our short-term policies along with our emphasis on long term policies. When Afghans are maltreated, they blame the government that impacts Pakistan’s relations with Taliban. When the situation is uncertain, Pakistan must ease the policies to increase people to people contact, which can recover the perception of Pakistan. If the relations between Taliban and Pakistan ameliorate, then Pakistan will have no means, for the policy change and progressed relations, to look up to. We have accepted the international pressure, demands of Taliban and vilification as well, so I believe we must now recognize them as well. In short, I believe Afghans should be given a concession to have better and cordial relations with Taliban and public as well.
Exploring Pakistan’s position, interests & policy options

Afrasiab Khattak, political analyst & expert on Afghan affairs

I endorse the opinion that Pakistan must frame a new Afghan policy. New policy does not mean to topple the government of Taliban, but rather to have a ‘bilateral security framework’ that focuses on the brotherly relations between two sovereign countries, irrespective of great powers’ preferences. The new policy is indispensable as all other approaches and objectives are interlinked with Afghan policy.

Secondly, fence on border was claimed to be erected to counter terrorism, but it clearly was not as terrorism appears to be widely prevalent. Fence needs to be removed and Pakistan must accept the Durand Line. Pakistan has always demanded from Afghanistan, but it itself has not accepted the Durand Line. Attitude of Pakistan about Durand Line does not align with the credibility and what Pakistan claims to follow the stance must adopt or practise it as well. Pakistan asserts that Afghans are our brothers, I believe only Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Taliban are our companions and we have never developed acquaintances with Afghans. Pakistan needs to have a policy, similar to China’s policy on Pakistan, as we have rarely heard anti-Chinese narrative in Pakistan.

Similarly, we need a trade policy that has a potential to be practical, and on the other hand, we need the capacity and capability to endorse the policies practically. In 1994 when Taliban came, Naseerullah Babar emphasized that Taliban’s government will progress our relations with Central Asian States, but unfortunately Afghanistan was transformed into an epicentre of terrorism. Sadiq Khan travelled from Torkham to Uzbekistan for initiation of trade, but we did not implement our trade policy. Potentially, ten trade avenues can be constructed from Pakistan to Afghanistan. We need proper transportation means such as railway tracks and endorse pragmatic geo-economic policies contrary to geostrategic policies.

Similarly, we need to employ soft power to enhance people to people relations. In addition to it, we have to be considerate of the Pashtun community and we can take Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a standard. In his oath taking ceremony, he invited all the prime ministers of neighbouring countries except Sri Lanka, because it is perceived as the executioners of the Tamil community, which are one of the various ethnicities subscribed by Indian citizens. On the contrary, we are alienating Pashtuns through erection of fences, trade restrictions that have dismantled the
livelihood of Pashtuns. Pakistan professes to be Pashtuns country, which ironically appears to be an impediment in their livelihood. I highly condemn ‘action in aid of civil power’, and intelligence agencies must give their feedback in foreign policy framework, but they are not responsible for the formation of foreign policies. Our intelligence agencies are taking actions like the Russian Tsar. To overcome the problem, we need to involve parliament. In the cold war, religious extremism was exploited to achieve political gains and manipulated against communism. Arabs have sensed their exploitation and Muhammad Bin Salman asserts the change in their policies. Similarly, Taliban need to recognize it.

I am afraid, change in circumstances will possibly initiate new conflicts, which can only be dealt with a new and transformed Afghan policy or else we will have to face the music of our actions.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of Pak Institute for Peace Studies.

About this report

This report is outcome of the PIPS-led structured consultation out of a series of eight such events that have been designed to discuss and critically evaluate evolving aspects of Afghan conflict and political reconciliation and suggest policy options and strategies to the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. To that end, PIPS has established a network of credible resource persons including former diplomats, academicians, government officials, and representatives of political and religious parties, security and law enforcement agencies, civil society, and media, as well as those living at the border including Afghan refugees. The underlying goal is to support Afghan peace and reconciliation and tackle its trickle-down effect for Pakistan including in terms of militancy and insecurity, among other things.

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