* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).
For much of Generation Z’s lifetime, Indians and international audiences alike have been exposed to slogans such as Incredible India, Shining India, and Make in India. These initiatives were designed not only to promote tourism, but also to signal India’s ambitions for industrial, technological, and economic modernization on the global stage. Over the past three decades, South Asia has witnessed India’s steady rise as a regional power with global aspirations. During this period, India’s economy expanded at an average annual rate of around 6 percent, accompanied by visible infrastructure development and incremental improvements in its Human Development Index (HDI). India also forged a dense web of regional and global economic partnerships, enhancing its profile as an emerging power. This expanding geo-economic footprint translated into greater geopolitical confidence. Some analysts even opined that the change of US Pacific command to Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 was indeed an acknowledgement of India’s flourishing status in the region and US interests to establish India as part of QUAD, a net security provider in the region against China. Indian geopolitical calculus was well balanced with Indian leverages through BRICS, SCO, ASEAN and numerous bilateral engagements.
In parallel, India’s information, media, and entertainment industries actively reinforced this image of a confident regional power on the cusp of global status. This narrative was amplified by Indian scholars embedded in global think-tank networks, an assertive television news ecosystem, and Bollywood’s unparalleled cultural reach. India’s soft power projection became almost textbook in its execution, at times appearing seamless and self-sustaining. Yet this very success obscured a critical requirement: the need for credible and proportionate hard power to underpin such expansive soft power claims. Before examining this imbalance, it is useful to recall that “soft power,” a concept coined by Joseph Nye, refers to a state’s ability to shape the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion – drawing on culture, values, media, and foreign policy legitimacy.
India’s soft power projection, however, may have been too polished, too confident, and ultimately premature. While economic growth and cultural outreach were indeed moving India closer to the ranks of developed nations, policymakers appear to have become over-convinced by their own narrative of regional and global stature, diverting attention from the hard power foundations required to sustain such claims. The 2019 crisis with Pakistan following the Pulwama attack should have served as a sobering reminder of India’s military and technological constraints. Instead, domestic media narratives and popular culture – steeped in triumphalism and anti-Pakistan rhetoric – created a sense of strategic complacency. The acquisition of Rafale fighter aircraft from France was presented as a decisive leap, while persistent deficiencies in the Indian Air Force’s electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum capabilities received far less scrutiny.
This imbalance became starkly visible in May 2025, when India’s carefully constructed soft power edifice faced its most serious test. Following the Pahalgam terror attack, India’s response culminated in another brief but intense military confrontation with Pakistan. Indian air strikes conducted on the night of 6–7 May targeted religious seminaries in Bahawalpur, Lahore, Muridke, and Muzaffarabad, which New Delhi described as precision strikes against terrorist training facilities. Pakistan, however, claimed to have shot down six to seven Indian Air Force aircraft during the same operation. Over the ensuing three-and-a-half-day conflict, both sides issued competing claims of military success. India framed the episode as a new doctrinal precedent – asserting its right to strike Pakistan following terrorist attacks. Pakistan, by contrast, claimed to have downed India’s frontline Rafale fighters and damaged a Russian-made S-400 air defence system, assertions that were subsequently echoed by several defence analysts and publicly referenced by the US president. India launched an immediate global diplomatic outreach to reinforce its narrative, yet repeated statements by President Donald Trump acknowledging Pakistani claims significantly undermined these efforts.
In the months that followed, the international environment suggested that the brief war had inflicted disproportionate damage on India’s global image. Three decades of sustained soft power construction appeared to unravel in a matter of days, exposing vulnerabilities in India’s hard power credibility. While some observers attribute this erosion to the so-called “Trump factor,” the deeper issue lay in the structural imbalance between India’s ambitions and its military preparedness. The dissonance became symbolically evident when Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared increasingly reticent on major international platforms, reportedly avoiding direct engagement with the US president on multiple occasions in the aftermath of the conflict.
At its core, India’s soft–hard power anomaly reflects a strategic misalignment. In emphasizing tourism, culture, and industrial prowess, India appeared to deprioritize the foundational requirement of credible deterrence – hard power capable of defending sovereignty and sustaining regional military superiority when required. This imbalance culminated in notable diplomatic missteps, including the controversial participation of a high-level Indian delegation in an Oxford Union debate questioning whether India’s Pakistan policy was driven more by populism than security logic. At the same time, India’s strategic messaging remained internally inconsistent: while New Delhi sought to frame Pakistan as secondary within its rivalry with China – often rhetorically linking Pakistan with Afghanistan – Indian popular culture remained fixated on Pakistan, producing a steady stream of films and streaming content depicting Indian intelligence triumphs across the border.
In conclusion, soft power can meaningfully complement and amplify hard power, but it cannot substitute for it. When hard power fails to meet the expectations generated by an ambitious soft power narrative, credibility erodes rapidly. This dynamic was starkly illustrated in India’s portrayal as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific, a counterweight to China, and an aspirant for a permanent UN Security Council seat – claims that were severely challenged by a smaller adversary leveraging superior operational effectiveness and doctrine. In an increasingly fluid geopolitical landscape, India’s exposed hard power vulnerabilities have significantly constrained, and in some respects severed, the soft power it spent decades cultivating.
Jehanzeb Iqbal has an MSc in Arts & Science of Warfare. The author can be reached at gulegulmit2015@gmail.com.